VZCZCXYZ0003
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAM #5058/01 3641444
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 301444Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1304
RHMFIUU/ITO FT MONMOUTH NJ
INFO RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//THEATER TRAVEL CELL//
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS AMMAN 005058 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OREP AMGT OTRA ASEC AFIN JO
SUBJECT: JORDAN COUNTRY CLEARANCE FOR James Holland 
and Peter McGrew 
 
REF:  STATE 
 
¶1. (SBU) Embassy Amman warmly welcomes the visit of 
James Holland and Peter McGrew to Jordan from 17 
January through 2 February, 2008, as requested 
reftel.  The travelers should carefully review this 
message, especially the threat assessment at 
paragraph 9. 
 
¶2.  On October 1, 2007, the Department of State 
electronic country clearance (eCC) application was 
deployed for all U.S. Government travelers.  eCC is 
the official channel to request country clearance. 
All agencies and visitors are requested to use eCC to 
request country clearance in the future. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Control officer for this visit is MAJ Orr. 
Contact information is as follows:  962-6-590-6651 
(office); 962-6-590-0160 (fax); 962-6-592-6023 
(home); 962-77-672-0453 (mobile); and 
orrsp@state.gov.  The Embassy's after-hours telephone 
number is +962-6-590-6500. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Hotel reservations have been made at Amman 
Crown Plaza Hotel, phone 962-6-551-0001 and fax 962- 
6-551-0003.  Cost is at a rate within per diem; 
breakfast is not included in the room rate.  Due to 
security concerns in Jordan (paragraph 8), TDY 
personnel are assigned hotels on a rotational basis. 
Therefore, Embassy Amman will make the final decision 
on hotel accommodations for all visitors.  The 
Embassy will provide expeditor assistance upon 
arrival and departure. 
 
¶5. (U) Valid visas are required for entry into 
Jordan.  Visas may be obtained at Queen Alia airport 
though not at all land border crossings; however, 
Embassy Amman suggests visitors obtain their visas 
prior to arrival, as there can be long queues for 
visa issuance at the airport.  Money can be exchanged 
at Queen Alia airport or in the delegationQs control 
room. 
 
¶6. (U) Action request: Each visitor, regardless of 
length of stay, must bring/forward fiscal data to pay 
for direct costs of the visit.  Each agency, 
organization or visiting delegation will be charged 
for the actual costs attributed to its visit.  Direct 
charge costs include, but are not limited to: 
American and LES overtime (for such services as 
airport expediting, cashier accommodation exchange, 
control room staffing, representational event 
support), travel and per diem costs incurred by post 
personnel in support of visitorQs field travel, 
rental of vehicles and other equipment, long distance 
telephone calls, office supplies, gasoline and other 
vehicle maintenance costs, departure tax and other 
airport fees.  Post will not provide service if 
fiscal data is not provided for the direct charges. 
For TDYers remaining at post over 30 days, there is a 
charge for ICASS support services.  This charge is 
for the following ICASS services:  Basic Package, CLO 
and Health Services.  Agencies will not be billed 
until the accumulated invoice cost for TDY support 
exceeds $2,500 for the fiscal year.  If your 
sponsoring agency is not signed up for ICASS services 
at post, please be prepared to sign a Memorandum of 
Understanding for ICASS support services upon 
arrival.  The agency should provide post with a 
written communication, generated by the travelerQs 
headquarters, that confirms the agency will pay ICASS 
charges for the TDYer, provides the agency ICASS 
billing code the TDY support charges should be 
applied to, and authorizes the traveler to sign the 
ICASS invoice generated by the TDY module.  Where 
travel is urgent, the TDYer should bring this 
documentation with him/her to ensure there are no 
interruptions in the provision of service.  Post will 
not provide any service to a TDYer staying in excess 
of thirty days without provision of this 
documentation before day 31 of the TDY. 
 
¶7. (U) HEALTH:  H5N1 avian flu was confirmed in 
poultry in Jordan in March 2006, and in the same 
month, the Government of Jordan confirmed a human 
case of H5N1 avian flu in a person who was infected 
in Egypt and traveled to Jordan while sick.  The 
World Health Organization declared Jordan to be free 
of avian flu in May 2006.  There have been no 
 
confirmed cases of avian flu in people or birds in 
Jordan since the summer of 2006.  Further cases of 
avian flu in both people and birds in Jordan remain 
possible.  For this reason and for normal health 
precautions, visitors are encouraged to avoid live 
poultry, poultry farms, and any dead birds.  Visitors 
should use hand sanitizer and wash hands frequently. 
Travelers should also patronize restaurants having 
high standards for food safety and hygiene, and ask 
that poultry and egg products be cooked thoroughly. 
 
Although Jordan does not pose any unusual health 
hazards for visitors, the quality of health care 
facilities is not up to the U.S. or European 
standards, particularly outside of Amman.  As 
medications on the local economy are often in short 
supply, visitors should bring sufficient medications 
to post for their chronic medical problems. 
Immunizations should be current for Tetanus and 
Diphtheria, Hepatitis A and B.  Visitors should drink 
bottled water rather than tap water.  Food in the 
hotels and most restaurants is safe to eat, but some 
of the smaller local restaurants do not always 
observe proper food handling procedures. 
 
Only those personnel covered under the State 
Department's medical program and who have a valid 
medical clearance for Jordan are eligible for a 
medical evacuation at USG cost.  All other visitors 
are advised to have their own medical evacuation 
insurance to cover evacuation by air ambulance. 
Otherwise it will be necessary to ensure that the 
respective agency will cover any costs related to a 
medical evacuation.  All local hospitals take major 
credit cards. 
 
¶8. (U) SECURITY CLEARANCE AND BUILDING ACCESS: In 
compliance with State Department regulations and 
Embassy policies, visitors requesting unescorted 
access to the Embassy compound should inform RSO 
Amman of their security clearance level (if any) and 
should name the agency that granted that clearance. 
Telegrams containing this information should include 
the QASECQ tag to ensure distribution to the RSO. 
 
Electronic devices:  RSO approval must be obtained 
before any electronic device is brought into the 
Embassy. Privately owned laptops and personal 
computers, peripherals, diskettes, and tapes are 
prohibited in all mission facilities. 
Cellular/mobile phones and palm pilots are prohibited 
in controlled access areas. 
 
Travelers with USG-owned unclassified laptops or 
notebook computers, peripherals, diskettes, and tapes 
must receive RSO/IMO authorization before being 
granted access to U.S. Mission buildings.  USG-owned 
classified computers must be sent to post via 
classified diplomatic pouch.  Classified equipment 
must bear external USG bar-code inventory numbers and 
classification markings commensurate with the highest 
level of information processed on the system. 
Questions concerning other types of electronic 
devices and magnetic media may be directed to the RSO 
and IMO. 
 
Mandatory personal security training:  Per 04 STATE 
66580, all employees traveling to post for 30 days or 
more (whether PCS or TDY) must have completed the 
mandatory personal security training (State 
Department Security Overseas Seminar or equivalent) 
before arriving at post.  Agencies must provide the 
Chief of Mission with certification that this 
training will be completed prior to the employeeQs 
travel.  Failure to do so will result in denial of 
country clearance. 
 
¶9. (U) THREAT ASSESSMENT: The threat of terrorism 
remains high in Jordan.  Transnational terrorist 
groups, as well as less sophisticated local elements, 
have demonstrated the capability to pose threats in 
Jordan.  The Al-Qaida in Iraq network is of 
particular concern for terrorist activities against 
U.S. and Government of Jordan (GOJ) targets in 
Jordan.  The Al-Qaida in Iraq network claimed 
responsibility for the November 9, 2005 bombings of 
three international hotels in Amman, which killed 60 
people and injured over 100.  Pedestrian suicide 
bombers wearing explosive vests carried the bombs 
 
into the hotels.  Al-Qaida in Iraq also claimed 
responsibility for the Aqaba rocket attacks on August 
19, 2005 targeting a U.S. naval ship, which killed 
one Jordanian soldier and wounded another.  The 
assassination of American diplomat Larry Foley 
outside his west Amman residence on October 28, 2002 
was also attributed to Al-Qaida in Iraq leader Abu 
Musab Al-Zarqawi, who was killed in Iraq in June 
¶2006. 
 
In addition, there has been a series of confirmed 
terrorist threats and disrupted terrorist plots 
targeting U.S. or Jordanian interests in Jordan.  In 
November 2006, the GOJ arrested four men who were 
planning to use a taxi cab to identify and 
assassinate an American.  In the same month, the GOJ 
arrested three men who were reportedly plotting to 
attack the U.S. Embassy and assassinate President 
Bush during his visit to Jordan.  In February 2006, 
the GOJ disrupted a terrorist cell plotting to attack 
Queen Alia International Airport.  In November 2005, 
the GOJ indicted six men for planning to carry out 
attacks against Americans at hotels and bars in Amman 
and Aqaba.  In August-September 2005, four militants 
were arrested for plotting assassinations of 
Americans in Jordan.  In July 2005, GOJ authorities 
arrested 17 men who had planned to assassinate GOJ 
officials and Americans in Jordan; the group was 
reportedly linked to Al-Qaida in Iraq.  In February 
2005, four men were arrested for plotting attacks 
against GOJ officials, tourists and five-star hotels. 
In the same month, another group was disrupted while 
plotting to attack liquor stores in Amman and foreign 
tourists in Aqaba. 
 
Terrorists often do not distinguish between U.S. 
government personnel and private citizens. 
Terrorists may target areas frequented by Westerners, 
such as tourist sites, hotels, restaurants, bars, 
nightclubs, liquor stores, shopping malls, 
transportation hubs, places of worship, expatriate 
residential areas, and schools.  In light of these 
security concerns, U.S. citizens are urged to 
maintain a high level of vigilance, to be aware of 
their surroundings, and to take appropriate steps to 
increase their security awareness.  It is especially 
important for travelers to be unpredictable by 
varying their times and routes and to maintain a low 
profile.  Moreover, U.S. citizens are urged to avoid 
contact with any suspicious or unfamiliar objects and 
to immediately report the presence of such objects to 
the authorities. U.S. Government personnel overseas 
have been advised to take the same precautions. 
 
Anti-American and anti-Western sentiment exists in 
Jordan and has been sparked on occasion by incidents 
in the region, particularly those related to 
Israeli/Palestinian issues and, to a lesser extent, 
Iraq.  This may lead to random acts of violence 
against Westerners.  On September 4, 2006, a gunman 
fired on foreigners at a popular tourist site in 
central Amman, killing one and injuring six. 
 
Travelers are advised to avoid any demonstrations or 
large gatherings of people.  Many demonstrations 
occur near mosques after Friday prayers. 
Consequently, special sensitivity and caution should 
be exercised at or near mosques and religious sites 
during holy days and the Friday Muslim Sabbath. 
Demonstrations also often take place at universities 
and refugee camps. 
 
Crime is generally not a serious problem for 
travelers in Jordan, but petty crime is prevalent in 
the downtown Amman Hashimiyah Square area and near 
the Roman Amphitheater.  In the narrow streets of the 
older parts of the city center, crowded conditions 
invite pickpockets and other petty criminals. 
Travelers are urged to be more guarded in these areas 
so that they do not present easy opportunities for 
criminals. 
 
In central and west Amman, there have been reports of 
thieves snatching pedestriansQ purses from moving 
vehicles and then driving off.  In some instances, 
victims were injured when they were unable to free 
themselves from their purses.  When carrying a purse, 
it would be wise to conceal it if possible, to avoid 
walking near the road within reach of passing 
 
vehicles, and to walk against the flow of traffic. 
 
Jordanian police have warned the public to exercise 
vigilance when leaving banks or ATM machines, as 
thieves have reportedly preyed upon persons soon 
after using these services. 
 
Western women both visiting and residing in Jordan 
report sexual harassment, stalking, and unwelcome 
advances of a sexual nature; there have been isolated 
reports of assault.  Women are advised to take 
reasonable precautions including dressing 
conservatively and not traveling alone.  Modest 
attire should be worn in deference to local custom. 
 
¶10. (U) TRAVEL GUIDELINES: American citizens and 
official visitors traveling in Jordan should exercise 
caution, be alert, and stay informed of regional and 
local events that could quickly impact the security 
environment in the country.  It is also recommended 
to maintain a low profile and not establish 
predictable patterns of movement, even if only 
visiting for a short period.  Yellow taxis are widely 
used throughout the country and for the most part 
without adverse incidents occurring.  Still, there 
have been confirmed reports of single females being 
assaulted or verbally harassed by taxi drivers.  The 
Embassy Internet website has a list of radio 
controlled taxi companies that the Government of 
Jordan has advised us vet their drivers at 
http://amman.usembassy.gov/int_dev/Pa_amman/d ocs/taxi 
_list.pdf. 
 
For further information, see the State Department's 
Consular Information Sheet for Jordan at 
http://www.travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/ cis 
/cis_1149.html and link from that site to the most 
recent Public Announcements on Travel in the Middle 
East and South Asia and the most recent Worldwide 
Caution. 
 
Visit AmmanQs Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.gov.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/ 
 
HALE