VZCZCXRO9898
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #2262/01 3461406
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 121406Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0630
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 6443
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 5162
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 7476
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 5550
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 1302
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 002262 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR WHA, WHA/BSC, AND S/CT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2027 
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL BR AR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: UNWILLING TO ENDORSE ARGENTINE CLAIMS ON 
AMIA 
 
REF: A. (A) BUENOS AIRES 002222 
     ¶B. (B) BRASILIA 002070 
     ¶C. (C) BUENOS AIRES 000520 
 
Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION PHIL CHICOLA FOR REASONS 1.4 B A 
ND D 
 
¶1. (S) Summary: With its abstention on the vote to confirm 
issuance of international capture notices for five Iranian 
nationals and one Lebanese suspected of involvement in the 
1994 terrorist attack in Buenos Aires at the Interpol General 
Assembly session on November 7 the Government of Brazil has 
now twice refused to take a formal and public position on the 
Argentine case, likely due to extreme sensitivities over 
Argentine allegations that some support for the attack may 
have been provided by individuals in the Triborder Area of 
Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil (TBA).  A vote to issue the 
red notices would undermine their long-standing claim that 
there is no evidence of an operational terrorist presence in 
Brazil.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------- 
Argentine Officials Miffed 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2. (S) In the aftermath of the Interpol General Assembly vote 
to confirm the Interpol Executive Committee's decision to 
issue the international capture notices, Gustavo Beguet, 
Political Counselor for External Affairs and Guillermo 
Devoto, Political Counselor for Internal Affairs at the 
Argentine Embassy called on Poloffs to exchange thoughts on 
Brazil's actions prior to and during the Interpol vote.  Both 
indicated that Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations 
(Itamaraty) contacted the Argentine Embassy in Brasilia just 
prior to the Interpol General Assembly vote, "out of 
courtesy," to inform the Government of Argentina that the 
Brazilian delegation would abstain during the vote. 
According to Beguet, Itamaraty explained that since the 
Argentine case includes evidence of links between the 
perpetrators of the attack and the TBA--a claim Brazil does 
not acknowledge--it could not vote in favor of issuing the 
notices. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Iranian Lobbying Key to Brazil's Abstention? 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (S) During the meeting, Beguet offered speculation that 
Iranian lobbying--he mentioned the visit of Muhammad 
Nahavandian of Iran's Supreme Council for National Security 
to Brazil in early September--also may have played a part in 
Brazil's abstention. 
 
¶4. (S) Argentine suspicions of an Iranian role go back to 
Interpol's Executive Committee (EC) meeting on March 15th, 
when the EC approved issuance of capture notices.  The 
Brazilian representative was the only EC member not to attend 
the March 15 session.  At the time, a source at the Argentine 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs speculated Brazil may have wanted 
to avoid complicating its relations with Iran (Ref C). 
(Note:  Post intends to follow up with various contacts on 
Argentine speculation on a possible Iranian role behind 
Brazil's actions.  End Note.) 
 
-------- 
Comment: 
-------- 
 
¶5. (S) With two missed opportunities to back up often 
repeated claims of solidarity with Argentina over the two 
terrorist attacks it suffered in 1992 (Israeli Embassy 
Bombing) and 1994 (AMIA Jewish Center Bombing), and a recent 
string of hard questioning  about the usefulness of the 3 1 
mechanism, post believes Itamaraty is taking its 
sensitivities with regards to the TBA to new heights.  With 
its initial reluctance to support reversion of the 3 1 agenda 
back to its original focus on transnational criminal issues 
(something which Brazil had in the past supported) Itamaraty 
seems determined not to give up an inch of ground publicly to 
the US on a counterterrorism issue that affects Brazil. 
While working level cooperation with Brazil's law enforcement 
agencies has not changed and remains productive, Itamaraty's 
obstruction is starting to be felt in more than symbolic 
ways. 
 
BRASILIA 00002262  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
Sobel