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Viewing cable 07SEOUL3359, 2007-2008 ROK AND DPRK INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07SEOUL3359 2007-11-21 04:33 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #3359/01 3250433
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 210433Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7412
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 3430
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 8580
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 3562
UNCLAS SEOUL 003359 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/K AND INL (JOHN LYLE) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: SNAR KS KN
SUBJECT: 2007-2008 ROK AND DPRK INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS 
CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT (INCSR) 
 
REF: SECSTATE 136782 
 
1. (U) Per reftel, Embassy Seoul's submission for the 
Republic of Korea (ROK) portion of the 2007-2008 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report is provided 
at para 2.  Input for the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea (DPRK) portion of the INCSR is provided at para 3 with 
the understanding that information on the DPRK's 
narcotics-related activities is very limited. 
 
2. (SBU) 2007-2008 INCSR input for the ROK: 
 
I. Summary 
 
Narcotics production or abuse is not a major problem in the 
Republic of Korea (ROK).  However, reports continue to 
indicate that an undetermined quantity of narcotics is 
smuggled through South Korea en route to the United States 
and other countries.  South Korea has become a transshipment 
location for drug traffickers due to the country's reputation 
for not having a drug abuse problem.  This combined with the 
fact that the South Korean port of Pusan is one of the 
region's largest ports makes South Korea an attractive 
location for illegal shipments coming from countries which 
are more likely to attract a contraband inspection upon 
arrival.  The ROK is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. 
 
II. Status of Country 
 
Drugs available in the ROK include methamphetamine, heroin, 
cocaine, marijuana, and club drugs such as LSD and Ecstasy. 
Methamphetamine continues to be the most widely abused drug, 
while marijuana remains popular as well.  Heroin and cocaine 
are only sporadically seen in the ROK.  Club drugs such as 
Ecstasy and LSD continue to be popular among college 
students.  In early 2007, ROK authorities discovered a mobile 
clandestine lab in South Korea that two individuals had been 
using to produce small amounts of methamphetamine from 
legally-obtained cold medicines.  In response, the South 
Korean government implemented stricter controls on the 
purchase of over-the-counter medicines containing ephedrine 
and psuedoephedrine, requiring customer registration for 
quantities greater than 720 mg (a three-day standard dose). 
 
III. Country Actions Against Drugs 2007 
 
Policy Initiatives.  In 2007, the Korean Food and Drug 
Administration (KFDA) continued to implement stronger 
precursor chemical controls under amended legislation 
approved in 2005.  The KFDA continued its efforts to educate 
companies and train its regulatory investigators on the 
enhanced regulations and procedures for monitoring the 
precursor chemical program.  The KFDA also implemented in 
2007 new regulatory oversight procedures to track and address 
diversion of narcotics and psychotropic substances from 
medical facilities and emerging patterns of abuse in South 
Korea of additional substances, including gamma butyrolactone 
(GBL), psychotropic-containing appetite suppressants, and the 
veterinary anesthesia ketamine. 
 
Law Enforcement Efforts.  In the first nine months of 2007, 
South Korean authorities arrested 878 persons for narcotics 
use, 6,041 persons for psychotropic substance use, and 591 
persons for marijuana use.  ROK authorities seized 18 kg of 
methamphetamine.  Ecstasy seizures increased to 18,151 
tablets from 319, approaching previous levels before 2004 
(20,385 tablets).  South Korean authorities seized 19.6 kg of 
marijuana. (NOTE: All figures provided are from the first 
nine months of the year. Total figures for 2007 are not 
available.)  South Koreans generally do not use heroin; and 
cocaine is used only sporadically, with no indication of its 
use increasing. 
 
Corruption.  There were no reports of corruption involving 
narcotics law enforcement in the ROK in 2007.  As a matter of 
government policy, the ROK does not encourage or facilitate 
illicit production or distribution of narcotic or 
psychotropic or other controlled substances, or the 
laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. 
 
Agreements and Treaties.  South Korea has extradition 
treaties with 23 countries and mutual legal assistance 
treaties in force with 18 countries, including the United 
States. South Korea is a party to the 1988 UN Drug 
Convention, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances, and the 1961 UN Single Convention, as amended by 
its 1972 Protocol.  South Korea has signed, but has not yet 
 
ratified, the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime 
and the UN Convention against Corruption.  Korean authorities 
exchange information with international counter narcotics 
agencies such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) and the International Criminal Police Organization 
(INTERPOL), and have placed Korean National Police and/or 
Korea Customs Service attachs in Thailand, Japan, Hong Kong, 
China, and the United States. 
 
Cultivation/Production.  Legal marijuana and hemp growth is 
licensed by local Health Departments.  The hemp is used to 
produce fiber for traditional hand-made ceremonial funeral 
clothing.  Every year, each District Prosecutor's Office, in 
conjunction with local governments, conducts surveillance 
into suspected illicit marijuana growing areas during 
planting or harvesting time periods to limit possible illicit 
diversion.  In the first six months of 2007, local 
authorities seized 274 marijuana plants, down significantly 
from 3,783 in the first nine months of 2006.  Opium poppy 
production is illegal in South Korea, although poppy 
continues to be grown in Kyonggi Province where farmers have 
traditionally used the harvested plants as a folk medicine to 
treat sick pigs and cows.  Opium is not normally processed 
from these plants for human consumption.  Korean authorities 
continue surveillance of opium poppy-growing areas and seized 
13,927 poppy plants in the first six months of 2007. 
 
Drug Flow/Transit.  Few narcotic drugs originate in South 
Korea.  The exportation of narcotic substances is illegal 
under South Korean law, and none are known to be exported. 
However, the ROK does produce and export the precursor 
chemicals acetone, toluene, and sulfuric acid.  Transshipment 
through South Korea's ports remains a serious problem.  ROK 
authorities recognize South Korea's vulnerability as a 
transshipment nexus and have undertaken greater efforts to 
educate shipping companies of the risk.  ROK authorities, 
ability to directly intercept the suspected transshipment of 
narcotics and precursor chemicals has been limited by the 
fact that the vast majority of the shipping containers never 
enter ROK territory.  Nonetheless, the ROK continued its 
international cooperation efforts to monitor and investigate 
transshipment cases.  In the previous year, ROK authorities 
and the Seoul DEA Country Office completed a modified 
controlled delivery of crystal methamphetamine originally 
intended for transshipment through South Korea from China to 
Guam, resulting in the dismantling of an international 
crystal methamphetamine organization in the U.S. and South 
Korea.  Redoubled efforts by the Korean Customs Service (KCS) 
have resulted in increased seizures of methamphetamine and 
marijuana (12.4 kg and 7.7 kg respectively in the first 6 
months of 2007) transported by arriving passengers and 
through postal services at South Korea's ports of entry. 
Most methamphetamine smuggled into South Korea comes from 
China.  A majority of the LSD and Ecstasy used in South Korea 
has been identified as coming from North America or Europe. 
People living in metropolitan areas are known to use 
marijuana originating in South Africa and Nigeria, whereas 
those living in rural areas appear to obtain their marijuana 
from locally produced crops.  ROK authorities also report 
increased instances of marijuana use among the foreign 
population in South Korea in recent years, a trend that is 
most likely the result of increased law enforcement efforts 
targeting this segment of the population. 
 
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs 
 
Policy Initiatives and Programs.  The U.S. Embassy's Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) Seoul Country Office and 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials work 
closely with ROK narcotics law enforcement authorities, and 
the DEA considers this working relationship to be excellent. 
 
Bilateral Cooperation. The DEA Seoul Country Office has 
focused its 2007 efforts on international drug interdiction, 
seizures of funds and assets related to illicit narcotics 
trafficking, and the diversion of precursor chemicals in 
South Korea and in the Far East region.  In 2007, the DEA 
Seoul Country Office organized, coordinated, and hosted a 
one-week training seminar on International Asset Forfeiture 
and Money Laundering Investigations.  This training was 
co-hosted by the Korean Supreme Prosecutors Office (KSPO) 
with 50 prosecutors, investigators, and analysts from the 
Korea Financial Intelligence Unit, KSPO, KCS, Korean National 
Intelligence Service (KNIS), and the Korean National Police 
Agency (KNPA) in attendance.  The DEA Seoul Country Office 
continues to share intelligence regarding the importation of 
precursor chemicals into South Korea from the United States 
 
and other Asian countries with the KFDA, KCS, KSPO, and KNIS. 
 DEA also works closely with the KSPO and KCS in their 
activities to monitor airport and drug transshipment methods 
and trends, including the use of international mail by drug 
traffickers. 
 
The Road Ahead.  ROK authorities have expressed concern that 
the popularity of South Korea as a transshipment nexus may 
lead to greater volume of drugs entering Korean markets. 
Korean authorities fear increased accessibility and lower 
prices could stimulate domestic drug use in the future. 
South Korean authorities also indicate a growing concern 
about the importation of narcotics, psychotropic drugs, and 
illegal medicines purchased via the internet, predominately 
from web sites maintained in the United States.  In the first 
nine months of 2007, South Korean authorities intercepted 341 
internet-based drug purchases.  In response, Korean 
authorities established Memorandum of Understanding with a 
number of Korean internet portal sites to allow the KNPA to 
track and intercept such purchases.  The South Korean 
government is currently seeking further international 
cooperation to better navigate the legal complexities 
surrounding the prosecution of transnational cyber crimes. 
The DEA Seoul Country Office will continue its extensive 
training, mentoring, and operational cooperation with ROK 
authorities. 
 
3. (SBU) 2007-2008 INCSR input for the DPRK: 
 
I. Summary 
 
For decades, North Koreans have been arrested for trafficking 
in narcotics and engaging in other criminal behavior and 
illicit activity, including passing counterfeit U.S. currency 
and trading in copyrighted products. There were no confirmed 
instances of drug trafficking involving North Korea or its 
nationals during 2007.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
trafficking and drug abuse in the DPRK and along its border 
with China continues.  There also continued to be press, 
industry and law enforcement reporting of DPRK links to 
counterfeit cigarette trafficking and counterfeit U.S. 
currency.  The Department is of the view that it is likely, 
but not certain, that the North Korean government has 
sponsored criminal activities in the past, including 
narcotics production and trafficking, but notes that there is 
no evidence for several years that it continues to traffic in 
narcotics.  The DPRK is not a party to the 1988 UN Drug 
Convention. 
 
II. Status of Country 
 
During 2007, there were numerous reports in the Japanese 
media of drug trafficking along the DPRK/Chinese border. 
According to these reports, Japanese criminal figures were 
traveling to the DPRK-PRC border area to purchase 
methamphetamine for smuggling back to Japan.  The Department 
is unable to confirm the accuracy of these reports, and if 
true, the reports seem to involve small-scale trafficking by 
individuals, not large-scale organized trafficking managed by 
the state.  There are indications that drug use in the DPRK 
may be increasing. In March 2006, the DPRK published a decree 
which warns citizens, state factories and groups in the DPRK 
to "not sell, buy, or use drugs illegally."  According to the 
decree, "Organizations, factories and groups should not 
illegally produce or export drugs."  Punishment is severe, up 
to death, and the family members and shop mates of offenders 
face collective responsibility and punishment with the 
perpetrator.  The DPRK also has an existing antinarcotics 
law.  The appearance of this new decree, its draconian 
penalties, and the fact that it is signed by the DPRK's 
National Security Council suggest that drug use and 
trafficking within the DPRK itself has come to the attention 
of authorities, and is viewed as a problem requiring a 
serious response. 
 
The "Pong-Su" incident in Australia in April 2003 renewed 
worldwide attention to the possibility of DPRK 
state-sponsorship of drug trafficking.  The "Pong-Su", a 
sea-going cargo vessel owned by a North Korean state 
enterprise, was seized after delivering a large quantity of 
pure heroin to accomplices on shore.  The trial of the 
"Pong-Su" captain and other senior officers, including a DPRK 
Korean Workers' Party Political Secretary, concluded in March 
2006 with the captain and the others found not guilty by an 
Australian jury.  Four other defendants associated with the 
incident pled guilty, and are serving long prison sentences 
in Australia.  These defendants included three individuals 
 
who were apprehended in possession of heroin brought to 
Australia aboard the "Pong-Su", and another individual who 
came to Australia aboard the "Pong-Su", and was apprehended 
on the same beach where some of the heroin was found.  The 
"Pong-Su" itself was destroyed by Australian military 
aircraft, as property forfeited to Australia because of its 
involvement in narcotics trafficking. 
 
In May 2006, Japanese prosecutors charged Woo Sii Yun, an 
ethnic Korean and long-term resident of Japan, and Katsuhiko 
Miyata, reputedly a Japanese gang member, with involvement in 
several 2002 methamphetamine drug smuggling incidents.  The 
2002 smuggling incidents involved several instances of DPRK 
vessels leaving hundreds of kg of methamphetamine drugs to 
float offshore for pick-up by criminals in Japan.  The police 
were led to Yun by the discovery of his phone number stored 
in the memory of a cell phone found aboard a DPRK patrol boat 
that sunk after a gun battle with the Japanese Coast Guard in 
late 2001.  Alerted to Yun's possible involvement in 
narcotics trafficking with DPRK accomplices, Japanese police 
investigated his financial records and found several large 
payments from criminal elements in Japan.  Japanese officials 
suspect these payments were for drugs from North Korea. 
Japanese authorities also suspect the sunken DPRK patrol boat 
of involvement in earlier instances of methamphetamine 
trafficking to Japan.  The charges against Yun connect the 
DPRK more closely to methamphetamine smuggling to Japan, as 
key lead information -- Yun's phone number -- was found 
aboard a North Korean patrol vessel. 
 
Department has no evidence to support a finding that drug 
trafficking has stopped.  It is also certainly possible that 
DPRK entities previously involved in narcotics trafficking 
recently have adopted a lower profile or better operational 
security. 
 
III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2007 
 
DPRK officials have ascribed past instances of misconduct by 
North Korean officials to the individuals involved, and 
stated that these individuals would be punished in the DPRK 
for their crimes.  A 2004 edition of the North Korean Book of 
Law contains the DPRK's Narcotics Control Law, and the DPRK 
government in 2007 re-affirmed its intent to punish drug 
traffickers severely, including with the death penalty, by 
issuing a new special decree in March 2006, signed by the 
DPRK's National Security Council.  There is no information 
available to the Department concerning enforcement of these 
laws or other legal actions taken against North Korean 
officials and citizens involved in drug trafficking in DPRK, 
or upon the return of North Korea citizens to the DPRK. 
 
IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs 
 
The United States has made it clear to the DPRK that it has 
concerns about the DPRK's involvement in a range of criminal 
and illicit activities, including narcotics trafficking, and 
that these activities must stop.  The United States 
thoroughly investigates all allegations of criminal behavior 
impacting the United States by DPRK citizens and entities, 
prosecutes cases under U.S. jurisdiction to the fullest 
extent of the law, and urges other countries to do the same. 
VERSHBOW