VZCZCXYZ0004
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHEG #3255/01 3181418
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 141418Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7446
INFO RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS CAIRO 003255 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ELA(IRWIN) AND PM(ARCHETTO) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MASS MARR EG
SUBJECT: EGYPT: COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT ON THE RELEASE OF 
AN/PVS-7B NIGHT VISION GOGGLES (NVG) 
 
REF: A. EGYPTIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE LETTER OF REQUEST 
        04/LP/022 03 MAR 06 
     ¶B. DRAFT PRICE AND AVAILABILITY DATA (P&A) FOR 
        FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS) CASE 
        (EG-P-BCW) 
     ¶C. EGYPTIAN NAVY ARMAMENT DEPARTMENT LETTER 
        F-07-350 10 SEP 07 
 
Sensitive but unclassified.  Please protect accordingly. 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Description:  In Ref A, the GOE requested price and 
availability data for sixty-six (66) replacements for Night 
Ranger Viewers and associated spare parts to support two (2) 
ex-Knox Class Frigates and four (4) ex-Oliver Hazard Perry 
Class Frigates. The Night Ranger Viewers were originally 
transferred to the GOE during the transfer of ex-Oliver 
Hazard Perry Class Frigates.  These Night Ranger Viewers are 
now obsolete and the AN/PVS-7B (NVG) has been identified by 
the program manager as the appropriate replacement (Ref B). 
These NVGs and spare parts are intended to help modernize 
Egyptian Naval Forces and aid in counter-terrorism 
activities.  Comment:  Ref B has not been finalized and will 
not be presented to the GOE until the release authorization 
for these NVGs has been approved. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Reason the purchaser desires NVGs:  The Egyptian 
Navy (EN) requires the upgraded NVGs to operate effectively 
at night.  The NVGs would improve the EN's capability to 
operate with U.S. Forces in a coalition environment.  The 
AN/PVS-7B is also more easily sustainable through the U.S. 
supply system. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) How the NVGs would affect Egypt's force structure: 
These NVGs will replace older Night Ranger Viewers already 
present in Egypt.  There will be no increase in force 
structure, however there will be an increase in EN capability 
to operate effectively at night. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) How the NVGs would contribute to both U.S. and 
Egyptian defense/security goals:  NVG sales are consistent 
with DOD's Security Cooperation Guidance as it enhances the 
territorial security of regional states.  It also supports 
three of CENTCOM's Security Cooperation objectives for Egypt: 
 (1) enabling allies and partners, and (2) protecting U.S. 
and partner interest.  This NVG purchase would also support 
two of CENTCOM's Security Cooperation Desired Effects (SCDE) 
for Egypt: 
 
-- SCDE 3.2 "Support the defense modernization and 
transformation of allies or partners to reduce their 
vulnerability external aggression and coercion" 
 
-- SCDE 4.2 "Improve their capability to operate 
independently or in coalition with U.S. Forces" 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Justification for the type and quantity of NVDs 
requested:  66x AN/PVS-7B are consistent with the quantity of 
NVDs required within the U.S. Navy to operate two (2) ex-Knox 
Class Frigates and four (4) ex-Oliver Hazard Perry Class 
Frigates.  This quantity would allow the EN to equip each 
operational ship with minimum night vision capability for a 
fully manned pilothouse navigation team and to provide 
sufficient spares. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Combatant Commander's concurrence to the 
introduction of a new war fighting capability to the nation 
or region:  Combatant Commander's concurrence will be 
provided separately. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Anticipated reactions of the neighboring nations: 
Release of NVGs should not impact the regional balance of 
power or cause negative reactions from any of Egypt's 
neighbors.  This sale does not introduce new technology to 
Egypt or the region and will not impact Israel's qualitative 
military edge. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Assessment of the nation's ability to account for, 
safeguard, operate, maintain, and support the articles:  The 
Egyptians have demonstrated the intent and ability to protect 
sensitive, classified military technology over an extended 
period.  Egypt signed a General Security of Information 
Agreement with the U.S. and, as a customer, has purchased and 
protected the sensitive technology of other U.S. weapons 
systems.  Egypt has procured night vision technology in the 
past to include AN/PVS-7Bs and has met all previous security 
and monitoring requirements. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Training required either in-country or in the U.S. 
and anticipated reactions resulting from the presence of U.S. 
trainers in-country:  No additional training would be 
required for the sale of these NVGs.  There is no additional 
presence that would be required beyond normal U.S. 
interaction with the EN personnel. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Source of financing and the economic impact of the 
proposed acquisition:  Egypt plans to procure NVDs utilizing 
Foreign Military Financing and has already allocated 
sufficient funds within their FY07/08 funding priority 
listing to finance a potential NVG purchase. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Human rights considerations relevant to the 
proposed acquisition:  None. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Plan for end-use monitoring and plan for 
compliance verification:  The Office of Military Cooperation 
(OMC) Egypt has a robust Golden Sentry Program.  The Golden 
Sentry point of contact, working in close coordination with 
the security assistance program officer, will review and 
maintain copies of the purchaser's physical security and 
accountability control plan, maintain a serial number list of 
all NVGs and intensifier tubes that may be offered or 
transferred, and stands ready to assist with or conduct 
inventories and inspections as required.  The Egyptian 
military currently has over 2500 Night Vision Devices of 
various configurations in-country and has maintained 
accountability and security of those devices without 
unauthorized loss, theft, or access to date. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Operational Plan and specific end-users:  The 
operational plan for the NVGs states that the devices will be 
issued to those ships conducting Surface Ship Warfare 
operations two (2) ex-Knox Class Frigates and four (4) 
ex-Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigates.  The EN will increase 
its interoperability with U.S. Forces as demonstrated by 
combined training exercises Bright Star and Eagle Salute. 
The extent of anti-terrorism missions may include countering 
intrusions of terrorists through the territorial waters of 
Egypt to include the Suez Canal.  The GOE has indicated a 
willingness to meet U.S. guidelines for accountability and 
security of NVGs, and the Office of Military Cooperation will 
conduct End Use Monitoring (EUM) of the devices if the 
transfer is approved. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Recommendation whether the USG should approve the 
transfer of NVGs:  The country team recommends USG approval 
for transfer of the NVGs.  This is a coordinated mission 
position. 
RICCIARDONE