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Viewing cable 07AITTAIPEI2561, MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07AITTAIPEI2561 2007-12-04 09:23 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0007
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #2561/01 3380923
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 040923Z DEC 07
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7509
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 7492
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 8778
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 002561 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS 
 
1. Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused news 
coverage December 4 on the 2008 legislative elections; on Eastern 
Multimedia Group Chairman Gary Wang, who is now in custody for 
embezzlement and whose funds were frozen by the Taipei District 
Prosecutor's Office Monday; and on the results of an Asian Baseball 
Championship game Monday.  Both the pro-independence "Liberty Times" 
and the pro-unification "United Daily News" reported on AIT Director 
Stephen Young's speech delivered at a seminar hosted by the 
Foundation on International and Cross-Strait Studies Monday.  The 
"Liberty Times" story ran with the headline "Stephen Young: UN 
Referendum Is Neither Necessary Nor Helpful," while the "United 
Daily News" story was headlined "Stephen Young: United States Hopes 
That [Taiwan's] New President Will [Resume] Dialogue with China." 
 
 
2. In terms of editorials and commentaries, a "Liberty Times" 
analysis discussed Young's remarks on Taiwan's UN referendum and 
said Washington has sensed that it can no longer stop the referendum 
and has thus started "damage control."  A "United Daily News" 
editorial discussed cross-Strait relations and the UN referendum. 
The article urged Beijing to clarify and elaborate on its new 
cross-Strait discourse.  End Summary. 
 
A) "Unable to Stop the Referendum, the United States [Starts] Damage 
Control?" 
 
Deputy Editor-in-Chief Tsou Jiing-wen noted in a news analysis in 
the pro-independence "Liberty Times" [circulation: 720,000] (12/4): 
 
"AIT Director Stephen Young prepared a written speech draft before 
he delivered his remarks at the Foundation on International and 
Cross-Strait Studies Monday.  Quite a few people present would 
surely find Young's remarks on the UN referenda, slated for March, 
2008 very unpleasant.  But a closer look into the logic behind 
Young's statement showed that the United States has sensed that the 
referenda can no longer be stopped and it has started the 'damage 
control' in advance. 
 
"Between the two referenda on Taiwan's bid to 'join' and 're-join' 
the UN, the second one is a useless, bogus referendum that is meant 
to spoil the situation only; it has never been the real focus of 
this controversy.  As for the really meaningful UN referendum 
[proposed by the DPP], it has always been the target of China's 
strong pressure, which was exerted via the United States both openly 
and under the table.  But the DPP sent a total of 2.72 million of 
signatures it has collected for its referendum to the Central 
Election Commission on November 28, and the day was marked as a 
watershed, indicating that there is no turning back for the [UN] 
referendum ... 
 
"Prior to November 28, the United States might still hope that 
Taiwan would apply the brakes on the UN referendum.  But after that 
day, when such anticipation was gone, what faced [the United States] 
was how it would handle the situation carefully, particularly when 
it involves Washington's own regional interests!  Young did not 
mention any names [in his speech] yesterday, but indistinctly he 
seemed to be very stern with President Chen; those who are unaware 
of the situation might mistake him for the U.S. governor-general in 
Taiwan.  Yet Young said he hopes that the new Taiwan president 
elected in 2008 will create a new situation via negotiation [with 
Beijing].  Young was non-committal, while at the same time he 
provided a vision for both sides of the Taiwan Strait; the 
significance that lies within his speech was quite 
thought-provoking.  Young seemed to have bundled the UN referendum 
with one single person and then drawn a line between that person and 
Taiwan.  Without a doubt, he was focusing all [the U.S.] complaints 
on one certain 'political figure.'  The way he dealt with it was 
quite self-consoling, and yet it has left more room for maneuver for 
the United States, particularly when it comes to its future 
management of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. ..." 
 
B) "How to Maintain the Status Quo for a Hundred Years?  Beijing 
Should Make It Clear:  Maintaining the Status Quo Is to Maintain the 
Republic of China" 
 
The pro-unification "United Daily News" [circulation: 400,000] 
editorialized (12/4): 
 
"One of the main reasons why [people] can still manipulate the 
Taiwan independence issue is that the Beijing authorities have never 
been able to define precisely the 'Republic of China.'  If Beijing 
fails to put the ROC in a proper perspective, leaving the Taiwan 
people to feel that the ROC is intolerable for Beijing, there will 
be room for manipulating Taiwan independence.  The 'UN referendum' 
is an evident example.  The psychological appeal behind the 'UN 
referendum' was actually not about advocating that 'Taiwan is able 
to join the UN.'  On the contrary, it was meant to ridicule [the 
fact that] 'the ROC was kicked out of the UN.'  All assertions 
regarding Taiwan independence are quite similar.  Their key point 
was to highlight the negative effects of 'the ROC being bullied and 
 
 
oppressed by China,' but they may not necessarily be able to point 
out the positive discourse or strategies about 'how the Republic of 
Taiwan is able to survive.' ... 
 
"The Beijing authorities have adjusted their cross-Strait discourse 
over the past few years:  First, to maintain the status quo 
naturally implies that they will 'accept the ROC.'  Second, they no 
longer press for unification, meaning that they have accepted the 
status quo that 'both sides of the Taiwan Strait have yet to unify.' 
 Third, the 'one China' [principle] has changed from the 'future 
tense' to 'present tense,' turning it into a theory that 'both 
mainland China and Taiwan belong to one China.'  One can pretty much 
see a complete structure of 'one China with different 
interpretations' in this new cross-Strait discourse of Beijing.  But 
the question is whether Beijing can further clarify the entire 
structure and spell things out more clearly. ..." 
 
YOUNG