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UNCLAS THE HAGUE 001963 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S, 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR LEDDY 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP UP FOR THE 
TWO WEEKS ENDING NOVEMBER 2, 2007 
 
This is CWC-87-07. 
 
 
------------------------------------ 
INDUSTRY CLUSTER ) LATE DECLARATIONS 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶1. (U) During the October 19 consultation (at which Iran was 
noticeably absent), significant progress was made on a draft 
decision.  As a result, the facilitator (Larry Denyer, Del) 
prepared a new draft to reflect the general consensus 
achieved during this most meeting.  Based on subsequent 
consultations with the TS, the facilitator, rather than 
holding another consultation during which Iran would just 
destroy the recently reached consensus, met with a member of 
the staff of EC Vice-Chair for the Industry Cluster (Amb. 
Dani, Algeria) to explain the current situation.  The 
Algerian rep expressed the willingness of his ambassador to 
intervene with Iran if need be but suggested that, as a first 
step, someone other the facilitator could show the Iranian 
delegation a copy of the consensus text to see how they 
reacted.  If a meeting of the Executive Council is called 
during the CSP, the Vice Chair should ask that this draft 
decision be added to the agenda.  If Iran has concerns, they 
have the option of asking that the decision be deferred to a 
later EC, a result not significantly different than if they 
caused trouble during a new consultation. 
 
------------ 
UNIVERSALITY 
------------ 
 
¶2. (U) On October 26 and 29, Said Moussi (Algeria) chaired 
consultations to work through draft decision text on 
Universality.  These meetings were followed by an informal 
gathering of interested parties on October 31 to break 
through the growing deadlock on a number of points.  The 
November 1 consultations saw a new approach adopted by a 
number of delegations, including Iran.  Noticeable progress 
was made in agreeing on most operative paragraphs of the 
text; however, the preambular language still will need work, 
which could prolong negotiations on a final text. 
 
----------- 
ARTICLE VII 
----------- 
 
¶3. (U) On October 30 and November 1, Kimmo Laukkanen 
(Finland) chaired consultations to draft decision text for 
the upcoming CSP on Article VII.  Rather than continue with 
protracted arguments about preambular language, the decision 
was made to focus on the operative paragraphs about the 
specific recommendations (from the EC), after which 
appropriate preambular language would be finalized.  Albeit a 
good plan, there are still significant differences between 
delegations about what should be done.  Iran has still not 
agreed to the general assumption that a decision is needed 
and has made it clear that they prefer report language only 
that would roll-over the existing action plan. 
 
¶4. (U) Of particular note and concern, during the October 30 
consultation, Cuba made a general comment about their 
national commitment to continuing this process and then 
proceeded to read a prepared statement on behalf of the NAM 
and China.  (Del has forwarded a copy of the statement to 
ISN.)  This statement opposed the idea of &redress8 (see OP 
2), encouraged sticking closely to the action plan and 
C-10/DEC.16, and called for no distinction between States 
Parties (SPs) regarding assistance.  Iran and India 
associated themselves with the NAM statement.  Other 
delegations (e.g., Mexico) expressed similar concerns (and 
provided constructive text suggestions) but were careful not 
to align themselves with the NAM statement. 
 
¶5. (U) Several WEOG delegations, along with Russia, called 
for a decision that was no weaker than previous decisions. 
Russia was particularly insistent that they would not support 
any language that implied that the Article VII situation had 
improved significantly and as such warranted any lesser 
 
effort or focus.  This group also promoted the role of the EC 
(and its Chair) in overseeing this effort alongside the DG, 
but not the DG alone.  Korea pointed to individual national 
plans and called for SPs to set specific, realistic goals. 
 
¶6. (U) India and Iran also discussed the relative priority of 
the CWC in some SPs, given their large list of priorities 
(e.g., poverty, health challenges, domestic volatility, 
etc.), while pointing out the differences in legislative 
processes and how focusing on draft legislation was 
inappropriate.  Del rep pointed to the prominent place draft 
legislation has in TS reporting (based on EC requests) and 
that this data is what we have to indicate progress and 
propose next steps.  Iran continued to insist that the budget 
parameters be referenced in the text on assistance, obviously 
laying the groundwork for decimating future budgets for 
Article VII assistance (especially if a decision is not 
reached) in deference to their priorities (e.g., Article XI). 
 Iran and India also questioned TS reporting methods 
(particularly that maintained on the external server) and 
whether they are necessary, a clear link to Iran's proposal 
in Universality consultations for the TS to maintain a 
progress report on Universality implementation. 
 
¶7. (U) Prior to the November 1 consultations, the facilitator 
distributed his new draft to some WEOG dels for consideration 
and discussion.  Del rep expressed concern to the facilitator 
about circulating his text too soon, a view shared by the UK; 
however, the facilitator made it clear that his intention was 
to distribute the text to all delegations before the start of 
the CSP. 
 
¶8. (U) The November 1 consultations focused on what the 
facilitator saw as the two most contentious operative 
paragraphs: 2 and 6.  With Iran absent from the beginning of 
the meeting, Mexico was the only delegation to object to OP2 
in its original form.  Most other delegations were amenable 
to it while having reservations on having a deadline.  Many 
also questioned what would need to be done by the deadline 
(i.e., simply reporting back to the TS or actually doing 
something more substantive). 
 
¶9. (U) As promised by the facilitator, his clean text was 
circulated on November 2; it noticeably did not take on board 
any of the concerns or suggested changes noted by Del rep. 
 
--------- 
ARTICLE X 
--------- 
 
¶10. (U) On November 1, French delegate requested a Quad 
working level meeting to discuss the Iranian effort to seek a 
CSP decision on a &victims, assistance network8.  The 
facilitator for Article X, Jitka Brodska (Czech Republic) had 
previously discussed the issue with Quad reps separately and 
informed them the TS had confirmed that no new CSP agenda 
items could be added at this time.  According to the TS, the 
only option for the Iranians would be to bring up the issue 
during Any Other Business, despite the fact that substantive 
issues are not normally brought up at that time.  The 
facilitator suggested that if any States Parties felt 
strongly enough, an objection could be raised during the 
adoption of the agenda (on the basis that it would be 
inappropriate to leave a substantive issue to Any Other 
Business).  All Quad reps agreed that if such an objection 
were to be raised, it would be better not to come from any 
WEOG members.  All four agreed that the proposed Iranian 
language was vague and that the proper place for discussion 
of any such proposal was in the ongoing Article X 
consultations. 
 
¶11. (U) Del rep spoke with facilitator Brodska following 
Brodska,s discussion with the Russian Federation on this 
issue.  Brodska expressed resignation that we would indeed be 
forced to discuss the Iranian proposal during the CSP under 
Any Other Business. 
 
---------- 
ARTICLE XI 
 
---------- 
 
¶12. (U) On October 30 and November 2, Li Hong (China) chaired 
consultations to draft decision text for the upcoming CSP on 
Article XI.  The October 30 meeting was replete with high 
drama and posturing, but some progress was made during the 
November 2 meeting. 
 
¶13. (U) In the October 30 consultation, the discussion began 
with the most controversial paragraph, OP 4, which refers to 
an action plan, roadmap, etc.  For the second time that day, 
Cuba made a general comment about how we should not fear the 
term &action plan8 and then proceeded to read a prepared 
statement on behalf of the NAM and China.  This statement 
made vague reference to specific elements the NAM has 
discussed (based on C-10/DEC.14) and that this approach 
should be the same as was done for Article VII and 
universality.  This time, China, Iran, and Algeria associated 
themselves with the NAM statement, while India was noticeably 
absent.  Several WEOG delegations insisted that they cannot 
support an empty box labeled &action plan8, while the 
NAM-leaning delegations wondered what everyone was so afraid 
of.  Cuba asked, at one point, how delegations would react if 
a delegation were to put some specific elements on the table, 
to which several delegations said they would be positively 
inclined. 
 
¶14. (U) A return to earlier operative paragraphs became more 
strident, as many delegations (led by Canada and Germany) 
pointed out the inappropriate and unbalanced approach of 
referring to only specific elements from previous decisions 
(see OP 1 language on the exchange of chemicals, equipment, 
and scientific and technical information).  The result was, 
well into the third hour, that the facilitator concluded that 
positions were still too divergent to work toward a decision 
at next week,s CSP and that he would continue consultations 
after that time.  Of course, this resulted in general calls 
for him to not give up hope.  In the midst of this, Cuba 
revealed that they in fact had specific elements they were 
willing to put on the table, if it was generally felt that 
productive work based on these could go forward.  They were 
careful to say that other items could be added by other 
delegations.  It was decided that this would serve as the 
basis for an additional consultation later in the week. 
 
¶15. (U) Cuba's draft action plan was released late on October 
31 but barely featured in discussions during the November 2 
consultations.  Instead, the main focus was a new, clean 
draft distributed by the facilitator.  Aside from Iran, which 
continued to table a number of proposed textual changes, all 
dels present noted the text to be a step towards addressing 
the positions of all sides. However, Japan and most WEOG dels 
reiterated that inclusion of the term "Action Plan" was 
unacceptable.  Cuba tabled a proposal to replace "Action 
Plan" with "programme of work".  Again, aside from Iran, this 
was met positively by both the NAM and WEOG/Japan. 
 
¶16. (U) The facilitator promised to formulate and circulate a 
new draft, and he plans to hold further consultations during 
the CSP. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
DELFT CHALLENGE INSPECTION EXERCISE LESSONS LEARNED 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶17.  (U) On October 31, Amb. Richard Ryan (Ireland) chaired a 
meeting of States Parties to hear and share feedback from the 
challenge inspection exercise hosted September 10-14 in 
Delft.  The DG opened by noting that this is a useful step in 
&de-demonizing8 the concept of the challenge inspection, 
and that the CI is not only a tool for verification, but also 
a valuable deterrent.  He caveated his remarks by stating 
that the expectation would, of course, be that States Parties 
exhaust all other avenues of consultation and clarification 
first. 
 
¶18.  (U) Delegations then viewed a short documentary on the 
exercise, which provided a day by day recap of the inspection 
activities and timeline.  The documentary was followed by a 
 
briefing from the Inspectorate point of view by Mr. David 
Mohn (hard copy will be forwarded separately).  Mohn reviewed 
the inspectorate resources dedicated to this particular 
exercise, the exercise scenario, and the findings, noting 
that this particular site is actually a declared and 
previously inspected facility.  Lessons learned included the 
fact that a challenge inspection requires a significantly 
different mindset from a routine inspection, the need for 
further refinement of perimeter monitoring procedures, the 
 
communications challenges posed by increasing the inspection 
team size, and the fact that sampling and analysis on 
Schedule 2 inspections seems to be helping with overall 
inspection team sampling procedures. 
 
¶19.  (U) From an OPCW perspective, Head of the Policy Review 
Branch Per Runn stressed the importance of the exercise 
itself and the Technical Secretariat (TS),s internal 
evaluation in developing and maintaining the TS capability to 
conduct a challenge inspection, adding that the possibility 
to train at an industry versus a military facility was 
particularly useful.  Runn also emphasized the importance of 
report writing, and the fact that at the conclusion of the 
inspection anything omitted from the report (intentionally or 
not) would not be part of the Executive Council,s 
consideration. 
 
¶20. (U) Amb Maarten Lak (Netherlands) gave a brief overview 
of the Dutch perspective.  He noted that the media were 
likely to play a significant role in a challenge inspection, 
and that this element was not developed enough in the 
exercise.  Responding to an earlier comment, he also noted 
that the Dutch national approach was to be as accommodating 
as possible of inspection team requests, and that even in a 
real scenario, managed access may not have been necessary. 
Representatives from DSM Delft added their views, 
highlighting as a challenge the difficulty they had in 
remembering that all information had to flow through the 
national escorts, as opposed to directly to the inspection 
team. 
 
¶21. (U) The Chair then opened the meeting for questions and 
comments.  Several WEOG States Parties expressed confidence 
that the TS was in fact prepared to conduct a real challenge 
inspection if the need arose, and indicated an interest in 
exercising the role of the EC.  The UK also shared the Dutch 
view that careful consideration would need to be given to the 
role of the media, noting it had held a brainstorming session 
on the same.  South Africa recommended a wider geographical 
distribution of observers (not only visitors), and expressed 
an interest in seeing a report from the observers themselves. 
 
 
¶22. (U) India, Pakistan, China and Iran all fell back to 
traditional positions on the need to exhaust all other 
options before calling for a challenge inspection, the 
political cost of doing so, the need to address the issue of 
abuse of a challenge inspection, and an implication that 
resolution of the &unresolved issues8 (a list of issues 
from the Preparatory Commission days that would in no way 
prevent a real challenge inspection from moving forward), 
perhaps in consultations, would be required before launching 
a challenge inspection.  India also expressed concern that in 
this particular scenario the rights of the State Party (e.g. 
managed access) did not seem to have been fully exercised. 
U.S. del rep expressed appreciation for the unique 
opportunity the Delft exercise offered to all regional 
groups, and noted that despite previous discussions of 
&unresolved issues,8 the CWC provides clear guidance that 
is more than adequate to conduct a challenge inspection. 
 
----------------------------- 
INDUSTRY AND PROTECTION FORUM 
----------------------------- 
 
¶23. (U) In general, the Industry and Protection Forum 
(November 1-2) was a success.  In his opening statement, the 
DG spoke on a wide range of issues, including a few of 
interest: Tenth Anniversary events, important of national 
implementation and universality, the progress made in 
 
destruction, the recent challenge inspection exercise, 
preparations to response to a use of CW, Article XI, ongoing 
changes in the global chemical industry, the importance of 
export controls, UNSC resolution 1540, and the modification 
to the site selection methodology and intensification of OCPF 
inspections.  Rene van Sloten (CEFIC) spoke about industry,s 
role in the development of the CWC and how Responsible Care 
has become integral to how the vast majority of industry 
meets all of their supply-chain obligations.  Ana Gomez (EU) 
spoke on EU support for the OPCW in general, but she also 
made very pointed comments about her home country (Portugal) 
) the &appalling situation8 that imports/exports are 
happening without proper supervision; that she &hopes al 
Qaeda has been too busy to go shopping in Portugal.8  K. 
Paturej (TS Director of Special Projects) also opened the 
Forum and announced that the various papers would be posted 
on the website very soon.  (Note: The abstracts that are part 
of the agenda are already available on the website ) 
www.opcwipf.org ) and are generally quite detailed.) 
 
¶24. (U) Workshop 1 focused on a number of practical aspects 
of implementing the CWC, including sampling and analysis 
(S&A).  Pietro Fontana (Switzerland) gave an update on the 
CEFIC-OPCW project regarding CAS Registry numbers, which is 
focused on the six Schedule 2B families.  Claudia Kurz 
(Federation of German Chemical Manufacturers) spoke of the 
generally smooth application of the CWC within their 
industry, while called into question their experiences with 
S&A and its value in the future given the burden on industry. 
 Hannu Vornamo (Chemical Industry Federation of Finland) 
spoke about industry inspection experience within their 
country, while expressing concern about balanced inspection 
levels in the burgeoning industry in the East and taking 
verbal potshots at Russian CW destruction.  Per Runn (TS Head 
of PRB) gave a general overview of the TS S&A preparations, 
practices, and experiences.  Gary Mallard (Head, OPCW Lab) 
gave a very good explanation of the methods and software 
tools (e.g., AMDIS) the TS implements to ensure protection of 
CBI.  Andrew Othieno (Inspector, and member of the upcoming 
S&A inspection team in the U.S.) spoke generally about TS 
logistical practices surrounding S&A.  There were four 
different presentations by NAs that had hosted Schedule 2 
inspections that included S&A ) Switzerland, the UK, the 
Netherlands, and Japan.  The first three presentations 
explained how they worked out the details in advance with the 
TS, including modification of their usual practices (e.g., 
 
SIPDIS 
shipment and inspection of equipment at a location other than 
the POE, doing &on-site8 analysis at an off-site location), 
to ensure a smooth inspection.  Japan, however, was honest 
about difficulties they experienced with import of equipment 
and chemicals, difficulties locating and supporting the TS 
lab, etc.  Bill Kane (TS Head of IVB) spoke about the TS S&A 
experience to date, including lessons learned, and future 
plans (e.g., budget for S&A in 2008, technological and 
timeline constraints to expanding S&A to Schedule 3 and OCPF). 
 
¶25. (U) Workshop 2 focused on assistance and protection under 
Article X of the Convention.  The morning session was 
comprised of presentations from members of the OPCW,s 
International Cooperation and Assistance division. Afternoon 
discussions centered on State Party experiences in the field 
of assistance.  Renato Carvalho (TS Head, IMB) shared TS 
lessons learned from Joint Assistance 2005, the exercise held 
in the Ukraine to evaluate TS readiness to conduct an 
investigation of an alleged use of chemical weapons and to 
respond to the subsequent request for assistance.  In 
response, Iran raised a series of questions focused on how 
the OPCW would decide when its role had ended and whether 
there was a specific checklist of activities to be completed 
before this could occur.  Carvalho noted that decisions such 
as these (as well as overall responsibility) actually lie 
with the National Authority. 
 
¶26. (U) A representative from NATO,s Euro-Atlantic Disaster 
Response Coordination Center (EADRCC) gave a more general 
overview of NATO,s disaster response capability to natural 
and other emergencies, which had been tested many times by 
both real life and exercise scenarios.  This presentation 
raised several interesting questions from the audience about 
 
the possibility of coordination between the OPCW and other 
emergency response organizations.  Gennadi Lutay (Head, APB) 
presented the TS perspective on the future of Assistance and 
Protection, noting that Article X is a core objective of the 
CWC and that assistance and protection will remain a 
fundamental benefit as long as we lack universal adherence to 
the Convention and the threat of chemical weapons use by 
non-state actors still exists. 
 
¶27. (U)  A representative of the National Authority of 
Croatia gave a surprisingly gloomy view of the utility of 
assistance and protection under Article X, focusing on a 
scenario in which a conventional munition attack targets a 
declared industrial facility, releasing toxic chemicals.  The 
convener, Hassan Masshadi, later summarized a rather heated 
discussion on the topic by noting that it seemed some States 
Parties believed that declarations under Article VI made them 
more vulnerable to terrorist attack and would therefore 
desire a widening of the scope of Article X.  TS 
representative Patrice Palanque also noted that perhaps 
national legislation could be used to address such concerns. 
 
¶28. (U) A representative from the Swiss MOD gave an overview 
of training courses Switzerland has offered in chemical 
protection and emergency field laboratory procedures, noting 
that Switzerland has used a regional approach in Central Asia 
that could perhaps be effective in future efforts in Africa. 
An audience member from Malaysia asked whether the OPCW had 
considered regional training centers; the TS responded that 
while it welcomed regional initiatives it needed to stay 
within its limited financial and human resources.  South 
Africa also presented its assistance efforts in the form of 
training courses designed to provide an overview of the 
assistance available under Article X, an introduction to 
protective equipment, methodologies for assembling an 
emergency response team, and establishment of basic 
protective capabilities for the civilian population.  Iran, 
picking up on earlier remarks, recommended that the OPCW 
focus on a framework of regional capacity building, to 
include assessing specific regional shortfalls and 
encouraging assistance from donors to target these 
shortfalls.  In an informal conversation with Del rep later, 
the Iranian representative continued to express a strong 
interest in this type of regionally focused capacity 
building. 
 
¶29. (U) District Commander of the Fire Service, Piet Aantjes, 
gave a presentation that described the integrated approach to 
emergency situations in the Rotterdam Rijnmond area, which 
involves the police, fire, ambulance and port and civil 
authorities as well as a partnership with private industry, 
including the Rotterdam harbor and petrochemical industry. 
Professor Jiri Matousek, a toxicology chemist from the Czech 
Republic gave a presentation which outlined the equipment 
provided to the OPCW (much of which was developed in the 
Czech Republic) as well as the many training courses which 
have been provided. 
 
¶30. (U) Workshop 3 focused on the roles of chemical safety 
and security in the age of terrorism and how each one is (or 
can be) supportive of the other.  Presentations from industry 
representatives (Dow, Chemtura, and Merck) focused on 
Responsible Care as a mechanism to incorporate chemical 
security into the corporate business model in the chemical 
industry.  Europol provided a look at the expanding terrorist 
threat in Europe but conceded that the threat of terrorist 
actually using chemicals in their attacks remains unlikely. 
The Ukraine provided an interesting case study of a rail 
accident (July 16, 2007) involving 750 MT of yellow 
phosphorous, 300 MT of which burned.  Croatia shared 
experiences of the Balkans War which showed that warring 
factions often targeted chemical facilities, yielding results 
one might expect from a terrorist attack.  The session ended 
with a presentation by K. Paturej (Head, Special Projects), 
who stressed that, while the OPCW did not have an 
anti-terrorism mandate, it should cooperate with 
international bodies to develop contacts and provide training 
when needed.  The U.S. made a brief presentation on the 
Chemical Security Engagement Program and the recent meeting 
 
in Kuala Lumpur on chemical security. 
 
¶31. (U) In the closing plenary session, which was a joint 
session with the opening of the annual meeting of National 
Authorities, the DG hit many of the topics he addressed the 
previous day, with a stronger Article VII (particularly 
legislation) message.  Jack Gerard (President and CEO of ACC, 
Secretary of ICCA) made an excellent presentation on a number 
 
SIPDIS 
of issues: that the OPCW needs to cast a wider inspection 
net, the importance of universality and full national 
implementation, the implications of a rapidly changing 
industry (globalization, growth in countries without the type 
of support infrastructure the OPCW would expect), the 
importance of outreach to the product quality chain, capacity 
building to allow all to comply. 
 
¶32. (U) Each Workshop convener made a brief summary of their 
Workshop outcomes.  The conveners for Workshops 1 (Ralf 
Trapp) and 2 (Hassan Mashadi) were well-done and received. 
The reaction to the report from the convener for Workshop 3 
(Sergey Batsanov) met with apparent displeasure from some 
industry representatives who attended, although they said 
privately that the content of the Workshop was fine.  In the 
Q&A session that followed, a representative of the Indian 
chemical association expressed concern over the burden of the 
CWC on industry (particularly new start-up and young 
scientists), claiming that this was &stifling8 growth in a 
similar way to what large industrialized countries do to 
stifle development.  The Iranian delegation also took the 
opportunity to play to the industry in their calls for a CW 
victims network, pointing to the value to industry in the 
event of a terrorist attack on a chemical plant site. 
 
¶33. JAVITS SENDS. 
Gallagher