VZCZCXRO8107
PP RUEHGA RUEHHA RUEHQU RUEHVC
DE RUEHOT #2029/01 3091443
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 051443Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6846
INFO RUCNCAN/ALL CANADIAN POSTS COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 002029 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER PREL KVPR PGOV PINR CVIS ASEC KHLS CA
SUBJECT: INFORMATION ON HOST GOVERNMENT PRACTICES - 
INFORMATION COLLECTION, SCREENING, AND SHARING; CANADA 
 
REF: STATE 133921 
 
¶1. (SBU)  Officials of the Canadian Border Services Agency 
(CBSA) declined to meet with Emboffs to discuss elements of 
their border practices in time to meet the deadline for 
responding to reftel.  The entire issue of "Watch-listing" is 
extremely politically sensitive in Canada.  Therefore, 
responses below are based on observation and interaction of 
various Embassy offices with their Canadian counterparts. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Responses are linked to para six of reftel. 
 
¶A. Watchlisting: 
 
-- the current Canadian Watchlist contains approximately 2000 
records.  We have no breakdown of the watchlist by content. 
The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) maintains 
the watchlist. 
 
¶B. Traveler Information Collection: 
 
--  What are the country's policies (legislation, mandates, 
etc.) on collecting information from travelers arriving in 
the country?: Essentially the same as the United States. 
 
--  Are there different policies for air, sea, and land entry 
and for domestic flights?: Policies are not officially 
different.  But data collection is more thorough at the air 
and sea ports of entry than the land border. 
 
--  Who collects traveler information?:  CBSA 
 
--  What are the policies of the collecting agency to share 
that information with foreign governments?:  Canadian privacy 
laws severely limit information-sharing with regard to 
Canadian citizens or persons with a legal status in Canada. 
Information on others is more freely shared. 
 
-- Does the host government collect Passenger Name Record 
(PNR) data on incoming commercial flights or vessels?  Is 
this data used for intelligence or law enforcement purposes 
to screen travelers?  Does host government have any existing 
treaties to share PNR data?:  Canada collects PNR data, but 
we have no information as to the extent this data is used for 
screening travelers. 
 
-- If applicable, have advance passenger information systems 
(APIS), interactive advanced passenger information systems 
(IAPIS), or electronic travel authority systems been 
effective at detecting other national security threats, such 
as wanted criminals?:  Not available. 
 
 ¶C.  Border Control and Screening: 
 
-- Does the host government employ software to screen 
travelers of security interest?:  Yes.  National Record 
Assessment Center (NRAC) 
 
-- Are all travelers tracked electronically, or only 
non-host- country nationals?  What is the frequency of 
travelers being "waived through"  because they hold up what 
appears to be an appropriate document, but whose information 
is not actually recorded electronically?  What is the 
estimated percentage of non-recorded crossings, entries and 
exits?:  All travelers are tracked only at entry.  All 
travelers are entering by land or sea are entered 
electronically.  The majority of land entries are entered 
electronically. 
 
-- Do host government border control officials have the 
authority to use other criminal data when making decisions on 
who can enter the country? If so, please describe this 
authority (legislation, mandates, etc):  Yes.  CBSA has MOU's 
with responsible agencies to use their information in making 
entry decisions. 
 
 -- What are the host government's policies on questioning, 
detaining and denying entry to individuals presenting 
themselves at a point of entry into the country?  Which 
agency would question, detain, or deny entry?:  CBSA has the 
authority and its practices are similar to those in the 
United States. 
 
--  How well does information-sharing function within the 
host government, e.g., if there is a determination that 
Qhost government, e.g., if there is a determination that 
someone with a valid host government visa is later identified 
with terrorism, how is this communicated and resolved 
internally?:  Interagency cooperation is not particularly 
good within the Canadian bureaucracy. 
 
¶D.  Biometric Collection: 
 
OTTAWA 00002029  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
-- Are biometric systems integrated for all active POEs? 
What are the systems and models used?:  No, they are still 
being integrated. 
 
--  Are all passengers screened for the biometric or does the 
host government target a specific population for collection 
(i.e. host country nationals)? Do the biometric collection 
systems look for a one to one comparison (ensure the 
biometric presented matches the one stored on the e-Passport) 
or one to many comparison (checking the biometric presented 
against a database of known biometrics)?:  No 
 
-- If biometric systems are in place, does the host 
government know of any countermeasures that have been used or 
attempted to defeat biometric checkpoints?:  Not available. 
 
-- What are the host government's policies on collecting the 
fingerprints of travelers coming into the country?: 
Fingerprints may only be collected for specific reasons such 
as Refugee Applicant, Suspected Criminal. 
 
--  Which agency is responsible for the host government's 
fingerprint system?:  Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) 
 
--  Are the fingerprint programs in place NIST, INT-I, EFTS, 
UK1 or RTID compliant?:  Not available. 
 
--  Are the fingerprints collected as flats or rolled? Which 
agency collects the fingerprints?:  Either process may be 
used depending on the circumstances.  CBSA collects the 
prints at the Port of Entry. 
 
 ¶E.  Passports: 
 
--  If the host government issues a machine-readable passport 
containing biometric information, does the host government 
share the public key required to read the biometric 
information with any other governments?  If so, which 
governments?:  There is no sharing. 
 
--  Does the host government issue replacement passports for 
full or limited validity (e.g. the time remaining on the 
original passports, fixed validity for a replacement, etc.)?: 
 Except for temporary, emergency passports, replacement 
passports are issued for a full validity.  They are 
considered new passports. 
 
--  Does the host government have special 
regulations/procedures for dealing with "habitual" losers of 
passports or bearers who have reported their passports stolen 
multiple times?:  There is no basis for denying issuance of a 
passport except for a violation of law. 
 
--  Are replacement passports of the same or different 
appearance and page length as regular passports (do they have 
something along the lines of our emergency partial duration 
passports)?:  Replacement passports are considered fully 
valid new passports.  There is a short validity emergency 
passport issued by overseas offices that has a different 
appearance. 
 
--  Do emergency replacement passports contain the same or 
fewer biometric fields as regular-issue passports?: 
Emergency passports have no biometric fields. 
 
--  Where applicable, has Post noticed any increase in the 
number of replacement or "clean" (i.e. no evidence of prior 
travel) passports used to apply for U.S. visas?:  Canadian 
citizens do not need a visa to enter the United States. 
 
--  Are replacement passports assigned a characteristic 
number series or otherwise identified?:  No 
 
 ¶F. Fraud Detection 
 
--  How robust is fraud detection and how actively are 
instances of fraud involving documents followed up?:  It is 
reasonably robust.  On an individual basis, there is limited 
follow-up.  Where a pattern is detected or where individual 
fraud appears as a component for a larger issue, there is 
significant investigation. 
 
--  How are potentially fraudulently issued documents taken 
out of circulation, or made harder to use?:  The documents 
Qout of circulation, or made harder to use?:  The documents 
are seized and entered into the CBSA Fraudulent Document 
System. 
 
¶G. Privacy and Data Security 
 
--  What are the country's policies on records related to the 
 
OTTAWA 00002029  003 OF 003 
 
 
questioning, detention, or removal of individuals encountered 
at points of entry into the country?  How are those records 
stored, and for how long?:  All records are covered by the 
Access To Information and Privacy Act.  All records are 
stored in the Field Operation Support System (FOSS).  We have 
no information on retention policies. 
 
-- What are the country's restrictions on the collection or 
use of sensitive data?:  Restrictions are based on the Access 
To Information and Privacy Act, which severely restricts the 
use or sharing of any collected data. 
 
-- What are the requirements to provide notice to the public 
on the implementation of new databases of records?:  Not 
available. 
 
-- Are there any laws relating to security features for 
government computer systems that hold personally identifying 
information?:  Yes.  Access To Information and Privacy Act. 
 
-- What are the rules on an individual's ability to access 
data that homeland security agencies hold about them?:  A 
Canadian citizen can request copies of data that government 
agencies hold on him except in the case of security-related 
data.  But the standards of withholding data are very high. 
 
--  Are there different rules for raw data (name, date of 
birth, etc.) versus case files (for example, records about 
enforcement actions)?:  No 
 
--  Does a non-citizen/resident have the right to sue the 
government to obtain these types of data?:  Yes 
 
Visit our shared North American Partnership blog (Canada & Mexico) at 
http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap 
 
WILKINS