Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07WELLINGTON806, NEW ZEALAND TO REMAIN TOUGH ON BURMA

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07WELLINGTON806.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07WELLINGTON806 2007-11-09 01:45 2011-04-28 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Wellington
VZCZCXRO2134
PP RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHWL #0806 3130145
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 090145Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4877
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0373
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 5029
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0173
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0149
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0673
RUEHDN/AMCONSUL SYDNEY PRIORITY 0603
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0103
C O N F I D E N T I A L WELLINGTON 000806 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/ANP, EAP/MLS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2017 
TAGS: PREL PHUM ASEAN BM NZ
SUBJECT: NEW ZEALAND TO REMAIN TOUGH ON BURMA 
 
REF: A. A) STATE 148530 
     B. B) STATE 148528 
 
Classified By: Pol/Econ Counselor Margaret McKean; Reason 1.4 (b) (d) 
 
1.  (C)  Pol/Econ Counselor met on November 5 with Bernadette 
Cavanaugh, the newly arrived head of the SouQast Asian 
office at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) to 
discuss Burma and next steps for the GNZ.  Cavanagh related 
that her office has been working on a proposal for the 
government that outlines various ideas to remain engaged on 
Burma.  She underscored that PM Helen Clark has been clear 
that New Zealand will raise Burma at every appropriate 
bilateral and multilateral meeting, and at all levels.  The 
PM plans to discuss Burma at the East Asian Summit Leaders 
lunch.  During the recent ARF intersessional meeting Brunei, 
Burma was a topic of discussion, according to Cavanaugh. 
 
2.  (C)  Raising Burma to the level of the Security Council 
would be a new step for New Zealand, allowed Cavanaugh, but 
New Zealand is looking at a variety of options.  Regarding 
sanctions, absent a Chapter 7 resolution, New Zealand 
domestic law does not allow imposition of sanctions. 
However, the violence in Burma has underscored to the 
government that there may be instances where New Zealand may 
want to impose sanctions without the benefit of a UNSC 
resolution.  Therefore, the government has asked MFAT's legal 
division to examine if New Zealand might usefully be amended 
to allow for such a possibility.  The legal division has also 
been asked to discuss the matter with other partner 
governments. 
3.  (C)  Cavanagh reported that the GNZ assesses the most 
useful avenues for positive action on Burma are China, India, 
and the ASEAN countries.  To that end, New Zealand missions 
in China and New Delhi and in those ASEAN capitals where New 
Zealand has a diplomatic presence were asked last week to 
demarche the Foreign Ministries in capitals regarding Burma, 
said Cavanaugh.  In all instances, New Zealand officials 
pressed host country governments to do more as well as stated 
New Zealand's position that the issue should to go to the 
Security Council.  In Beijing, Chinese authorities reportedly 
told New Zealand interlocutors that China believed that 
Gambari was doing a good job and to allow him to continue to 
work.  In New Delhi, the New Zealand embassy's attempts to 
schedule a meeting with the Foreign Ministry have been 
rebuffed; Cavanaugh opined that their mission believed Indian 
officials were trying to avoid discussing Burma. 
 
4.  (C)  New Zealand's assistance program to Burma amounts to 
roughly NZ$500,000, with all of it going through 
international agencies such as UNDP and WFP.  The GNZ is 
examining if any of that money is more available to Burmese 
officials as opposed to the public.  There are also a small 
number (approximately 6) English-language training 
scholarships and roughly a dozen other scholarships; the GNZ 
is also analyzing if those benefit officials or their 
families. 
 
5.  (C)  Finally, New Zealand has put off indefinitely its 
ASEAN dialogue meeting, originally scheduled for later this 
year.  New Zealand is Burma's dialogue partner, and the GNZ 
has informed other ASEAN countries that there will be no 
meeting with ASEAN because of Burma.  Initial reaction within 
ASEAN has been positive, and Cavanaugh acknowledged that 
pressure on New Zealand to schedule a meeting may materialize 
in the future, as there remains 18 months before the rotation 
to Malaysia -- a long time without a dialogue meeting between 
ASEAN and New Zealand. 
 
6.  (C)  P/E Counselor noted that the Asian Pacific 
Parliamentary Forum (APPF) would be meeting in January 2008, 
and that might be a useful venue for discussions on Burma, 
particularly with those ASEAN countries represented. 
Cavanaugh responded that the APPF was a useful idea and 
agreed to include it in the MFAT proposal to government. 
Cavanaugh offered to provide a readout to us regarding New 
Zealand's discussions on Burma at the EAS 
 
McCormick