VZCZCXRO0728
RR RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #4049/01 3471009
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 131009Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4821
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004049 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
 
SUBJECT: EPRT DIYALA SOUTH:  HOW CONFLICTING LINES 
OF AUTHORITY HINDER EFFECTIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
 
¶1.  (U) This is an ePRT Diyala South reporting cable. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  The emergence of effective local government in 
Diyala Province is stalling due to conflicting lines of authority, a 
lack of defined roles and responsibilities, and disconnects with 
ministerial representatives from the central government who retain 
control of key services.  Without a Provincial Powers Act that 
clearly defines powers and responsibilities, locally accountable 
government will not be able to take on and manage the provision of 
services at the local level.  END SUMMARY 
 
-------------------------------- 
Outline of Government Structures 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (U) The Provincial Government - excluding the courts and 
security services - breaks down into three main entities: i) the 
Provincial Council (PC), ii) the Governor's Office, and, iii) the 
Provincial Directors General (DGs) representing national ministries. 
 The Province furthermore is comprised of five Qadas: Baqubah, 
Khalis, Muqdadiyah, Khanaqin, and Balad Ruz, with each Qada in turn 
split into several Nahiyas or groupings of several villages or 
towns. 
 
¶4.  (U) The Provincial Council has the ability to approve the 
budget, remove the Governor, and to disband Qada and Nahiya 
Councils.  It exercises no real authority over the Provincial DGs. 
The Governor manages provincial budget development and execution, 
and various other provincial government activities.  The Provincial 
DGs are in charge of managing the provision of the service overseen 
by their respective ministry, and have their own subordinate 
offices.  While the Governor has little direct authority over the 
Provincial DGs, he does play a coordinating role and is able to 
demand reports from them.  The Governor can also pressure the 
ministries in Baghdad of the respective DGs, and has been known to 
have recalcitrant DGs put in jail for a few days. 
 
----------------------------- 
The Example of Baqubah Qada: 
Lines and Layers of Authority 
----------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (U) In theory, the three "branches" of government - i) the 
Provincial Council (PC), ii) the Governor's Office, and, iii) the 
Provincial Directors General (DGs) representing national ministries 
- should be mirrored at the level of Qada and Nahiya.  This, 
however, is not the case in Baqubah.  Baqubah Qada has a Qada 
Council (QC), which, like the PC, selects the Qada Mayor or Qaim 
Maqam.  Each Nahiya in the Qada also has a Nahiya Council (NC), 
which selects the Nahiya Mayor.  The Qada Mayor and QC also serve as 
the government for the city of Baqubah.  In practice, the QC's 
authority does not extend beyond the city; and the Qada Mayor is 
mostly focused on the city's issues, and only deals with the other 
Nahiyas when they come to him with problems.  The other Nahiyas - 
al-Abarra, Buhriz, Kanaann, and Khan Bani Saad (KBS) -are not 
represented on the QC, and the NCs or Mayors often go straight to 
the Provincial Government, or even Baghdad, completely bypassing the 
Qada Government. 
 
¶6.  (U) Each ministry has its own lines of authority and reporting 
structures at the sub-provincial level.  Some mirror the provincial 
structure of: Province - Qada - Nahiya.  Many lack Qada-level 
representatives and go straight from the Provincial DG to 
Nahiya-level Directors.  Still others have created entirely unique 
administrative units for their reporting structure.  Baqubah Qada 
poses exceptional complications, due to the de facto transfer of 
many core ministry functions in Khan Bani Saad Nahiya to Baghdad 
from Baqubah when Diyala's security situation hit a nadir in late 
2006 and early-mid 2007. 
 
¶7.  (U) Below is a breakdown of the administrative structure of some 
of the essential service directorates in Baqubah Qada: 
¶A. Provincial DG - Qada Director - Local Manager 
-- Water (Ministry of Municipalities) 
-- Education (Ministry of Education) - though for Baqubah Qada, the 
Provincial DG himself acts as the Qada Director 
¶B. Provincial DG - Nahiya/Local Manager 
-- Sewage (Ministry of Municipalities) - has ten offices across the 
Province reporting directly to the Provincial DG.  In Baqubah Qada, 
these include Baqubah and Khan Bani Saad.  The Provincial DG has 
reportedly requested that the Ministry re-assign Khan Bani Saad to 
Baghdad. 
-- Electricity (Ministry of Electricity) - several of the larger 
local offices, including the city of Baqubah, have sub-offices. 
-- Municipalities (Ministry of Municipalities) - in Baqubah Qada, 
KBS has reportedly been re-assigned to Baghdad. 
-- Health (Ministry of Health) - The nine hospital and 45 clinics 
administrators each report to the Provincial DG.  The Ministry of 
Health is yet another ministry that has reportedly re-tasked KBS to 
Baghdad. 
 
BAGHDAD 00004049  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
------------------------------- 
Tribal/Sectarian Impediments to 
Strong Qada Government 
------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The patchwork nature of tribal and sectarian populations 
in Baqubah and across Diyala hinder the development of a Qada 
leadership in Baqubah capable of managing the Qada as a governmental 
entity.  (Note: There are roughly 25 tribes and over 100 sub-tribes 
in the province. Endnote)  Baqubah's character as a predominantly 
Sunni city has become more pronounced in recent years.  Other parts 
of the Qada, however, have a different sectarian composition. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) For example, Al-Abarra Nahiya, which covers much of the 
Diyala River Valley north of the city of Baqubah, is a largely Shia 
area, though it does contain some Sunni towns and villages. 
Al-Abarra has strong ties to the Shia leadership in the Provincial 
government.  The Mayor of al-Abarra, Shakir Mazin al-Timimi, is the 
nephew of Diyala Governor Raad al-Timimi, and the son of one of the 
al-Timimi paramount Sheikhs in Diyala; the al-Abarra Council 
Chairman is also the Governor's brother.  Al-Abarra also includes 
the town of Kharnabat, which is the hometown of the Provincial 
Director of Police (MG Ghanem Abbas al-Quraeshy) - also a Shia. 
Given these connections, the al-Abarra Nahiya rarely acts as a 
subordinate structure to the Baqubah Qada. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Khan Bani Saad, located between Baghdad Province and the 
city of Baqubah, is another area where tribal/sectarian and security 
concerns have caused a significant separation between the Nahiya and 
Qada governments.  In this case, however, the Nahiya has growing 
ties to Baghdad, not the Diyala Provincial government.  One example 
is that several of the ministry offices in KBS have reportedly been 
re-tasked from Diyala (Baqubah Qada) to Baghdad.  One of the major 
problems with this development is that KBS is roughly evenly divided 
between Sunni and Shia, though the town of KBS is largely Shia.  The 
Baghdad solution works well for the Shia of KBS, as KBS borders on 
Sadr City and provides easy access to Baghdad.  This option is less 
optimal for the Sunnis of KBS, as they are afraid to travel to 
Baghdad, and are no longer resourced from Sunni-friendly Baqubah. 
 
------------------------------- 
Qada and Local Governments Left 
Organizationally Weak 
------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) The cumulative effect of these various formal and 
informal lines of authority - especially when combined with the lack 
of clarity for provincial and sub-provincial authorities under 
current Iraqi legislation - is to leave Baqubah Qada and Nahiya 
governments with ill-defined roles.  The Qada Mayor, who is in 
theory the senior executive for the Qada, lacks direct authority 
over those responsible for providing essential services in the Qada. 
 The Qada Mayor does not have a group of non-subordinate service 
directors sharing Qada-wide responsibility with which to consult. 
Neither the Qada Council nor the Qada Mayor controls a budget that 
can be used to fund capital projects, or operations and maintenance. 
 Even the operations costs of the Qada Mayor's office itself are 
handled by the Provincial Accounting Office.  In short, the locally 
elected and accountable Qada and Nahiya governments may be 
responsible for "managing" services in their areas, but lack formal 
control of the means for the provision of those services. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Effective local government in Baqubah Qada depends on 
informal relations and the personal authority and leadership skills 
of the individual local government leaders; of lesser importance is 
the authority of the office.  The Baqubah Qada Mayor hosts a weekly 
meeting with some of the service directors for the city of Baqubah. 
However, this meeting only came about as a result of pressure from 
Coalition Forces (CF).  The CF and ePRT maintain a regular presence 
at the meeting.  The service directors provide the Mayor with 
information and listen to his comments.  They do not take orders or 
taskings from him.  This also explains why the dominant positions in 
local government vary so greatly.  In one place the Mayor may be the 
most influential individual, while in another the Council Chairman 
exerts more power. 
 
--------------------------- 
Comment: Qada Government as 
Information Manager 
--------------------------- 
 
¶13. (U) The government of Baqubah Qada will not be able to direct 
the provision and development of services in the Qada in the near 
future.  The varying independent lines of authority operating at the 
sub-provincial level and the lack of clarity on current or future 
Qada and local government powers hinder this development.  Until a 
Provincial Powers Act that clearly delineates roles and authorities 
at the national and provincial level - and allows for the further 
definition of sub-provincial administrative bodies - is adopted, 
 
BAGHDAD 00004049  003 OF 003 
 
 
capacity-building efforts at the sub-provincial level will be 
limited to improving the capacity for information management, with 
little overall effect on the actual provision of services. 
 
BUTENIS