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UNCLAS ISTANBUL 000987 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER TU IZ
SUBJECT: A PROFESSOR OF GENERALS SPEAKS OF THE OBLIGATION 
TO ATTACK KURDISH IRAQ 
 
1.(SBU)  At a lunch meeting, on October 30, professor Ercan 
Citlioglu spoke to poloffs of the need to appease the Turkish 
population-at-large, who increasingly demand that the GOT 
take military action against the Kurdistan Workers Party 
(PKK) in Iraq.  Citlioglu, a terrorism expert and president 
of the Strategic Research Center at Bahcesehir University, 
claimed that intense domestic pressure on the government, 
both from the military and from frequent street protests, has 
pushed the current Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
government to the point where a decision to launch a 
significant cross-border operation (CBO) into Iraq is 
inevitable.  Citlioglu claimed domestic pressure is now 
steering Turkish foreign policy.  He said the military, still 
feeling somewhat threatened by the election of President Gul, 
dares not appear ineffective against the terrorist threat. 
And, the current AKP administration simply does not have the 
political capital to keep the military -- pressed to appear 
relevant and effective -- from giving the people what they 
are demanding. 
 
¶2. (SBU)  While the professor thought a CBO would be 
ineffectual with regards to military objectives (destroying 
or even seriously degrading the PKK's military capabilities) 
he felt it was unavoidable if the GOT wanted to prevent 
public outrage from boiling over.  "Nothing short of a 
full-scale incursion would satisfy the people."  His fear is 
that public anger and hatred towards the PKK, which has begun 
to morph into anger at and hatred of Kurdish Regional 
Government (KRG) President Barzani, may further mutate into 
public anger and hatred towards Kurds in general.  One 
possible consequence, should the government fail to act, 
could be an increase in anti-Kurdish internal conflict (e.g., 
bombings of Democratic Society Party (DTP) offices; massive, 
commerce-choking protests in the streets, etc.).  He 
acknowledged that the benefits of undertaking a significant 
CBO into Iraq would be largely symbolic.  Even so, Citlioglu 
felt the Turkish public was prepared to withstand casualties 
resulting from such an operation.  "It does not matter if 
1,000 soldiers are lost in the offensive.  The people will 
gladly accept this to the handful of soldiers that would 
continue to die at home should we do nothing." 
 
¶3. (SBU)  COMMENT   As a former diplomat, and more 
importantly as a professor currently teaching a security 
issues seminar for some 25 Turkish general officers, 
Citlioglu's opinions could hold considerable sway with senior 
military officials.  Citlioglu is savvy and experienced 
enough to acknowledge that a military effort, geared towards 
ending PKK violence, must be coupled with both economic and 
social policies to persuade the local population to withdraw 
support from the PKK and thus "win" the fight against 
terrorism in the long-run.  But he is convinced that the GOT 
has no choice but to accede to the Turkish military's, and 
Turkish population's, demand for a CBO in the very near term. 
 Although recent reports of a U.S. agreement to provide 
"real-time intelligence sharing" and other operational 
support in the fight against PKK terrorism have tempered 
calls for a large scale CBO, Citlioglu's comments reflect the 
intensity of the pressure felt by the Turkish military in the 
run up to the November 3 Iraq Neighbors Meeting and the 
November 5 POTUS-PM Erdogan meeting.  END COMMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WIENER