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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 002151 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2017 
TAGS: PREL PBTS MASS MCAP BR GY VE IR RS
SUBJECT: FORMER PRESIDENT URGES USG TO COUNTER CHAVEZ 
 
REF: A. BRASILIA 2132 
     ¶B. BRASILIA 313 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD SOBEL, REASONS 1.4 B AND D 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary.  Former President and sitting senator Jose 
Sarney (PMDB, Brazilian Democratic Movement Party, governing 
coalition; of Amapa) urges the USG to do more to counter 
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's increasingly destabilizing 
actions in the region.  Sarney said Chavez threatens to 
create a hotspot of regional conflict like the Balkans, and 
he reiterated that Chavez will seize Guyana's Essequibo 
region (ref B), and he hoped Brazil and the U.S. would step 
in and confront Chavez if he did anything extraterritorial. 
He expressed concern over an increasing flow of foreign arms 
into the region and urged the USG to pressure Russia to stop 
selling arms to Venezuela, emphasizing that this is not a 
U.S.-Venezuela problem, but a regional one.  The growing link 
between Venezuela and Iran is part of Chavez's plan to spread 
his destabilizing influence, Sarney said, but he considers it 
unlikely that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad will 
visit Brazil (ref A).  Sarney predicted the Brazilian Senate 
would not approve Venezuelan accession to Mercosul, and he 
recommended the U.S. and Brazil make positive gestures toward 
Bolivia.  Sarney belongs to a growing chorus of elites 
worried about destabilization from Caracas, but he supports 
President Lula's conflict-averse approach and, like many, 
looks to Washington to take the lead in countering Chavez. 
End summary. 
 
Chavez will destabilize a divided South America 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Jose Sarney, former president of Brazil, now an 
influential senator, told Ambassador on November 13 that 
Chavez "is a big danger for us and the U.S.," the USG should 
be more concerned about Chavez's destabilizing effects in the 
region, and the U.S. should engage more, and more visibly, 
throughout the region.  South America has changed from a 
continent of similar countries to a divided continent where 
Chavez exploits divisions, destabilizes states, and will 
replace the previous generations' peaceful legacy with a 
divisive and bellicose legacy, Sarney explained.  He believes 
Brazilian President Lula is aware of the dangers Chavez 
presents, and understands the concerns and needs of the 
Brazilian armed forces, but added that the Foreign Ministry 
is "infiltrated" with Chavez sympathizers.  Asked about the 
effort to revive the moribund Amazonian Parliament 
("Parlamaz," ref A), Sarney replied, "Chavez wants what 
serves him." 
 
Chavez will attack Guyana 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3.  (C)  Sarney repeated his firm conviction that "Chavez 
wants to do what all dictators do, start an external war," 
and will attack Guyana to seize the Essequibo region, claimed 
by Venezuela.  (Sarney previously expressed this view, ref 
B.)  (In a private conversation with the Ambassador a few 
days later, Defense Minister Nelson Jobim expressed a 
personal concern that if Chavez started to have domestic 
problems, he could decide to focus public attention on 
unresolved claims on Venezuela's borders.)  He hoped Brazil 
and the U.S. would step in and confront Chavez if he did 
anything extraterritorial.  While Brazil and the U.S. would 
be drawn into the conflict, Bolivarian Circles in Brazil (ref 
A) would support Chavez's Essequibo aggression, Sarney said, 
recalling that Brazil-Nicaragua friendship groups harvested 
coffee in Nicaragua during Daniel Ortega's first presidency. 
(Note: Brazilian media reported on November 17 that Guyana 
accused Venezuela of invading its territory with a military 
operation on November 15 against gold mining operations 
inside Guyana; Venezuela reportedly said the action was 
inside Venezuela.  End note.) 
 
Pressure Russia to stop arms sales 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Sarney said the USG must pressure Russia and 
others who sell arms in the region, even if it appears to be 
a futile effort, otherwise South America will have a Balkan 
 
BRASILIA 00002151  002 OF 002 
 
 
or Korean conflict on its soil.  Arms sales do not merely 
involve Venezuela, but will destabilize the whole region, and 
the USG should view it as such, Sarney said, emphasizing that 
this is not a U.S.-Venezuela problem, but a regional one.  He 
suggested there ought to be more arms embargoes for the 
region, and recalled how as president he helped ensure the 
imposition of an embargo on Chile at a tense time in 
Chilean-Argentine relations. 
 
Iran-Venezuela Ties 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Venezuela's growing relationship with Iran is but 
"a part of Chavez's plan" that includes fomenting 
anti-Americanism and replacing Fidel as the regional leftist 
leader, but Sarney said he did not think Ahmadinejad would 
come to Brazil, although he was to have come in September and 
canceled on short notice. (ref A). 
 
Venezuelan Mercosul Accession 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Sarney predicted Venezuelan accession to Mercosul 
will be defeated in the Brazilian Senate because everyone 
understands what Chavez is up to.  (Note:  The accession bill 
is in the Chamber of Deputies and has two more hurdles to 
pass before it reaches the Senate.  There is a growing chorus 
in both houses of Congress voicing deep concerns about 
Venezuelan behavior, and Senate approval is uncertain.  End 
note.) 
 
Bolivia 
- - - - 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  President Sarney told the Ambassador he has long 
believed that because of Bolivia's historical baggage over 
its loss of territory to Brazil, Paraguay, Chile and Peru, 
and now the historical baggage that Evo Morales expresses 
(the indigenous as oppressed and rightful owners of the 
land), Brazil and the U.S. would do well to make joint, 
positive gestures to Bolivia.  Bolivia is barely viable as a 
country and needs help, even concessions, from Brazil, Sarney 
said, in order to prevent Chavez from taking over management 
of Bolivia. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Comment.  Sarney's urging of more USG involvement in 
South America indicates he believes Brazil and her neighbors 
cannot by themselves overcome the problems Chavez is causing 
in the neighborhood.  The chorus of anti-Chavez warnings is 
growing, but prescriptions vary: while Sarney favors fewer 
arms in the region, another leading senator favors more arms 
to create a balance (ref A).  Sarney has publicly praised 
Lula's approach of avoiding interference in Venezuela's 
internal affairs and maintaining good ties with Chavez, while 
opposition politicians criticize Lula's approach as weak and 
fearful of conflict.  Although Chavez still has his 
supporters in Brazil -- Lula himself publicly defended 
Venezuelan democracy the day after the Ambassador's meeting 
with Sarney -- the mood is changing, and there is growing 
agreement among the political and foreign policy elites that 
Venezuela represents a threat to stability and that something 
must be done. Despite the growing pride here in Brazil's 
global and regional role, many nonetheless look to the U.S. 
to lead in countering Chavez; few seem to be considering the 
possibility that Brazil might take more public leadership on 
the issue. 
 
Sobel