VZCZCXRO9315
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1795/01 3221703
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 181703Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9206
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001795 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
SENSETIVE 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, DCHA/OFDA, AND AFR/SP 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, USAID/SFO AND FAS 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NSC FOR PMARCHAM AND MMAGAN 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PBROWN 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI UN SU
 
SUBJECT: DARFUR - THE HAC AND WALI DISCUSS KALMA ISSUES AND THE 
EXPULSION OF OCHA STAFF 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 1659 B) KHARTOUM 1680 
 
KHARTOUM 00001795  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
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Summary 
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¶1. (U) On November 10, the Charge d'Affaires Fernandez, the USAID 
Mission Director, and the USAID Darfur Team Leader met with the 
Government of National Unity (GNU) Humanitarian Aid Commissioner and 
the Governor (Wali) of South Darfur to discuss the current state of 
affairs with Kalma internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the 
expulsion of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs's (OCHA) South Darfur representative, Wael al-Haj Ibrahim. 
The Sudanese government officials expounded on their reasons behind 
Ibrahim being thrown out of South Darfur and agreed to work with the 
USG and humanitarian community on the issue of Kalma.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Kalma, Camp Coordination, and Forced Relocation 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶2. (U) The November 10 meeting was the latest in a series of 
meetings the Charge has recently had with the Sudanese government to 
discuss the situation in Kalma (REFTELS).  This meeting came on the 
heels of the expulsion of the OCHA South Darfur head of office, Wael 
al-Haj Ibrahim.  The GNU Humanitarian Aid Commissioner General 
Hassabo Abdel Rahman requested the November 10 meeting as a 
follow-up to the November 7 meeting in which the Charge, USAID/Sudan 
Mission Director, and USAID Darfur Team Leader discussed possible 
ways forward on the Kalma camp issue with Hassabo. 
 
¶3. (U) CDA opened the meeting by stating that the USG had come in 
the spirit of cooperation to discuss a way forward for the displaced 
populations in Darfur, in order to do the best we can for the IDPs 
in cooperation with the GNU, humanitarian community, UN agencies, 
and donors.  CDA expressed the USG's concerns over movement of IDPs 
and the lack of proper camp management in Darfur, specifically 
Kalma.  CDA reiterated the importance of letting the Office of the 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) into South Darfur to 
fulfill their mandated role as camp coordinators.  CDA noted that 
the USG shares the Sudanese government's concerns over the 
proliferation of weapons in Kalma camp and agreed that something 
needed to be done.  CDA also asked the GNU officials how we can 
assist in making the situation better. 
 
¶4. (U) CDA raised three key points:  recommending that the issue of 
Kalma be discussed at the next high-level committee meeting; stating 
that UNHCR must be allowed to fulfill their mandated role in camp 
coordination; and reiterating that any movement of IDPs from Kalma, 
or any other location, must be done in cooperation and coordination 
with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), donors, and UN 
agencies. 
 
¶5. (U) While agreeing that the humanitarian community needed to "get 
off dead center" in Darfur, the group also debated what steps could 
be taken in the coming weeks and months to change the plight of 
Kalma IDPs.  USAID made it clear that while the needs in Darfur are 
real, security must be in place before any assistance can be 
provided in areas of return and called upon the Sudanese government 
to assist in maintaining security.  USAID also stressed the need for 
returns to be on a voluntary basis and the importance of giving the 
IDPs the opportunity to choose when and where they return.  USAID 
recited the list of difficulties NGOs have operating in Darfur -- 
carjackings, office raids, staff abduction, administrative 
obstacles, and staff intimidation -- and made it clear that NGOs 
will not operate in areas, or provide assistance for returns, if 
security conditions were not permissive and IDPs were not returning 
voluntarily. 
 
¶6. (U) The GNU officials reaffirmed their desire to work with the 
humanitarian community on addressing the issues in Kalma.  The Wali 
of South Darfur forcefully explained that the government had nothing 
to do with the violence in Kalma. These were ethnic/political 
clashes between Fur/Dajo versus Zaghawa/Masalit. The expelled IDPs 
fled to various sites, including Otash IDP camp. That camp didn't 
want them and the government did indeed force them to move. "Yes, we 
pushed them and moved them," noted the Wali; "we would have 
preferred not to, but no one was hurt and much worse has happened in 
Darfur." The Wali extended an invitation to USAID to come to Nyala 
and meet with the Sudanese government and other stakeholders to map 
 
KHARTOUM 00001795  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
out a way forward. 
 
-------------------- 
OCHA Staff Expulsion 
-------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) On the expulsion of the OCHA head of office in South 
Darfur, the GNU officials offered a lengthy explanation.  The Wali 
explained that Ibrahim had been warned a number of times by the 
Wali's office to stop meddling in what they consider to be strictly 
political affairs.  Among many other accusations, the officials 
blamed the OCHA staff member of organizing women and children to 
conduct anti-government demonstrations in the camps, having secret 
meetings with Sheiks and IDPs in the camps, encouraging suspicion 
and opposition to the goverlment, and peblirxing ujfowndedQiNforoAtil gn x(u intupmw abosT fvcueQ~%lmQauQm{. Xes c`g*u@eQKQgerQioaj=GwNQBvQ@k*a{"Q}f[sOG$ewcil idHHbbvk6YX>wQ`ty[QQeQz8XjvBfgD)db>`DQOQI2{5l Qy !dQH{Q< Qq *\d-aQ#W"b*M&M~Qhe 
UN Deputy Special 
Representative of the Secretary General for Sudan, Ameerah Haq, and 
the head of OCHA to discuss the incident.  In this meeting, the GNU 
officials asked the UN for a written explanation of OCHA's role and 
mandate in order to better understand their role, specifically in 
Darfur. End Note.) At a later meeting with the international 
community, Haq said that the UN was trying to treat the issue in a 
low-key manner in order to see if they could place Ibrahim in a 
position in North Darfur state. 
 
-------- 
Comments 
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¶8. (U) The USG sees responding to humanitarian needs in Darfur as a 
partnership involving the GNU, donors, UN agencies, NGOs, and the 
people of Darfur.  Working together, stakeholders can turn around 
the current negative situation.  Gaining agreement on humanitarian 
activities and policies can be key to opening the door to resolving 
wider issues in Darfur.  All stakeholders need to work together to 
develop a common plan on the Kalma situation and the wider Darfur 
IDP situation.  We face the challenge of needing GNU acquiescence 
but mistrusting their motives and actions, in order to get the 
life-saving work done. 
 
FERNANDEZ