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OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
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DE RUEHKH #1845/01 3300549
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 260549Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9291
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001845 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UN AU SU
SUBJECT: TWO MAJOR DARFUR FACTIONS STEP TOWARD UNION WHILE 
FUR REMAIN IN THE COLD 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 01776 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (SBU) JEM/Collective Leadership and SLA/Unity, two of the 
strongest rebel movements in Darfur, have taken steps toward 
a tentative alliance, and JEM/CL plans to conduct 
consultations with SLA/Unity leaders Abdullah Yehia, Suleiman 
Jamous, and Sharif Harir in Darfur over the next week to 
solidify this union.  While insisting that their political 
and military strength entitles them to a commensurate role in 
peace negotiations, both JEM/CL and SLA/Unity have expressed 
a desire to coordinate with some of the less significant 
factions to broaden their ethnic base beyond the minority 
Zaghawa tribe.  Coming after the conclusion of these 
consultations, hands-on UN/AU mediation with the movements 
would consolidate the gains thus far and lay the foundation 
for a resumption of peace talks.  Incorporating the Fur into 
the political process, however, still presents a serious 
challenge and will require more consistent UN/AU leadership 
to execute a sophisticated strategy involving IDP 
representatives and Fur field commanders.  End summary. 
 
-------------------- 
A Tentative Alliance 
-------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Justice and Equality Movement/Collective 
Leadership (JEM/CL) and the Sudan Liberation Army/Unity 
(SLA/Unity) have taken tentative steps towards a political 
and military alliance, which they hope will be consolidated 
after both movements' top leaders meet in Darfur within the 
next week, JEM/CL spokesman and political commissar 
Tadjedinne Niam and SLA/Unity commander Abdullah Yehia told 
Poloff in recent conversations.  JEM/CL and SLA/Unity 
maintain the most potent fighting forces in the field, and 
while both groups' insist that their representation in peace 
negotiations be commensurate with their political and 
military strength, they support continued outreach efforts to 
the less significant rebel factions--many of whom are in Juba 
under the auspices of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement 
(SPLM).  "Our goal is still to get one movement," said Yehia. 
 
------------------------------- 
One Week of Field Consultations 
------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) According to Niam, JEM/CL leaders will travel from 
Juba to Darfur around November 27 to consult with the 
elements in the field for approximately one week.  The bulk 
of these discussions will focus on consolidating the union of 
JEM/CL and SLA/Unity, said Niam, who added that further 
consultations with the field-based elements of the National 
Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD), the United 
Revolutionary Forces Front (URFF) and SLA/Khamis Abdullah are 
also necessary.  Yehia confirmed that he and his sometime 
rivals Suleiman Jamous and Sharif Harir--all of whom are in 
Darfur--welcome these consultations.  Both leaders emphasized 
that no further progress can be made to prepare for talks 
until these discussions are complete, and Niam warned that 
rushing the preparatory phase without the input from the 
field could further splinter Darfur's fractious movements. 
Yehia delivered a similar message to UN Chief Mediator Taye 
Brooke Zerihoun and AU Chief Mediator Sam Ibok when they met 
with him in the field on November 22, according to UN Senior 
Political Advisor Muin Shrim.  (Note: Taye and Ibok's meeting 
with Yehia was delayed from November 21 because the Sudanese 
Government denied the UN/AU flight clearance.  Taye intends 
to raise this issue in Khartoum in the coming days. UN saw 
this as a new ratcheting up bureaucracy/control by the GOS 
nervous about events in Darfur.  End note.) 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Zaghawa Dominant but Crossing Ethnic Lines 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶4. (SBU) Of the two consolidated yet fragile groups that have 
emerged in Juba since mid-November, only JEM/CL carries 
significant military weight (reftel).  Recognizing, however, 
that JEM/CL and SLA/Unity are predominantly Zaghawa, Niam 
said that he hopes their tentative alliance can expand to 
include Khamis Abdullah's Massalit-dominated SLA to broaden 
 
KHARTOUM 00001845  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
their ethnic base.  Following their field consultation, Niam 
said that JEM/CL will return to Juba for additional 
discussions with the factions there to bring these more minor 
groups into the fold.  (Note: Due to fissures within 
SLA/Unity, Yehia, Jamous, and Harir are unlikely to travel to 
Juba in order to maintain their hold over their field 
commanders.  End note.) 
 
-------------------------------- 
Abdulshafie: The New Abdulwahid? 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) The group in Juba that has coalesced around Ahmed 
Abdulshafie, a Fur, remains less open to coordination with 
JEM/CL and SLA/Unity and more opposed to current UN/AU plans 
for the peace process, according to Niam, Yehia, and UN/AU 
sources.  Meeting with UN Chief Mediator Taye and AU Chief 
Mediator Ibok in Juba on November 19, Abdulshafie said that 
he would never attend peace talks in Libya and called for 
full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1706 
before he would participate in negotiations. 
 
¶6. (SBU) "He's become a smaller version of Abdulwahid Nur," 
Ibok told Poloff in a recent conversation, adding that Shafie 
would only accept an alliance with the other factions if he 
were selected as the group's leader, an unlikely scenario 
given his weak military and political position.  Niam said 
that Abdulshafie continues to press for a declaration of 
unity without consultations in the field.  (Comment: As 
Abdulwahid's continued refusal to participate in the peace 
process has increased his popularity among the Fur, 
particularly those in the IDP camps, Abdulshafie is likely 
seeking to demonstrate his own independent streak in order to 
gain support in the field.  Meanwhile, the UN/AU suspect that 
the SPLM is giving tacit encouragement to Abdulshafie, their 
long-time ally, to demand the top leadership position in any 
consolidated rebel movement.  End comment.) 
 
--------------------------- 
Ongoing UN/AU-SPLM Problems 
--------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) The UN and AU remain concerned that the SPLM is not 
coordinating its efforts with them and is using the movements 
now assembled in Juba as leverage against the National 
Congress Party (NCP).  Ibok and Taye met with Government of 
Southern Sudan Vice President Riek Machar, now the SPLM's 
focal point for its Darfur initiative, on November 19. 
According to Ibok, Machar refused to provide the UN/AU with a 
specific strategy for the coming weeks, beyond aiming to 
entice Yehia to Juba. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Machar also admitted that the SPLM had encouraged 
the Darfur movements to consider linking their struggle to 
the simmering tensions in Kordofan and that the SPLM had 
invited several "Janjaweed" to Juba to participate in the 
discussions, said Ibok (UNDSS told visiting USAID 
Administrator Fore on November 23 of several former janjaweed 
factions who may be switching sides, both in North and South 
Darfur).  Ibok and Taye cautioned Machar against broadening 
the scope of the SPLM initiative to include Kordofan and the 
Arab tribes, noting that it would be detrimental to the 
overall political process as well as deepen the political 
crisis in the Government of National Unity (GNU) between the 
NCP and the SPLM.  (Note: Subsequent to the UN/AU's November 
19 meetings in Juba, the SPLM announced that First Vice 
President Salva Kiir will hold a closing ceremony for the 
Juba gathering on November 29.  The UN/AU plan to airlift 
some of the movements' representatives to Darfur thereafter, 
according to UN Advisor Shrim.  End note.) 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) While no single leader is likely to emerge from 
among Darfur's rebel movements, a loose coalition of the 
relatively stronger rebel factions may be possible for the 
first time in several months.  However, the absence of a 
pre-eminent leader means that such a fragile coalition will 
only be forged through consensus and will always operate 
based on a collective decision-making process, a fact that 
the UN/AU mediators would be well-advised to incorporate into 
their negotiating strategy.  It is encouraging that JEM/CL 
 
KHARTOUM 00001845  003 OF 003 
 
 
and SLA/Unity appear to be courting other ethnic groups and 
lone military commanders such as Adam Bakheit--who, while now 
weak, could regain their footing and divide the movements 
again unless they are brought firmly into the fold.  Coming 
after the consultations in Darfur, a UN/AU-sponsored meeting 
for the rebel movements in a neutral venue--with serious, 
hands-on UN/AU mediation--could capitalize on the gains thus 
far, defuse some of the growing concern about the SPLM's 
intentions in Juba, and accelerate preparations for the next 
phase of peace talks (it must be admitted frankly that the 
SPLM has made more progress, modest as it is, than the UN/AU 
in uniting the factions).  Incorporating the Fur into the 
political process, however, still presents a serious 
challenge.  Constrained by its own institutional dysfunction, 
the UN/AU is unlikely to overcome this obstacle (which would 
require a sophisticated UN/AU strategy involving Fur IDPs and 
prominent field commanders) without more consistent 
leadership.  UN sources continue to indicate their agreement 
that a single UN mediator with support staff, leaving the 
JMST structure behind, is the best approach.  However, they 
would need U.S. and international community's support for 
finding a graceful way for Eliasson and Salim to step aside 
during the mediation phase. End comment. 
FERNANDEZ