VZCZCXRO8012
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSQ #0879/01 3091309
ZNY EEEEE ZZH
P 051309Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3713
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6677
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE 0077
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUESEN/SKOPJE BETA
RUEHSQ/USDAO SKOPJE MK
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 000879 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/SCE, EUR/FO, EUR/RPM 
USNATO FOR AMB NULAND, NSC FOR TBRADLEY, OSD FOR DASD FATA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: SCENESETTER FOR US INTERAGENCY NATO MAP 
VISIT 
 
 
Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4(b) & (d). 
 
GRUEVSKI ON THE ROPES: AVOID A ONE-TWO KNOCKOUT PUNCH... 
 
¶1. (SBU/NF) When you step off the plane in Skopje on November 
7, PM Gruevski will have just taken a beating from Brussels, 
having received the EU's annual progress report on November 
¶6.  The report will criticize the lack of political consensus 
here, slow progress on EU-related reforms, and the lack of 
effective PM-President cohabitation, among others.  It will 
not recommend a date for beginning EU accession negotiations, 
a rebuke of the Gruevski government that was expected but 
will sting nonetheless.  The opposition and media will make 
hay out of the report's negatives, hammering Gruevski for the 
"lost year" since he took office last August.  Gruevski will 
be bruised and on the defensive.  He will be eager to blame 
"someone else" for the negative assessments which, in his 
view, undervalue his achievements. 
 
...IRON FIST, VELVET GLOVE: START WITH THE POSITIVE 
 
¶2. (SBU) Your message to Gruevski on NATO membership must be 
equally tough and hard-hitting.  But it should be preceded by 
some positives to make it easier to digest: 
 
--Macedonia has made good anti-TIP progress this year, moving 
from a Tier II Watchlist candidate to a solid Tier II 
performer.  The government has also shown progress on the 
anti-corruption front, jumping from 105th place on 
Transparency International's corruption perception index in 
2006 to 84th place this year.  The government has actively 
pursued corruption investigations and prosecutions, although 
some cases clearly have been motivated by partisan 
considerations (including the ongoing prosecution of former 
PM Buckovski). 
 
--Framework Agreement (FWA) implementation has progressed, 
with phase II of decentralization having begun as scheduled 
in 42 of Macedonia's 84 municipalities in July of this year, 
and continued hiring of ethnic Albanian and other minorities 
to implement equitable representation.  More remains to be 
done.  The GOM needs to work with the remaining 42 
municipalities to prepare them to take part in phase II of 
decentralization.  Despite its oft-touted "tripling of the 
equitable representation budget for 2007," the government 
also needs to clear up the currently murky process for hiring 
ethnic minorities with transparent, fair, and non-partisan 
hiring guidelines. 
 
--Macedonia is showing positive economic performance, with 
the country recently ranked by the World Bank as one of the 
top 10 "most improved" countries in carrying out business 
environment reforms.  Gruevski has raised public sector wages 
and cut VAT rates on some key consumer items, which has 
helped keep his poll numbers strong.  Starting in 2008, 
personal and corporate tax rates will fall from 12 percent to 
10 percent (flat tax), one of the lowest tax rates in Europe. 
 
--Rounding out its achievements, the GOM passed this year a 
liberal religious freedom law which generally meets ODIHR 
standards for protecting religious freedom.  The GOM just 
submitted for parliamentary approval a decision calling for 
doubling Macedonia's contributions in Iraq -- by an 
additional platoon -- and MOD Elenovski says Macedonia also 
is considering a future increase in its troop contributions 
in Afghanistan (President Crvenkovski paid a morale-booster 
visit to ARM troops in ISAF October 10-11).  Although 
cohabitation remains poor, President Crvenkovski recently 
accepted PM Gruevski's offer to meet monthly to "harmonize 
positions on strategic issues." 
 
NATO BID IN THE BALANCE: "MAKE A U-TURN, OR YOU'RE HEADED FOR 
THE OFF RAMP" 
 
¶3. (SBU) Despite positive accomplishments, movement on key 
political criteria has been glacial since you were here in 
June.  There has been some slight movement on two of the five 
points in the May 29 VMRO-DUI agreement, but the two main 
 
SKOPJE 00000879  002 OF 003 
 
 
issues -- a draft language law and a social package for 
former insurgents -- are stuck in a quagmire of political 
gamesmanship on both sides.  As earlier, Gruevski holds the 
key to de-blocking the process but prefers to blame others 
for the deadlock.  DUI and Gruevski ally DPA also are at 
loggerheads, despite a recent attempt by Albania's President 
to nudge both sides toward rapprochement.  The two ethnic 
Albanian parties are being blamed in the media for direct or 
indirect links to recent incidents near the border with 
Kosovo that have involved arms smuggling, movements of 
criminal elements, and a recent shoot-out between rival 
criminal groups.  Some local analysts (incorrectly, in our 
view) have assessed those incidents as "security challenges" 
that could be destabilizing as Kosovo status approaches. 
 
¶4. (SBU/NF) The government has managed to fill four of the 
remaining five seats on the 15-member State Judicial Council 
(SJC), which has allowed the SJC to fully function.  It 
achieved that goal, however, through a tactical end run 
around the President and ethnic Albanian opposition DUI, 
which further damaged relations with DUI.  Gruevski has 
refused to agree to the President's proposals to fill the 
remaining seat to complete the SJC.  By alienating DUI, 
Gruevski also has ensured a tough slog as the MOI moves to 
implement the law on police, which will require DUI buy-in. 
 
¶5. (SBU/NF) Your message to the GOM accordingly should be 
hard-hitting: 
 
"If you do not change the way you are working, if you fail to 
work with the opposition to build consensus on May 29 
implementation, completion of the SJC, and implementation of 
the police law -- among others -- you will not need to worry 
about a Greek veto of your NATO candidacy.  You will have 
failed to meet NATO criteria.  The image you convey in 
implementing priority tasks -- whether you bypass the 
opposition or work to build consensus -- is critical  to 
promoting your candidacy with other NATO allies.  We will 
press the opposition to be flexible as well.  But you are 
responsible for following through to change the current 
negative atmosphere.  Your NATO bid hangs in the balance." 
 
¶6. (SBU) The opposition needs to hear an equally tough 
message about acting responsibly: "Now is not the time for 
partisan gamesmanship or filibusters that could endanger 
Macedonia's NATO bid.  Not just Gruevski, but Ahmeti too 
needs to abide by the May 29 agreement (e.g., no law/law for 
former fighters, but just a social package).  Short-term 
partisan gains could cost your country its NATO candidacy. 
All must demonstrate flexibility and a readiness to 
compromise for Macedonia's sake." 
 
COURSE CORRECTION ALSO NEEDED ON THE NAME ISSUE 
 
¶7. (SBU/NF) The GOM has, by and large, tried to act with 
restraint on the name issue, despite missteps by both UNGA 
President Srjan Kerim and President Crvenkovski at the UNGA 
in September that understandably provoked strong Greek 
reactions.  Ambassador Dimitrov was in New York November 1 
for further discussions on the name with his Greek 
counterparts and Ambassador Nimetz.  Nimetz proposed some 
guidelines and principles for moving toward a solution of the 
name issue, which FM Milososki cautiously described as 
"generally positive," while declining to reveal any details 
of the proposal in accordance with the agreement between the 
parties involved. 
 
¶8. (SBU/NF) PM Gruevski, however, succumbed to temptation and 
told local press that the GOM could not accept one of the 
points in the proposal that would require Macedonia to use a 
modified name for international use.  That statement violated 
Nimetz's request for confidentiality and undermined the 
overall process.  We are urging both sides to "study the 
Nimetz paper with an open mind and with a view toward finally 
resolving differences and reaching a long-overdue, near-term 
solution to the issue." You should underscore the importance 
of this, without suggesting that the U.S. is asking Macedonia 
to alter its constitutional name. At the same time, you 
 
SKOPJE 00000879  003 OF 003 
 
 
should remind Gruevski and his colleagues  that they should 
take the high ground and refrain from provoking Greece or 
responding to provocations. 
MILOVANOVIC