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Viewing cable 07JAKARTA3100, PAPUA -- AMBASSADOR VISITS KEY SITES IN TURBULENT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07JAKARTA3100 2007-11-07 11:00 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Jakarta
VZCZCXRO0203
OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #3100/01 3111100
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 071100Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6965
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 1515
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY PRIORITY 3537
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1079
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 1982
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHHJJPI/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 003100 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/ANP, DRL/AWH 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS EMIN ENRG ID
SUBJECT: PAPUA -- AMBASSADOR VISITS KEY SITES IN TURBULENT 
REGION 
 
REF: A. JAKARTA 3076 
     B. JAKARTA 3015 
     C. JAKARTA 2930 
 
JAKARTA 00003100  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
1. (U) This message is Sensitive But Unclassified--Please 
handle accordingly.  Not for distribution outside of USG 
channels. 
 
2. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Ambassador Hume discussed economic 
development, health, human rights and other concerns with key 
government and civil society interlocutors on a November 1-5 
visit to Papua.  He also toured BP's Tangguh liquid natural 
gas (LNG) project, currently under construction on Bintuni 
Bay in West Papua.  Unrest in Timika in south-central Papua 
restricted the Ambassador's visit to U.S. firm 
Freeport-McMoRan's mining operation to observe corporate 
social responsibility activities.  END SUMMARY 
 
JAYAPURA:  DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 
 
3. (SBU) In a November 2 meeting with Vice Governor Alex 
Hesegem in the provincial capital Jayapura, Ambassador noted 
the USG's interest in Papua and asked about progress on 
implementing the provincial government's development agenda. 
(Note:  Governor Barnabas Suebu was traveling in China.) 
Hesegem explained that Papua remained one of Indonesia's 
poorest provinces and faced myriad development challenges, 
including housing, nutrition, education, infrastructure, 
HIV/AIDS, and unemployment.  Papua's problem was not money: 
funds transferred to the provincial government under Special 
Autonomy as well as money provided to local NGOs through 
Freeport's One Percent Fund remained unspent.  The problem, 
according to Hesegem, was that the government lacked the 
capacity to use the funds to implement development programs 
and NGOs could not agree on how to spend Freeport's 
contributions. 
 
4. (SBU) Examining one of Papua's most critical health 
crises, the Ambassador visited a USAID-supported HIV/AIDS 
clinic on November 2.  The clinic serves an area of 
approximately 31,000 people and sees between 2,000 and 2,500 
patients per month.  At 2.5 percent, the HIV/AIDS infection 
rate in Papua far exceeds the Indonesian national rate of 
less than 0.1 percent.  The Ambassador observed that Papua 
was at a critical tipping point where effective prevention 
could slow the infection's growth rate.  Inadequate 
preventative measures, however, could result in an expansion 
of HIV/AIDS infections in the province.  Clinic staff agreed 
that prevention was critical and outlined their campaign of 
testing, counseling and distribution of condoms. 
 
MIXED VIEWS ON SPECIAL AUTONOMY 
 
5. (SBU) Members of the Papuan People's Assembly (MRP) gave 
the Ambassador a mixed picture of the relationship between 
the province and the central government in the context of the 
2001 Special Autonomy Law.  MRP members viewed Special 
Autonomy as a "victory" for Papuans.  However, they expressed 
frustration that the central government had yet to issue all 
the regulations necessary for the provincial government to 
take up its new responsibilities.  The root of the problem, 
according to MRP interlocutors, was a lack of trust between 
Jakarta and Jayapura.  They stressed that the MRP was firmly 
committed to making Special Autonomy work and was "not 
interested in the separatist route." 
 
6. (SBU) The Ambassador suggested that the problem might be 
more a case of Jakarta's distraction from its Papua Special 
Autonomy agenda by other priorities, rather than Jakarta's 
opposition to it.  He stressed that Papua and Jakarta must 
show strong leadership in order to push the implementation of 
Special Autonomy forward.  The USG, he noted, could provide 
capacity-building assistance to the provincial government. 
It was up to Indonesians--in Papua, in Jakarta and 
elsewhere--to make Special Autonomy succeed. 
 
7. (SBU) Representatives of several key civil society 
organizations raised a variety of concerns, including a lack 
of trust between Papuans and the security forces.  They could 
not, however, point to specific instances of security force 
 
JAKARTA 00003100  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
violence against Papuans, and vaguely invoked fears and 
threats.  They agreed that Governor Suebu's frequent trips to 
villages was important because it gave Papuans direct access 
to their elected leaders and helped build trust between the 
people and the government. 
 
TIMIKA--UNREST PERSISTS 
 
8. (SBU)  Unrest in Timika, sparked by the suspicious death 
of a tribal elder, who was also a retired police officer, 
prevented the Ambassador's planned November 3 visit to key 
sites around the city (Ref A).  These included the Mitra 
Masyarakat Hospital, a 101-bed hospital that Freeport-McMoRan 
built to support the local community; the Nemangkawi Mining 
Institute, where Freeport provides training to Papuans; and 
Kokanau, where a Freeport-USAID partnership project assists 
local fishermen.  Although the rioters did not target these 
sites or other Freeport facilities, the general lack of 
security throughout the town prompted the change in the 
Ambassador's program. 
 
9. (SBU) The situation revealed weaknesses in Papua's 
security services.  Lacking training and equipment to deal 
with a riot, the local police were unable to handle the 
situation.  Many officers fled their posts and went into 
hiding once the conflagration began.  Lack of efficient 
coordination between the police and the military (TNI), 
combined with the TNI's reluctance to be undertake riot 
control--largely because of a fear of possible allegations of 
human-rights violations--delayed the deployment of 
reinforcements.  As a result, the violence continued until 
the police acceded to the rioters' demands. 
 
HIGHLANDS--UNREST PERSISTS 
 
10. (SBU) On November 4 the Ambassador proceeded to the 
Papuan highlands, where he got a firsthand glimpse of the 
ongoing tribal conflict in the village of Banti, located 
approximately eight miles from Freeport's Grasberg mine (ref 
C).  A helicopter tour of the area revealed some of the 
population pressures that have triggered the tensions.  The 
town's original inhabitants are approximately 1000 members of 
the Amungme tribe who live in houses that Freeport 
constructed to compensate them for traditional lands lost as 
a result of the mine's establishment.  Among these are 
several hundred makeshift dwellings constructed by members of 
the Dani tribe who have recently come to the area to conduct 
illegal gold panning operations in the mine tailings.  The 
influx of migrants has exacerbated tensions between the two 
groups as they compete over the scarce resources of the 
rugged Papuan highlands.  Later, the Ambassador toured the 
Freeport-run Tembagapura hospital, which treats both Freeport 
employees and people from nearby villages.  (Note: 
Tembagapura is the "company town" in the highlands that 
supports Freeport operations and houses most of the mine 
employees.)  Several local villagers were being treated for 
arrow wounds sustained in tribal violence which had already 
left eight people dead. 
 
VIST TO BP PROJECT 
 
11. (SBU) The Ambassador concluded his visit with a November 
5 tour of BP's Tangguh LNG site and surrounding communities. 
BP officials told the Ambassador they expected gas to begin 
flowing from the 14.4 trillion cubic feet of proven reserves 
in late 2008, with deliveries to customers in China, South 
Korea, and the United States in 2009.  The project, still in 
the construction phase, employs approximately 10,000 workers, 
30 percent of whom are Papuan. 
 
12. (SBU) The major social challenges continue to revolve 
around delivering concrete benefits to the local communities 
around the project without creating a culture of dependency, 
said BP officials.  BP continues to try to restore social 
peace among effected communities after its ill-advised 
decision to relocate one village and rebuild it on a grand 
and comparatively lavish scale.  The neighboring villagers 
are envious and openly resentful of the largesse bestowed 
upon the relocated villagers of Tanah Merah.  The Ambassador 
toured the neighboring village of Saengga, which displayed 
 
JAKARTA 00003100  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
few of the modern conveniences of Tanah Merah.  Some 
villagers did have satellite television, and there were some 
modest, new houses with glass windows built by locals who had 
found construction work at the LNG site, according to BP 
officials.  BP said its near-term social priorities were 
based on community feedback and would focus on clean water, 
health, and education projects. 
 
HUME