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E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP UP FOR 
OPCW EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SESSION, NOVEMBER 27-28, 2007 
(EC-51) 
 
REF: STATE 159645 
 
(U) This is CWC-90-70 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (U) Despite being a much shorter session than normal (a 
day and a half as opposed to the usual four), Executive 
Council 51 did manage to clear several lingering issues 
from the Council agenda, including a decision on late 
declarations shepherded through by U.S. facilitator Larry 
Denyer and several lists of validated data for the OPCW 
Central Analytical Database.  Following so closely on the 
heels of the Conference of States Parties, this EC was 
characterized not by a flurry of consultations, but by an 
unnecessarily protracted debate on the report of the EC 
visit to the Anniston Chemical Weapons Destruction 
Facility.  The documents for the Russian facility at 
Maradykovsky, and the U.S. facilities at Newport and Pine 
Bluff were deferred to the next EC. However, by requesting 
an opinion from the Legal Advisor, the U.S. Delegation did 
get one set of Pine Bluff modifications noted and off the 
agenda.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------------- 
STREAMLINING THE EC AGENDA 
-------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) At the request of the U.S. Delegation, the agenda 
items on Article VII implementation (5. d), Article XI (5. 
e), and Universality (5, f) were deleted from the agenda. 
At the request of the South African delegation, the agenda 
(7) on the OPCW Office in Africa was also deleted from the 
agenda.  In both cases, delegations noted the recent 
actions by the Conference of States Parties.  Iran voiced 
initial skepticism at the deletion, but acquiesced to 
consensus when the Secretariat noted that there were 
precedents for the deletion and that it would not prejudice 
any future discussion of the matters. 
 
-------------- 
GENERAL DEBATE 
-------------- 
 
¶3. (U) General debate was short, with only five delegations 
making statements: Cuba (on behalf of the NAM and China), 
South Africa (on behalf of the Africa Group), Portugal (on 
behalf of the EU and others), China and the U.S.  Of note 
were two elements of the EU statement.  The first was an 
expression of concern "regarding aspects of the procedures 
and methods adopted to reach agreement on several issues" 
and noting "we must ensure that informal negotiation does 
not replace either the role of the appointed facilitators, 
or preclude a representative mix of states parties drawn 
from the regional groups."  This was a clear reference to 
the dissatisfaction expressed by many WEOG members 
immediately following the CSP regarding the lead role the 
U.S. took in the final stages of negotiation, to the 
perceived exclusion of other interested delegations.  The 
second element was an endorsement by the EU of the DG,s 
statement at EC-49 regarding destruction at Maradykovsky; 
the EU statement included a clear reference to Article IV 
of the Convention. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
DETAILED PLANS FOR CWDF VERIFICATION AND FACILITY 
AGREEMENTS 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶4. (U) Following the mutually agreed request to the Chair 
by Russia and the U.S., the agenda items on the Newport 
detailed verification plan (5.1), the Maradykovsky detailed 
verification plan (5.2), the Newport facility agreement 
amendments (5.19 and 5.20), and the Maradykovsky facility 
agreement (5.21) were all deferred to the next regular 
 
 
session of the EC.  Russia also requested that the Pine 
Bluff Binary detailed verification plan (5.3) and Pine 
Bluff Binary facility agreement modifications (5.23) be 
deferred. 
 
¶5. (U) In an effort to break at least some of the documents 
free from the Maradykovsky/Newport stalemate, the U.S. 
explained that sub-items 5.22 and 5.23 were simply 
modifications to attachments, and as such did not require 
Council approval.  The U.S. noted that no recommendations 
for revisions or expressions of concern had been made to 
date, and recommended that the EC-51 report state that the 
documents had been considered, and that they then be 
removed from the EC agenda.  Russia stated that it did not 
agree with this interpretation of Council action.  The U.S. 
requested a formal opinion from the Legal Advisor.  India 
noted the importance of resolving whether Council was 
necessary or not, at this session. 
 
¶6. (U) Legal Advisor Onate later gave his formal 
concurrence with the U.S. position.  The modifications to 
the Pine Bluff Chemical Agent Disposal Facility were then 
noted.  Continued Russian deferral of the Pine Bluff Binary 
modifications was undercut somewhat by the U.S. 
announcement of completion of destruction operations at the 
secondary treatment facility for PBBDF.  Del will request 
that the following statement, read during the debate on 
this item, be circulated as an official document. 
 
BEGIN STATEMENT.  The United States is pleased to report 
that as of yesterday, November 27, 2007, we have completed 
destruction operations at the Treatment Storage and 
Disposal Facility for the Pine Bluff Binary Destruction 
Facility.  The Technical Secretariat will conduct one more 
inspection at this location in early December to confirm 
the completeness of destruction. 
 
As we stated Tuesday morning, the U.S. has completed the 
destruction of all parts, components, munitions, and 
chemicals associated with the most modern chemical weapons 
system ever developed by the United States.  All former 
production facilities associated with the production of 
these systems have also been destroyed.  This marks a 
significant milestone for both the United States and the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, and is yet another 
demonstration of our commitment to the goals and objectives 
of the Convention, to rid the world of the threat of use of 
chemical weapons. END OF STATEMENT. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
CONVERSION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶7. (U) All four of the DG,s notes on Russian Conversion 
progress were noted (Agenda item 5 b). Germany took the 
floor to state that Russia had missed the original 
conversion deadline in 2003 and urged Russia to make every 
effort to complete conversion as soon as possible. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
PROGRESS REPORTS IN MEETING REVISED DEADLINES 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (U) Under agenda items 5.8, 5.11, and 5.14, the Council 
noted national papers by Libya, the United States, China, 
and Japan. Unlike EC-50, Iran agreed without comment to 
note the U.S. report, but still insisted upon chapeau 
language in the report belaboring its standard point about 
the obligation of possessor states to destroy within 
extended deadlines.  Russia expressed irritation from the 
floor at the unnecessary repetition of this text, but did 
not contest it. 
 
-------------- 
ANNISTON VISIT 
-------------- 
 
 
¶9. (SBU) BACKGROUND TO THE REPORT.  Following the visit 
itself in October, the TS drafted the group,s report, 
working closely with the U.S. behind the scenes so that 
several issues of characterization were resolved without 
the drafting group,s knowledge.  By the time the U.S. had 
its "first look" at the draft report, the only substantive 
issue seemed to be the unusual highlighting of a specific 
passage through the use of direct quotation.  The sentence 
in question dealt with the U.S. position that Schedule 2B 
chemicals generated by a destruction process must also be 
destroyed, and had evidently been the subject of much 
debate between the Russian Federation and the rest of the 
delegation.  Del noted its concern that the report not be 
used as a stage for unrelated policy debates, and also that 
elements clearly covered by a U.S. presentation not be 
omitted simply because they differed with Russian policy. 
 
¶10. (U) Although this draft had been presented as final, Del 
was surprised to receive a new version very shortly before 
the EC session that had further highlighted the text in 
question by relegating it to a footnote.  After offering a 
possible alternative that was rejected by Russia, Del met 
with the EC visit delegation to express its appreciation 
for their work in drafting, but its concern at the 
inappropriately heavy hand one delegation had in the 
drafting.  However, to avoid further delays in distribution 
and to set a positive precedent in terms of minimal host 
State Party interference with the drafting, the U.S. 
allowed distribution of the new version, but attached 
comments as follow: 
 
QUOTE.  In accordance with C-11/DEC.20, the U.S. has had 
the opportunity to review the draft report, and in keeping 
with this decision attaches written comments below: 
 
The United States would like to express its appreciation 
for the efforts of the Chairman of the Executive Council, 
the EC delegation, and the Technical Secretariat in 
preparing for, conducting, and reporting the results of the 
first visit of an Executive Council delegation to a U.S. 
destruction facility.  We believe that these visits are and 
will continue to be a useful exercise in building 
confidence and transparency regarding the efforts of States 
Parties to destroy their chemical weapons stockpiles. 
 
Footnote 2 - The U.S. believes that the report should, 
first and foremost, be an accurate and comprehensive 
reflection of all topics covered in the presentations and 
discussions.  In this case, neither U.S. participants nor 
members of the Council delegation have been able to confirm 
that this is, in fact, a verbatim quotation.  While this 
footnote may not reflect the precise words of Dr. Hopkins, 
it does accurately reflect United States policy.  Both the 
use of quotation marks and relegation of this statement to 
a footnote were, as we understand it, done to satisfy one 
government whose objection was that the U.S. view reflected 
was inconsistent with its own.  UNQUOTE. 
 
¶11. (U)  Agenda item 5.12, the report of the EC visit to the 
Anniston CWDF, was not discussed until the final hours of 
EC-51.  The text, with U.S. comments, was distributed on 
November 28 at 11:30 after a recess in the morning session 
(to finish reproduction of the text).  The EC Chair made no 
formal introduction of the report except to read the agenda 
item and suggest immediately that due to its late 
distribution consideration of the report be deferred to the 
following session.  Ambassador Javits noted that time 
should be allowed for any initial comments delegations 
might wish to make, and he read the following statement. 
 
QUOTE.  The United States would like to express its 
appreciation for the efforts of the EC Chair, the EC 
delegation, and the Technical Secretariat - not only in the 
drafting of this report, but also in the preparations for 
and conduct of the visit to Anniston. 
 
As envisioned by CSP-11/DEC.20, the U.S. had the 
 
 
opportunity to review the draft report of the visit early 
last week.  We commend the group on its hard work in 
drafting.  Overall, it seems to us to be a balanced and 
accurate reflection of the EC visit. 
 
We did express concern about one phrase in particular that, 
unlike any other, had been placed in quotation marks.  This 
was apparently done to accommodate the concerns of one 
delegation regarding a difference in interpretation of the 
treaty.  We noted that neither we, nor the group, were able 
to confirm that this was an accurate transcription of Dr. 
Hopkins, words, and thus questioned the use of quotation 
marks.  We even suggested an alternative formulation which 
would capture the essence of the presentation but that we 
hoped would be less objectionable.  In this final version, 
the quotation has been retained, and relegated to a 
footnote. 
 
We view the role of the host State Party in the review 
process as one of ensuring that the contents of the draft 
report are factually accurate, and a comprehensive 
reflection of the presentations, discussions and activities 
of the visit.  It is not our desire to alter the text or 
change the message of the report.  We do, however, wish to 
emphasize that the report of a Council visit should not be 
used as a vehicle to raise or contest policy issues 
unrelated to the purpose of the visits.  Presentations by 
U.S. officials reflect U.S. policy, and in no way prejudge 
the actions or opinions of the Council.  Since this is the 
case, issues that were covered by the host State Party in 
some detail should not be omitted from the report or 
subjected to protracted drafting exercises simply because 
they are deemed controversial or are not in accordance with 
the policy of a single participant. 
 
In conclusion, we would like to again express our 
appreciation to all involved in the visit and the drafting 
of this report - we believe that on the whole it did an 
excellent job accurately reflecting the events of the visit 
and the observations and conclusions of the delegation, and 
trust that future reports will do the same.  END QUOTE. 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  DEL COMMENTS.  From the delays and debate 
surrounding the drafting and distribution of the report, 
Del would offer several observations for future visits. 
First, the report was drafted by the Technical Secretariat 
and discussed initially with the group weeks after the 
visit itself.  As the lengthy debate and final report 
proved, the collective memory after such a period was less 
than accurate and led to inaccurate and unnecessary 
quotations attributed to U.S. officials.  Del would 
strongly recommend that delegations on future visits 
accomplish the majority of the drafting before conclusion 
of the visit. 
 
¶13. (U) In addition, Del learned that a good deal of the 
drafting seems to have been done by proxy, with members of 
the Delegation sending alternates to drafting meetings here 
in The Hague.  Given the difficulty the group seems to have 
had in agreeing on what presentations actually covered and 
how to portray these topics, the substitution of 
individuals who had nothing to do with the visit is 
inappropriate in drafting sessions.  This too could be 
resolved by insisting that the report be drafted on site 
prior to the delegation,s departure.  END COMMENT. 
 
--------------------------------- 
TIMELY SUBMISSION OF DECLARATIONS 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (U) This decision (EC-M-27/DEC/CRP.4/Rev.2, dated 26 
November 2007), representing the work of the consultations 
conducted by Larry Denyer (US Del), was adopted without 
discussion.  Because the language in the provisional agenda 
indicated that this decision contained recommendations to 
the CSP, the fact that this would be and now is a stand- 
alone EC decision was made clear by the EC Chair when he 
 
 
presented it to the Council. 
 
-------------------------------- 
OPCW CENTRAL ANALYTICAL DATABASE 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶15. (U) After deferral from several previous sessions, the 
EC approved the addition of new lists of validated data to 
the OPCW Central Analytical Database (OCAD) and the removal 
of other data from the OCAD. 
 
------------------------------------ 
ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL MATTERS 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶16. (U)  The report by the Director General on OPCW income 
and expenditure for the financial year to 30 September 2007 
and the TS Note on the Verification Information System were 
noted.  The EC "received" the Note to the External Auditor 
with regard to the contingency margin. 
 
------- 
CLOSURE 
------- 
 
¶17. (U) The EC closed just after noon on November 28.  The 
report was adopted with no discussion except the Russian 
comment noted above on the Iranian chapeau on destruction 
deadlines.  No other business items were proposed. 
 
------------------ 
BILATERAL MEETINGS 
------------------ 
 
¶18. (SBU) The UK requested a meeting with Del Reps, the 
primary purpose of which seemed to be to review the outcome 
of the Amman Workshop and to probe for any developments in 
a possible U.S. approach to the topic of "non-lethals" at 
the Review Conference.  However, the UK also expressed an 
interest in U.S. discussions with the Libyans during the 
last EC, and requested clarification as to whether the U.S. 
was interested in reviving the Trilateral Steering 
Committee process.  The UK noted its view that this might 
not be the best time to do so, but also that it is likely 
to accept a Libyan offer to a UK embassy officer in Tripoli 
to facilitate a UK visit to Rabta.  The UK believes this 
could provide useful insight into the progress of 
conversion of the former CWPF, and indicated that if the 
U.S. were interested, it would request that the Libyan 
invitation be extended to the U.S. as well.  UK reps also 
noted that this offer would probably be made more formally 
from London to Washington in the near future. 
 
¶19. (U) Russian MFA rep Anna Lukashina requested an informal 
meeting with U.S. Del Rep to discuss possible goals and 
interests for the Review Conference.  Lukashina noted the 
Russian view that the Review Conference should do just that 
- review the past five years of the operations of the 
Organization (as opposed to spending too much time on new 
initiatives), and possibly suggest improvements in some 
areas, or a return to "unresolved issues" (citing Challenge 
Inspections as one example).  Lukashina also underlined the 
importance of the General Purpose Criterion.  She added 
that Russia is in the process of internal government 
discussions to develop its Revcon strategy, and asked where 
the U.S. was in its preparations and whether it intended to 
submit national papers.  Del Rep explained that the U.S. is 
also engaged in internal discussions and has submitted 
national papers on a number of the Revcon Working Group 
topics over the course of the year, and suggested that a 
more detailed discussion might be possible early next year. 
 
¶20.  (U) Javits sends. 
Arnall