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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM1742, UNAMID: PERSONNEL WILL BE KEY TO SUCCESS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM1742 2007-11-07 13:31 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO0364
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1742/01 3111331
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 071331Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9109
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001742 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UNAMID: PERSONNEL WILL BE KEY TO SUCCESS 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In a November 5 meeting with FieldOff, a senior 
United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) officer corroborated 
assessments from other UNAMID officers (septel) that the main 
shortcoming threatening deployment of the UN-African Union Mission 
in Darfur (UNAMID) is not the Sudanese Government but a dearth of 
qualified and experienced human resources needed immediately to lay 
the infrastructure groundwork for implementation of UN Security 
Council Resolution 1769 (2007).  The UN Officer hopes that the 
impending arrival of a Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 
team will lend the necessary impetus to jump-start this process. 
The UN Officer, like many in the El Fasher international 
communities, was guarded in his assessment of Government of Sudan 
(GOS) cooperation with UNAMID deployment.  END SUMMARY. 
 
PERSONNEL GAP NEGATES DEPLOYMENT RATE ADVANTAGE 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
2. (SBU) UNMIS Senior Officer opened his November 5 meeting with 
FieldOff by hailing the comparative advantages Darfur enjoys over 
South Sudan in facilitating deployment of a peacekeeping force.  The 
UN Officer considered that the availability of accommodations and of 
skilled labor and manufacturing could give UNAMID deployment an edge 
over UNMIS deployment in the South (where deployment of the bulk of 
the approximately 10,000 peacekeepers took over 15 months). 
 
3. (SBU) However, the UN Officer warned that deployment timelines 
would mean nothing if personnel being sent to the field remain in 
short and unqualified supply.  On the military side, the UN Officer 
worried that incoming troops were neither properly trained nor 
equipped.  He was similarly concerned that actual Formed Police Unit 
(FPU) contributions fell short of projected levels (UNSCR 1769 
envisaged 19 FPUs); he said in best-case scenario, the first two 
FPUs (from Bangladesh and Nepal) would arrive in Darfur by 
mid-November and would be operational in Nyala by mid-December.  The 
UN Officer noted that despite the readiness of the Bangladeshi FPU 
to deploy early, UNMIS had recommended delaying deployment until 
both FPUs could be sent to South Darfur simultaneously, given the 
recent internal violence at Kalma IDP camp.  He expected that the 
Chinese engineering unit of the Heavy Support Package would be in 
place this month. 
 
4. (SBU) On the civilian side, the UN Officer noted that UNMIS 
itself is not fully staffed (the last Secretary-General's report on 
UNMIS, S/2007/624, put UNMIS force strength at 97 percent - 9,402 of 
9,706 deployed), which presents problems for UNAMID, as UNMIS is 
supporting the fledging operation from its own resources.  The UN 
Officer hoped to move an initial wave of 100 staff into the 
newly-inaugurated UNAMID El Fasher headquarters, a move contingent 
upon arrival of necessary communications and information technology 
equipment.  He saw as a positive sign the presence of UNAMID the 
Joint Special Representative, Force Commander and their respective 
Deputies in Sudan, but remarked that selection of a Police 
Commissioner and his two Deputies was still pending.  Other than 
appointments of Director of Administration, Assistant-SYG for 
Mission Support, and Heads of Offices of Civil Affairs and Safety 
and Security, he said the remainder of Heads of Section had yet to 
be selected.  The sooner they could be recruited and deployed, he 
explained, the faster they could in turn start recruiting their own 
staff, many of whom were expected to come from a restless yet 
potentially unqualified AMIS civilian pool. 
 
DPKO VISIT SEEN AS SHOT IN ARM FOR RECRUITMENT 
--------------------------------------------- - 
5. (SBU) The UN Officer explained that there was a "Tiger Team" 
comprised of staff from UN New York Headquarters currently in 
Khartoum to work on UNAMID recruitment, but he expressed frustration 
that this team was trying to do its work in the capital rather than 
on the ground, where his staff could better advise the hiring 
process.  He was hopeful that the impending arrival during the week 
of November 12 of a DPKO team headed by A/SYG Mulet would provide 
the necessary impetus to expediting the recruitment process, as well 
as address operational issues, including procurement of an 
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