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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM1744, SUDAN: NORTH-SOUTH TRANSPORT STOPPAGE REFLECTS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM1744 2007-11-08 05:36 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXYZ0009
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKH #1744 3120536
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 080536Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9112
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 001744 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, S/E NATSIOS AND AF/SPG 
NSC FOR HUDSON AND PITTMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON SU
SUBJECT: SUDAN:  NORTH-SOUTH TRANSPORT STOPPAGE REFLECTS 
CONTINUED POLITICAL/MILITARY TENSION 
 
REF: A. KHARTOUM 1723 
     B. KHARTOUM 1709 
 
1.  (U) The Governors of White Nile State (in Sudan's 
"North") and Upper Nile State (part of South Sudan)were to 
confer November 7 on reopening North-South river and road 
traffic along the Nile.  National Congress Party (NCP) White 
Nile Governor Mohamed Nurallah had halted North-South 
transport on November 1, alleging increased tension along the 
1-1-56 boundary between Northern and Southern Sudan, due to 
an increased presence of the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army 
(SPLA).  The local Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) commander charged 
harassment of river traffic by the SPLA, claims that the SPLA 
has denied. 
 
2.  (SBU) The closure follows an October 24 SAF-SPLA 
confrontation in the nearby town of Kwek, the specifics of 
which remain murky.  On November 1, senior SPLA leaders told 
Special Envoy Natsios that the SAF advanced aggressively on 
an SPLA unit on the Southern side of the border (reftel). 
Governor Nurallah, however, claimed that it was the SPLA that 
entered the town. 
 
3.  (U) The blockade reportedly has stopped food and other 
consumer goods from reaching the Upper Nile town of El-Renk, 
resulting in shortages and rising prices.  The Sudan Peoples 
Liberation Movement (SPLM) has denounced the closures as a 
violation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.  SPLM 
officials have charged that the stoppage was masterminded by 
the NCP leadership in Khartoum, rather than by local 
officials in White Nile, as a means of demonstrating their 
ability to inflict pain on the South. 
 
4.  (SBU) Comment:  The closure is another in a series of 
incidents along the 1-1-56 border, following the withdrawal 
by the SPLM of cabinet level participation in the Government 
of National Unity.  Although the SPLM and the NCP have 
reached a potential agreement on a mechanism to resolve their 
dispute, tensions between the two sides remain high. Deep 
suspicions remain on both sides, especially security forces, 
and these have not been eased by a poorly understood and yet 
to be implemented arrangement agreed to by five men in 
Khartoum on November 2 (reftel b). SPLM charges that the 
blockade is a thinly disguised attempt by Khartoum to bully 
the South may be true, or they may reflect the pervasive 
suspicion in the South of the NCP and the Khartoum 
government.  One of the ironies of the situation is that, as 
per the CPA, the Governors of both states involved in this 
issue belong to the NCP as that agreement designates the 
governorship of one state in the North and one in the South 
for the other party (the SPLM holds the governorship in the 
Northern state of Blue Nile). End comment. 
FERNANDEZ