VZCZCXRO1758
OO RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHPW RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #3876/01 3250108
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 210108Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1484
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 003876 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, PRM 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
CG CJTF-82, POLAD, JICCENT 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREF PREL PHUM AF
SUBJECT:  Overall Success and Room for Improvement in Refugee 
Assistance Projects in Northern Afghanistan 
 
REF: 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  During a visit to Kunduz, Baghlan, and Takhar 
provinces from November 11-14, the Refugee Section found most FY06 
projects well-done and FY07 projects underway.  The programs are 
vital to refugee reintegration and fill a critical need.  In some 
cases, they represent the only visible sign of post-war 
reconstruction.  Overall, the projects get good marks but we need to 
increase our monitoring and fine-tune the beneficiary selection 
processes to optimize return on our investment.  Corruption in the 
land allocation program has led to land speculation, construction of 
shelters for unqualified beneficiaries, and marginalization of some 
desperately poor people.  Some educational programs seem to focus on 
quantity over quality.  We will communicate our findings to the 
relevant NGOs' Kabul headquarters, share best practices with our 
implementing partners, and conduct more unannounced monitoring and 
evaluation of these projects. 
 
The Target Beneficiaries:  Recently Returned Vulnerable Families 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
¶2.  (SBU) Funding from the State Department's Bureau of Population, 
Refugees, and Migration (PRM) targets Afghan refugees who recently 
returned from Pakistan, Iran, or other countries of refuge.  PRM 
funds internally displaced persons (IDPs) but only indirectly 
through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 
Northern Afghanistan has seen an increase in both returnee and IDP 
resettlement, particularly in Kunduz, which UNHCR claims has the 
country's fifth highest rate of return.  Most returnees are Tajiks, 
Hazaras, Uzbeks, and Pashtuns, most of whom said they returned two 
to three years ago because they loved their homeland and wanted to 
come back despite the hardships.  Many have seen plenty.  Most 
families depend on unskilled day labor, share cropping, and minor 
animal husbandry for survival.  They often have little to no access 
to potable water, health care, education, or steady employment. 
They have lived with relatives, in ramshackle mud shelters, or in 
the case of some IDPs in Baghlan province last winter, in holes dug 
in the ground and covered with plastic sheeting.  While these 
provinces are relatively fertile, the environment is harsh.  We 
conducted our Takhar monitoring in a massive dust storm that 
grounded planes in a nearby Samangan province, closed schools and 
shops, and reportedly caused the death of a child.  Even the most 
basic shelter can mean the difference between life and death. 
 
Christian Children's Fund (CCF) Operates Good Education 
and Water Projects in Conservative Kunduz and Takhar 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) CCF completed education and water projects in Kunduz and 
Takhar provinces with FY06 funds and has started similar programs 
with FY07 funds.  We watched a rickety but effective well drilling 
rig at work in Kunduz, and saw new wells in Takhar that children 
could operate.  We also visited a sturdy two-room shelter CCF had 
built for UNHCR with steel beams and a latrine outside.  But as 
UNHCR is increasingly seeing, the family expanded the central 
hallway for more room, which may decrease the seismic stability. 
Most families spent $200-$600 of their own funds to build the 
shelters, along with their sweat equity. No one with whom we spoke 
went into debt, as some Australian officials have alleged. 
 
¶4. (SBU) CCF's literacy programs in Kunduz and Takhar were in full 
swing when we arrived on our pre-arranged tour.  Each child or woman 
had a book and seemed eager to learn.  Most, if not all, were the 
first in their families to learn to read, and for many women and 
girls, this is the only education they will ever receive.  Overall, 
the projects are proceeding well despite sometimes conflicting or 
restrictive cultural practices.  Several children could not write 
their names after two years in the program; many leave during 
harvest season to help their parents.  We were concerned that the 
literacy program siphoned off children from the regular school, but 
many parents, citing security and kidnapping concerns, would not 
allow their children, especially girls, to walk the 2.5 kilometers 
to school.  Married Uzbek women in the Takhar literacy program said 
their husbands wanted them to learn to read so that they could get 
jobs and earn money, but they were not allowed to attend the 
male-taught classes at the government school.  They asked us to fund 
female teachers, but CCF said all the female candidates whom the 
school tried to recruit were not allowed to travel to this remote 
 
KABUL 00003876  002 OF 004 
 
 
area alone or without their husbands, especially for the meager 
$60/month salary. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) CCF received FY06 funds to build two schools, but the 
construction of one school according to the new GoIRoA school design 
absorbed the majority of the funding.  The new school, located in a 
remote corner of Takhar province, was truly outstanding.  The large 
concrete building held big, furnished classrooms and even a 
teachers' lounge.  With the leftover funds, CCF refurbished four 
schools; we visited one in Kunduz with a new CCF-funded perimeter 
wall.  The three-year old, Korean-built 11-room school, however, was 
already crumbling, and many of the 2,300 students studied in four 
ragged UNICEF tents and six small huts in the inner courtyard.  (We 
confirmed that 714 girls and 1586 boys attended in two shifts.)  We 
questioned why CCF did not build more classrooms instead of a wall 
and were told that parents would not let their daughters attend 
unless a secure wall was built around the outer courtyard that 
housed the latrine. 
 
ACTED Shelter Project at the Land Allocation Scheme 
LAS) Site in Baghlan:  Many Hard Lessons Learned 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Despite the best intentions and excellent work of our 
implementing partner, the Agency for Technical Cooperation and 
Development (ACTED), the well-located Baghlan site is almost a ghost 
town.  Whether from a lack of a real need or from a real lack of 
complementary services, only 100 out of 747 ACTED-built shelters are 
occupied, and 3 out of 36 UNHCR-built shelters.  This pilot project 
has generated many hard lessons and provided a wake-up call to the 
international community that greater oversight is needed.  The 
project is salvageable but will take strong political will and 
commitment. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Due to security concerns, the Refugee Coordinator did not 
accompany the Afghan LES Refugee Specialist to Baghlan.  The Refugee 
Specialist, however, met with male and female shuras, government and 
NGO officials, and inspected the beautiful new clinic and 
well-constructed shelters.  ACTED has a good reputation and long 
history of work in Afghanistan, and has built 747 PRM-funded 
shelters at the site (out of 840 planned), along with 3.5 kilometers 
of road and 40 wells.  ACTED also runs community development and 
conflict resolution programs, which are vital in these 
mixed-ethnicity communities. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The Baghlan site is a GoIRoA Land Allocation Scheme site, 
where the Afghan government provides a 600 square meter plot for 
poor returnee and IDP families.  The international community then 
funds shelter construction for the most vulnerable of these 
families.  There is evidence that the GoIRoA-run land allocation 
beneficiary selection process was rife with corruption.  The former 
Department of Refugees and Repatriation (DORR) chief allegedly 
circumvented the official Beneficiary Selection Committee and drew 
up a beneficiary list that included police, shopkeepers, the deputy 
Governor, MPs, provincial and central government department heads, 
and, according to some claims, even a cousin of President Karzai. 
Land speculation was rampant, as the nominal price the beneficiaries 
paid for the land (9000 Afghanis ($180) per plot or 1500 Afghanis 
($30) per square meter) is vastly below market prices.  Reports 
surfaced that even local ACTED and UNHCR staff had plots, and some 
people own 20-30 plots.  Many families and even whole villages had 
to pay bribes to be selected as beneficiaries.  The Kuchi families 
who could not pay the bribe lived in deplorable conditions next to 
the site for three years without receiving any land. 
 
¶9.  In the end, DORR allocated 3,000 plots.  ACTED and UNHCR -- 
whose expatriate project managers underestimated the scale of the 
corruption -- then provided shelters to  the most vulnerable 
families among the selected plot allocation beneficiaries.  Before 
long, these "vulnerable" beneficiaries were modifying the shelters 
with high compound walls, fancy gates and individual wells, all of 
which cost as much as the $1,000 shelter.  We heard reports of plots 
and shelters being sold for anywhere from 50,000 Afghanis($1,000) to 
$300,000 ($6,000) depending on the plot location.  (Sale is illegal; 
beneficiaries are supposed to live in their shelters for five years 
before selling them.)  The good news is that the new DORR chief, 
working through the newly-engaged Beneficiary Selection Committee, 
 
KABUL 00003876  003 OF 004 
 
 
reevaluated the eligibility criteria of 1,000 land allocation 
beneficiaries and rejected 900 of them.  He said he was able to do 
this due to the "support of his tribe and 14 educated brothers," but 
he wants a high-level MORR letter supporting the next phase: 
physical redistribution of the plots to new beneficiaries.  While 
this process will hopefully chill land speculation and target truly 
vulnerable people, redistribution could be drawn-out and even 
dangerous.  The DORR chief faces enormous pressure to do nothing and 
is considering taking another job. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) The Baghlan site has enormous potential but all parties 
now realize that shelter construction is pointless in areas without 
concomitant social services.  The site currently lacks livelihood 
projects, reliable water, and transportation into Pul-e-Khumri, 
which is only eight kilometers away on the major highway.  A bus 
service to town began a few months ago but lasted only three days 
after local taxi drivers paid the bus driver to claim he had no 
riders.  The driver kept the fares, the local Department of 
Transportation discontinued the bus service, and now, instead of 
paying the 5 Afghani bus fare (10 cents), residents must pay several 
dollars each way.  Since most residents make only two or three 
dollars a day as unskilled laborers, many cannot break even after 
paying their transportation costs.  One family left because "they 
starved for three days," another because a family member died of 
exposure over the winter.  Other beneficiaries moved back to town, 
and their shelters collapsed when last winter's snowfall piled up on 
their roofs.  Project residents were supposed to be employed by the 
Hungarian PRT-funded brick factory but the $150/month salary they 
were promised (and the free bricks for vulnerable families) never 
materialized.  Instead, residents were offered (and they refused) 
$2.50/day and no transportation to the factory three kilometers 
away.   (Note:  UNHCR felt that some of these families had a 
"refugee camp" attitude, developed after years of dependency in 
Pakistani camps where aid organizations provided extensive services 
at their doorsteps.  End note.)  All these issues underscore that 
land allocation sites need holistic development that incorporates 
shelter and services if they are to become viable "pull factors" for 
Afghan refugees considering repatriation. 
 
Shelter for Life Strengthens Communities with Bridges 
and Shelters in Takhar Province 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Shelter for Life (SFL) built bridges and shelters in 
several districts in under-served Takhar province, which is still 
studded with rusty Soviet tanks and charred personnel carriers. 
Beneficiaries spoke warmly of SFL and proudly showed us the six 
sturdy bridges they built in a Cash-For-Work program.  Village 
residents said that cars routinely fell off the wooden bridges into 
the canal, and they had to load and unload donkeys to get over each 
crossing.  (To reach this area, we drove through a wide river and 
marsh that will be impassable after the winter rains.)  Along with 
the bridges, the SFL shelters were well-built and completed on 
schedule, although the tour included only the shelters SFL selected. 
 While we found no blatant corruption, we did find many of the 
residents were IDPs, and not refugees.  We also saw many shelters 
with few belongings, or being used primarily for storage.  (One 
family used the latrine for storage, and another stored their onion 
harvest in the shelter.)  We doubled-back on our own to a shelter we 
had visited that morning and found only a small girl who said the 
family "had gone to the other house." 
 
¶12.  (SBU) We are concerned that beneficiaries either do not need 
their shelters or did not qualify in the first place.  We examined 
SFL's beneficiary applications and found their interview process to 
be thorough but highly subjective.  Beneficiaries are also confirmed 
by the local shura council but that too can be subject to "you 
scratch my back, I'll scratch yours" when it comes to designating 
family and tribal members to receive plots.  These projects 
highlight the difficulty in working with an opaque tribal culture 
such as in Afghanistan.  SFL has worked in Takhar for many years and 
probably has the most experience in targeting vulnerable people, and 
even they have most likely included non-eligible people in their 
beneficiary selection. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Our implementing partners, for the most part, are meeting 
their project objectives and indicators, but we need a more 
 
KABUL 00003876  004 OF 004 
 
 
transparent LAS program beneficiary selection process, with greater 
oversight and follow-up.  UNHCR is considering taking the land 
allocation process away from provincial DORR offices, which will 
undermine capacity-building goals but help ensure the right people 
receive assistance.  It is a delicate balance; too aggressive an 
effort could threaten UN and NGO staff security and jeopardize their 
continued involvement with the project.  We are holding a strategy 
meeting with UNHCR and donors on November 24 to discuss reforming 
the land allocation program in light of the pilot project 
experiences.  UNCHR and the donor community agree that, while 
flawed, these programs are important and still worth pursuing -- and 
thus worth improving.