VZCZCXRO2325
PP RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHAB #1227/01 3481749
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 141749Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3826
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ABIDJAN 001227 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
FOR H K.MOODY, AF/W E.PLUMB 
DOL FOR T.RASA, D.GARMS 
DEPARTMENT PASS TO USTR C. HAMILTON 
USAID FOR C. GARRETT, S. SWIFT 
EMBASSY ACCRA FOR B.SHUKIN, S.BROWN,AMB.BRIDGEWATER 
TREASURY FOR D. PETERS 
COMMERCE FOR M. RIVERO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EAGR PREL PGOV EAID ELAB EIND IV
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR HARKIN CODEL JANUARY 7-9 VISIT TO 
COTE D'IVOIRE 
 
REF: ABIDJAN 1219 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Embassy Abidjan warmly welcomes your visit to Cote 
d'Ivoire.  Yours will be the second recent visit of 
high-level U.S. government officials, following the November 
visit of Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte. We 
believe your visit will be viewed as a sign of increased USG 
interest in seeing Cote d'Ivoire return to its former 
prosperity and political stability.  Senator Harkin's and 
Representative Engle's role in developing and implementing an 
international public/provate accord (The "Harkin-Engle 
Protocol") is well-known here, and your visit will be an 
excellent opportunity to underscore the interest of the 
American people in seeing sustained progress in eliminating 
the worst forms of child labor in Cote d'Ivoire. 
 
Political Situation 
---------- 
¶2.  (SBU)  The overall security situation has improved since 
the signing of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA) but 
there is still widespread uncertainty about the future. 
Reportedly the result of direct negotiations between the 
government and rebel forces, the OPA was facilitated by 
President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso and signed by Cote 
d'Ivoire's two primary protagonists (President Gbagbo and now 
Prime Minister Soro) in March 2007.  It is a viable roadmap 
for the country's emergence from the political crisis but the 
pace of implementation has been slow and uneven.    The USG 
is very positively viewed in Cote d'Ivoire great influence; 
in a poll taken within the last 12 months, 
the U.S. was favorably viewed by 88 percent of Ivorians. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  The question of nationality or "Ivoirite", is at 
the heart of the political stalemate.  A substantial number 
of individuals (estimates range from 300,000 to 3 million) 
are currently undocumented as Ivorians and are thus unable to 
participate fully in Ivorian society where the possession of 
a national ID card governs a broad swath of activities, 
including eligibility to vote and to own land for 
agricultural cultivation.  A majority of those who are 
undocumented have family ties to Burkina Faso and were 
initially welcomed into the northern region of Cote d'Ivoire 
as much-needed laborers in the cocoa sector.  While Cote 
d'Ivoire's founding father and first president 
Houphouet-Boigny took a very liberal approach to integrating 
this group into Ivorian society; his successors (Bedie and 
Guei) actively promoted a more restrictive approach, 
including changes to the constitution that emphasized the 
national divisions between north and south and between 
Christian and Muslim.  The 2002 coup attempt, which quickly 
evolved into an armed rebellion that split the country in 
two, underscored the depth of emotion attached to this 
question. Definitive reunification of the country and the 
restoration of government authority throughout the national 
territory will be difficult to achieve unless the issue of 
nationality is dealt with in a manner acceptable to both 
sides. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  The "audiences foraines" or public tribunals 
called for in the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (and several 
previous peace agreements) are intended to facilitate voter 
registration and the eventual issuance of ID-cards to those 
who qualify by providing numerous fora at which persons whose 
births were never registered are issued birth documentation 
(jugements suppletifs).  In recent weeks, the pace of the 
work done by the audiences foraines has picked up, but 
numbers processed remain below 100,000.  In both 2005 and 
2006, then-Prime Minister Banny attempted to get the process 
underway, but radical and sometimes violent supporters of the 
President succeeded each time in derailing the audiences 
foraines and stalling the overall peace process.  The 
political stakes are high for PM Soro to deliver a credible 
identity program for his constituency in the North. 
 
Child Labor Situation 
--------- 
¶5.  (SBU)  Prompted in large measure by the Harkin-Engle 
Protocol, the government of Cote d'Ivoire, working with 
international industry and a number of bilateral development 
agencies and international Non-Governmental Organizations, 
has implemented a variety of programs and conducted a number 
 
ABIDJAN 00001227  002 OF 004 
 
 
of surveys addressing the worst forms of child labor. 
Several diagnostic studies have been completed, the most 
recent a preliminary study conducted by the Prime Minister's 
interministerial taskforce (supported by the international 
industry) published November 30.  It found that 22 percent of 
children in the sample region are involved in cocoa 
production, and a majority of them are involved in one of the 
worst forms of child labor, carrying heavy loads.  The rest 
of the report demonstrates that the cocoa-growing sector is 
composed of hundreds of thousands of relatively small 
family-owned and operated farms, many, if not most, operated 
by non-indigenous peoples from the northern part of Cote 
d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Mali and other countries in the 
region who have settled and formed communities in the 
southern cocoa-growing belt.  The survey shows the great 
majority of children involved in farm labor are members 
(either immediate or extended) of the farm owner's family. 
This pilot survey will be scaled up and conducted throughout 
at least 50 percent of the country's cocoa-growing regions in 
the coming months. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The government of Cote d'Ivoire has also adopted a 
National Plan of Action Against Child Trafficking and Labor 
(drafted by the Ministry of Labor) that will run from 
September 2007 through December 2009.  The plan's overall 
objectives are: to adopt laws specifically prohibiting these 
practices, to determine the scope of the problem, and to take 
measures to prevent these practices and to reintegrate 
victims into society.  The plan relies substantially on the 
continued engagement of international actors.  The following 
is a list of some (but not all) of the more imporant groups 
and international agencies involved in the campaign against 
the worst forms of child labor and some of their activities: 
 
International Labor Organization - Supports a variety of 
NGOs, activities, including LUTRENA (see below) 
International Organization of Migration - This group 
occasionally offers return/reintegration assistance to 
victims of trafficking, particularly women and children. 
UNICEF - Engaged in repatriation of trafficked youth to their 
home countries. 
The International Cocoa Foundation - This group, an 
industry/NGO initiative, implements locally-based 
sensitization campaigns teaching cocoa families and youth 
about the negative effects of the worst forms of child labor. 
The Sustainable Tree Crops Program - This group, funded by 
industry and USAID, promotes the farmer field school model, 
which teaches farmers ways to improve their income through 
higher yield, while also educating them about the worst forms 
of child labor. 
GTZ - This group, the German equivalent to USAID, implements 
campaigns to train judges and prosecutors about child 
trafficking; creates and supports regional and village 
anti-trafficking committees in coordination with local 
prefects (these have seen some notable recent success in 
detecting cross-border child trafficking); creating an 
anti-trafficking and anti-worst forms of child labor radio 
campaign conducted on the country's rural radio network in 
local languages. 
LUTRENA - This is an ILO-USAID funded regional project 
designed to remove 9,000 children from trafficking situations 
and prevent other cases from occurring.  LUTRENA in Cote 
d'Ivoire implements programs in the field to detect 
trafficking of children in coordination with government 
authorities. 
CARE - This group engages in reinsertion and reintegration of 
trafficked youth. 
Winrock International - This group runs a modest program 
encouraging cocoa farm families to send their children to 
school, and incorporates agronomy studies in the curriculum. 
International Foundation for Education and Self Help - This 
group runs a modest literacy program for cocoa farmers, with 
a strong component directed towards educating against the 
worst forms of child labor 
Enfance Meturie Sans Frontieres (Injured Childhood Without 
Borders) - This group works to remove children from 
trafficking networks. 
Bureau International Catholique de l'Enfance (Catholic 
Children's Organization) - This group works to recover 
children from trafficking networks. 
 
 
ABIDJAN 00001227  003 OF 004 
 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  A preliminary study of efforts to monitor and 
eliminate WFCL, done by Tulane University's Payson Center 
(under a grant from the DOL) provided an initial review of 
the multiple efforts to assess and end WFCL. 
 
Economic Overview 
-------- 
¶8.  (C)  The lack of a clear resolution to Cote d' Ivoire's 
political crisis has had a predictably negative effect on 
many parts of the economy.  The key issue for the donor 
community, however, has been the lack of transparency in 
government revenues (cocoa, oil and gas) as well as the use 
of those revenues.  The government's fiscal performance has 
deteriorated over the past five years due to pressure to 
increase crisis-related expenditures (such as defense) an 
eroding tax base, and a worsening lack of transparency in the 
budget.  Spending on health and education 
fell as a share of GDP while discretionary presidential 
spending rose.  The government revenues from oil remain 
undetermined, and are not reported in the national budget. 
Since 2002, domestic and external debt arrears have 
increased, prompting the World Bank, the IMF and the AfDB to 
suspend engagement until July 2007 when an arrears clearance 
package was negotiated.  This package works in conjunction 
with a post-conflict assistance package from the World Bank, 
IMF and African Development Bank to support  DDR 
(disarmament, demobilization, and 
reintegration) assistance, aid to the national identification 
program, and redeployment of the national administration 
throughout the country. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Economic activity in general remains sluggish and 
per capita income has slumped. Overall GDP grew by 1.8 
percent in 2006, a slight recovery over 2005; growth in 2007 
is projected to be 2 percent.  This growth can be attributed 
primarily to higher export earning from oil and refined 
products (now $1.3 billion annually, reasonably steady cocoa 
revenues ($1 billion) and proceeds form an expanding 
telecommunications sector.  However, the majority of the 
population is not better off.  Per capita income declined by 
0.6 percent in 2005 and 0.7 percent in 2006; a 0.2 percent 
drop is predicted for 2007.  Economic activity in the north 
of the country remains well below pre-crisis levels. 
Inflation has not been an issue until recently; the average 
consumer price rise was about on-half a percent from 
2004-2006. Rising oil prices have increased transportation 
costs and the exchange rate has accelerated in recent months 
in line with the Euro's appreciation vis-a-vis the dollar. 
 
¶10.  (U)  The hardships brought on by the division of the 
country, including food insecurity in the north, triggered a 
substantial movement of people from north to south; several 
hundred thousand have been internally displaced since 2002. 
The result has been a significant increase in poverty. 
According to World Bank estimates, the poverty level has 
increased 5 percent, from 38.2 percent in 2002 at the onset 
of the crisis to 43.2 percent in 2006. The absence of a 
central government public administration severely compromised 
the delivery of health, education, and other services. 
 
¶11. (SBU)  The cotton and cocoa sectors support some 9 
million people, nearly half the population; cotton output 
dropped by more than 50 percent since 2000.  Cocoa output has 
remained essentially stable, hovering at the 1 million ton 
mark since 2000, with a slight dip to 950,000 in the 2002-03 
harvest.  International industry and Ivorian shipping 
companies estimate that up to 200,000 tons of cocoa per year 
have been transshipped through Ghana and Togo to evade 
artificially low prices since 2000, but those numbers appear 
to have come down since 2006.  Modest improvements in 
economic activity have been noted since the signature of the 
OPA, and civil servants are beginning to return but huge 
challenges loom ahead.   Foremost among those will be the 
government's ability to demonstrate to foreign investors that 
both political stability and an investor-friendly environment 
have been restored. It would be helpful for you to highlight 
in your meetings with President Gbagbo and PM Soro that 
getting the economic climate right is as critical to 
restoring investor confidence as political stability. 
 
Bilateral Assistance and Sanctions 
 
ABIDJAN 00001227  004 OF 004 
 
 
---------- 
¶12.  (SBU)  Cote d' Ivoire has been under Section 508 
sanctions since the December 1999 coup that removed Henri 
Bedie from power.  Sanctions were not lifted following the 
2000 election due to government interference in the election 
with the intent of manipulating the results.  Cote d'Ivoire 
was suspended from AGOA benefits on January 1, 2005, due to 
an Ivorian government decision to violate the UN-monitored 
cease-fire in November 2004 and lack of progress on key 
economic reforms.  A credible election and substantial 
progress in meeting IMF/World Bank transparency goals would 
pave the way for a resumption of aid. In the interim, a very 
small bilateral assistance program focused on electoral 
preparation (involving NDI and IFES) is directed from USAID's 
West African Regional Program based in Accra. 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  One of the few very bright spots in the US-Cote 
d'Ivoire relationship has been our PEPFAR program. 
Cote d'Ivoire is one of 15 focus countries that receives 
funds for HIV/AIDs prevention, education, and treatment; the 
USG is by far the largest supporter of HIV/AIDs activities in 
Cote d Ivoire and of the health sector in general. In 2007, 
the PEPFAR program here received $85 million; we expect an 
increase to about $120 million in FY 08.  Ensuring the proper 
use of these funds is a central focus of our PEPFAR team.  We 
have made remarkable strides in terms of expanding treatment 
and ware working to improve joint efforts with the government 
of Cote d' Ivoire to tackle ongoing issues with stigma and 
HIV/AIDs education/prevention activities. 
NESBITT