VZCZCXYZ0004
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSP #1099/01 3051743
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 011743Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8766
INFO RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

UNCLAS PORT OF SPAIN 001099 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR S/CT--MCCUNE;CIA FOR NCTC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC CVIS KVPR PGOV PINR PREL PTER TD KHLS
SUBJECT: PRACTICES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
ON INFORMATION COLLECTION, SCREENING, AND SHARING 
 
REF: (A) STATE 133921 (B) 06 STATE 190832 (C) 06 PORT 
     OF SPAIN 01035 
 
 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED, PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY 
 
¶1. (SBU) This cable responds to questions in ref A. 
Questions in ref B were previously answered in ref C. 
 
 
Watch listing 
---------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Government of Trinidad and Tobago (GOTT) 
maintains both an &alert list8 of individuals who should be 
immediately detained upon entry and a &watch list8 of 
people whose entry into T and T is made known to appropriate 
agencies for monitoring of movements, etc.  The number of 
names on this list is unknown, although interlocutors have 
indicated that there are &too many8 names and that the 
lists should be culled.  The watch list and alert list are 
maintained by the Ministry of National Security. 
 
Traveler Information Collection 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) The GOTT collects information from travelers 
arriving in Trinidad and Tobago based on regulations in the 
Immigration Act.  The travel documents of passengers arriving 
by air and sea, including passengers and crew of yachts and 
similar craft, are examined in the same manner by immigration 
officials.  Although policies are the same for arrivals by 
air and sea, a slight difference in regulations calls for 
more intensive monitoring of maritime arrivals, although this 
is not always practiced; one difficulty is that immigration 
officials monitoring maritime arrivals are generally 
presented with a paper list of names of passengers and crew 
and their nationality and passport information, making rapid 
screening difficult.  The GOTT may share information on 
individual travelers with foreign governments on a case by 
case basis if requested; there is no formal policy 
authorizing this, and information is not shared on a routine 
basis.  During the Cricket World Cup in 2007, various 
Caribbean nations cooperated on sharing data, but this 
practice lapsed in T and T due to a sunset clause.  The GOTT 
collects passenger name record (PNR) data on incoming 
commercial flights or vessels, but this is sometimes in hard 
copy on paper.  U.S. Customs is currently working with T and 
T Customs and Excise officials to automate passenger lists 
and enter and retrieve them electronically.  PNR data is 
currently available to systematically screen travelers for 
intelligence or law enforcement purposes, but in practice 
arrivals by sea are more difficult to screen.  The GOTT does 
not have any existing treaties to share PNR data.  Although 
the electronic travel authority systems and the data base 
currently in place have been used to detect security threats, 
including wanted criminals, an interlocutor has commented 
that sometimes too many names are flagged without sufficient 
accompanying data on reasons to detain or monitor an 
individual. 
 
Border Control and Screening 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶4. (SBU) The GOTT employs new software that has certain 
algorithms to screen travelers of security interest, but it 
is not certain that this has been activated for daily use. 
All travelers, both T and T citizens and other nationals, are 
recorded and tracked.  There is no data available on the 
frequency with which travelers are admitted with ostensibly 
bona fide documents that are not electronically recorded. 
Unrecorded entries and exits by persons arriving by boat from 
Venezuela at locations other than official ports of entry are 
frequent; the number of such entries and exits may be between 
five and ten percent of all entries and exits.  There is 
legislation in place authorizing border control officials to 
use other criminal data when deciding who can enter the 
country.  Individuals attempting to enter without valid 
travel documents are referred by officials of the Immigration 
Division of the Ministry of National Security to the Special 
Branch Police, who detain them until they can be sent back to 
the country from which they arrived.  Individuals are 
sometimes sent back without being questioned on the 
provenance of their false documents, although recently more 
of them have been questioned regarding their reasons for 
attempting to enter T and T illegally before they are sent 
back to their previous point of origin.  Government policies 
on questioning, detaining and denying entry to individuals 
 
presenting themselves at a point of entry follow regulations 
in the Immigration Act; the GOTT also refers to International 
Conventions to which it is a signatory.    Information 
sharing within and among agencies of the GOTT has 
traditionally been sporadic, irregular, and not adequate for 
making rapid decisions or taking quick action.  Recently, due 
to personal contacts among agencies formed by training 
together, this situation has begun to improve slightly. 
 
Biometric Collection 
------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) The only biometric in the GOTT border control system 
installed by the Canadian Banknote Company is facial 
recognition capability.  Officials of the Immigration 
Division are not legally authorized to take or collect 
fingerprints.  There is some discussion of using fingerprint 
biometrics in the passport application process. 
 
 
Passports 
----------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) The GOTT began to issue machine readable passports 
in June of 2007; these passports include facial recognition 
features.  The GOTT does not share the public key to read 
data with other governments.  However, the system in place 
can read biometric data from other countries, provided they 
have made the key available.  The GOTT issues a standard 
passport with the normal five-year validity to replace a 
passport that has been lost or stolen.  There are no standard 
procedures in place for bearers who frequently report their 
passports lost or stolen.  However, each application to 
replace a stolen passport must be accompanied by a police 
report.  The older style passport that was easier to alter 
was more likely to be reported lost or stolen than the newer 
machine readable passport.  In most cases, a new standard 
passport with no distinctive identifying features is issued 
with a full five years, validity.  Post has not noticed an 
increase in the number of passports with no record of prior 
travel being used to apply for U.S. visas.  There is an 
emergency passport that has a white cover (the regular 
passport is dark blue) and has its own series of serial 
numbers. 
 
Fraud Detection 
------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) There is a fraud unit within the police that 
investigates various instances of fraud, including the use of 
fraudulent documents.  In addition, as part of a training 
program conducted by the IOM, immigration officials are being 
issued hand-held scanners, loupes, and combination loupes and 
infrared and black light devices with which to examine 
passports.  The GOTT will also reportedly subscribe to the 
Edison database, which provides examples of all passports in 
the world and their identifying features. 
 
Privacy and Data Security 
------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) The immigration and data base system currently in 
use reportedly contains information on previous deportations. 
 Records related to questioning, detention or removal of 
individuals are kept on file indefinitely, usually in locked 
filing cabinets.  The collection and use of sensitive data is 
restricted by privacy laws; however, data is shared among 
GOTT entities as required.  Post is not aware of any 
requirement to provide notice to the public concerning the 
implementation of new databases of records; post is also 
unaware of laws relating to security features for government 
computer systems that hold personally identifying 
information.  The Freedom of Information Act would allow an 
individual to request access to data, either raw data or case 
file data that domestic security agencies hold about him; 
however, there are some prescribed exceptions to the type of 
data that must be made available.  A non-citizen does not 
have the right to sue the GOTT to obtain data held by a 
government security agency about him. 
KUSNITZ