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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 BRUSSELS 003530 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR INL/FO, INL/PC, EUR/ERA, L/LEI 
JUSTICE FOR CRIMINAL DIVISION, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL 
AFFAIRS; 
DIR ONDCP FOR OSR; 
DEA HQS FOR OC, OE, SOD; 
ROME FOR DCM, POL, DEA; 
KABUL FOR DCM, POL, NAS, DEA; 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KCRM PGOV PREL SNAR EU
SUBJECT: U.S.-EU TROIKA MEETING GENERATES WIDE-RANGING 
DISCUSSION OF DRUG ISSUES 
 
REF: BRUSSELS 2415 (NOTAL) 
 
BRUSSELS 00003530  001.2 OF 010 
 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) Officials from the United States and the European 
Union (EU) engaged in a wide-ranging discussion of drug 
issues at a US-EU Troika Meeting in Brussels on November 14. 
The U.S. Delegation, led by Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) 
Christy McCampbell of the International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs (INL) Bureau, encouraged greater EU 
involvement in all aspects of couter-drug and rule of law 
efforts in Afghanistn.  The U.S. also sought clarification 
of the terms of reference for an EU-funded study on 
traditional coca use in Bolivia and encouraged interaction 
with Venezuela to boost efforts against drugs transiting that 
country.  The EU, led by International Political 
Organizations Head of Division Pedro Monteiro of the 
Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, expressed overall 
agreement with U.S. counter-drug objectives, including 
greater focus on incentives and disincentives to reduce opium 
cultivation in Afghanistan.  Representatives of the 
Commission and EU Member States repeated long-standing EU 
opposition to the use of spray eradication.  The Commission 
remained non-committal on the idea of seeking extradition of 
selected, high-value drug traffickers from Afghanistan, 
noting that individual Member States would need to determine 
whether their national laws permitted such measures. 
Implementation of the United Nations General Assembly Special 
Session (UNGASS) Ten-Year Review and U.S. Drug Kingpins Act 
also generated lively discussions.  END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------------------- 
TROIKA MEETING ON DRUG ISSUES 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) U.S. and EU officials met November 14 in Brussels in 
the informal "troika" format to discuss drug developments and 
issues of mutual interest.  The U.S. Delegation included INL 
DAS Christy McCampbell, Mission INL Counselor James McAnulty, 
Mission Justice Counselor Mary Lee Warren, Mission Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) Assistant Regional Director 
Thomas Scarantino, INL Policy Coordination Acting Office 
Director John Bargeron, INL Asia, Africa, and Europe Foreign 
Affairs Officer Elizabeth Carroll, and Office of National 
Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Official Richard Baum.  The EU 
Delegation included Head of Division Monteiro, Justice and 
Home Affairs (JHA) Counselor Paulo Cunha Alves of the 
Portuguese Permanent Representation in Brussels, Head of Unit 
Johannes Vos of the Council Secretariat, Drugs Coordination 
Head of Unit Carel Edwards of the European Commission, Drugs 
Coordination Deputy Head of Unit Francisco Bataller of the 
Commission, Precursor Chemicals Administrator Suzanne 
Stauffer of the Commission, and representatives from 16 EU 
Member States, the European Police Office (EUROPOL), and the 
European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction 
(EMCDDA). 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
COUNTER-NARCOTICS AND RULE OF LAW IN AFGHANISTAN 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
COUNTER-NARCOTICS STRATEGY 
-------------------------- 
 
¶3. (U) After welcoming remarks and introductions on both 
sides, DAS McCampbell briefed on the updated U.S. 
 
BRUSSELS 00003530  002.2 OF 010 
 
 
counter-narcotics strategy in Afghanistan.  She expressed 
U.S. concern over the large increase in cultivation over the 
past season, noting that cultivation reflected a 
"north-south" divide in the country based on stronger 
security and political will in the north. The good news is 
that the number of poppy-free provinces had increased from 
six to thirteen.  Even so, the processing of opium into 
heroin and other products permeates the country, even in 
areas free of cultivation. 
 
¶4. (U) DAS McCampbell encouraged EU partners to become more 
involved in all aspects of the strategy, including the five 
pillars which the U.S. supports.  Eradication until now has 
involved negotiations with local leaders to identify fields 
to be targeted and has experienced only limited success.  The 
U.S. plans to proceed on "non-negotiated" programs that will 
target wealthy farmers and corrupt officials.  Interdiction 
funding will increase from 137 million dollars last year to 
355 million dollars this year, with focus on higher-level 
targets. DEA officials are working with Afghanistan Sensitive 
Investigative Units (SIUs) to gather evidence, including 
through court-ordered wiretaps. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Director Bargeron elaborated by explaining that the 
U.S. had refined its strategy, based on lessons learned, and 
wanted to focus on promoting both incentives and 
disincentives for behavior by farmers.  This included 
increased funding for the Good Performers Fund and greater 
emphasis on and funding for interdiction operations focused 
on taking down high-level targets. He invited the Europeans 
to consider contributing to the Good Performers' Initiative. 
The U.S. favored a spray eradication program but would only 
implement one if the Afghan Government agrees.  The U.S. is 
aware that Taliban insurgents could exploit a spray program 
if not implemented properly.  Noting that some allies oppose 
aerial spraying, he said the U.S. seeks EU help in 
identifying new ideas for "non-negotiated" eradication.  He 
also stressed the importance of doing a better job in 
coordinating public information campaigns by 
counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency forces and asked for 
EU help on this. 
 
RULE OF LAW EFFORTS 
------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Justice Counselor Warren cited progress on rule of 
law efforts in Afghanistan as a "good news" story for 
Afghanistan.  With the help of the U.S. and other partners, 
particularly the UK. and Norway, the Afghanistan Government 
has established fledgling criminal justice institutions to 
promote rule of law in the country.  Progress has occurred in 
the capital, but officials must extend their reach out to the 
provinces.  The Attorney General has embarked on an 
anti-corruption campaign, including announcing a "jihad" 
against corruption.  Investigators, prosecutors, and judges 
operate through the Criminal Justice Task Force and Central 
Narcotics Tribunal in Kabul with exclusive jurisdiction over 
handling drug offenses.  More than 500 successful 
prosecutions occurred in past year for crimes involving drug 
trafficking and corruption.        . 
 
¶7. (SBU) As a complement to these efforts, Afghanistan 
extradited one major drug trafficker to the United States 
under provisions of the 1988 Vienna Convention against Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances.  Another three individuals 
surrendered voluntarily in lieu of formal extradition 
proceedings and continued incarceration in Afghan prisons. 
Warren encouraged colleagues from EU Member States to seek 
 
BRUSSELS 00003530  003.2 OF 010 
 
 
the extradition of traffickers in appropriate cases who have 
caused major harm to their societies.  The primary U.S. 
objective remained capacity building but selected 
extraditions could promote justice in those cases that the 
Afghanistan criminal justice system could not yet handle. 
 
PARIS PACT 
---------- 
 
¶8. (U) INL Foreign Affairs Officer Carroll provided a 
read-out from a recent Paris Pact meeting in Kabul.  She 
encouraged greater focus on China as a source of precursor 
chemicals for Afghanistan, noting the lack of seizures of 
acetic anhydride from that country.   The United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has proposed five pilot 
projects for countries east of the Black Sea that merit 
international support. 
 
EU:  SUPPORT FOR OVERALL APPROACH, OPPOSE SPRAY ERADICATION 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Commission Deputy Head of Unit Bataller expressed 
overall EU agreement with "many" ideas from the U.S., adding 
that some proposals required further discussion  He 
reiterated long-standing EU opposition to the use of spray 
eradication, expressing the desire to develop alternatives 
that would make "non-negotiated" manual eradication more 
effective.  Nonetheless, he agreed that greater focus should 
be devoted towards interdiction.  Commission officials always 
remained concerned about the negative impact of eradication, 
particularly in the short term.  Eradication should target 
large farmers controlled by warlords.  Bataller described 
extradition as an "interesting idea," but noted that 
individual Member States would need to determine whether 
their national laws permitted such measures.  He agreed on 
the need for greater coordination between counter-narcotics 
and counter-insurgency efforts, acknowledging the existence 
of a close "alliance" among insurgents, warlords, and drug 
traffickers.  He stated EU broad support for the overall 
counter-narcotics strategy, adding that much work and many 
challenges remained ahead to promote greater Afghanistan 
capabilities in a difficult environment.    . 
 
¶10. (SBU) Bataller said he viewed Paris Pact efforts in a 
"less positive" way than his colleagues from Member States. 
He acknowledged the need for greater coordination among 
countries in the region, particularly among Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and Iran.  UK Representative Leslie Pallet 
expressed support for the "reinforced approach" of the U.S. 
in Afghanistan, including a better balance between "sticks 
and carrots," which included more funding for interdiction 
and the Good Performers Fund.  The international community 
must reward good behavior and punish bad behavior. 
Developing an effective criminal justice system would be key 
-- there was no point in developing good policing, if 
authorities could not effectively prosecute and punish 
criminals.  The German Representative described many elements 
f the new strategy as "very promising," especialy the Good 
Performers initiative.  He lamentd reports of increased 
cultivation of cannabi in poppy-free provinces and advocated 
zero tlerance of any drug cultivation.  Otherwise, critics 
would label the program as the "Good Poppy Initiative."  The 
main difficulty with eradication was that it targeted opium 
farmers rather than going after those who converted opium 
into heroin and supplied precursor chemicals.  He understood 
that processing of opium into heroin had declined lately in 
Afghanistan, which he attributed to lesser availability of 
precursor chemicals.  Efforts should target interdiction of 
 
BRUSSELS 00003530  004.2 OF 010 
 
 
precursors and destruction of drug laboratories.  Another 
representative asked for clarification of U.S, views on ISAF 
support of counter-drug efforts. 
 
¶11. (SBU) DAS McCampbell agreed on the need to eliminate all 
drug crops, including both opium poppy and marijuana. 
Bargeron noted that, under its operations plan, ISAF forces 
could provide certain types of support to counter-drug 
operations, including provision of intelligence information. 
Law enforcement personnel would do the actual seizures and 
destruction of laboratories.  Soldiers should not get 
involved directly.  Scarantino added that the U.S. side was 
not asking for anything more than what already existed in the 
ISAF operations plan.  Strong links existed between 
insurgents and drug trafficking.  Counter-drug efforts 
promoted counterinsurgency objectives. Bargeron agreed on the 
need to tackle the drug issue from all angles, including 
control of precursor chemicals.   Eradication had a 
disproportionate impact on farmers, and the U.S. promoted 
alternative development as a way to allow farmers to grow 
licit crops.  Considerable opium production now occurred in 
Helmand province, where, ironically, eradication could have 
the greatest impact on wealthy farmers and Taliban 
insurgents.  The Dutch representative asked for reasons 
behind the U.S. change in policy regarding negotiated 
eradication.  The Dutch effort in Oruzgan involved close 
coordination with the governors, because, without local 
support, longer-term results would not be possible.  Bargeron 
explained that negotiated eradication worked well in the 
north, but not in the south, which lacked political will. 
INL experiences in other countries indicated that successful 
elimination of drug crops only occurred after a period of 
time using a multi-pronged approach that included forced 
eradication. 
 
------------------ 
WESTERN HEMISPHERE 
------------------ 
 
EU COUNTER-DRUG ASSISTANCE 
-------------------------- 
 
¶12. (U) Bataller noted that, as of December 2005, the 
Commission had allocated 235 million euros (note:  over 330 
million U.S. dollars at current exchange rates) in funding 
for projects in Latin America, primarily involving 
alternative development projects.  Some funding went towards 
law enforcement, border cooperation, and control of precursor 
chemicals as well.  Most projects involved bilateral ones 
between the Commission and individual nations.  The Andean 
region received the lion's share of the funding -- some 220 
million euros.  The Commission also supported three regional 
projects -- (1) promoting intelligence sharing via a network 
of liaison officers (led by the UK), (2) encouraging 
intelligence sharing between South America and six African 
nations (implemented by UNODC), and (3) promoting demand 
reduction (implemented by CICAD).  Bataller acknowledged that 
intelligence sharing between South America and Africa 
remained a work in progress, given limited 
intelligence-gathering capacity in Africa. 
 
EU-FUNDED STUDY ON USES OF COCA LEAF IN BOLIVIA 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Commission Desk Officer Murray provided an update 
on the status of the EU-funded study in Bolivia on 
traditional demand for coca leaf.  She provided some of the 
history, noting that, in 2004, the then Bolivian Government 
 
BRUSSELS 00003530  005.2 OF 010 
 
 
had reached agreement with coca growers on the idea of such a 
study.  The EU had also consulted with international 
partners, including the U.S., which encouraged funding for a 
study on traditional uses.  A long interlude occurred without 
final agreement on the terms of reference (TORs).  After the 
election of Evo Morales, the Bolivian Government asked to 
review the TORs.  Finally, in June 2007, the Commission and 
the Bolivian Government agreed on the TORs for the project, 
which would include a group of eight studies or analyses 
within an integrated framework.  Overall funding would amount 
to one million Euros.  She cautioned that the project should 
not be seen as an "EU study" or a "Commission study" but 
rather as a "Bolivian Government study" to be funded by the 
Commission.  The project would involve a mix of quantitative 
and qualitative analyses, including some case studies. 
Analyses would examine household demand, economic costs, 
existing markets, and new consumers within the internal 
market of Bolivia.  A nine-person Committee, including a 
UNODC representative, would oversee implementation of the 
study.  Delays had occurred, initially owing to internal 
divisions within Bolivia and then to the change in 
government.  She anticipated that the signing of the 
financing agreement would occur by the end of the month. 
 
¶14. (SBU) DAS McCampbell expressed strong U.S. concern over 
the possible scope of the study, which may go beyond analysis 
of the traditional uses of coca leaf.  The U.S. Embassy in La 
Paz had received and translated a document that seemed to 
include many aspects of commercialization and 
industrialization, including analysis of the structure of the 
current and future markets and potential demand generated by 
new consumers.  Such language would seem to support Bolivian 
efforts to legalize use of the coca leaf beyond current 
traditional uses.  Such actions would run counter to 
provisions of the 1988 UN Convention Against Drugs.  The U.S. 
side heard that the Commission may be paying for certain 
aspects, while the Bolivian Government would pay for others. 
DAS McCampbell suggested a separate meeting or conference 
call soon to clarify the issue. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Murray noted that she had not seen the document to 
which DAS McCampbell referred.  So, she could not comment 
authoritatively.   She remarked that some language, including 
references to potential demand generated by new consumers, 
sounded similar to language in the EU-funded study. 
Certainly, she insisted, the Commission would not finance 
anything to do with commercialization and industrialization. 
That said, the Commission could not control other studies 
funded by the Bolivian Government itself, but the UNODC would 
be among the Committee members overseeing the study.  She 
expressed hope that the Commission could alleviate U.S. 
concerns.   DAS McCampbell promised to forward a copy of the 
document obtained by the U.S. Embassy to Murray for 
comparison.  Bargeon noted that the document that they had 
received was only a portion of a larger paper and lacked a 
title.   So, it was unclear how it fit into the overall terms 
of reference.  Murray reviewed the earlier consultation that 
her Commission colleagues had with U.S. officials on funding 
the study.  DAS McCampbell said she understood, but she did 
not want to play into the hands of the current Bolivian 
Government, which seemed intent on building an economy based 
on coca leaf and did not seem concerned about transformation 
of coca leaf into cocaine.  The U.S. remained greatly 
concerned about coca leaf leaving Bolivia in the form of 
cocaine. 
 
THE "MERIDA INITIATIVE" 
----------------------- 
 
BRUSSELS 00003530  006.2 OF 010 
 
 
 
¶16. (U) DAS McCampbell provided an overview of the recently 
announced "Merida Initiative that would involve expenditure 
of 1.4 billion U.S. dollars on counter-drug, security, and 
anti-gang projects.   She described the program as an 
"unprecedented" step resulting from a meeting between the 
U.S. and Mexican Presidents in Merida last March.  Both 
Presidents agreed to work as partners against drug 
trafficking and transnational crimes.  In the first year, 
assuming Congressional approval, 500 million would go towards 
projects in Mexico and 50 million towards projects in Central 
America.  The USG sent a team to Mexico to examine upgrades 
to existing programs on border security, detection and 
monitoring of drug movements, provision of equipment, and 
training of police and prosecutors, and support for 
non-gvernmental organizations involved in demand redution 
initiatives.  Commodities to be provided to Mexican 
authorities will include aircraft, helicopters, computer and 
communications equipment, and non-intrusive inspection 
equipment.  Central American programs will focus on drug 
trafficking and community action programs against gangs.  DAS 
McCampbell emphasized that the "Merida Initiative" is not a 
repeat of Plan Colombia and certainly will not involve 
deployment of U.S. troops to Mexico. 
 
¶17. (U) Justice Counselor noted that Mexican Attorney General 
Eduardo Medina Mora and his Central American colleagues had 
specifically requested a regional approach in fighting drug 
trafficking.   Otherwise, traffickers would continue to 
circumvent measures put into place.  She also recalled a 
"watershed" moment in the U.S.-Mexican relations when Mexican 
President Felipe Calderon had agreed to extradite 19 major 
fugitives, including four or five drug kingpins, to the 
United States.  ONDCP Analyst Baum added that the United 
States and Mexico had enjoyed a long, close partnership on 
fighting drugs.  Interdiction efforts along the U.S.-Mexico 
border appeared to have transformed the U.S. cocaine market, 
at least temporarily, with cocaine prices rising 44 percent 
and supply dropping 15 percent.  U.S. authorities also 
observed "sporadic shortages" of cocaine in 37 U.S. cities. 
INL Officer Carroll observed that these figures seemed to 
indicate that counter-drug efforts had produced a 
"disturbance" in the U.S. drug market, but the situation 
merited further monitoring. 
 
COCAINE FLOWS TO EUROPE FROM SOUTH AMERICA 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶18. (SBU) Mission DEA Representative Scarantino said the 
movement of an estimated 220 metric tons of cocaine via 
Venezuela exerted a major impact on Europe and West Africa. 
Colombian drug traffickers had become involved in smuggling 
cocaine through Venezuela and Brazil to West Africa, 
particularly to Mauritania and Senegal.  Traffickers relied 
not only on maritime conveyances, but use of aircraft 
modified to carry large loads over long distances.  Citing 
figures from Joint Inter-Agency Task Force - South 
(JIATF-South), DAS McCampbell emphasized the increasing 
amounts of cocaine smuggled from Venezuela to Hispaniola 
(Haiti and Dominican Republic) since 2003.  Currently, formal 
counter-narcotics cooperation by Venezuela with both the U.S. 
and Colombia remained limited, and did not include sharing of 
drug-related intelligence.  She appealed to EU countries with 
better relations with Venezuela to work towards greater 
cooperation on stemming the flow of drugs.  Monteiro, while 
noting that Portugal had a Drug Liaison Officer in Caracas, 
remarked that he did not foresee any improvement soon of 
counter-drug efforts or the quality of police in Venezuela. 
 
BRUSSELS 00003530  007.2 OF 010 
 
 
The Spanish representative acknowledged the problem of drugs 
entering his country via the south from Africa. The UK 
Representative shared U.S. analysis of the situation, 
including use of larger aircraft to transport drugs. While 
the UK enjoyed a slightly better relationship with Venezuela, 
she cautioned that any counter-drug cooperation would need to 
proceed cautiously, perhaps with involvement of the Maritime 
Analysis and Operations Center. The Dutch representative 
agreed, adding that getting drug information from Venezuelan 
officials, even with the assignment of a DLO in Caracas since 
November, remained difficult.  EUROPOL agreed with the 
observation on the increase in suspicious flights from 
Venezuela to the Dominican Republic and Haiti, noting that 
many drug seizures in Europe could be linked to Venezuela. 
Monteiro cited some cooperation on screening cargo 
containers, given Venezuela's large volume of trade with 
Portugal.  DAS McCampbell said the U.S. had invested in 
inspection equipment at one of Venezuela's ports, but 
authorities there did not use the equipment. 
 
----------- 
WEST AFRICA 
----------- 
 
MAOC NOW OPERATIONAL 
-------------------- 
 
¶19. (U) Monteiro briefed on operations at the MAOC, which now 
included seven EU Member States -- France, Spain, Ireland, 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Portugal.  To 
date, MAOC had already conducted 27 operations, including 8 
maritime events, that resulted in the seizure of some 20 tons 
of cocaine.  He compared MAOC's role to that of JIATF South, 
while noting differences in composition.  He described MAOC 
as primarily a law enforcement center with some military 
support.  Monteiro said MAOC enjoyed good cooperation with 
JIATF-South, whose officials played an "instrumental" role in 
the establishment of this organization.  The Center itself 
serves mainly as a fusion center for intelligence and has no 
significant costs.  It remains open to membership from 
additional EU nations.  Currently, MAOC focuses primarily on 
the Atlantic and West Africa.  DAS McCampbell noted that she 
had met with the prospective MAOC Director after attending 
the International Drug Enforcement Conference (IDEC) in 
Madrid earlier this year.  Monteiro noted that MAOC was now 
fully operational and inquired how it might interact with the 
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM).  INL Officer Carroll noted 
that AFRICOM was in the process of establishing its structure 
and for the moment remained based out of Stuttgart.  She 
noted that the Southeast Europe Cooperation Initiative (SECI) 
Center and Central Asia Regional Information Coordination 
Center (CARICC) could also become valuable partners for MAOC. 
 Monteiro said MAOC could expand its focus into the 
Mediterranean,  Head of Unit Edwards declared that, with MAOC 
up and running, the new entity represented a success for the 
EU, which had a lengthy coastline to patrol.  Along with 
MAOC, the Baltic Sea Task Force, European Maritime Security 
Task Force, and Black Sea Cooperation Forum served as 
building blocks for a security "ring" around the EU based on 
intelligence-sharing. 
 
CONFERENCES FOCUSING ON AFRICA 
------------------------------ 
 
¶20. (U) DEA Representative Scarantino noted that IDEC 
participants had expressed concern over the lack of 
capabilities and infrastructure in most African nations to 
curb drug trafficking.  The international community needed to 
 
BRUSSELS 00003530  008.2 OF 010 
 
 
address this issue with a multilateral, unified approach. 
The European Command and INL planned to organize a conference 
in early 2008.  Monteiro invited U.S. support for 
transforming general conferences into operational ones.  DAS 
McCampbell expressed support for this idea.  Monteiro 
promised to forward contact information on a future 
EU-sponsored conference through the INL Counselor. 
 
------------------- 
PRECURSOR CHEMICALS 
------------------- 
 
21, (U) DAS McCampbell characterized the U.S.-EU partnership 
on control of precursor chemicals as "extremely productive." 
Operational Crystal Flow had a real impact, with seizures of 
53 tons of precursor chemicals in 65 countries.  Such efforts 
have had a significant impact on methamphetamine price and 
purity in the U.S., resulting in an increase in price of 73 
percent and a drop in purity of 31 percent.  Moreover, the 
Mexican Government had pledged to ban the import of all 
ephedrine and pseudo-ephedrine soon.  Bargeron described the 
role of the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) as 
very important in controlling precursors.  Even so, 80 
countries, including three EU member states, had not yet 
reported their estimated needs and production of such 
substances.  Diversion could occur through these 
non-reporting states, especially given the large amount of 
transshipment occurring through countries not considered to 
be major producers or importers.  He said the U.S. was 
considering conducting demarches with the countries that had 
not yet reported and suggested that the EU consider doing the 
same.  Perhaps, the U.S. and the EU could coordinate on the 
timing of these demarches or even consider joint demarches 
where appropriate. 
 
¶22. (U) Bargeron also described reporting requirements 
instituted by the U.S. Congress under the Combat 
Methamphetamine Act to identify the top five foreign 
countries that produced and imported pseudo-ephedrine and 
ephedrine, respectively, and to certify compliance with 
precursor control controls.  He assured EU colleagues that 
the Act was not intended as a "punitive" measure for 
countries on the lists that implemented effective controls. 
He added that the U.S. had increased its funding for the INCB 
to help in carrying out its new mission. 
 
¶23. (U) Commission Administrator Stauffer asserted that the 
EU had experienced "less pronounced" problems than the U.S. 
with methamphetamine use, but that the situation merited 
continued vigilance.  She expressed agreement with U.S. views 
on the important role played by INCB and on the requirement 
for countries to estimate legitimate needs.  Stauffer 
expressed some concern, however, about the "certification" 
requirement under the Combat Meth Act, given the presence of 
two EU member states on the lists.  Bargeron noted that no 
country had ben decertified, and he could not envision a 
siuation where an EU Member State would be decertified. 
Moreover, the U.S. identified itself in the text of the 
report to Congress as the largest importer of such 
substances.  Stauffer also urged continued attention to 
non-controlled substances.  An experts meeting in December 
would examine private sector cooperation as well. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY SPECIAL SESSION REVIEW 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶24. (SBU) Referring to the upcoming UNGASS Ten-Year review, 
 
BRUSSELS 00003530  009.2 OF 010 
 
 
Monteiro said the thematic debate at the March 2008 
Commission on Narcotics Drugs (CND) would examine the issue 
of when to stop collecting data and to start negotiating the 
text of the report.  He said that all EU Member States 
supported the principles of a balanced approach and shared 
responsibility.  DAS McCampbell cautioned against getting 
overly focused on the collection of data for the report's 
findings.  INL Counselor noted that a three-way digital video 
conference (DVC) in early 2007 had proven quite useful in 
coordinating actions before the last CND session; he 
suggested consideration of another DVC before the March CND. 
INL Officer Bargeron noted that focus on implementation of 
the three Drug Conventions would be critical.  He suggested 
that the U.S. and EU share concepts or ideas that may later 
form the basis of the UNGASS review report.  ONDCP Officer 
Baum noted that the U.S. would likely propose a resolution at 
the upcoming CND session that would outline six measures that 
have proven useful in U.S. demand reduction efforts and could 
prove instructive to other nation's efforts.  Monteiro said 
the EU took the UNGASS Review exercise seriously and had no 
interest in changing the global Drug Conventions.  He agreed 
with the suggestion to review ideas before preparing the 
formal resolutions. 
 
--------------------------- 
U.S. DRUG SCREENING PROGRAM 
--------------------------- 
 
¶25. (U) During the working luncheon, ONDCP Official Baum 
briefed on use of a screening mechanism used in the U.S. 
health care system to identify abusers of drugs who would 
benefit from counseling and treatment.  Monteiro described 
the idea as "interesting," given the generally lengthy 
interval that occurred between the start of drug use and the 
abuser's request for voluntary treatment.  The EMCDDA 
Representative inquired about the scope of the program and 
safeguards to protect personal freedoms.  Baum explained that 
screening programs in the military and schools had mechanisms 
to protect privacy rights.  Drug courts also used incentives 
in sentencing guidelines to encourage drug abusers to undergo 
treatment. 
 
--------------------- 
U.S. DRUG KINGPIN ACT 
--------------------- 
 
¶26. (U) DAS McCampbell, Counselor Warren, and DEA Official 
Scarantino explained the great utility of the U.S. Drug 
Kingpin Act in preventing access by drug kingpins and their 
families to the U.S. financial system.  Such measures not 
only resulted in forfeiture of over 2.1 billion dollars in 
assets since the Act's inception in 1999, but in undercutting 
the ability of drug traffickers to conduct their illicit 
operations, including money laundering and arranging of 
transport services.  DAS McCampbell invited the EU to provide 
names for the U.S. to consider in its system of designations. 
 Head of Unit Edwards inquired whether such designations 
resulted from court convictions for from mere suspicions 
Warren explained that names of kingpins, associates, and 
relatives added to the designation lists have undergone 
thorough vetting within the U.S. executive branch.  INL 
Counselor, noting EU concerns over safeguards, inquired 
whether any persons had successfully challenged their 
designations.  Counselor Warren cited one case in which a 
person (a step-child to a kingpin) had successfully gained 
removal of her name.  Head of Unit Edwards explained that the 
EU legal system worked differently and that any seizure of 
assets would require a court order.  He added, however, that 
 
BRUSSELS 00003530  010.2 OF 010 
 
 
the name of anyone charged in the court of an EU Member State 
with a serious drug offense would become a matter of public 
record.  Counselor Warren clarified that the U.S. Kingpin Act 
permitted the designation of individuals who could no longer 
gain access to the U.S. financial system, but that the actual 
taking of property would require a court decision in the U.S. 
as well. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶27. (SBU) The latest meeting of the U.S.-EU Troika on Drug 
Issues again provided a valuable opportunity for senior U.S. 
and EU officials to engage on drug issues and trends of 
mutual interest.  Lively, wide-ranging discussions confirmed 
transatlantic convergence on many drug issues, with the 
notable exception of spray eradication in Afghanistan.  The 
EU remained largely non-committal on the idea of extradition, 
leaving this initiative to the discretion of individual 
Member States.  The Commission promised to examine more 
closely the terms of reference for the EU-funded study in 
Bolivia.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶28. (U) The INL Bureau cleared on this telegram. 
 
MURRAY 
.