VZCZCXRO1340
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #1264/01 3121041
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 081041Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7107
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 001264 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS PREF MOPS KPKO CG RW
SUBJECT: AF Senior Advisor Shortley's visit to Nyabiondo, 
a Microcosm of North Kivu 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary.  MONUC peacekeepers in the southwestern North Kivu 
town of Nyabiondo told AF senior advisor Tim Shortly November 2 that 
negative forces encircling the town, including FDLR, Mayi Mayi, and 
National Council for the Defense of the People (CNDP) fighters, will 
not be easily dislodged, even in an all-out military offensive.  The 
local population blames the international community for its plight, 
including the inability to support its own institutions, and fears 
that any attempt to forcibly evict negative forces will end in their 
own destruction.  Local leaders reject the so-called "FDLR Plan" put 
forward by the GDRC, claim that they should be the arbiters for the 
eventual return of Tutsi refugees to the area, and feel that Laurent 
Nkunda and his CNDP forces are being pandered to.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) USG delegation (Senior Advisor to A/S AF Tim Shortley, Lt. 
Col. Mark Ellington, AF/ Julie Chalfin, Kinshasa Emboffs Marc Trahan 
and Greg Groth) traveled to Nyabiondo, Masisi Territory, on a MONUC 
PKO INDBATT (India Battalion) helicopter November 2.  Nyabiondo, in 
North Kivu's Masisi territory, is approximately 100 kilometers (70 
miles) northeast of Goma and is currently inaccessible by surface 
transportation due to poor road conditions between it and Masisi, 
the territorial capital.  The delegation, joined by INDBATT Sake 
commander Col. Chand Seroha and representatives of the UN Office for 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), World Food Program 
(WFP), and the UN DDRRR program, received a briefing from INDBATT 
Mobile Operations Perimeter (MOP) personnel, based in Nyabiondo. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The local population is 65 percent Hunde ethnicity, 25 
percent Hutu ethnicity, and the remaining 10 percent is a mix of 
various ethnicities including Tutsis and Pygmies.  The area of 
Nyabiondo is surrounded by a mlange of negative forces, including 
FDLR, Mayi Mayi, and a breakaway Mayi Mayi group known as PARECO. 
The Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) and Congolese National Police 
(PNC) are also in and around Nyabiondo.  CNDP armed forces (led by 
General Laurent Nkunda) extend to a few kilometers east of Nyabiondo 
from the Nkunda stronghold in Kilolirwe and Kichanga. 
 
¶4. (SBU) INDBATT/Nyabiondo briefers indicated that FDLR troops 
around Nyabiondo consist of a battalion made up four companies, 
numbering perhaps 200 altogether.  They said that the Mayi Mayi 
forces had few weapons, the FDLR somewhat more, but still not a 
weapon for each fighter.  INDBATT said that there is evidence of 
some collaboration between Mayi Mayi and FDLR personnel in the area, 
as well as commercial trading between FDLR and CNDP troops at the 
Nyabiondo market, where negative forces check their weapons at the 
entrance and reclaim them after shopping. 
 
FDLR Repatriation? 
------------------ 
 
¶5. (SBU) INDBATT briefers said that total FDLR population in the 
territory is approximately 50,000 and that some have expressed 
interest in returning to Rwanda, but are afraid of arrest, despite 
their claim that 60-70 percent of them were not involved in the 
genocide.  Some have apparently integrated locally in and around 
Nyabiondo, marrying local women and raising children, but remain 
armed.  INDBATT said that even boys of 13, born in the DRC, have 
been indoctrinated into the FDLR cause.  INDBATT said that those 
FDLR who turn themselves in for repatriation to Rwanda prefer to do 
so with MONUC PKO, where they are fed, sheltered, and offered 
protection and transport, rather than the UN DDRRR program, in which 
they may spend a couple days "on the loose" before being taken 
charge of and provided material support.  (Note: the delegation was 
told later by DDRRR personnel in Goma that since 2003, 10,000 FDLR 
fighters and their families/dependents have been repatriated to 
Rwanda through the DDRRR program.  There are currently no DDRRR 
"sensitizers" operating in the Nyabiondo area actively working to 
convince the FDLR there to enter the program; UN's DDRRR program 
relies instead on dropping leaflets and emitting radio publicity 
about the repatriation program.  End note.) 
 
INDBATT: FDLR Forces Second Only to CNDP 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) INDBATT believes that FDLR forces in the Nyabiondo, Masisi 
territory would be difficult, if not impossible, to dislodge from 
their positions in the hills.  Their commanders are in communication 
with each other and exert reasonable command and control over their 
forces, which are widely dispersed and second only to CNDP forces in 
fighting ability, in INDBATT's opinion.  FARDC ranks third, followed 
by Mayi Mayi forces.  They noted that all negative forces, as well 
as local FARDC and PNC personnel, collect taxes on the mineral ores, 
mainly cassiterite (tin ore, currently valued at close to USD 10,000 
per ton) emanating from Walikale, most of which is flown to Goma in 
small planes but some of which is transported via roads when 
passable.  (Note.  Sources estimate that 20 to 30 LET 410 aircraft, 
each capable of carrying up to one and half tons of ore, take off 
from Walikale and land in Goma each day.  This trade could be worth 
over a quarter million dollars/day.  End note.) 
 
KINSHASA 00001264  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
International Community at Fault 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) The USG delegation and UN agencies met next with local 
authorities from Nyabiondo, including local government, traditional 
chiefs, civil society representatives, and a PNC officer.  They 
complained about the security situation in Nyabiondo and outlying 
areas, noting that both insecurity and poor road conditions have 
prohibited trucks from arriving from Goma via Masisi for over one 
month.  The PNC officer compared the situation to HIV/AIDS, saying 
that the insecurity and socioeconomic difficulties they were facing 
were merely symptoms, like tuberculosis and opportunistic diseases, 
but that the real problem ("the virus") was an "international 
conspiracy" which had left the community powerless in the face of 
depredation by the FDLR and the threat of attack by CNDP forces. 
Another said that the international community had brought the FDLR 
to their zone, and that the international community must find a way 
to get them out. 
 
Snake and Eggs? 
--------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) The officials felt that the GDRC, through the FARDC, had 
only succeeded in moving the FDLR westward into their community, 
which was now powerless to confront them.  They feared that an 
offensive launched against either the FDLR or CNDP forces would 
prove disastrous for the local population due to their proximity to 
the conflict, likening it to killing a snake preying on a nest of 
chicken eggs.  "You can chop off the snake's head, but you will 
break some eggs in the effort, and we are the eggs," said one.  They 
also feared that brassage for the Congolese militias would fail, 
since they did not believe that Laurent Nkunda would be forced to 
participate, and that others would then return to attack Nkunda. 
They said that they were tired of dialogues, which had no effect, 
and that CNDP forces must be removed from the field somehow. 
 
No Funds for Local Services 
--------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Regarding domestic problems, the officials cited their 
inability to fund local services, since they were unable to collect 
their own taxes due to the depredations by the forces surrounding 
them.  They insisted that Nkunda and his troops were being handled 
too gently, and that this was because without Nkunda, there would be 
fewer jobs for the international community working the issue ("No 
Nkunda, no jobs.")  The officials complained that the central and 
provincial governments in Kinshasa and Goma, respectively, were 
taking revenues from the territory, often through "mining agents," 
in addition to those exacted by negative forces.  To add insult to 
injury, they were obliged to repair the road through their zone so 
that trucks transporting FARDC soldiers in and those carrying 
mineral ores out from Walikale to Goma could get through during most 
of the year. 
 
Tutsi Refugee Returns 
--------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) The Nyabiondo officials expressed concern over the return 
of Congolese refugees, mainly Tutsis, from refugee camps in Rwanda. 
They claimed that the decisions on where and how these returnees 
could resettle in the area should be left up to local authorities, 
not the central or provincial government.  They said that they knew 
well where these refugees had been prior to their exodus, and that 
they could determine whose land was whose.  They concluded that the 
best way to handle refugee repatriation would be to allow pressure 
on the Rwandan government to force the issue. 
 
The "FDLR Plan" 
--------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Regarding the GDRC's "FDLR Plan," which they appeared to 
have some knowledge of, the officials again used the snake/eggs 
metaphor and asked the rhetorical question "How do you easily disarm 
someone who is holding a weapon?"  They asked why the GDRC wanted to 
send the FDLR further west in the DRC and "all over the country," 
noting that some had already integrated locally, while others wanted 
to return to Rwanda but were either being physically prevented from 
doing so or were afraid to go back.  They ended their presentation 
to the delegation by suggesting that the solution to the CNDP 
problem would have to be found in collaboration with the Rwandan 
government. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Comment:  The INDBATT assessment of the situation around 
Nyabiondo, plus the local population's fear of being caught in the 
crossfire, lends weight to the message that there is no military 
solution to this standoff.  Distrust of the international community, 
the GDRC, the FARDC, and all negative forces (especially the CNDP) 
 
KINSHASA 00001264  003 OF 003 
 
 
means that a way must be found to effect a simultaneous reduction in 
saber-rattling and depredation, once a ceasefire and a disengagement 
of those negative forces is achieved.  Local communities need to see 
the peace dividend that was promised after elections, and this 
includes finding a way to give them back some power over their own 
finances and the ability to improve local infrastructure.  FDLR 
repatriation and Congolese Tutsi refugee returns remain big question 
marks, and will require much more work and preparation before they 
can begin in earnest. The population of Nyabiondo and Masisi 
territory must not join the ranks of the hundreds of thousands of 
North Kivuans already caught up in conflict and displacement.  End 
comment. 
 
BROCK