VZCZCXRO7551
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1862/01 3320735
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 280735Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9327
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001862 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, AF SE NATSIOS 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: ADDRESSING ABYEI 
 
REF: (A) KHARTOUM 1812 
(B) KHARTOUM 1813 
(C) KHARTOUM 1719 
(D) KHARTOUM 1847 
 
¶1. (SBU) The complex issue of Abyei has haunted implementation of 
the CPA since the beginning. It is the only part of the agreement 
that seen zero progress towards implementation since the signing of 
the peace accord in 2005. A warning should be sounded to any in the 
international community who seek to delve into this esoteric, 
emotional topic which has generated a whole regiment of opinionated, 
knowledgeable and passionate experts in Sudan on both sides of the 
political divide. Preparation and depth of knowledge is key to those 
who wish to help break the deadlock. 
 
¶2. (SBU) In advance of Secretary Rice's planned December 5 
Ministerial meeting in Addis Ababa to discuss implementation of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), we offer the following 
recommendations on Abyei, which lies at the heart of the current 
NCP-SPLM standoff (reftels provide additional suggestions and 
background).  We do not yet know if the NCP will attend the 
Ministerial-level meeting.  If they do not, the recommendations 
outlined here will inform our future engagement with the SPLM and 
NCP on the issue of Abyei.  Post highly recommends that the U.S. 
engage at a high level on this issue, as leadership on the issue is 
lacking and failure to move forward could spell disaster for the CPA 
and possibly for peace in Sudan. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Currently the NCP and SPLM are relying on legalistic 
arguments and their discussions have ground to a halt while they 
seek tactical advantage.  Meanwhile the Abyei issue blocks progress 
on other more important aspects of the CPA, such as the electoral 
law, the census, and troop redeployment.  The SPLM would like the 
U.S. or other IGAD partners to take up the fight for them and insist 
on full implementation of the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) 
Report.  However, the NCP has legal arguments for why the ABC report 
is not valid and is unlikely to change its position, even in the 
face of mounting domestic and international pressure, especially 
after President Al-Bashir's very public dismissal.  Therefore we 
believe a negotiated solution is more likely to produce results and 
get the CPA back on track. 
 
Recommendation 1: Move forward on the rest of the CPA 
 
While a solution for Abyei is under discussion, the parties must be 
pressed to resume their work on implementing all other aspects of 
the CPA, including troop redeployments, the conduct of the census, 
and the passage of the elections law.  Abyei cannot be allowed to 
hold the CPA and the Government of National Unity (GNU) hostage. The 
SPLM, several of whose leaders are from Abyei, will not agree to 
move forward on other issues without a solution on Abyei. They fear 
that the NCP claim all problems are solved and then go back to 
stonewalling on Abyei. 
 
Recommendation 2: Allow experts to present the ABC report 
 
The parties must move beyond their current legalistic battle and 
allow the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) to present its report as 
a starting point for discussions between the parties on a way 
forward.  The NCP claims the ABC experts went beyond their CPA 
mandate, which according to the Abyei Protocol of the CPA was to 
define the boundaries of the nine Ngok Dinka kingdoms in 1905, thus 
the ABC report is invalid.  The SPLM claims that the ABC report must 
be implemented as required in the CPA (the Abyei appendix says the 
ABC report is "final and binding.")  The fact of the matter is that 
defining the 1905 border is nearly impossible based on a scarcity of 
historical maps, and therefore the ABC did go beyond its mandate to 
look at later historical borders (according to our own analysis and 
other observers in Khartoum.) 
 
Recommendation 3: Reconstitute the ABC Panel 
 
The current panel of experts has become controversial.  The panel 
could be reconstituted with the agreement of the parties (the 
mandate is already in place for representation from all interested 
parties) and given a proscribed mandate to stay strictly within the 
confines of the CPA with regard to the border.  The reconstituted 
panel could be directed to reach a consensual decision based on all 
of the historical evidence presented (as opposed to a report 
directed by the experts, as occurred with the current ABC report). 
This approach has the advantage of staying closer to the text of the 
CPA - which does not envisage arbitration or direct negotiations - 
and avoiding protracted negotiations.  The NCP's preferred option is 
drawn out negotiations or arbitration while it continues to enjoy 
the full benefit of Abyei's oil wealth.  (Note: The GNU has not 
begun sharing Abyei oil revenue with the GOSS, Bahr al Ghazal 
region, Western Kordofan, the Ngok Dinka, or the Misseriya Arabs 
 
KHARTOUM 00001862  002 OF 003 
 
 
presumably because the ABC report was not implemented and the 
special administration for Abyei was not put in place as a result. 
End note.)  If the reconstituted ABC panel fails, negotiations with 
international intervention will likely be necessary. 
 
Recommendation 4: Separate land from oil in negotiations 
 
Apart from the border demarcation issue, if there is to be a final 
solution on Abyei, negotiations on future oil revenues beyond the 
2011 referendum will likely be required because the NCP depends on 
(declining) oil revenues from Abyei.  If the parties are unable to 
reach a negotiated solution on their own, outside intervention will 
likely be required, despite the NCP's contention that it does not 
want to "internationalize" CPA discussions.  High-level intervention 
from the U.S. could move the parties forward, with a meeting hosted 
in the U.S. as suggested in Ref B.  The NCP's primary interest in 
Abyei is oil (though oil production in the area is declining).  The 
SPLM's primary interest is land (the historical nine Ngok Dinka 
kingdoms).  Thus a negotiated solution would logically include land 
for the South in exchange for a share of oil revenue for the North 
even after the 2011 referendum on Southern self-determination, since 
the pipeline and infrastructure pass through the North.  (Comment: 
We recommend that the many examples of wealth sharing, such as East 
Timor or the North Sea, should be examined and a compilation of such 
wealth sharing models from other regions be produced for the parties 
to consider.) 
 
Recommendation 5: Grazing rights for the Misseriya 
 
Any agreement reached must include the nomadic Misseriya Arabs and 
provide them grazing rights on both sides of the border. It is also 
only fair that Southern states also be compensated for the 
confirmation of those traditional grazing rights. The Misseriya 
should also be included in the long-term revenue sharing scheme, as 
should the Ngok Dinka, the Bahr al Ghazal region, and Western 
Kordofan.  Since the Abyei Protocol sets the precedent for revenue 
sharing between all six entities during the interim administration, 
if there is a deal for Abyei oil revenue sharing between the North 
and South after the interim period, it should again include all six 
entities. 
 
Recommendation 6: Appeal to other nations 
 
China, Malaysia, and India are the countries with oil interests in 
Sudan.  They should be called on urge the parties toward an early 
agreement, as the financial consequences of the parties not 
resolving this issue will affect them directly. 
 
Recommendation 7: Introduce incentives 
 
If it becomes engaged in negotiations, the U.S. could introduce 
incentives to move beyond a "zero sum" negotiating exercise.  For 
example, with waivers to sanctions, Abyei could become a special 
economic zone where U.S. firms that have more advanced technology in 
extracting oil from depleted fields could participate in oil 
exploration.  The Chinese would likely be very interested in such 
collaboration as well. 
 
Recommendation 8: Review the historical texts 
 
If the U.S. plans to become actively involved in negotiations on 
Abyei, it will have to begin gathering a database of historical 
information to inform its involvement.  The NCP has gathered an 
impressive electronic library of maps and historical references to 
Abyei to support its claim that the ABC experts went beyond their 
mandate.  The ABC panel should make any documents it acquired 
available to the parties, and the U.S. should begin doing research 
of its own rather than relying on the parties or the ABC, if it is 
to engage credibly. 
 
Recommendation 9: Study projected Abyei oil revenues 
 
In concert with the Norwegians, who have a Petroleum envoy based in 
Khartoum, and Dutch (who chair the AEC working group on the "three 
areas") the U.S. should assist with a detailed analysis of the 
anticipated declining oil revenues from Abyei.  (Which may ease the 
pain to the NCP of "losing" territory in Abyei.)  The financial 
implications of pipeline rights should be included in this study, so 
that both the SPLM and the NCP can have access to baseline data on 
which to base their negotiations. 
 
Recommendation 10: Address the issue of arrears 
 
The issue of Abyei oil revenue arrears to the GOSS, Bahr al Ghazal, 
Western Kordofan, the Dinka, and the Misseriya needs to be 
addressed.  As it stands now, the GNU may owe several hundred 
million dollars in total to these entities due to delayed 
 
KHARTOUM 00001862  003 OF 003 
 
 
installment of the interim administration in Abyei.  The GOSS may be 
willing to pay this in exchange for a guarantee of a share of future 
oil revenue and pipeline fees. 
 
¶3. (SBU) These ideas just scratch the surface of a complicated 
political and economic issue. With the leadership of the two parties 
meeting on this issue and other CPA problems in the next few days, 
these ideas may be completely overtaken by events, radically altered 
or be even more pertinent by December 5. 
 
FERNANDEZ