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UNCLAS BERLIN 002141 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR T, ISN, EUR, WHA, EAP, SCA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM MNUC PREL ETTC KNNP JA GM
SUBJECT: G-8 NONPROLIFERATION DIRECTORS GROUP MEETING, 
BERLIN, NOVEMBER 27, 2007 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  ISN DAS Andrew Semmel visited Berlin 
November 27 to participate in the final G-8 Nonproliferation 
Directors Group Meeting (NPDG) of the German presidency. 
Delegates expressed disappointment with the lack of agreement 
on a work program at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and 
agreed to consider issuing a statement of support for the 
organization.  Notwithstanding the lack of consensus in the 
UN First Committee and related implications for future arms 
control and nonproliferation activities, most participants 
anticipated that the next NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) 
meeting would focus to a greater extent on substantive issues 
than the previous PrepCom.  Delegates showed considerable 
interest in the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement and 
made clear NSG approval would require PGs to decide on the 
basis of political, rather than technical, considerations. 
Participants described the current state of play of national 
and cooperative offers to provide multilateral nuclear fuel 
supply assurances.  Most participants said they would 
continue to oppose the USG-supported moratorium on transfers 
of sensitive nuclear technology.  Delegates were generally 
skeptical about the prospects for progress with Iran.  Most 
expressed satisfaction with efforts currently underway with 
the DPRK, but wondered how much the North Koreans would 
reveal in their declaration.  Germany reported on its efforts 
on behalf of the G-8 to promote universalization of the 
Additional Protocol and UNSCR 1540.  Japan outlined four foci 
for next year and said it would give nonproliferation a high 
priority during its G-8 presidency.  End Summary. 
 
Conference on Disarmament 
 
¶2. (SBU) Participants' assessments of the state of play in 
the CD were generally pessimistic.  All noted that only three 
states of the 65 CD members were disinclined to go along with 
the six presidents' program of work (L.1 and that Pakistan 
was the most recalcitrant.  France did not share the negative 
assessment of othrs and said that since Pakistan could not 
be coninced, L.1 supporters should devote greater energy to 
convincing China to accept negotiations on a fissile material 
cutoff treaty (FMCT).  Others countered that Pakistan, not 
China, was the problem.  The Russian delegate also wondered 
what Israel would do if it could no longer hide behind China, 
Pakistan, and Iran. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Japan, the incoming G-8 Chair for 2008, suggested a 
joint G-8 demarche in support of the L.1 program of work or 
FMCT negotiations.  France and Canada objected, however, on 
the grounds that a demarche from the G-8, which is perceived 
as a Western/Northern grouping, might be counterproductive. 
After further discussion, the group tentatively agreed to a 
U.S. suggestion that the G-8 express support for the CD in 
general.  Germany and Japan (as current and incoming chairs) 
will consult and circulate a draft that could be issued 
before the start of the 2008 CD session in late January. 
 
UN General Assembly First Committee 
 
¶4. (SBU) Participants agreed with the chair's assessment that 
the discussion at the First Committee (UNFC) revealed a lack 
of consensus on nonproliferation and disarmament issues and 
speculated that work at upcoming events, including the 2008 
NPT PrepCom, would be difficult.  The chair noted in 
particular the failure of efforts to introduce a resolution 
on the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile 
Proliferation (HCOC) and deplored the fact that Canada was 
not able to introduce an FMCT resolution.  He noted that it 
was not possible for a single nuclear resolution to win the 
support of all nuclear weapon states (NWS).  The U.S. and 
France stressed the need for NWS to continue efforts to 
enumerate and explain their disarmament achievements (Russia 
made the same point in the subsequent NPT discussion), but at 
the same time France thought it would be a big mistake to 
divert attention from the key problem of proliferation. 
 
Prospects for the NPT Review Process 
 
¶5. (SBU) In contrast to the UNFC discussion, speakers were 
positive about prospects for the 2008 NPT PrepCom meeting. 
Several (UK, Russia, Canada) urged a focus on all three 
 
pillars of the NPT - peaceful uses, as well as 
nonproliferation and disarmament.  States noted that several 
papers that had not been considered in 2007 because of 
procedural wrangling could provide the basis for discussion 
in 2008.  The EU Council said that the issue of a Middle East 
Nuclear Weapon Free Zone would play an important role in the 
PrepCom and said the EU Institute of Security Studies in 
Paris would organize a seminar on the subject in early 2008. 
Canada and the Chair agreed that nuclear weapon free zones 
would be a major issue. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The U.S. observed that parties at the 2007 PrepCom 
agreed on many issues and yet there was no agreed text 
because of the principle that "nothing is agreed until 
everything is agreed."  He wondered whether it might be 
possible in the future to formalize partial agreement.  The 
Chair was skeptical, expressing doubt about the possibility 
of getting away from a package deal. 
 
Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
 
¶7. (SBU) Delegates noted the "proliferation" of approaches to 
providing supply assurances and mentioned steps they were 
taking to move their own proposals forward. 
 
-- The German Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary Proposal has 
received support from the Bundestag.  The Max Planck 
Institute is drafting a model supply agreement.  To get the 
non-aligned (NAM) on board, Germany, the Netherlands, and the 
UK will hold a meeting with the NAM in February. 
 
-- The Russian proposal is aimed at providing fuel services. 
A deal has been worked out with Kazakhstan.  Another will 
soon be concluded with Armenia.  Russia is also negotiating 
with the IAEA on providing safeguards to its buffer stock. 
When an agreement is reached - not easy because the IAEA was 
unenthusiastic about spending resources on safeguards in a 
NWS - it would be presented to the IAEA Board of Governors 
(BOG). 
 
-- Japan emphasized the importance of comprehensive 
safeguards and the Additional Protocol as a condition of 
supply in any multilateral approach. 
 
-- The UK noted that PM Brown raised the "enrichment bond" 
proposal in a key foreign policy speech, showing the 
importance the UK attaches to the idea.  The British aim for 
a market-driven solution, but nonproliferation elements 
remain essential. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The moratorium on the transfer of sensitive 
technology, in particular enrichment and reprocessing 
technology, was also raised in this discussion.  Russia 
called attention to the attraction of a "latent deterrent," 
created by the possession of nuclear technology as a reason 
to elaborate an alternative to the possession of enrichment 
and reprocessing (ENR) technology.  Canada said it was not 
seeking a latent deterrent, but it had an industry to 
protect.  The Canadian delegate referred to PM Harper's June 
2007 letter to President Bush stating that Canada would not 
accept reference to a moratorium on ENR transfer in next 
year's G-8 Summit declaration.  Canada thinks a ban is 
ineffective and unfair, and does not address the "real 
problem" of illicit transfers.  The U.S. replied that U.S. 
and Canadian experts were consulting to see if a compromise 
could be worked out and noted further that the U.S. has begun 
downblending 17.4 MT of HEU to LEU for a nuclear fuel 
reserve.  France said that lack of G-8 consensus complicates 
the group's efforts to convince the Third World that the G-8 
is serious about guarantees. 
 
U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement 
 
¶9. (SBU) The U.S. briefed the group on the status of the 
deal, stressing the need to get it to U.S. Congress as soon 
as possible in an election year.  Among other points, the 
U.S. noted that several key decision points lay ahead, 
including India-IAEA negotiations on a safeguards agreement, 
a decision by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to grant an 
 
India exception to its guidelines, U.S. Congress approval, 
and the successful outcome of the political debate in India. 
Participants praised U.S. transparency in discussing this 
issue, raised numerous questions on sequencing and timing, 
and emphasized that a NSG decision to grant a one-time 
exception for India would likely require a political, rather 
than technical, decision by Participating Governments. 
Delegates also stressed the importance of allowing sufficient 
time for consultations within capitals in advance of a final 
NSG decision. 
 
Nuclear Suppliers Group Preparations 
 
¶10. (SBU) The Chair reported that preparations are on track 
for the meeting in Berlin on May 22-23, preceded by a 
Consultative Group meeting on May 19-22.  The primary item on 
the agenda will be the India agreement.  Russia said it was 
thinking of adding an item on "complying with the NSG's 
 confidentiality rule," with respect to denial of dual-use 
items in light of recent breaches of that rule. 
 
Iran 
 
¶11. (SBU) The group briefly discussed the upcoming 
Solana-Jalili meeting on November 30, which the Chair did not 
expect to be successful.  He thought that now was the time 
for a follow-on UN Security Council Resolution to UNSCR 1747. 
 Japan also favored a follow-on resolution.  Several members 
points to the sense of urgency and the need for maintaining 
coherence in the UN Security Council. 
 
DPRK 
 
¶12. (SBU) Japan welcomed the DPRK's actions to disable the 
Yongbyan facilities and reported that a Japanese expert had 
arrived that day to join the project in Pyongyang.  The U.S. 
also reported on its activities in the DPRK, noting that 
cooperation on disablement activity thus far has been good 
and that problems are being resolved, but it remains to be 
seen whether the DPRK will meet U.S. expectations by 
including its uranium program in its promised declaration. 
Russia argued that the positive developments in the DPRK 
showed that urgent issues could be solved with political will 
and diplomacy, not sanctions.  The French delegate later 
reminded the Russian delegate that UN sanctions had played an 
important role in convincing the DPRK to return and 
participate constructively in Six-Party Talks.  The Chair 
concluded that he was sure Japan would keep the issue on the 
agenda next year and noted the importance of keeping a focus 
on the DPRK to ensure that it "came clean." 
 
Universalization of the Additional Protocol and UNSCR 1540 
 
¶13. (SBU) The Chair circulated two papers reporting on 
demarches carried out on behalf of the G-8 regarding the 
Universalization of the Additional Protocol (AP) and UNSCR 
¶1540.  The results were positive on the Addition Protocol, as 
several additional countries, including Nigeria and 
Kazakhstan, had ratified.  Others, he noted, are close to 
completing ratification. 
 
¶14. (SBU) The Chair noted that much remains to be done on 
1540 implementation and that further consultations in New 
York are necessary.  He also reported that the EU had 
undertaken Joint Actions to promote universalization of the 
BWC, CWC, and CTBT and had made a special effort to promote 
the HCOC.  Russia reported that the AP is now in force for 
the Russian Federation.  Japan noted it would continue the 
effort in its G-8 presidency. 
 
Outlook for the Japanese Presidency 
 
¶15. (SBU) Japan outlined the overall priorities for its 2008 
G-8 Presidency: environment/climate change, development and 
Africa, the global economy, and political issues.  Japan 
reported that nonproliferation would be the major focus under 
political issues.  Within that framework Japan will focus the 
NPDG's work on regional issues, in particular the DPRK and 
Iran; the Global Partnership (GP), where they plan to 
 
emphasize expansion to other countries rather than extension 
beyond 2012 (Comment: Japan also seems to envisage giving the 
NPDG a greater supervisory role over the GP.); possible risks 
associated with peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and 
strengthening international nonproliferation efforts. 
 
¶16. (SBU) The Japanese plan to include nonproliferation in a 
planned 10-page (maximum) Summit declaration, rather than 
issuing a separate nonproliferation statement.  If all topics 
of importance cannot be addressed in the Summit declaration, 
Japan would consider the possibility of the NPDG itself 
issuing a statement that would be endorsed by Leaders.  The 
schedule of proposed NPDG meetings is: January 31, February 
28, March 27, April 24, and June 5 (all Thursdays).  At each 
meeting the group will decide if the next one is necessary. 
All meetings will take place in Tokyo, except the last, which 
Japan expects to hold in a provincial city. 
 
¶17. (SBU) Because of the press of time, the Global 
Partnership and Biological Weapons issues were not discussed. 
 
¶18. (U) Participation: 
 
Germany - Ruediger Luedeking (Chair) 
Japan - Takeshi Nakane 
Italy - Antonio Catalano di Melilli 
Canada - Mark Gwodecky 
France - Philippe Carre 
UK - Paul Arkwright 
U.S. - Andrew Semmel 
Russia - Oleg Rozhkov 
EU Council - Annalisa Giannella 
EU Commission - Bruno Dupre 
 
¶19. (U) DAS Semmel has cleared this cable. 
TIMKEN JR