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Viewing cable 07NDJAMENA903, CHAD: JEM EXPLAINS ARAB ALLIANCE AND WARNS OF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07NDJAMENA903 2007-11-21 13:51 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ndjamena
VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNJ #0903 3251351
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 211351Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5907
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS NDJAMENA 000903 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KPKO PGOV PHUM CD SU
SUBJECT: CHAD: JEM EXPLAINS ARAB ALLIANCE AND WARNS OF 
VIOLENCE 
 
REF: A. NDJAMENA 0784 
     B. KHARTOUM 1807 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: Representatives of the Khalil Ibrahim-led 
wing of the Sudan Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) met 
with Emboffs November 19 to announce a new JEM/Arab alliance, 
explain the defects of the Sirte meeting and warn of future 
armed conflict in Darfur and Kordofan.  End summary. 
 
JEM REPORTS NEW ALLIANCE WITH DARFUR ARABS 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU)  In a November 19 meeting with CDA and other 
embassy officers, Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) Chief 
Negotiator Ahmed Tugod Lissan (representing the Khalil 
Ibrahim wing) reported that recent JEM-led meetings had been 
successful on organizational and political fronts. The 
meetings brought together a number of Arab communities which 
were now willing to become part of the JEM movement.  These 
Arab groups included the Mahamit, Mahariyya, Habatia 
(phonetic), Ireigat and Salamat. No signed document existed, 
but talks were ongoing and the groups had indicated that they 
were ready for "tribal reconciliation." Lissan explained that 
the Arab tribes finally understand that the Government of 
Sudan did not respect peace agreements and that it had used 
them for their own interests.  He stated that the alliance 
between Khartoum and the Janjaweed has "collapsed" and that 
the Government of Sudan was now seriously in danger of 
"losing Darfur." Lissan also asked for U.S. support to visit 
New York to express the group's views to the United Nations 
Security Council. 
 
 
FLAWS AT SIRTE 
-------------- 
 
3.  (SBU) Lissan stated that he was in Chad to discuss the 
ongoing Sirte negotiations with Chadian authorities (and 
explain why JEM/Khalil was not in Sirte.)  Lissan stated that 
the JEM/Khalil faction would not attend Sirte because - to 
their mind - the UN/AU leadership had fallen for the Sudanese 
strategy of giving a voice to every group, including those 
without any forces on the ground.  The groups represented in 
Sirte were all creations of the Sudanese government, and the 
Libyans had cooperated with the Sudanese in bringing them to 
Sirte. Special Envoy Andrew Natsios' invitation for all to 
attend had "created a new crisis." 
 
4.  (SBU) Lissan reiterated that negotiations needed to be 
confined to JEM and well-defined factions of the SLA.  Other 
would-be players needed to decide which of these groups they 
belonged to and return to those groups if they wanted to be 
part of the peace process.  For the peace process to succeed, 
the mediation team needed to focus on the people on the 
ground, and sit down with the non-signatories.  Lissan 
downplayed the rifts in the JEM and ascribed rebel disunity 
to Government of Sudan manipulation.  Queried as to locations 
which he thought propitious for peace talks, Lissan stated 
that Libya as a venue could still be acceptable; South Africa 
was too far away; Eritrea was out of the question. Lissan 
complained that the SPLM meeting in Juba was "like a market" 
- everyone was there - including representatives of Mini 
Minawi. 
 
VIOLENCE AHEAD 
-------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Lissan forecast that in the coming weeks or months 
there would be "a total change on the ground" in Darfur and a 
collapse of relations between the Government of Sudan and the 
Janjaweed.  Violence would escalate and reach as far as the 
Chinese-run oil fields in Kordofan.  When asked if UNAMID 
would affect circulation of Sudanese rebels, Lissan said he 
doubted that the Government of Sudan will ever allow a large 
number of troops to come into Darfur. He said that on 
November 18, the President of Sudan announced a "jihad" 
against the UN Peacekeepers.  He also alleged that there were 
contacts between the GoS and the AMIS attackers in 
Haskanitas. 
 
Comment: 
 
6. (SBU) Lissan's comments on a return to war echo Khalil 
Ibrahim's statements in a BBC interview in September.  JEM's 
position on the key negotiators in the conflict has remained 
the same (reftel A).  We are not able to comment on a 
possible JEM/Arab alliance. 
TAMLYN