VZCZCXRO0486
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHSQ #0887/01 3111533
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 071533Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6689
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 0084
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/CDR TF FALCON
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUESEN/SKOPJE BETA
RUEHSQ/USDAO SKOPJE MK
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SKOPJE 000887 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/SCE (MCCLUNG), DS/ITA/EUR, DS/IP/EUR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KCRM PTER ASEC MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: MAJOR POLICE ACTION AGAINST CRIMINAL 
GROUP IN NORTHWEST 
 
REF: A. SKOPJE 698 
 
     ¶B. SKOPJE 712 
 
TARGET: CRIMINAL GANG IN NORTHWEST MACEDONIA 
 
¶1. (SBU) The Ministry of Interior (MOI) informed us today 
that a police operation began early this morning against a 
group of 30-40 armed ethnic Albanian criminals who have been 
holed up outside of the northwest village of Brodec near the 
Kosovo border since July. The group includes escapees from 
the Dubrava Prison in Kosovo (ref A), and has been under MOI 
surveillance for the past several months.  MOI reports 
indicate the group has been involved in weapons smuggling 
since arriving in Brodec this summer.  MOI contacts also tell 
us the group had imposed a curfew on local residents, and had 
beaten some villagers.  The group allegedly was in the final 
stages of planning an attack on Skopje (no further 
information available on specific targeting) before the 
police action began, and possessed MANPADS for which group 
members reportedly had received training.  Ethnic Albanian 
parties in Macedonia have distanced themselves from the 
group, and we have advised both DUI and DPA (the largest 
ethnic Albanian parties here) that we view this operation as 
a legitimate law enforcement action. A senior DUI official 
told us that DUI held a similar view, and was concerned about 
possible casualties among local residents. 
 
UNDER POLICE PRESSURE, CRIMINALS FLEE TO VILLAGE 
 
¶2. (SBU) The operation began with the movement by helicopter 
and MOI vehicles of approximately 400 police officers into 
position above and around Brodec the evening of November 6. 
One helicopter was hit by ground fire and returned safely to 
base.  Around 0500 hours on November 7, elements of the MOI's 
Rapid Deployment Unit (RDU) and Task Force (Tigers) special 
operations forces began moving on the criminal group's 
positions outside of Brodec, which MOI sources reported 
included trenches and buildings constructed by the group. 
 
¶3. (SBU) As of midday November 7, the MOI confirmed that some 
of those buildings were aflame.  The MOI later reported four 
members of the group had been killed in exchanges of gunfire 
with police, and that another three members might have been 
killed.  Police also have reported discovering a large cache 
of ammunition, rocket-propelled grenades, machine guns, and 
MANPADS belonging to the group.  There have been no reported 
police casualties in the operation.  Local media report one 
MOI helicopter was shot down, but the MOI has denied that 
report.  The MOI also coordinated with KFOR, which deployed 
reinforced units to the border area to handle any members of 
the criminal group who might try to flee there. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Under pressure from the RDU forces, the group fled 
its position outside Brodec and entered the village, where 
group members holed up in residents' houses.  Police 
surrounded one house where five suspects were sheltering and 
were firing from windows at the law enforcement officials. 
As of 1430 local time, the police had entered that house and 
arrested six subjects.  The MOI intends to continue working 
to identify the houses where the individuals are holed up, 
and will then attempt to negotiate with those individuals to 
persuade them to surrender.  If that tactic fails, they plan 
to use force to capture the remaining group members. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The MOI has kept us informed of the activities of 
the criminal group since this summer, and we have repeatedly 
told the GOM that we would support actions to enforce rule of 
law in the region, provided they developed a detailed plan 
and consulted with our ICITAP Adviser and OSCE's Police 
Adviser beforehand.  The Minister of Interior and Chief of 
Police briefed the Ambassador on the security situation in 
the area during a meeting November 5.  At the time, the Chief 
of Police hinted that an operation was imminent, but gave no 
further details; we did not learn about the launch of this 
risky operation until after the fact.  The MOI did/did keep 
KFOR in the loop as the operation got underway, a positive 
development that we had urged in the November 5 and earlier 
meetings with the MOI. 
 
COMMENT: RISKY GAMBIT 
 
SKOPJE 00000887  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) That the operation took place today probably is 
partly due to increasing pressure the GOM has felt from some 
local and international critics who have complained that the 
government has failed to demonstrate it can exercise 
effective control over its territory.  If the police capture 
the remaining criminals with no further bloodshed or civilian 
casualties, then the operation likely will be considered a 
major law enforcement success.  If they are forced to enter 
houses to capture the fugitives and there are civilian 
(and/or police) casualties as a result, the GOM is likely to 
come under domestic fire for botching the operation.  The GOM 
then would be subjected to strong domestic and international 
scrutiny regarding whether it properly planned the operation. 
 We will continue to press the GOM to ensure liaison with 
international police advisers on such operations takes place 
before/before they take place, rather than after the fact. 
MILOVANOVIC