VZCZCXRO0751
RR RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHHI #1966/01 3240737
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 200737Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6744
INFO RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH 3966
RUEHZS/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 HANOI 001966 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR PM A/S MULL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL PGOV OTRA VM
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR 
POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS STEPHEN MULL 
 
 
HANOI 00001966  001.2 OF 006 
 
 
Introduction 
------------ 
 
¶1. (SBU) Acting Assistant Secretary Mull: Mission Vietnam looks 
forward to welcoming you to Hanoi.  Your visit will be an important 
contribution to the growing U.S.-Vietnam relationship, especially in 
advance of Vietnam taking its seat on the UNSC next year.  Your 
visit comes on the heels of November visits by Secretary of Commerce 
Carlos Gutierrez, Assistant Secretary for International 
Organizations Kristen Silverberg, EAP Deputy Assistant Secretary 
Scot Marciel and Congressman Eni Faleomaveaga, Chairman of the House 
Asia-Pacific Subcommittee.  Your discussions will allow us to 
highlight a broad area of bilateral cooperation that to date has 
lagged behind its potential, including in the security area. 
 
¶2. (SBU) A series of high-level bilateral visits, the highlights of 
which were President Bush's trip to Vietnam in November 2006 and 
President Nguyen Minh Triet's Washington visit in June 2007, have 
helped push the bilateral relationship to a higher plane.  Vietnam's 
desire last year to successfully host APEC and accede to the WTO 
also helped strengthen bilateral ties.  Vietnam's recent election to 
a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council during the 2008-2009 
term, and its emerging leadership role in ASEAN, are also key 
indications of the GVN's desire to pursue a more outward looking and 
engaged role in the world community. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Our strengthening relations are in large part due to 
Vietnam's realization that the United States is an important force 
in maintaining a stable geopolitical environment in which even 
"small" countries like Vietnam are assured their independence and 
freedom of action.  Vietnam also sees in the United States an 
increasingly important source of financial and technical assistance 
and a huge market for Vietnamese goods.  For these reasons, 
Vietnam's leaders are committed to continued progress in bilateral 
relations and will likely speak positively and optimistically about 
the future of U.S.-Vietnam ties.  Differences over human rights 
remain, however, and lingering fears that the United States supports 
the overthrow of the current regime continue to complicate the 
relationship.  China also looms as a factor coloring Hanoi's 
reactions to our proposals in the security realm, as discussed 
further below. 
 
Counterterrorism: Case-by-Case Cooperation 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶4. (SBU) Vietnam says the right things about terrorism, underscoring 
its willingness to respond rapidly to specific cases or incidents. 
However, in response to our efforts, together with like-minded 
countries, to urge GVN participation in multilateral efforts such as 
the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to 
Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the GVN has stood firm in limiting its 
involvement to cooperation only on a "case-by-case basis." 
Nonetheless, the GVN and the United States have made gradual 
progress in strengthening our joint counterterrorism efforts. 
During President Bush's visit last year, the President and his 
Vietnamese counterpart pledged to increase cooperation to halt the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related technology 
and materials in accordance with international and national laws and 
each country's capacities.  The U.S.-led project to repatriate 
Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) from the Nuclear Research Institute in 
Dalat and convert the reactor to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU), 
completed in mid-September, was an important deliverable on this 
commitment.  The United States provides counterterrorism assistance 
to Vietnam by funding Vietnamese participation in 
counterterrorism-related training at the International Law 
Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok, and through 
military-to-military exchanges with an emphasis on counterterrorism 
themes.  We'd like to do much more. 
 
¶5. (SBU) In the multilateral arena, Vietnam has signed eight out of 
13 UN terrorism conventions.  Approval of the remaining five is 
winding its way through the cumbersome GVN bureaucracy, the delay 
explained in part by GVN concern with its capacity to carry out 
obligations under the conventions.  Two of the remaining conventions 
are reportedly in the final stages of GVN approval, while the status 
of the other three remains unclear. 
 
Gradual Progress in Defense Cooperation 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Defense relations have advanced at a measured pace, but 
reflect the overall positive shift in the relationship.  We conduct 
professional military exchanges with the People's Army of Vietnam 
(PAVN) in a limited but growing range of areas including military 
law, military nursing, public affairs, search and rescue, 
meteorological/ oceanographic (METOC) prediction, and disaster 
preparedness.  PAVN officers have been invited as observers to Cobra 
Gold for the past four years and routinely attend U.S. Pacific 
 
HANOI 00001966  002.2 OF 006 
 
 
Command-sponsored multilateral conferences.  Since 1997, over sixty 
GVN officials, including more than thirty PAVN officers, have 
attended courses and seminars at the Asia Pacific Center for 
Security Studies (APCSS).  PAVN also sent observers to the annual 
Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercises this 
summer, and they provided very positive feedback from that 
opportunity.  During the recent Chiefs of Defense conference in 
Hawaii, the PAVN Deputy Chief of the General Staff told the Pacific 
Commander that Vietnam was willing to do a search and rescue 
exercise with the United States in CY2008.  This would be very 
positive step forward and Admiral Keating, the Commander of the 
USPACOM, is likely to follow up on this offer during his visit to 
Vietnam in December. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Since 2003, U.S. Navy ships have made five port visits to 
Vietnam, including most recently a November 14-18 visit by two mine 
countermeasures ships, the USS Guardian and the USS Patriot, at 
Haiphong port.  In July, Vietnam participated in the Pacific 
Partnership mission of the U.S.S. Peleliu (LHA 5).  This vessel, 
which docked for two weeks at Danang, served as a working area for 
civilian and military medical professionals to provide a full range 
of medical, dental and construction services.  In 2005, Vietnam 
agreed to participate in the International Military Education and 
Training Program (IMET), and the first two officers from the PAVN 
completed their IMET-sponsored (almost one year long) English 
language training in Texas this year.  In October, we sent an 
additional six officers for training in the United States.  This 
year, we have accelerated the pace of IMET and will provide a 
language laboratory in Hanoi using IMET funds.  In addition, IMET 
will expand mil-mil contacts in FY08 to U.S. mobile training team 
visits for Search and Rescue and for military medical techniques 
training.  This will open a new phase in bilateral military 
contacts.  Reaching our full potential for closer cooperation in 
defense activities, including multilateral peacekeeping, 
humanitarian assistance efforts and attendance at U.S. military 
schools exists, is attainable, but will require time, persistence 
and patience. 
 
Expanding U.S. Naval Ship Visits 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) While we have regularized our SOP for regular ship visits 
over recent years, the GVN has remained firm in limiting the 
frequency of port visits by U.S. Navy vessels to one a year.  This 
restriction is frequently cited as being consistent with GVN laws 
that regulate visits by foreign warships; however, some other 
nations conduct more frequent port visits.  While it may be 
unproductive to demand more frequent port calls, we still seek to 
persuade the GVN to permit more frequent access for limited, 
technical calls (i.e., for refueling and replenishment).  This would 
support our overall goal of increasing routine access for U.S. Naval 
vessels at Vietnam's ports, while not escalating the pace of 
military contacts beyond a level that is comfortable for the GVN. 
We also hope to continue asking the GVN to participate in fly-outs 
and believe that the general positive trend in the relationship will 
result in an acceptance at some point, hopefully soon. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Similarly, we hope to reverse the PAVN leadership's 
reluctance to participate in distinguished visitor fly-outs to U.S. 
Navy vessels transiting the South China Sea.  To date, these have 
been rebuffed due to concerns over the "appearance of Vietnam's 
participation in joint exercises with the United States."  This, 
clearly, is code for limiting advances in the relationship to a pace 
that does not discomfort the Chinese. 
 
Peacekeeping Operations 
----------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) are well outside the range 
of normal PAVN missions of protecting sovereignty and preserving the 
Communist Party regime.  Over past years, however, the GVN has 
expressed increasing interest in the potential for involvement in 
PKO missions, especially those organized under UN auspices.  We 
believe that Vietnam's recent election to a non-permanent seat on 
the UN Security Council during the 2008-2009 term has given 
significant impetus to this thinking.  Vietnamese military leaders 
remain cautious, however, saying that Vietnam would focus Vietnam's 
PKO participation only on providing medical or engineer support 
missions, including demining. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Several PAVN officers have already gone abroad to 
participate in Peace Operations Military Observer's Courses offered 
by several nations and in 2005 the GVN hosted a strategic-level 
peacekeeping seminar in Hanoi sponsored by Great Britain.  PAVN 
leaders nonetheless have yet to discuss Vietnamese commitment to any 
actual PKO contingency.  To move to that stage, the GVN would have 
to do much more to meet the remaining challenges of the lack of 
interoperability, the paucity of English language speakers in the 
 
HANOI 00001966  003.2 OF 006 
 
 
military and complications due to funding issues. 
 
Consequences of War 
-------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) In your meetings, you are likely to hear references to 
"consequences of war" or "legacies of war" issues.  This is the 
catch-all term that the GVN applies to a myriad of problems, 
including Agent Orange(AO)/Dioxin contamination, unexploded ordnance 
(UXO) and land mines from the war era, and the incomplete recovery 
of missing Vietnamese military personnel. 
 
¶13. (SBU) While scientists and GVN officials continue to debate the 
human impact of the 80 million liters of AO sprayed over 2.6 million 
hectares and 3,000 hamlets in Vietnam, recent GVN-approved studies 
reveal that Dioxin contamination is not widespread, but rather is 
concentrated in roughly 20 "hotspots."  Former U.S. bases, from 
which Operation Ranch Hand missions were staged and AO was stored, 
have soil dioxin concentrations exceeding concentration levels 
recommended by the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and 
World Health Organization, while other areas thought to be targets 
of heavy aerial spraying do not currently have soil concentrations 
considered hazardous to health. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Much has been accomplished recently in turning a new leaf 
on the AO/Dioxin issue with regards to government-to-government 
relations and changing the tone of the dialogue both in meetings and 
in the press.  On November 17, 2006 the Joint Statement between the 
GVN and USG on the occasion of President Bush's visit to Vietnam 
stated: "The U.S. and Vietnam also agreed that further joint efforts 
to address the environmental contamination near former Dioxin 
storage sites would make a valuable contribution to the continued 
development of their bilateral relationship."  In 2005, the 
Department of Defense conducted a dioxin remediation workshop in 
Hanoi and shared the U.S. experience in dioxin remediation with GVN. 
 Beginning in 2006, the State Department and EPA provided USD 
400,000 in technical assistance to the GVN's Office 33 and MOD's 
Chemical Command for remediation planning and immediate 
interventions at the Danang airport.  Congress recently appropriated 
an additional USD 3 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for 
"dioxin mitigation and health activities," thereby helping Vietnam 
to remediate areas with demonstrably high levels of dioxin and 
assist those with disabilities.  This follows four years of USG 
support to build the capacity of the Vietnam Academy of Science for 
analysis of contaminated soils and sediment.  The USG is continuing 
to work with the GVN, and in parallel to efforts by UNDP, Ford 
Foundation and other NGOs, to examine the next steps in the 
environmental remediation of three priority hotspots in Danang, Hoa 
Binh and Phu Cat airfields.  Developing a partnership to share all 
information and best practices in environmental remediation between 
the DOD and MOD would be well received by the GVN. 
 
Impacts of Remaining UXO 
------------------------ 
 
¶15. (SBU) Since 1989, USAID, through support from the Patrick J. 
Leahy War Victims Fund (LWVF) and other sources, has provided over 
USD 43 million to support NGOs and private voluntary organizations 
to develop comprehensive programs for people with disabilities.  In 
addition, since 1993 the USG has been actively involved in assisting 
the people of Vietnam in overcoming the social and economic impacts 
of remaining UXO from the war.  Vietnam was formally accepted as the 
37th participant in the U.S. Humanitarian De-mining Program in June 
2000, and the USG is now the largest donor of humanitarian 
assistance for mine action programs in Vietnam.  The USG has 
invested over USD 37 million in a broad spectrum of programs not 
only to locate, remove and destroy unexploded ordnance and 
landmines, but also to address the UXO effects on health and 
livelihood of Vietnamese living in affected areas. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Today, various NGOs conduct UXO and land mine clearance, 
risk education and victim rehabilitation. The USG has also donated a 
significant quantity of equipment to the PAVN to assist efforts in 
UXO and landmine clearance and return land to productive use.  In 
2006, the State Department provided USD 3.5 million to support UXO 
action and demining activities in Vietnam, almost a third of which 
went directly to PAVN in the form of donated demining equipment. In 
2007, an additional USD 2.5 million will be provided to underwrite 
mine action related activities in Vietnam.  In initial budgets, USG 
funds for demining have been cut substantially, which will force 
tough choices as we continue this program. 
 
Fullest Possible Accounting 
--------------------------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) Predating the re-establishment of diplomatic relations and 
normal defense contacts, U.S. military and DoD elements continue 
their efforts toward the fullest possible accounting of Americans 
 
HANOI 00001966  004.2 OF 006 
 
 
missing from the Vietnam Conflict.  Since 1988, the Joint POW/MIA 
Accounting Command (JPAC), a USPACOM subordinate element, has 
evolved to include forward Detachments in Vietnam, Laos, and 
Thailand/Cambodia.  With its Vietnam Detachment (Det 2), it has 
completed 90 Joint Field Activities (JFA), which incorporated 
extensive research, interviews, analysis, and excavations in order 
to accomplish its mission.  From its inception, Det 2 has forged 
excellent relations with its GVN counterparts (notably, the Vietnam 
Office for Seeking Missing Persons or VNOSMP)  Ultimately, JPAC's 
efforts in Southeast Asia have resulted in accounting for 880 
American's who were previously unaccounted for.  The foundation has 
been set for sustaining JPAC's success as it continues to account 
for the remaining 1766 missing Americans throughout Southeast Asia. 
 
 
¶18. (SBU) JPAC Det 2 is currently working toward the: (1) admission 
of JPAC teams to research or recover cases located in select areas 
of high GVN sensitivity; (2) the access to information held in 
classified military and security ministry archives and records that 
have not previously been made available to USG; and (3) further 
assistance in resolving cases in Laos and Cambodia where members of 
Vietnam's armed forces might provide the largest pool of 
eyewitnesses. 
 
¶19. (SBU) An area of heightened bilateral cooperation is the 
undertaking of investigation and recovery efforts at sea.  During 
the Vietnam Conflict, more than 400 American aviators were lost in 
the waters off the coast of Vietnam.  While the majority of those 
American's were declared dead and their remains deemed not 
recoverable, JPAC continues to conduct underwater investigation and 
survey activity when information obtained and validated has the 
potential to lead to a recovery.  This is a resource-intensive 
endeavor. In December, 2006 the GVN gave its approval for the use of 
U.S. naval vessels to operate within their territorial waters in 
order to enhance JPAC's underwater investigations towards the 
identification of potential recovery sites. 
 
Humanitarian Assistance 
----------------------- 
 
¶20. (SBU) Since 1995, U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID) programs have provided aid in legal reform, governance, 
economic growth, HIV/AIDS, environmental protection and disaster 
prevention.  For FY 2007, total U.S. assistance from all agencies 
was about USD 86.6 million, most of which has gone towards providing 
health-related assistance, notably in the area of HIV/AIDS treatment 
and prevention.  Vietnam is one of fifteen countries in the 
President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).  The United 
States provided USD 65 million in 2007 to expand integrated HIV/AIDS 
prevention, care and treatment programs.  This figure includes 
approximately USD 3.1 million dollars for the Department of Defense 
(DOD)-managed portion of PEPFAR HIV/AIDS programs with Vietnam's 
Ministry of Defense. 
 
¶21. (SBU) Since 2000, DOD has supported a wide variety of Overseas 
Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDCA) projects in Vietnam. 
Through USPACOM, the U.S. Government has sponsored the construction 
of eight medical clinics in Thua Thien-Hue Province, a primary 
school in Quang Binh Province, and two centers for disabled children 
in Quang Binh Province.  This past summer, two additional 
humanitarian assistance construction projects were completed and 
turned over to local authorities in Central Vietnam: a medical 
clinic in Quang Binh Province, and a 10-room primary school in Quang 
Tri Province.  Additionally, USPACOM has facilitated multiple 
donations of excess medical property to various medical facilities 
throughout Vietnam. 
 
¶22. (SBU) Through a combination of Fulbright grants and the Vietnam 
Education Foundation (VEF), an innovative program created through 
legislation to facilitate the training of Vietnamese scientists, the 
United States sponsors over 100 students yearly for graduate study 
in the United States.  The Fulbright program is the largest in Asia. 
 The VEF was established with the unpaid proceeds of loans extended 
to the old South Vietnamese government.  Another important activity 
is the Fulbright Education Training Program, through which 70 
mid-level Vietnamese professionals receive in-country training in 
economics and public policy each year. 
 
A Word on the Economy, WTO and Investment 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶23. (SBU) Vietnam today is fueled by a dynamic economy, which grew 
at an 8.1% rate last year.  Per capita annual income jumped from 
about $220 in 1994 to $720 in 2006.  The 20-year old economic reform 
program known as "Doi Moi" (renovation) has been effective in 
promoting market-oriented changes and has improved the quality of 
life for many Vietnamese.  Foreign trade and foreign direct 
investment have increased dramatically and poverty rates have 
 
HANOI 00001966  005.2 OF 006 
 
 
dropped. Vietnam formally acceded to the WTO as its 150th member on 
January 11, 2007.  Vietnam's chief exports are crude oil, textiles, 
footwear and aquatic products.  The United States is currently 
Vietnam's third largest overall trade partner (behind China and 
Japan), but remains its largest export market. The economy still 
faces challenges, especially from the inherent difficulties of 
transforming legacy command-economy structures, systemic corruption 
and the slow pace of reform in many areas. 
 
Future Prospects 
---------------- 
 
¶24. (SBU) Since 1991, the GVN has sought to improve diplomatic ties 
both regionally and worldwide.  The GVN recognizes the strategic 
importance of the United States in the region and the world, but is 
not shy about raising the specter of "peaceful evolution," or to 
criticize U.S. actions it perceives as outside the multilateral 
system.  They routinely chafe over U.S. criticism of Vietnam's 
record of human rights and religious freedom.  Nonetheless, 
Vietnam's leaders are also pragmatic and recognize that Vietnam's 
own continued economic well-being, growth and security are, in large 
measure, inexorably tied to its relationship with the United 
States. 
 
¶25. (SBU) Vietnam has begun to explore opportunities within regional 
organizations, to increase joint efforts against terrorism, 
narcotics, maritime piracy and other issues of shared concern. 
Vietnam has also recently begun joint sea patrols with other 
neighbors in the Gulf of Thailand and has established hotlines to 
help facilitate coordination along sea boundaries.  The recent 
success of the Royal Thai Navy rescue of Vietnamese seamen adrift in 
the Gulf of Thailand was largely credited to the use of one such 
hotline.  Nevertheless, for historic and foreign policy reasons, the 
GVN is generally reluctant to speak out against its "traditional 
friends" such as North Korea and Iran when they engage in behavior 
that the rest of the international community condemns. 
 
The China Factor 
---------------- 
 
¶26. (SBU) China, again, constitutes Vietnam's most important 
strategic preoccupation.  Relations must remain on an even keel, and 
Hanoi has no illusions about the relative power balance.  Vietnam's 
huge neighbor to the north constitutes a vital and necessary 
commercial partner and former ally.  The two nations share 
ideological roots.  At the same time, China is perceived as a 
constraint to Vietnam's freedom of action, and the undertone of 
Beijing's dominance in the relationship has a nasty implication due 
to China's 1,000 year history of colonial domination.  Even today, 
Beijing appears to be willing to set aside its core policy strategy 
of improving relations with nations on its periphery when faced with 
energy security and sovereignty issues.  Both of these are coming 
into play as China engages in bullying of foreign companies to cause 
them to cease oil and gas exploration efforts in the South China 
Sea, as has been reported in the press. 
 
¶27. (SBU) Sensitivity about China's possible reactions to engagement 
with the United States has definitely not constrained Hanoi 
willingness to engage on broad economic issues.  We are a driver of 
Vietnam's integration into the world economy, which is not 
proceeding according to the "Chinese model."  On security matters, 
however, GVN reluctance to engage with us more fully is attributable 
to concern over China's potential reaction, in particular, mixed 
with an institutional conservatism born out of concern over 
"peaceful evolution" as a real threat to the regime.  Also, there is 
an ingrained caution on the part of Vietnam's military in the face 
of relative power calculations vis-`-vis China.  As documented 
above, while progress is still being made, we are moving at a 
measured pace and within these constraints. 
 
What You Can Expect 
-------------------- 
 
¶28. (SBU) You can expect your interlocutors not only to be 
articulate and well informed, but also to speak in terms generally 
supportive of growth in the bilateral relationship.  As noted above, 
lingering suspicions still exist among conservatives in leadership 
about the development of closer ties with the United States, but the 
overall tenor is one of support and interest at a measured pace that 
will not upset the GVN's calibrated attempts to maintain balance 
among its other regional partners.  Your upcoming trip to Hanoi will 
continue to help translate those good feelings into measurable 
accomplishments in the defense and security relationship. 
 
¶29. (SBU) We look forward to your visit and stand ready to do 
everything we can to make your time in Vietnam as productive as 
possible. 
 
 
HANOI 00001966  006.2 OF 006 
 
 
MICHALAK