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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KYIV 002753 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
Department also for EUR/UMB, EUR/PRA, and ISN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PTER KCRM PREL KNNP UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: PSI Eastern Shield Exercise, October 29-31, Odesa, 
Ukraine 
 
REF:  STATE 148432 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  NOT FOR INTERNET. 
 
¶1. (U) Summary:  Ukraine and Poland sponsored a Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI) Eastern Shield demonstration, with 
Romanian, Georgian, Moldovan, and Bulgarian participation, October 
29-31 in Odesa, Ukraine.  The demonstration, planned as the first 
PSI exercise in the Black Sea region, employed a scripted scenario 
in which the respective ministries and agencies of the participating 
countries uncovered and interdicted the simulated illicit transit of 
dual-use technology from the participating countries through 
Ukraine.  The Ukrainians demonstrated their capability at land, sea, 
and air interdiction before observers from 26 countries, not all of 
them currently PSI participants.  The demonstration also provided an 
opportunity to showcase the capabilities of the USG-funded GUAM (for 
Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) Virtual Law-Enforcement 
Center (VLEC).  The demonstration was the largest multinational 
event that the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU, successor to the 
Soviet-era KGB) and its Anti-terrorism Center (ATC) has organized to 
date; SBU Director Nalyvaichenko and Ambassador Taylor participated 
in the event and closing ceremony.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Comment:  The exercise achieved the main general goals, but 
only partially achieved the specific agreed goals of the exercise: 
to review law enforcement, customs, and border control procedures 
relating to the control and effective interdiction of shipments of 
dual-use chemical precursors and other WMD-related equipment and 
supplies; to examine procedures for coordination among countries 
when these items move across borders; to uncover and document 
shortfalls in these procedures and recommend ways to 
revise/strengthen/improve them; to exercise national decision-making 
processes for interdicting WMD-related materials in the 
participating countries; and to review information sharing 
arrangements and determine ways to improve and make them more 
effective and timely.  Various defense attaches and other observers 
from both Kyiv and Moscow-based embassies (Germany, UK, Belgium, 
Sweden, Spain, the Netherlands) privately stated that the 
demonstrations did not constitute an exercise and were artificially 
constructed.  The same sentiment was expressed by observers from 
other countries (UK, Croatia, Japan, India, South Korea). 
 
¶3. (SBU) Comment cont.:  Polish MFA Security Policy Department 
Deputy Director Tadeusz Chomicki, the chief instigator of the 
exercise, observed, however, the exercise achieved its intended 
general goals, which were not focused on testing the actual 
coordination mechanisms but to foster connections between 
governments, between counterpart agencies in participating 
countries, and among non-proliferation agencies within each 
government.  In addition, the demonstration presented a limited 
opportunity to demonstrate PSI principles and operations to 
observing nations and to reach out to governments that have not yet 
become PSI partners.  With non-PSI countries South Korea and 
Indonesia sending observers from their capitals, we would judge the 
PSI Eastern Shield exercise to have been successful from this 
perspective.  (The United Arab Emirates also dispatched three 
observers.)  Chomicki, in a private conversation, indicated an 
interest in holding a follow-on table-top exercise utilizing VLEC. 
End summary/comment. 
 
The Scenario and Program 
------------------------ 
 
¶4. (SBU) The scenario demonstration began with a powerpoint 
presentation of the detection by Polish intelligence services of 
efforts to purchase steel tanks with a glass lining for transport to 
the country, "Grey," in the Middle East.  It proceeded as follows. 
Initial intelligence indicates that a shipment will be transferred 
imminently to a location in Ukraine.  Ukrainian intelligence 
established that the consignor is the Alena firm located in Odesa, 
and further coordination with the intelligence and law enforcement 
services of Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, and Romania develops 
additional information about the links between Alena to Grey and the 
other countries.  The Mirea forwarding company, located in 
Constantsa, Romania, provides shipping services for most of Alena's 
cargo.  An illegal shipment, without an export license, of tanks 
from Poland to Ukraine is allowed to proceed.  The shipment is kept 
under surveillance as it crosses the Polish-Ukrainian border at 
Mostyska rail crossing and proceeds to the Odesa-Sortirovochnaya 
rail station.  Merchant vessel Dana steams toward Odesa from 
 
KYIV 00002753  002 OF 002 
 
 
Constantsa, presumably to take on the Polish cargo and other 
shipments originating in Moldova and Georgia.  Moldova transmits 
information to the SBU, using the VLEC network, that Alena's 
representatives are proceeding by car to Odesa with purchases of 
chemical components.  Georgia also transmits information to the SBU 
that two Alena representatives have chartered an aircraft to 
transport chemical weapons precursors from Georgia to Odesa. 
Finally, the Bulgarian intelligence service detects two Grey 
citizens who are proceeding to Odesa with a large sum of cash. 
 
¶5. (U) The elaborate scenario timeline allowed Ukrainian ministries 
and agencies to discuss their ability to interdict illegal shipments 
and respond to accidents.  According the participant list, a wide 
range of Ukrainian ministries and agencies besides the SBU were 
involved: the Presidential Secretariat, the Cabinet of Ministers, 
Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Interior Internal Troops, the 
Ministry of Defense and uniformed services, Ministry of Emergency 
Situations, MFA, Ministry of Transport and Communications, National 
Security and Defense Council, State Border Guards Service, State 
Export Control Service, and State Customs Service.  On the first 
day, observers viewed videotapes demonstrating how information was 
transferred using VLEC and the procedures used to detect the illicit 
rail shipment.  On the second day, observers first watched an 
anti-terrorist stop of a vehicle movement at Chornomorsky training 
ground, culminating in the explosion of a mini-van and 
first-responders handling of a chemical contamination.  In the 
afternoon, the observers saw a demonstration of SBU Alpha Troops 
storming an aircraft after it had landed at the Shkolny airfield and 
then toured an elaborate field hospital.  On the third and final 
day, observers saw Alpha Troops board the simulated Dana commercial 
vessel, in reality a passenger ferry with the observers on board. 
All live demonstrations highlighted Ukrainian efforts on 
anti-terrorist consequence management tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (TTP's). 
 
Lessons Learned 
--------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) We are grateful to the Department's Nonproliferation and 
Disarmament Fund (NDF), and especially to the NDF's John Conlon, for 
the support provided that allowed the exercise to happen at all. 
The bureaucratic hurdles that the Ukrainians overcame, however, were 
an instructive insight into the progress that SBU, ATC, and other 
Ukrainian agencies must still make in order to be able to cooperate 
with other countries to the degree required for actual PSI 
operations.  The Ukrainians, for example, were unable to authorize a 
representative to sign a simple Memorandum of Discussion and 
Workplan, so that, ultimately, we resorted to an exchange of 
diplomatic notes (a simpler procedure, surprisingly, for the 
Ukrainians).  The Ukrainians' ability to carry out relatively simple 
procedures continues to be hampered by an extreme 
over-centralization of authority.  (Note: Per exchange of diplomatic 
notes, the Counter Terrorism Center of the Security Service of 
Ukraine will submit a report on the exercise outcome regarding NDF 
costs associated with the exercise.) 
 
¶7. (SBU) The Ukrainians also had difficulty with simple issues of 
proper coordination.  They failed to notify the Romanians in a 
timely fashion, for example, that they would be unable to accept an 
arrangement to have a Romanian Border Police vessel participate in 
the exercise.  They explained during the September Final Planning 
Conference that insufficient time remained to obtain Ukrainian 
government clearance for a police/military vessel to visit Odesa. 
The Romanians nearly pulled out of the exercise, given their vessel 
participation was agreed back in April during the mid-planning 
conference held in Bucharest, but in the end, after consultations 
with USG representatives, reluctantly agreed to accept the use of 
the Ukrainian vessel in place of the Romanian one.  We should note, 
however, that the Ukrainians had no way of anticipating the May 29 
decision to call pre-term elections for September 30, which made it 
virtually impossible to obtain the required Cabinet of Ministers 
decision to authorize a visit by a foreign military vessel to Odesa 
port. 
 
Taylor