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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM1889, JEM/CL CLAIMS ZAGHAWA UNIFYING, WARNS UN/AU LOSING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM1889 2007-11-30 13:08 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO4245
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1889/01 3341308
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 301308Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9387
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0260
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001889 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: JEM/CL CLAIMS ZAGHAWA UNIFYING, WARNS UN/AU LOSING 
CREDIBILITY 
 
KHARTOUM 00001889  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
----------------------------- 
ZAGHAWA GROUPS APPROACH UNITY 
----------------------------- 
 
1. (SBU) Meeting with Poloff on November 29, cadres of the Justice 
and Equality Movement/Collective Leadership (JEM/CL) were optimistic 
that it will finalize its consolidation with the other major Zaghawa 
military elements in Darfur after upcoming field consultations and 
will be ready to resume negotiations within two weeks.  Following 
the conclusion of the rebel unification talks in Juba, JEM/CL 
representatives will travel to Darfur in the coming days to brief 
the commanders on the results of the meetings sponsored by the Sudan 
People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and on the Sirte process.  The 
consultations will focus on solidifying the momentum generated by 
the establishment of the United Revolutionary Front (URF), which 
formed in Juba and consists of JEM/CL, the National Movement for 
Reform and Development (NMRD), and the Sudan Liberation Movement 
(SLM) affiliated with Adam Bakheit.  They urged the UN/AU to 
capitalize on the momentum in the process, saying that the problems 
of Darfur "were bigger than the upcoming holidays" and should take 
precedence. 
 
2. (SBU) JEM/CL is coordinating politically and militarily with 
SLA/Unity, which, the representatives claim, is posed to join the 
URF and is committed to participating in resumed peace negotiations 
in Sirte.  They emphasized, however, that SLA/Unity is "not one 
movement" and confirmed independent reports that Suleiman Jamous, 
Sharif Harir, and Abdullah Yehia each control different power 
centers within the faction.  Pressed by Poloff on which SLA/Unity 
leader will soon join the URF, they hesitantly admitted that Jamous 
had just allied with them.  (Note: JEM/CL's reticence to disclose 
this information is likely indicative of the tentative nature--and 
sensitivity--of this alliance.  End note.) 
 
----------------------------- 
UN/AU Consultations Essential 
----------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) JEM/CL cautioned that all-inclusive invitations to the next 
round of talks will legitimize movements with no military or 
political influence and will result in further splintering.  "The 
UN/AU should revise the strategy for invitations," one of the JEM/CL 
representatives explained.  "It could lead to one-man movements." 
They suggested that priority be given to factions that maintain 
formidable military forces.  Acknowledging the risk that excluding 
some groups could also be detrimental to the process, JEM/CL said 
that the UN/AU can only "do the invitations right" if they launch 
consistent, direct discussions with the field commanders and 
political leaders in Darfur. 
 
----------- 
CFC Demands 
----------- 
 
4. (SBU) The Sudanese Government violates its unilateral declaration 
of a cessation of hostilities on a daily basis, according to the 
JEM/CL representatives, and they called on the UN/AU to establish a 
more effective cease-fire monitoring mechanism, characterizing the 
current arrangement as "useless."  Nonetheless, JEM/CL demanded 
that, as a signatory to the N'djamena Humanitarian Cease-fire, it be 
allowed to participate in the Cease-fire Commission (CFC) and 
claimed that AU Chief Mediator Sam Ibok had promised them seats. 
(Note: Having denied JEM/CL representation on the CFC, Agwai told 
international observers on November 28 that participation by JEM/CL 
would open the door for other splinter movements to request the same 
status.  End note.) 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Deferring to Sudan, UN/AU Risks Credibility 
------------------------------------------ 
 
5. (SBU) JEM/CL criticized the UN and AU for their deference to the 
Sudanese Government, on both the political and peacekeeping tracks. 
"We understand that we can't get all we want," said one cadre, "but 
the UN/AU cannot just accommodate the Government--they must also 
compromise."  Mentioning China and Pakistan, they said the 
Government is only accepting troop contributions for the UN-AU 
Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) from allies that were complicit in the 
"genocide."  While they acknowledged that the Chinese and Pakistani 
troops will come under international authority, they questioned both 
countries' motives and said that their troop contributions needed to 
be balanced by Western forces--or UNAMID risked a backlash from the 
volatile IDP population.  The "people" had respected the AU Mission 
in Sudan (AMIS) from 2004 to 2005, but it had later lost all of its 
credibility due to its own inefficacy.  They warned that a similar 
fate could befall UNAMID and asked for the U.S. to intervene 
 
KHARTOUM 00001889  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
politically to ensure a balanced force. 
 
6. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
 
FERNANDEZ