VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #8068/01 3182211
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 142211Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0109
INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 9537
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ NOV 9054
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 5627
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 9988
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA PRIORITY 0817
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 6255
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 3518
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL PRIORITY 4170
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS BOGOTA 008068 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PHUM PTER NL SP CO
SUBJECT: GOC CONTINUES EFFORTS TO REESTABLISH STATE PRESENCE 
 
REF: 06 BOGOTA 10526 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (U) The GOC created the Centro de Coordinacion de Accion 
Integral (CCAI) to integrate military, police civilian 
programs into a single, coordinated effort to establish GOC 
penetration of key conflict areas. CCAI works to ensure 
civilian health, welfare, educational, and economic 
development programs quickly follow military efforts, helping 
to consolidate GOC control and state presence.  CCAI programs 
have suffered from interagency and personal rivalries, but 
interagency coordination is improving. In November 2007, CCAI 
launched an ambitious consolidation plan to establish 
civilian services in six municipalities in Meta, a historic 
FARC stronghold. The USG provided $13.5 million to support 
CCAI activities in FY 2007, and plans to continue funding 
CCAI activities in out years. Some human rights groups 
criticize CCAI for failing to involve local officials and 
civil society in its projects. END SUMMARY. 
 
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CCAI'S MANDATE 
-------------- 
 
¶2. (U) In 2004, the GOC created the Centro de Coordinacion de 
Accion Integral (CCAI), an interagency committee lead by 
Vice-Minister of Defense Sergio Jaramillo and Accion Social 
Director Luis Alfonso Hoyos, to promote short-term social and 
economic development in priority areas where Colombian 
security forces have established a security presence, but 
penetration by civilian institutions remains weak or 
nonexistent.  CCAI's creation reflected the GOC's recognition 
that a purely military response to the FARC and paramilitary 
threats was insufficient to solve the country's security 
problems.  Instead, GOC officials understood the GOC needed 
to complement the military effort with programs to establish 
a permanent police and government presence in newly secured 
areas.  CCAI focuses on the departments of Meta, Choco, 
Cesar, Magdalena, Antioquia, and Norte de Santander-- which 
are centers of FARC or other illegal armed group activity. 
 
¶3. (U) CCAI is located in the office of the presidency and 
includes representatives from approximately a dozen GOC 
ministries and agencies, including Defense, Interior and 
Justice, and Development. CCAI does not have its own budget, 
and relies on support, funding and personnel from other 
agencies and ministries. Still, CCAI has mobilized almost $85 
million in spending by GOC agencies and ministries in 2007. 
The GOC hopes to expand that amount to $100 million in 2008. 
The USG supports CCAI through USAID (technical assistance and 
training) and U.S. Military Group funding, which represents 
approximately 7 percent of the CCAI total budget. Spain and 
the Netherlands also support CCAI. 
 
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SECURITY CHALLENGES AND OBSTACLES 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (U) In 2002 approximately 30 percent of mayors in Colombia 
were forced to govern outside their mostly rural 
municipalities due to  a lack of security. By November, 2007, 
the GOC's military effort--supported by CCAI programs--has 
enabled almost all mayors to return to their municipalities. 
In particular, CCAI has reestablished state presence in six 
of the most insecure towns in Meta and Caqueta departments 
and enhanced GOC credibility and legitimacy. Still, security 
remains a serious concern in rural areas of the CCAI 
municipalities. The presence of the FARC and other armed 
groups and the high risk of attacks on GOC security services 
remain CCAI's main obstacle. Other concerns include a lack of 
political will in some local governments to work with CCAI, 
community sympathy for the FARC in some regions (Meta), and 
continued coca cultivation and drug trafficking. 
 
¶5. (U) CCAI has made significant advances in reducing 
interagency infighting and institutionalizing coordination 
mechanisms. Initial CCAI efforts suffered from interagency 
and personal squabbles over overall strategy, budgets, and 
personnel requirements, especially between the Ministry of 
Defense and civilian agencies. Moreover, in many areas the 
military remains far ahead of civilian agencies, raising 
concerns within the GOC, local communities, and human rights 
groups. Still, CCAI continues to develop ways to promote 
effective coordination and communication. 
 
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CONSOLIDATION PLAN 
------------------ 
 
¶6. (SBU) Vice Defense Minister Jarmillo spearheaded 
development of an ambitious plan to establish a permanent 
police and civilian presence in a former FARC stronghold in 
Meta Department. Major General Gilberto Rocha Ayala, military 
Chief of Joint Operations, told us the plan, know as the 
Consolidation Plan for Macarena, Meta Department (PCIM), 
focuses on six municipalities, including Uribe and Mesetas, 
which are central to the fight against the FARC. The PCIM 
calls for an integrated, interagency effort to regain state 
control, foster economic development, and support civil 
society. Due to region's importance as a coca cultivation 
center, the plan also lays out strategies to eradicate 
illegal crops, create legal industries, recover national 
parks and reserves, and establish a functioning judicial 
system. On November 8, the GOC released a draft presidential 
decree outlining the PCIM. 
 
¶7. (SBU) In the plan, CCAI will for the first time establish 
a joint civil-military fusion center, headed by a 
three-person team, with military, police and civilian 
representatives. The fusion center will be based in Vista 
Hermosa to coordinate the military, policing, development, 
and judicial aspects of the PCIM. The CCAI's effort in La 
Macarena and the establishment of the CCAI fusion cell in 
Vista Hermosa are intended to serve as a model for similar 
efforts in other regions, such as Narino and Bolivar (Montes 
de Maria). 
 
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CCAI'S DEPLOYMENT TO MACARENA 
----------------------------- 
 
¶8. (U) In early October, CCAI coordinated the return of 100 
police officers to the small town of La Julia in Uribe 
Municipality to re-establish security and begin to provide 
long-term public services. On October 8, Minister of Defense 
Juan Manuel Santos, Armed Forces Commander Freddy Padilla, 
National Police Commander Oscar Naranjo, and Emboffs traveled 
to La Julia to meet with local authorities ad show support 
for CCAI programs. Santos told the people of La Julia that 
the GOC was back, and that the time of FARC control in the 
region was over. Santos told us that a goal of the trip was 
to change local perceptions of the GOC and to delegitimize 
the FARC. The GOC is working to win over a local population 
that has had close ties to the FARC for decades.  Though the 
GOC does not fully control the region, it intends to use 
high-level visits and major public events, such as the return 
of police to La Julia, to convey the message that the GOC is 
committed to the region for the long-term. 
 
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USG FOCUS AND SUPPORT 
--------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) In support of CCAI programs, the USG is funding 
technical assistance, training, infrastructure and small 
community based projects in areas such as Meta, Choco and 
Antioquia. It also plans to expand its support to ongoing 
CCAI efforts in Bolivar (Montes de Maria). The USG provided 
USD 13.5 million in FY07 funds to CCAI through USAID's Office 
of Transition Initiatives ($8 million), USAID's Regional 
Governance Consolidation Program (RGCP) (USD 3.5 million) and 
the Milgroup (USD 2 million). USAID funds support small, 
high-impact community projects in Meta and plans to expand 
into Bolivar (Montes de Maria) in 2008. In mid-October, DoD 
approved USD 4 million in Section 1207 funds for USAID 
programs to support CCAI. USAID will soon add an alternative 
development component to the program in Meta.  Through the 
RGCP, USAID is also providing assistance to 26 CCAI-targetted 
municipalities with USD 3.5 million in FY07 and USD 16.5 
million over five years. The U.S Military Group is providing 
USD 2 million in FY07 funds to provide community centers, 
schools, and health clinics in CCAI areas. 
 
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WAY AHEAD 
--------- 
 
¶10. (U) In 2008, the majority of CCAI's effort will focus on 
La Macarena. Still, CCAI will also work to increase social 
investment to establish GOC credibility in targeted regions; 
strengthen CCAI's mandate over ministries and budgets; and to 
develop an inter-agency strategy for CCAI expansion.  In 
response to criticism from local and international human 
rights groups, CCAI plans to brief civil society on its 
programs, as well as its efforts to incorporate local 
officials into CCAI decision making.  Some human rights 
groups complain CCAI relies too much on the military to 
implement programs, strengthens national agencies at the 
expense of local officials, and fails to consult with civil 
society. 
 
Brownfield