VZCZCXYZ0025
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAN #1252/01 3511352
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 171352Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0796

UNCLAS ANTANANARIVO 001252 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/FO -- ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRAZER 
DEPT FOR AF/E -- MBEYZEROV 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON OVIP MA CN
SUBJECT:  SCENESETTER FOR A/S FRAZER'S VISIT TO THE COMOROS 
 
REF:  Antananarivo 1251 
 
¶1. (SBU)  SUMMARY.  Welcome also to Moroni!  Your visit to the Union 
of the Comoros comes as this fragile country faces the latest in a 
long series of challenges.  Your arrival, as the highest ranking 
U.S. government official ever (we believe) to visit the archipelago, 
gives you leverage to help steer the country toward stability and 
peace.  The election of President Ahmed Abdallah Sambi in 2006 
marked a dramatic change as the first peaceful democratic transfer 
of power in the country's troubled post-colonial history. 
Unfortunately, Sambi's ability to pursue his top goal of promoting 
economic growth has been stymied by rebel warlord Colonel Mohamed 
Bacar on the island of Anjouan.  While the other two islands held 
peaceful elections last June, Bacar has clung to power in defiance 
of the Union government, the African Union (AU), and supportive 
statements from the U.S., France, and others.  Your arrival comes 
mid-way through the 60-day extension of AU sanctions against Bacar 
and his henchmen.  Sambi has appreciated the AU support but, 
pressured by the Comoran street, is growing impatient to move to 
military action against Bacar (which almost all observers think 
would end in failure, if not disaster).  You can counsel additional 
patience, and reaffirm U.S. support for the AU.  Any tangible 
support you can give to Sambi will help him hew to the AU process, 
but make no mistake - Sambi's political survival ultimately depends 
on resolving the Anjouan problem.  Ref provided a separate 
scenesetter for Madagascar.  END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - 
COMOROS - Political 
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¶2. (U)  Lying midway between Madagascar and Mozambique, the Union of 
the Comoros stands out among its neighbors in the region as a 
pro-U.S., Muslim democracy.  It is comprised of three 
semi-autonomous islands whose governments are tenuously subordinate 
to the Union government.  It retains a claim on the fourth Comoran 
island, Mayotte, which is administered by France.  For thirty years 
after independence in 1975, the Comoros were racked by coups and 
counter-coups, several led by the notorious French mercenary Bob 
Denard.  In 1997 Anjouan and Moheli attempted to secede from the 
Union and only returned when a new constitution was agreed to in 
¶2001.  This constitution stipulated a Union presidency rotating 
among the three islands.  In 2002 President Assoumani Azali of 
Grande Comore (who had taken power earlier in a coup) was elected 
president.  In 2006 Sambi was one of three candidates - and the 
leading vote-getter -- selected in Anjouan's primary process.  In 
nationwide voting among these three, Sambi won in a landslide free 
and fair election.  The inauguration of President Sambi in June 2006 
marked the first democratic transition of power in Comoran history 
and an opportunity for the U.S. to increase our engagement in the 
island nation. 
 
¶3. (SBU)  The next step in the Comoros' democratic evolution was to 
have been elections for individual island leaders in 2007.  On 
Grande Comore and Moheli, these were held on schedule and judged to 
have been free and fair.  On Anjouan, however, island "president" 
(read Governor) Bacar - probably sensing that he would lose a free 
election - refused to allow an impartial process and instead held a 
sham election in which he "won" 90 per cent of the vote.  As a 
result, while the main trend in the Comoros is toward peaceful, 
Muslim democracy, recent headlines have been dominated by Colonel 
Bacar and his intransigence.  The AU, which participated in 
observation of the other two islands' elections, refused to accept 
Bacar's illegitimate poll and has tried to broker a peaceful and 
democratic solution to the impasse.  However, as Bacar's bad faith 
has become ever more apparent, the AU has gradually turned to 
sterner messages to seek compliance, including sanctions that now 
block travel and financial transfers by a list of persons associated 
with Bacar.  The first 45-day term of these sanctions expired and 
the AU renewed them for an additional 60 days in late November in 
the hopes that they may yet persuade Bacar to hold acceptable 
elections.  In the meantime, Sambi is under intense political 
pressure from the people who ask why, as a "son of Anjouan," he 
cannot handle Bacar.  As a result, Sambi grows more impatient with 
peaceful pressure and seemingly more eager to move to a military 
solution.  Your public support of the AU process, linked to your 
support for the Union government, should give Sambi a little 
breathing room and give the AU a little more time to seek a peaceful 
resolution.  He also needs to hear your voice joining those of 
France, South Africa, and others in advising him - as Secretary Rice 
did in a letter sent last summer -- to eschew violence and military 
action as a means toward resolving the Anjouan crisis. 
 
¶4. (SBU)  Once the Anjouan crisis is resolved, and however it is 
resolved, most observers agree that the Union and the three island 
authorities should discuss ways to revise their political compact. 
Aside from blatant inefficiencies in having three separate 
bureaucratic structures in such a small and poor entity, the fact of 
there being an independent militia on Anjouan proves rather 
dramatically the need to reserve certain competencies, at least, to 
the Union.  Sambi has fully agreed to this, but will do so only with 
a freely elected representative from Anjouan.  The U.S. has a modest 
USD 50,000 ESF project with the National Democratic Institute (NDI) 
that could be used to provide technical assistance for the islands 
in this process. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The pragmatic GOC is reaching out to deepen its 
relationships with Western, Arab, and Asian countries alike.  Iran 
is one of those countries who seem to be seeking a special 
friendship with the Comoros, and has recently provided a fishing 
boat to the government as a down payment on this relationship. 
Sambi, while appreciative, has been careful to stress that while he 
studied theology in Iran at one time, his government does NOT have a 
special relationship with Iran.  China is also active in the Comoros 
- you will see the Chinese-built (but still vacant) terminal at the 
airport.  Nonetheless, the government of the Comoros has taken 
considerable steps to show solidarity with the U.S. and they 
consistently request greater U.S. engagement through development 
assistance, economic programs, and the return of an American Peace 
Corps and diplomatic presence.  Now more than ever, the U.S. needs 
peaceful, democratic, Muslim friends like the Comoros.  Your timely 
visit gives senior-level international recognition to the 
well-intentioned but struggling Union Government.  Six months after 
the first U.S.-Comoran bilateral talks attended by then-Office 
Director for East African Affairs Eunice Reddick, your announcement 
of any new initiatives will be warmly welcomed as confirmation that 
the U.S. stands behind its pledge of deeper partnership. 
 
- - - - - - - - - 
COMOROS - Economic 
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¶6. (U)  The economic outlook in the Comoros is not bright.  With 
very little industry and few exports (chiefly vanilla, cloves and 
the perfume essence of ylang-ylang), only remittances from Comorans 
living abroad (mostly in southern France) - as well as budget 
support from France -- keep the Comoros afloat.  The IMF estimates 
the Comoran economy will contract by at least one percent of GDP in 
¶2007.  Imports are down based on the declining economy, partially 
caused by the blockages at the main port in Anjouan imposed by 
Colonel Bacar.  Several Arab Gulf nations have proposed significant 
investment in tourism infrastructure, but the funds have yet to 
flow.  The Union government is engaged in revising its investment 
laws, creating a "one-stop" investment shop, and implementing other 
measures intended to make the country more receptive to foreign 
investment. 
 
¶7. (U)  Despite fiscal revenue shortfalls, Union spending has 
increased.  The Union Treasury has taken on debt from all possible 
domestic credit sources, including the Central Bank, savings 
accounts, and from salaries arrears.  Talks with the IMF on a new 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), at the verge of 
approval this summer, have been stalled since July due to the 
ongoing Anjouan crisis.  Absent quick resolution of this political 
impasse, it seems the heavily indebted Union of the Comoros will not 
benefit from large scale debt relief anytime soon.  A meeting 
earlier this month to seek forgiveness of African Development Bank 
debt was partially successful, with donors contributing a portion of 
the target needed to annul the debt.  U.S. presence at this meeting 
was appreciated, but our failure to contribute funds along side 
France, Britain and other partners was also noted.  The Comoros have 
a tight peg on the French Franc and as such have been able to keep 
QLQ&qinflation in the low single digits. 
 
¶8. (SBU)  The U.S. contribution to Comoran development efforts has 
been minimal in recent years at best and is only beginning to ramp 
up.  Our military colleagues from CJTF-HOA are active on the island, 
rehabilitating school furniture and soon to reconstruct several 
schools on Grande Comore (and hopefully later on Moheli; similar 
projects identified on Anjouan are on hold).  Our military also 
contributed an English language lab that now is used by both 
military and civilian students.  We are just beginning a distance 
education program, funded with ESF, for roughly half a million 
dollars.  Our Ambassador's Self Help and Democracy and Human Rights 
projects give us an entre with civil society in the Comoros.  Your 
announcement of additional ESF funds for micro-enterprise 
development is likely to be warmly welcomed. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
COMOROS - Security Challenges 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶9. (SBU)  Probably the most wanted terrorist in Africa, Harun Fazul, 
is of Comoran origin.  An Al Qaeda member and the alleged mastermind 
of the 1998 bombings at our embassies in Nairobi and Dar, he 
received his training and indoctrination after leaving the Comoros 
in search of opportunity abroad.  Our Comoran interlocutors are at 
frequent pains to disavow his radical ideas and insist the Comoran 
practice of moderate Islam offers no room for extremist ideology. 
Still, with so few opportunities for education or employment, there 
is an ongoing concern that other Comoran youth might easily be led 
astray.  The Comoran government, though very limited in capacity, 
cooperates fully with us in our counterterrorism efforts and in 
Rewards for Justice. 
 
¶10. (SBU)  The Comoros' miles of unprotected coastline also present 
a maritime security challenge.  Through FMF funds we are in the 
process of acquiring an "Arch Angel" patrol boat to assist in 
securing their maritime domain.  The President may express 
appreciation for this assistance, which will not arrive for another 
year or so (the vessel is under construction in the state of 
Washington).  The most serious maritime issue, however, is outbound 
migrants from the Comoros seeking to land clandestinely in 
French-governed Mayotte.  The small boats they employ, called 
kwasa-kwasa, are often not very seaworthy and substantial numbers of 
Comorans are known to have drowned trying to evade French patrols. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - 
COMOROS - The People 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶11. (SBU)  The Comoran people speak a common language and have a 
common background, but do retain a strong identity to their islands 
of origin.  Almost all are Sunni Muslims, but many are unaware of 
what the Sunni/Shi'a distinction really means.  Living under 
Karthala, one of the largest and most active volcanoes in the world, 
those on Grande Comore have learned to live with seismic as well as 
political upheavals.  Although the U.S. Embassy closed in 1995 and 
the Peace Corps left in 1996, we have found frequent warm memories 
of the "Americans who spoke Comoran."  The Comorans appreciate our 
very active American Corner, but re-opening the Peace Corps presence 
would provide tremendous impact in restoring our people-to-people 
relations.  As you know, Peace Corps Director Tschetter has agreed 
in principle to reopen early in FY09; PC's feasibility assessment 
was concluded over a year ago. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
COMOROS - Your Message 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶12. (SBU)  Your presence alone, the most senior USG official ever to 
visit, will convey that the United States is seriously engaging in 
and with the Comoros.  This has been a sore point since our 
embassy's closure over a decade ago, and your announcement of a new 
diplomatic position focused entirely on U.S.-Comoran relations - 
even if initially based in Antananarivo - will send an important 
message of engagement.  Coming in the wake of the recent launch of 
the long-awaited USAID distance learning project and the growing 
CJTF-HOA presence on Grande Comore, any new programs or projects you 
can announce will add to the new spirit of bilateral engagement. 
Your support of the elected Union government in its dispute with the 
island rebels will be deeply appreciated and will give you the 
stature to speak in support of giving the AU process more time to 
seek a peaceful resolution of the Anjouan impasse.  Privately, it 
will be important for President Sambi to hear you reinforce 
Secretary Rice's advice to resolve their dispute peacefully through 
 
SIPDIS 
negotiation, not violence.  In addition, coming right after the 
major Muslim holiday of Eid il-Adha, your warm holiday wishes will 
send the American message of tolerance and mutual respect that 
perhaps is important to be heard throughout the Muslim world. 
 
MARQUARDT