VZCZCXRO4085
RR RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1763 3161513
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 121513Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9142
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 001763 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KSCA OTRA EAID CDC SU
SUBJECT: SWEDISH PLAN TO SUPPORT SIRTRE TALKS FOCUSES ON JOB 
TRAINING FOR FIGHTERS 
 
REF:  KHARTOUM 1711 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: Poloff attended a working-level meeting November 
8 at the Swedish Embassy on a Swedish plan to provide non-lethal 
support to armed groups in order to stabilize the situation on the 
ground in Darfur to promote the success of the Sirte peace talks. 
To receive support, in the form of job training and per diem, 
participants would be required to place their guns "out of reach." 
Swedish CDA Ulrika Sundberg led the discussion, which included reps 
from the NGO community, the Dutch Embassy, and the UN Development 
Program.  Sundberg described the draft program to S/E Natsios during 
his recent visit to Khartoum (reftel).  Natsios noted that legal 
restrictions prevent the USG from contributing to such a program. 
End Summary. 
 
REBELS TO BE OFFERED TRAINING 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Swedes have been exploring the job training program for 
several weeks, seeking input from representatives (so far, only 
Khartoum-based) of Darfur rebel groups and other western embassies. 
Rebel leaders have reportedly been supportive of the concept.  The 
aim is to provide job-training and subsistence to members of armed 
groups so that they will not have to engage in banditry to survive 
while the peace talks are ongoing.  Rebels receiving assistance 
would place their weapons under external control for the duration of 
the training (length of training has not yet been determined). 
Ideally, a peace plan would be in place by the end of the training 
to ensure the weapons would be taken permanently out of commission. 
Sundberg said participation in the program would not preclude 
subsequent DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) 
participation - addressing a key concern of rebel fighters. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Under the current plan, field commanders would decide 
which of their fighters would participate in the program. 
Empowering the field commanders would give them a "peace incentive," 
Sundberg said.  Field commanders would have to voice support for the 
peace talks and to keep their men in line. 
 
WEAPONS CONTROL MECHANISM TO BE DETERMINED 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The Swedes have not yet worked out a feasible mechanism 
whereby the weapons would be placed out of reach of the combatants 
and under external control, and are seeking additional ideas.  The 
trainees would have to know they could have access to the weapons in 
case of attack.  Among the possibilities, Sundberg noted, would be 
to give responsibility for the arms to field commanders or tribal 
leaders, although she said she was "not comfortable" with giving 
them to the field commanders.  A representative of the UNDP DDR 
program said a "dual-key" mechanism had proven effective in similar 
circumstances in other conflict zones (whereby approval of two 
authorities would be required to access the weapons). 
 
QUICK IMPLEMENTATION KEY TO SUCCESS 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Sundberg, along with others at the meeting, stressed that 
the program would need to be put into effect quickly to ensure 
success.  A realistic time frame would be to have the program 
running within three to four weeks of a Cessation of Hostilities. 
She said she would travel in early December to El Fasher to discuss 
the program with rebel leaders and field commanders, and invited 
others to join her on the trip.  She estimated that six to eight 
thousand fighters would take advantage of the training program. 
 
COMMENTS SOUGHT 
--------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Sundberg requested comments on the draft program from all 
present.  She said comments would be worked into a new draft, which 
would then be given a formal presentation to the international/NGO 
community.  She has not yet approached the GOS about the plan. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Comment:  The Swedish proposal addresses one of the common 
causes of instability during a cessation of hostilities and peace 
talks: how to provide an immediate "peace dividend" for armed 
fighters who otherwise might not have any means of support until a 
peace agreement takes effect with a DDR program.  The current plan 
takes into account concerns expressed by S/E Natsios (reftel) that 
the program target only armed fighters (who are the potential 
spoilers) irrespective of traditional NGO humanitarian principles 
that all individuals be able to participate.  The Swedish are eager 
to receive our input on the plan, which we will scan and email to 
S/E Natsios and SPG.  One of the basic drawbacks it faces is that it 
is only a short-term solution to a long term problem.  We also plan 
to suggest that the Swedes look at models from other countries where 
similar efforts have been made, such as Burundi or Congo. 
 
FERNANDEZ