VZCZCXRO6661
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1859/01 3311238
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 271238Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9319
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001859 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
 
SUBJECT: SHIFTING ALLEGIANCES AMONG SLA AND JANJAWEED 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 01776 
KHARTOUM 01845 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  Some rebel and political leaders on the ground in 
Darfur are signaling a shift in the current political climate where 
by some support for Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) faction leader 
Abdelwahid al-Nur is shifting to Ahmed Abdelshafie and whereby some 
Arab militias (encouraged by the rebel movements) are abandoning the 
Government of Sudan (GoS) in favor of greener Darfur Peace Agreement 
(DPA) non-signatory pastures.  If predictions by SLA reps in El 
Fasher prove true and the SLA factions in Juba announce their 
consolidated political and military structure by November 30, then 
we run the risk of seeing a commensurate response in the security 
situation, which most contacts on the ground, especially in the 
absence of functioning ceasefire monitoring mechanism, expect will 
be violent.  END SUMMARY. 
 
SLA UNIFICATION EXPECTED IMMINENTLY 
----------------------------------- 
¶2. (SBU) In separate conversations with FieldOff on November 21, 25 
and 26 in El Fasher, representatives of the Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM)/Khalil Ibrahim, representatives from the SLA factions 
of Abdulwahid al Nur and Ahmed Abdelshafie, the Darfur Forum and the 
El Fasher Native Administration discussed recent trends emerging 
among the SLA and janjaweed in the wake of the Sirte peace talks and 
in the run-up to UNAMID deployment.  All agreed that the unification 
of the SLA faction allied to Abdelshafie, some member of SLA/Khamis 
Abdullah, and other minor SLA factions, per the ongoing process in 
Juba, was imminent, with the SLA/Abdelshafie rep predicting that an 
announcement on the political and military structure of the emerging 
group could be announced o/a November 30.  Once this announcement is 
made, the group will approach the African Union/United Nations Joint 
Mediation Support Team to voice its concerns about timeframe, venue 
and negotiation methodology for subsequent rounds of peace talks. 
"Our aim is to avoid the mistakes of Abuja," the Abdelshafie rep 
explained. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Regarding splinter groups, most reps agree that none of 
these factions poses a significant threat to SLA unification.  SLA 
faction leader Khamis Abdullah was dismissed as isolated (with his 
forces defecting to Abdelshafie's ranks) and lacking in ground 
strength.  (Note: Per Ref. A, SLA/Khamis Abdullah's supporters have 
split between the faction allied with Abdelshafie and the other 
group in Juba.  End note.)  JEM and Darfur Forum reps also agree 
that JEM/Idriss Ibrahim Azrag and JEM/Collective Leadership Banda 
Abu Garda have insufficient vehicles and soldiers to pose a credible 
threat.  (Note: Sensitive reporting and UN/AU contacts report that 
JEM/Collective Leadership maintains a formidable military capacity, 
which JEM/Khalil Ibrahim has an interest in discounting.  End note.) 
 JEM rep speculates that the GoS will seek to exploit the weaknesses 
of these groups by offering its support to them (something which 
most rebels consider it is doing already) as part of a broader 
divide-and-conquer strategy against the SLA.  Representatives of the 
JEM, SLA/Abdelwahid and SLA/Abdelshafie shared Ref. B assessment 
that SLA/Unity of Abdullah Yehia and JEM/Collective Leadership would 
consolidate their movements, given their shared experience in 
Haskanita, which JEM attributes squarely to this alliance. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The SLA/Abdelshafie rep does not consider, however, that 
such a consolidation will serve any faction well.  He explained that 
neither Khamis nor Yehia would agree to disband their respective 
factions and to abandon their positions therein in favor of creating 
a clean SLA slate.  The first leader who had volunteered to do this, 
he said, was Abdelshafie, who he expects to assume the political 
leadership of the reconstituted SLA.  (Note: Credible reports 
indicate that Abdelshafie's political and military influence in 
Darfur is limited, despite assertions from his supporters.  End 
note.) 
 
"HE WHO SPEAKS FOR THE PEOPLE WILL WIN DARFUR" 
--------------------------------------------- - 
¶5. (SBU) The founder of the Darfur Forum, a Fur and a traditional 
SLA/Abdelwahid supporter, was unambiguous in his assertion that he 
"does not see a future for Abdelwahid."  He says that Fur 
intellectuals in particular no longer support Abdelwahid because "he 
is leading us nowhere and is causing us to lose our lands" as a 
result of what the rep considers Abdelwahid's opportunism and his 
quest to serve only his own interests.  The rep continued that 
Abdelwahid's voice "is cooling down in the IDP camps," where IDPs 
are "shocked" by his refusal to attend Sirte talks.  The longer 
Abdelwahid stays outside the political process, the rep warns, the 
less faith IDPs will have in him so that even if he were to attend 
subsequent negotiations, "it wouldn't do him any good." 
SLA/Abdelshafie rep advised against the international community's 
affording excessive attention to Abdelwahid's recalcitrance, warning 
that to do so would only encourage other rebel leaders to follow 
suit. 
 
KHARTOUM 00001859  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) In a surprising reversal, the Darfur Forum chief stated 
that the intellectuals of the SLA are now firmly behind Abdelshafie, 
who they consider open-minded and supported by strong SPLM ties. 
He, like the SLA/Abdelshafie rep, claims the IDPs, especially in 
Kalma, are turning from Abdelwahid to Abdelshafie, bolstered by 
lobbying efforts by the Abdelshafie faction to get word out in the 
camps that Abdelwahid is not the only one making contributions to 
the Darfur process.  "He who speaks for the people," the chief 
declared, "will win Darfur."  (Note: A generational divide exists 
between Darfur's elites--represented in the Darfur Forum--and the 
region's youth, which has resulted in considerable resentment among 
IDPs for the traditional leadership.  End note.) 
 
¶7. (SBU) Dimlig (a Fur word for district chief) General of the El 
Fasher Native Administration, however, disagrees that Abdelshafie is 
that spokesperson.  He refutes the theory that IDP sentiment is 
shifting toward Abdelshafie, insisting instead that Abdelwahid is 
still fighting for the rights of Darfur people and is right to hold 
out for UNAMID deployment to ensure IDP safety before committing to 
participate in peace talks.  "The IDPs have already waited four 
years for peace," he explained, "and they can wait another two." 
[NOTE: There is often a disconnect in perceptions between those 
representatives on the ground who are involved closely tied to El 
Fasher political life, such as the head of the Darfur Forum, and 
those who with more traditional ties to the populations on the 
ground, such as the Native Administration rep.  END NOTE]. 
 
JANJAWEED DISENCHANTMENT DRIVING THEM TO SLA 
-------------------------------------------- 
¶8. (SBU) Despite differences of opinion about the leadership of SLA, 
one common theme among all groups was the reality of Janjaweed 
disillusionment, which is now driving Arabs (mostly of the 
camel-herding Rizegat and mostly in northern North Darfur, southern 
South Darfur, El Geneina and Kabkabiya) to "desert" their government 
benefactor and to seek alliances with the very DPA non-signatories 
they were originally instructed to persecute.  Fear of persecution 
is a justification given by the JEM and SLA factions for this 
janjaweed defection: fear of persecution by the International 
Criminal Court and by UNAMID are the most commonly cited, and other 
rebels speculate that these "converts" are trying to get a piece of 
the Darfur reconciliation pie before peace talks proceed any 
further. 
 
¶9. (SBU) According to JEM and SLA reps, these Arabs are tired of 
unfulfilled GoS promises of money, land, posts in Native 
Administrations and integration into the SAF, police and NISS (and 
are evidently vulnerable to JEM and SLA/Abdelshafie intimations 
about GoS manipulation), and they are making their demands known to 
the GoS.  In what reps on the ground admit is a first-time 
occurrence in the Darfur conflict, janjaweed fighters are seeking 
refuge among the ranks of the very groups they were once ordered to 
attack, including the SLA.  The SLA and Native Administration, which 
represent the Fur populations, regard the janjaweed defectors with a 
healthy dose of skepticism, stating that these groups must "prove 
their sincerity" before confidence and trust can be rebuilt within 
the IDP populations to welcome these elements into SLA ranks.  A 
healthy dose of paranoia pervades as well: Fur tribe members suspect 
the GoS is using certain of these Arabs to "infiltrate" rebel ranks 
and destroy the rebel movements from the inside out. 
 
¶10. (SBU) For its part, the GoS is reportedly taking measures to 
protect against the potential threat of janjaweed turncoats.  The 
JEM rep claims the GoS is on the lookout for new recruits (whom he 
called "mujahedin") and has 12,000 military IDs ready to distribute 
to them among the three Darfur states, as well as 500 military 
positions earmarked for them at the rank of Major and above. 
 
¶11. (SBU) COMMENT. It is hard to know how much of the rhetoric 
surrounding SLA shifting allegiances is accurate, as all factions 
and groups are positioning themselves as robustly as possible ahead 
of rebel consolidation in Juba and ahead of resumption of 
negotiations with the GoS.  However, one thing that all groups did 
not dispute was the janjaweed convert trend.  While it is hard for 
many of these rebels to resist the urge to use conspiracy theories 
to explain this trend, given their violent history with these 
janjaweed fighters, it is worth noting that the SLA might even 
consider joining forces with them.  Whether SLA motives behind their 
decision to entertain this possibility are entirely genuine (a true 
"spirit of comprehensive reconciliation") is another question.  We 
have not yet seen significant Janjaweed fighting alongside SLA 
forces on the battlefield (although rumors are rife that this is 
imminent), so for now this is all speculative.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶12. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
 
FERNANDEZ