VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNR #4550/01 3271108
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 231108Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3592
INFO RHEFHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS NAIROBI 004550 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR S/CT KEN MCKUNE, NCTC, AND DHS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KVPR PTER PREL PGOV PINR CVIS ASEC KHLS KE
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON HOST 
GOVERNMENT PRACTICES - INFORMATION COLLECTION, SCREENING, 
AND SHARING 
 
REF: STATE 133921 
 
 ¶1. (SBU) U.S. Mission Kenya provides the following on host 
government practices in response to REFTEL. 
 
¶A.  Watchlisting: 
-- If host government maintains a "watchlist," how many 
records 
does the watchlist contain, and how many are 
terrorist-related? 
Answer: The GoK/Immigration has approximately four thousand 
(4000) 
persons watchlisted and twelve thousand documents. We do not 
know how 
many of these are terrorist-related. 
-- Which ministry or office maintains the watchlist? 
Answer: The Kenyan Department of Immigration. Other agency's 
may 
maintain their own "watchlist" but they have to submit a 
request to 
Immigration to have the name or document placed on the 
"official" 
watchlist. 
 
¶B. Traveler Information Collection: 
--  What are the country's policies (legislation, mandates, 
etc.) 
on collecting information from travelers arriving in the 
country? 
Answer: We do not have specific information. 
--  Are there different policies for air, sea, and land entry 
and 
for domestic flights? 
Answer: Not to our Knowledge 
--  Who collects traveler information? 
Answer: The Kenyan Department of Immigration. They may pass 
the 
entry/departure cards to the Tourist board for their use. 
--  What are the policies of the collecting agency to share 
that 
information with foreign governments? 
Answer: No observed set policy 
-- Does the host government collect Passenger Name Record 
(PNR) 
data on incoming commercial flights or vessels?  Is this data 
used for intelligence or law enforcement purposes to screen 
travelers?  Does host government have any existing treaties to 
share PNR data? 
Answer: The Kenyan Airport Authority (KAA) does receive the 
flight 
manifests but the information is not passed in a timely 
manner to 
security entities to pre-screen passengers. 
-- If applicable, have advance passenger information systems 
(APIS), interactive advanced passenger information systems 
(IAPIS), or electronic travel authority systems been 
effective at 
detecting other national security threats, such as wanted 
criminals? 
Answer: No information available. 
 
¶C.  Border Control and Screening: 
-- Does the host government employ software to screen 
travelers 
of security interest? 
Answer: Yes, they use the US funded PISCES system at three 
airports; 
JKIA, Mombasa and Wilson. The system is not deployed at any 
other 
sites. The sites without the PISCES system do not have any 
computer 
systems and the method of data collection is by hand. Each 
site has 
a printed "watchlist", which is only referenced when a 
traveler is 
sent to the Secondary for further questioning. 
-- Are all travelers tracked electronically or only non-host- 
country nationals?  What is the frequency of travelers being 
"waived 
through" because they hold up what appears to be an 
appropriate 
document, but whose information is not actually recorded 
electronically?  What is the estimated percentage of 
non-recorded 
crossings, entries and exits? 
 
 
Answers: At site where the PISCES system is in use 
approximately 95% 
of the travelers are entered into the system. They process 
all 
travelers, local and foreign. It has been observed on many 
occasions 
where the host nation personnel do not enter travelers into 
the 
system if they are in the line to obtain a entry visa and 
have a 
western (US, CAN, EU, JAP, etc.) passport. At the border 
crossings 
many travelers have been observed being waived through as 
"local 
traders". The rough estimate of these types of "local 
traders" 
passing through without being recorded can be as high as 70%. 
-- Do host government border control officials have the 
authority 
to use other criminal data when making decisions on who can 
enter 
the country? If so, please describe this authority 
(legislation, 
mandates, etc). 
Answer: Immigration has limited access to "other" databases. 
However, such access is often based on personal relationships 
of 
individual officers. Depending on the  agency that made the 
discovery 
of a suspect individual it might take  the involvement of the 
various 
heads of agencies in order for information be shared. The 
Kenyan 
Immigration Act Chapter 172 Laws of Kenya Section 10-16 gives 
the 
Kenya Immigration Department the authority to question, 
detain or 
deny entry into the country under and provides guidelines on 
the 
administration, offenses and legal proceedings. The same 
section also 
confers powers to the Kenya Police Service to perform the 
functions of 
immigrations officers. 
 -- What are the host government's policies on questioning, 
detaining and denying entry to individuals presenting 
themselves 
at a point of entry into the country?  Which agency would 
question, detain, or deny entry? 
Answer: Immigration would be the first to "detain" a 
traveler. They 
would then deny them entry and send them back onto the flight 
they 
arrived, pursue prosecution for violations of the 
"Immigration Act" 
or hand them over to the appropriate security office 
(Criminal 
Investigation Division (CID), Anti Terrorist Police Unit 
(ATPU), 
Police, etc.) 
--  How well does information sharing function within the host 
government, e.g., if there is a determination that someone 
with a 
valid host-government visa is later identified with terrorism, 
how is this communicated and resolved internally? 
Answer: The identifying office or agency would write a letter 
to 
Immigration and ask that the suspect be added to the 
"watchlist". 
This can be a very slow process and the finial decision to 
add a 
suspect to the "watchlist" is held by the Director of 
Immigration. 
 
¶D.  Biometric Collection: 
-- Are biometric systems integrated for all active POEs?  What 
are the systems and models used? 
Anwswer: No, but at the PISCES sites the host nation 
officials can 
take digital fingerprints and photographs in secondary only 
but 
the data is not compared to any database. The users would 
have to 
send the data out for confirmation. 
--  Are all passengers screened for the biometric or does the 
 
 
host government target a specific population for collection 
(i.e. 
host country nationals)? Do the biometric collection systems 
look 
for a one to one comparison (ensure the biometric presented 
matches the one stored on the e-Passport) or one to many 
comparison (checking the biometric presented against a 
database 
of known biometrics)? 
Answer: Host nation does not have that capibilty. 
-- If biometric systems are in place, does the host government 
know of any countermeasures that have been used or attempted 
to 
defeat biometric checkpoints? 
Answer: N/A 
-- What are the host government's policies on collecting the 
fingerprints of travelers coming into the country? 
Anaswer: Only those found with immigration offenses are 
finger- 
printed. There is no policy on fingerprinting regular 
travelers. 
--  Which agency is responsible for the host government's 
fingerprint system? 
Answer: The CID, under the Kenya Police Service, is 
responsible 
for the criminal fingerprint system, while the Kenya National 
Registration Bureau under the Ministry of Immigration and 
Regristration of Persons collects fingerprints for the 
issuance 
of National Identification Cards. 
--  Are the fingerprint programs in place NIST, INT-I, EFTS, 
UK1 
or RTID compliant? 
Answer: Unknown 
--  Are the fingerprints collected as flats or rolled? Which 
agency collects the fingerprints? 
Answer: Fingerprints are rolled. 
 
¶E.  Passports: 
--  If the host government issues a machine-readable passport 
containing biometric information, does the host government 
share 
the public key required to read the biometric information with 
any other governments?  If so, which governments? 
Answer: The host nation passport do not currently contain any 
biometric information. 
--  Does the host government issue replacement passports for 
full 
or limited validity (e.g. the time remaining on the original 
passports, fixed validity for a replacement, etc.)? 
Answer: The GOK issues a (1) one year replacement passport 
which 
requires the holder to renew the limited validity passport. 
--  Does the host government have special 
regulations/procedures 
for dealing with "habitual" losers of passports or bearers who 
have reported their passports stolen multiple times? 
Answer: No, there is an annotation on the replacement 
passport 
stamped in by Kenyan Immigration indicating that the holder 
was 
previously issued a passport and the previously issued 
pasport 
number. 
--  Are replacement passports of the same or different 
appearance 
and page length as regular passports (do they have something 
along the lines of our emergency partial duration passports)? 
Answer: The replacement passports are the same in appearance 
and 
page length of regular passports, with a stamp indicating the 
previously issued passport. 
--  Do emergency replacement passports contain the same or 
fewer 
biometric fields as regular-issue passports? 
Answer: Same. 
--  Where applicable, has Post noticed any increase in the 
number 
of replacement or "clean" (i.e. no evidence of prior travel) 
passports used to apply for U.S. visas? 
Answer: No. Kenyan citizens are aware of the fingerprint scan 
required 
during the visa interview process and its ability to cross 
reference 
previous applications. Passports are either newly issued or 
 
 
older 
passports are provided. 
--  Are replacement passports assigned a characteristic number 
series or otherwise identified? 
Answer: Replacement passports are characterized by the 
stamped 
annotation from Kenyan Immigration indicating the bearer was 
previously issued a passport and it will only be valid for 
(1) one 
year. 
 
¶F. Fraud Detection 
-  How robust is fraud detection and how actively are 
instances 
of fraud involving documents followed up? 
Answer: The host government will follow up on all requests 
from post's 
fraud detection unit; however, post would spend too much time 
following 
up on all instances of fraud involving fraudulent documents 
so 
applicants who provide questionable documents are denied 
during the 
visa interview and post maintains files to identify specific 
trends. 
--  How are potentially fraudulently issued documents taken 
out 
of circulation, or made harder to use? 
Answer: Documents are not taken out of circulation and Kenya 
has a 
number of document vendors that will sell forged or poorly 
copied 
documents even after they are identifiable by Kenyan 
authorities and 
post officials. 
 
¶G. Privacy and Data Security 
--  What are the country's policies on records related to the 
questioning, detention or removal of individuals encountered 
at 
points of entry into the country? How are those records 
stored, 
and for how long? 
-- What are the country's restrictions on the collection or 
use 
of sensitive data? 
-- What are the requirements to provide notice to the public 
on 
the implementation of new databases of records? 
-- Are there any laws relating to security features for 
government computer systems that hold personally identifying 
information? 
-- What are the rules on an individual's ability to access 
data 
that homeland security agencies hold about them? 
--  Are there different rules for raw data (name, date of 
birth, 
etc.) versus case files (for example, records about 
enforcement 
actions)? 
--  Does a non-citizen/resident have the right to sue the 
government to obtain these types of data? 
Answer: Unknown. 
 
 
¶H.  Immigration Data Bases: 
--  What computerized immigration databases are used to track 
entries and exits? 
Answer: PISCES and MSAccess 
--  Is the immigration database available at all ports of 
entry 
(POEs)? 
Answer: No. 
--  If immigration databases are available at some POEs, 
but not all, how does the host government decide which POEs 
will 
receive the tool? 
Answer: PISCES in deployed and in use at; JKIA, Mombasa and 
Wilson 
(NBO) Airports. Where PISCES is in use in a function of US 
funding 
of the project. 
--  What problems, if any, limit the effectiveness of the 
systems?  For example, limited training, power brownouts, 
budgetary restraints, corruption, etc.? 
 
 
Answer: Power availability and brownouts, limited budgets and 
corruption are all issues. 
--  How often are national immigration databases updated? 
Answer: Where PISCES is installed it occurs in near real-time. 
 
¶I.  Watchlist and Information Sharing: 
--  Is there a name-based watchlist system used to screen 
travelers at POEs? 
Answer: Yes, at sites where PISCES is installed it is via 
computer 
software and at other sites it is in written form generated 
with 
MSAccess and delivered to the site. 
--  What domestic sources of information populate the 
name-based 
watchlist, i.e. names of deported persons, terrorist lookouts, 
criminal wants/warrants? 
Answer: All of the above mentioned 
--  What international watchlists do the  host government use 
for 
screening individuals, e.g. Interpol or TSA No Fly lists, UN, 
etc.? 
Answer: The Host nation does have access to the Interpol 
database 
but not at the POE. The host nation has not entered the 
Interpol 
data in the PISCES system. The Airlines have access to the 
TSA No 
 
SIPDIS 
Fly lists but it appears that the host nation officials do 
not. 
--  What bilateral/multilateral watchlist agreements exist 
between host government and its neighbors? 
Answer: Unknown. 
 
¶J.  Biometrics: 
--  Are biometric systems in place at ports of entry (air, 
land, 
sea)?  If no, does host government have plans to install such 
a 
system? 
Answer: No and unknown. 
--  If biometric systems are available at some POEs, but not 
all, 
how does the host government decide which POEs will receive 
the 
tool? 
Answer: N/A 
--  What biometric technologies, if any, does the host 
government 
use, i.e. fingerprint identification, facial recognition, iris 
recognition, hand geometry, retinal identification, DNA-based 
identification, keystroke dynamics, gait analysis?  Are the 
systems ICAO compliant? 
Answer: N/A 
--  Does the host government issue a machine-readable passport 
containing biometric information?  If e-Passports are issued, 
what biometric information is included on the document, i.e. 
fingerprint, iris, facial recognition, etc?  If not, does host 
government plan to issue a biometric document in the future? 
When? 
Answer: The Host nation does not currently issue 
machine-readable 
passportcontaining biometric information. The host nation 
just 
awarded a tender for a new passport issuance system and it 
does 
not currently include biometrics. It is unknown when the host 
nation will have a system to issue passport containing 
biometric 
information. 
 
¶K.  Identifying Appropriate Partners: 
Department would appreciate post's assessment of whether host 
government would be an appropriate partner in data sharing. 
Considerations include whether host government watchlists may 
include political dissidents (as opposed or in addition to 
terrorists), and whether host governments would share or use 
U.S. 
watchlist data inappropriately, etc. 
Answer:  In recent years Kenya has emerged from a long period 
in 
which political oppression was common.  While the government 
has 
largely moved away from many such practices it is yet to be 
seen 
 
 
if the reforms will be permanent. The question of whether or 
not 
the Kenyan government would be an appropriate partner for data 
sharing would require careful evaluation, with a close eye on 
the 
attitudes and practices of whoever wins the upcoming 
presidential 
elections. 
-- Are there political realities which would preclude a 
country 
from entering into a formal data-sharing agreement with the 
U.S? 
Answer: Very possible, as counterterrorism in general and 
accusations of "profiling" and "targeting" of Muslims are 
major 
political issues. 
-- Is the host country's legal system sufficiently developed 
to 
adequately provide safeguards for the protection and 
nondisclosure of information? 
Answer: Legal safeguards are not fully developed. 
-- How much information sharing does the host country do 
internally?  Is there a single consolidated database, for 
example?  If not, do different ministries share information 
amongst themselves? 
Answer:  The information sharing function within the 
government 
is still wanting. There are no formal standard operating 
procedures 
for sharing of information and therfore consistency is 
lacking. 
-- How does the country define terrorism?  Are there legal 
statutes that do so? 
Answer:  There is no fixed legal definition of terrorism. 
This was 
one of the features of the counter terrorism legislation that 
is 
languishing in the Parliament. 
 
 
RANNEBERGER 
RANNEBERGER