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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM1856, SUDAN - NGOS BRIEF AA/AFR ON CURRENT CHALLENGES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM1856 2007-11-27 09:12 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO6588
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1856/01 3310912
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 270912Z NOV 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9314
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001856 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR PMARCHAM, MMAGAN, AND BPITTMAN 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PBROWN 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI UN SU
SUBJECT:  SUDAN - NGOS BRIEF AA/AFR ON CURRENT CHALLENGES 
 
REF: Khartoum 1680 
 
KHARTOUM 00001856  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. On November 21, representatives from the Non-Governmental 
Organization (NGO) Steering Committee and other USAID implementing 
partners briefed the Assistant Administrator for USAID's Africa 
Bureau (AA/AFR) Kate Almquist on the current operating environment 
in Sudan.  The NGOs reported that their most pressing concern was 
responding to Sudanese government intentions to forcibly disarm 
Kalma internally displaced person (IDP) camp.  NGOs raised concerns 
over focusing on recovery and development activities in Darfur, 
stating that in the current operating environment these activities 
are not feasible or appropriate.  The NGOs also urged the USG to 
advocate for the extension of the moratorium on restrictions, which 
is set to expire at the end of January 2008, in order to avoid 
delays in implementing humanitarian activities.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Plans to Disarm Kalma IDP Camp Raise Concerns 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
2. According to the NGOs, the Sudanese government has escalated 
pressure to support the return of IDPs in Darfur.  The increasing 
pressure for returns is occurring at the same time that fighting and 
insecurity continues to displace thousands of people.  NGOs stated 
that the recent incident in Kalma IDP camp, which led to the 
displacement of approximately 30,000 IDPs from the camp due to 
inter-tribal fighting and the forced relocation of Kalma IDPs from 
Otash IDP camp (REFTEL), should be viewed in the larger context of 
increasing pressure on returns.  As of November 23, humanitarian 
agencies have not been able to verify the whereabouts of an 
estimated 10,000 IDPs who fled Kalma camp oo Octobar 18(and18. 
Qs. Oh NovabeR 09.`thE Afvion"U~i_n Eh3sioleo0Wud`n,(aOS(-anese government will "take all necessary 
measures" to seize all remaining weapons in the camp.  The letter 
also mentions that the Sudanese government, along with AMIS, is 
responsible for the safety of IDPs and is implementing this 
disarmament campaign to protect the IDPs. 
 
4. The NGOs noted significant concern over this proposed disarmament 
plan and requested USG support in responding to the issue.  NGOs 
asked that the USG speak out against any forced disarmament in the 
camp and support a phased disarmament plan that is coupled with 
political negotiations.  NGOs also stated that establishing the 
UN-AU Mission in Sudan (UNAMID) police force for Kalma camp is 
urgently needed to monitor the volatile situation.  Further, the 
NGOs asked that USAID pressure the UN to agree on a common position 
on forced returns to avoid ambiguity between agencies and enable 
rapid, unified responses from the UN to evolving situations. 
 
5. Comment: In the current environment, a UNAMID attempt to disarm 
IDPs could be problematic as it would be perceived as disarming only 
one party to the conflict.  However, weapons proliferation in IDP 
camps is a significant security concern that needs to be addressed 
to improve the safety and stability in IDP camps across Darfur. 
USAID is closely monitoring the situation in Kalma camp through 
field officers in Nyala, South Darfur, and working with USAID 
implementing partners to continue to provide humanitarian services 
in Kalma camp and reduce protection risks for those IDPs who fled 
Kalma.  On November 30, the CDA and USAID Mission Director plan to 
travel to Nyala to urge restraint by the Sudanese government and 
encourage non-violent solutions to the issue of armed elements in 
Kalma camp. End Comment. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Too Early for Recovery in Darfur 
-------------------------------- 
 
6. NGOs expressed concern over the discussions to resume the Darfur 
Joint Assessment Mission (DJAM) meetings, stating that it is too 
early to be focusing on recovery efforts in Darfur.  The NGOs 
 
KHARTOUM 00001856  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
believe that recovery and development activities should be a peace 
dividend for Darfurians and that focusing efforts on these 
activities now is misguided as humanitarian access is at its lowest 
point.  The NGOs also expressed concern that planning for recovery 
and development activities plays into the hands of the Sudanese 
government, which is encouraging IDPs to return to rural areas 
despite pervasive insecurity and ongoing fighting throughout Darfur. 
 NGOs also want to see the macro-level peace process accompanied by 
a parallel process that focuses on resolving local land issues. 
(Note: Conflict drivers in Darfur include access to land, land use, 
and access to water.  When the 2.2 million people displaced by the 
ongoing conflict decide to return home, complex issues over land 
rights and land tenure will arise and need to be effectively 
resolved.  End Note.) 
 
7. AA/AFR Almquist agreed that in the current environment 
implementing recovery and development activities in Darfur is not 
appropriate or feasible, but stressed the need to have a viable 
recovery and reconstruction plan in place.  Almquist also noted 
that, even in Darfur, windows of opportunity for small-scale 
development projects may appear and the humanitarian community needs 
to be prepared to seize them when the opportunity arises.  USAID 
will continue to work with partners to plan and prepare for recovery 
and development activities in Darfur to ensure that aid agencies can 
rapidly switch gears from humanitarian to recovery activities when 
the time is right.  NGOs mentioned that their Darfur programs have 
numerous peacebuilding components that could easily link into early 
recovery activities at the appropriate time. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Addressing the Perception Problem 
--------------------------------- 
 
8. NGOs also stated that more funding for recovery activities in 
Southern Sudan and the Three Areas is needed and reiterated the 
frequently expressed sentiment that the people are not seeing peace 
dividends.  Further, the NGOs noted that there is frustration in the 
Three Areas that the aid activities are Khartoum-managed and 
highlighted that recovery in the Three Areas is a critical priority 
for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). 
 
9. USAID regularly hears the complaint that Sudanese people feel 
that nothing has changed in Southern Sudan since the signing of the 
CPA and continues to grapple with how to address this perception. 
AA/AFR Almquist noted that although we have a long way to go in 
Southern Sudan, there are visible improvements throughout the region 
since the CPA was signed, particularly in Juba where many people are 
building new houses and economic activity has markedly increased. 
Almquist said it was important for the humanitarian community to not 
only focus on what still needed to be done, but to also acknowledge 
the huge contribution from the humanitarian community and the 
results that have been achieved.  While additional recovery efforts 
are certainly needed and life is still difficult for many Southern 
Sudanese, USAID and its NGO partners need to work together to ensure 
that communities are better informed of improvements. 
 
10. AA/AFR Almquist has cleared this cable. 
 
FERNANDEZ