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DE RUEHBS #3488/01 3461131
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 121131Z DEC 07
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 003488 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
DEPT FOR EUR/ERA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL EUN PGOV PHUM ECIN PBTS
SUBJECT: EU TREATY OF LISBON - THE ROAD AHEAD 
 
REF A: BRUSSELS 2473, REF B: BRUSSELS 2001 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) When EU leaders clink champagne glasses over the Treaty of 
Lisbon on December 13, the mood will be celebratory.  Do not be 
deceived, however: in many ways, the real work and political 
maneuvering will be just beginning.  Over the next year, the member 
states and institutions will have their hands full making he words 
a reality.  This will in fact be a multi-pronged process -- 
completing national ratfications, beginning technical 
implementation merging EU foreign policy power and resources, and 
competing for new top leadership spots.  Beginning December 14, and 
continuing through 2008, the gargantuan political and bureaucratic 
effort will distract EU officials from other work.  Getting it all 
done in a year will not be easy, but there should be enough 
collective pressure to ensure everything is settled before the next 
round of European elections in the summer of 2009. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Member state ratification -- particularly in more 
euro-skeptic countries like the UK -- will be the focus in the first 
half of 2008.  This could suck the oxygen out of every other policy 
debate in member states where a referendum is a possibility.  In the 
second half of the year, France -- as EU President -- will shape and 
drive the race for leadership positions and key treaty 
implementation decisions.  Meanwhile, the UK, Germany, and others 
will go on high alert to check the French EU Presidency's influence 
if its interests do not coincide with their own. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The treaty's signing marks the beginning of what is sure to 
be a bloody political battle for EU power and resources that will 
pre-occupy the EU into early 2009.  The EU that emerges from this 
process -- for better or for worse -- will affect the conduct of our 
European diplomacy for the foreseeable future.  Consequently, it is 
worth our while to pay attention; seemingly minor institutional and 
legal changes could have major implications for the conduct of US-EU 
relations.  End Summary. 
 
INTRODUCTION TO FIRST IN A SERIES 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) This message is the first in a series that will put the 
treaty's provisions in perspective and describe their impact on the 
United States' relations with the EU, building on previous USEU 
reporting on this subject (REFTELS).  Later messages will focus more 
specifically on changes in foreign policy, defense, justice and home 
affairs, economic policy, the role of the European Parliament and 
national parliaments, the removal of the pillar structure, the EU's 
legal personality, and the EU's presence in international 
organizations. 
 
NOT A READABLE TREATY 
---------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) In order to understand the Treaty of Lisbon, one must read 
it side by side with the two treaties that it amends -- the Treaty 
on the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community (TEC).  In total, this equates to hundreds of pages of 
text -- hard to read, let alone understand.  Under the Treaty of 
Lisbon, the TEU will keep its name, but the TEC will be called the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the Union (TFU).  The EU will thus have 
two basic treaties: 
 
--  The TEU will contain most of the institutional provisions. 
 
--  The TFU will contain provisions on specific EU policies, with 
implementing modalities and mechanisms. 
 
Once the Treaty of Lisbon has been signed and ratified, its 
provisions will be integrated into the above texts. 
Further adding to its bulk, the Treaty of Lisbon will contain a 
number of Protocols -- which have the same legal value as the Treaty 
-- and Declarations -- the content and practical significance of 
which will vary. 
 
RATIFICATION DEADLINE LOOMS 
(First Half 2008) 
---------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) The Treaty of Lisbon must be ratified by all 27 EU Member 
States.  Each country decides how it will ratify the treaty, in 
accordance with its constitution.  EU officials expect a mostly cut 
and dried process here, with the exceptions of UK and Ireland. 
While Ireland is the only member state required to hold a 
referendum, most of the EU's referendum angst centers on the UK. 
Brussels fears that British Conservatives will force HMG to hold a 
 
BRUSSELS 00003488  002 OF 003 
 
 
referendum -- which by most counts would fail.  The treaty is 
intended to enter into force on January 1, 2009.  Since the 
ratification process by all EU countries normally takes at least 18 
months, that target date may be overly optimistic.  Nevertheless, EU 
leaders will be eager not to let the date slip by more than a few 
months. 
 
PREPARING FOR LAUNCH 
(April 2008 onward) 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) EU officials in Brussels have begun quiet preparations for 
implementing the treaty.  Once the ratification train is on track, 
however, officials in the institutions will feel more comfortable 
going public with their preparations.  Contacts say that should 
happen in April or May 2008, by which point UK Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown is hoped to have ratified the treaty in the UK and by which 
time a critical mass of other member state ratifications should have 
taken place as well.  Treaty implementation tasks will span about 40 
different areas.  Discussions on some more sensitive areas such as 
defense are likely to be delayed until later in the year in order to 
get past critical ratifications or to be entrusted to the French 
presidency's management.  It is hard to overstate how much time 
these preparations will require of our contacts throughout the EU 
institutions. 
 
CREATING A NEW EXTERNAL SERVICE 
(All of 2008) 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Standing up a new EU External Action Service (i.e., 
diplomatic corps) may prove to be the most technically demanding and 
politically bruising task for the EU in 2008.  We expect to see 
three simultaneous and sometimes overlapping battles: for jobs, 
control of resources, and control of the agenda. 
--  Jobs: the new external service will merge personnel from the 
Commission, Council Secretariat, and member states.  The extent of 
the merger remains to be decided - it will definitely include the 
Commission's External Relations RELEX DG and the Council 
Secretariat's regional teams, but may also involve parts of DGs 
 
SIPDIS 
Development, Enlargement, and others.  Member states will fight to 
place their own diplomats in key positions.  Contacts in Brussels 
and capitals will likely find themselves lobbying for jobs. 
 
--  Resources: Council Secretariat contacts are eager to get their 
hands on the Commission's resources, which this "double hatting" 
implies.  The Commission will fight back to make sure it pockets 
some resource gains as well. 
 
--  Agenda: The new High Rep will chair the EU Foreign Ministers' 
meetings and the High Rep's representative will run the Political 
and Security Committee.  Leadership has yet to be determined for 
many other important EU committees.  To be sure, member states will 
vie with institutions for control of these committees because chairs 
will have the power to shape the agenda and direct the debate. 
 
JOCKEYING FOR NEW TOP SPOTS 
(Summer - Fall 2008) 
---------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) At the political level, we expect in the second half of 
2008 a fierce race for two new foreign policy jobs created by the 
treaty: 1) new Permanent President of the European Council and 2) 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy.  The latter position merges the current policy role of 
Solana, the resources of DG RELEX Commissioner Ferrero Waldner, and 
the chairmanship of the monthly EU Foreign Ministers' meetings.  EU 
leaders may well try to make appointment decisions for these two 
jobs at they same time they consider who may fill the other 
leadership posts, including Commission President and European 
Parliament President. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The negotiation of a package could somewhat ease the 
political calculus which must balance geographical distribution, 
political affiliations, and big versus small countries.  Personal 
chemistry between candidates will also be a factor.  The choice of 
the future job-holders -- new and old, Barroso being a likely 
candidate for a second term at the Commission's helm -- will affect 
the way the new mandates are perceived and actually performed.  The 
European Parliament, for its part, will be anxious to protect and 
enhance its prerogatives in the selection of nominees.  This contest 
will color the activities, appetite for risk, cultivation of image, 
and so on, of those vying for the jobs over the next year or so. 
While some, such as Swedish FM Carl Bildt, have already launched 
their campaigns, the race will only heat up. 
 
ROLE OF THE EU PRESIDENCIES 
 
BRUSSELS 00003488  003 OF 003 
 
 
--------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Slovenia, as EU President for the first half of 2008, is 
widely expected to take a low profile on treaty-related issues, 
mainly acting as a neutral broker.  In sharp contrast, France -- led 
by a charismatic and Euro-ambitious Sarkozy -- will play a leading 
role during its EU presidency (June - December 2008).  In addition 
to fully launching the "name game" for top posts, the French will 
run any meetings of the 27 that make decisions related to 
implementation of the treaty.  In this regard, we expect the French 
to have a strong hand in deciding new rules of procedure as well as 
the appointment of key foreign policy committee chairs -- in essence 
how the new EU power structure will look and run. 
 
COMMENT: IS THIS THE LAST EU TREATY? 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶12. (SBU) The signing of the Treaty of Lisbon marks the end of a 
seven-year saga defined by the lofty debate on the Future of Europe, 
the stunning failure of the 2004 draft Constitutional treaty, and 
the refashioning of a weak EU consensus for reform in 2007.  As the 
end result, the Treaty of Lisbon was obtained at the price of a 
two-fold paradox: 
 
--  A project originally aimed at simplification of the treaties, a 
clearer delineation of EU competencies, and a more user-friendly 
reference document on European integration has ended with the 
adoption of a text even more opaque than its predecessors. 
 
--  Plans of leaders in the early 2000s to lay the political 
foundation for a confederal EU - the grand leap forward neatly 
symbolized by the word "constitution" - have given way to a 
widespread desire to complete the swiftest possible ratification of 
the treaty and move on. 
 
Despite the "success" of the Lisbon treaty, the cost has been high, 
not only in time wasted, but in the severe blow that the initial 
failure dealt to the European project.  As a result, the reality is 
that the Lisbon Treaty is likely to be the last major reform of the 
EU for the foreseeable future.  End Comment. 
MURRAY