VZCZCXRO4472
RR RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3728/01 3170850
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 130850Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4318
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003728 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINS IZ
SUBJECT:  DIYALA PRT: BRING BACK THE BA'ATHISTS? IT COULD WORK 
 
¶1. (U) This is a Diyala PRT reporting cable. 
 
Summary 
------- 
¶2.  (SBU) Summary:  Several senior provincial executives in Diyala 
Province, both Sunni and Shia, believe that controlled conditions 
allowing former Ba'ath party members to return to public life would 
accelerate the stalled reconciliation process and eliminate a major 
source of division in Iraqi politics. Despite differing backgrounds 
and perspectives, all government officials who discussed this were 
remarkably homogenous in their belief that Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA) Order #1 - De-Ba'athification of Iraqi Society - had 
effectively decapitated the public sector and was to blame for the 
largely dysfunctional technical administration in Diyala today. 
They proposed that former Ba'athists be allowed to return to public 
life once they are screened and vetted and are able to produce 
convincing evidence that they have no 'bloody hands."  End Summary. 
 
Similar Perspectives 
-------------------- 
¶3.  (SBU) PRTOffs interviewed four senior executives who work at the 
Governance Center (GC) on their general views regarding 
De-Ba'athification.  The officials interviewed asked to remain 
anonymous.  For background purposes, three are elected officials, 
one is an appointee, two are Sunni, and two are Shia.  All were 
interviewed individually and encouraged to provide their most frank 
assessment on several topics.  Their responses to the various 
interview topics were remarkably similar.  Interview topics included 
the Ba'ath party under Saddam, the future of a Ba'ath party, CPA 
Order Number 1, and De-Ba'athification.  Each respondent provided 
multiple anecdotes to support their viewpoints. 
 
The Ba'ath Party Under Saddam And The Future 
-------------------------------------------- 
¶4.  (SBU) All respondents indicated that the Ba'ath Party under 
Saddam Hussein was Ba'athist in name only, and had been merely 
created to champion Saddam's priorities and tighten Saddam's grip on 
power.  Party membership and some degree of participation were 
critical to achieving upward mobility in society.  Advancement 
within the party was largely limited to Sunni members of specific 
tribes.  Refusal to join the party guaranteed downward mobility or 
worse.  All those interviewed said they were discriminated against 
as a result of not joining the party, and one indicated he had been 
denied an opportunity for advanced education because he was not a 
Ba'athist, despite being in the top five percent of his class.  He 
added that Ba'athist students with lower qualifications were allowed 
to attend advanced schooling, solely based on party affiliation. 
All agreed that the Ba'ath party under Saddam had no relation to the 
ideology of the original Ba'athist Pan-Arab, secular ideology that 
still exists in other Arab countries.  Respondents were ambivalent 
about the formation of a Ba'ath party in Iraq today provided it 
maintained no ideological relationship with Saddam.  One explained 
that a new Ba'ath party, if formed, would be dead on arrival based 
on name association alone. 
 
CPA Order Number 1 
------------------ 
¶5.  (SBU) Each government official maintained that CPA Order Number 
1 was a disaster that continues to impact Iraq four years later. 
The order, which was implemented in May 2003, removed all Iraqis 
with Ba'athist affiliation from public life and government 
employment.  Each official described the order as decapitating the 
nation and as Iraq's greatest tragedy.  One official said that 
removing three layers of officials from government ministries and 
local offices inevitably left the least educated and qualified to 
fill official positions.  Another senior official asked rhetorically 
whether there was any other result that could have come from 
removing the head, his deputy, the deputy, the deputy's assistant, 
and the senior administrative staff from every single office 
requiring technical expertise.  The officials made clear that they 
were speaking exclusively of Ba'athists with no involvement in 
criminal activities, but had achieved a degree of personal education 
and competence by virtue of their membership in the Ba'ath party.  A 
senior official in the provincial government told PRTOffs that it 
was widely acknowledged in Diyala that most, if not all, of the 
individuals appointed by the central government to be Directors 
General (DG) of various ministries are incompetent and are directly 
responsible for the current dysfunctional provincial government. 
 
De-Ba'athification - The Time Has Come 
-------------------------------------- 
¶6.  (SBU) We asked the government officials if and under what 
conditions they thought individual Ba'athists could return to public 
life or be rehabilitated. The responses were striking in their 
uniformity.  All suggested that if individuals' records were 
examined and it was determined they had committed no serious 
criminal actions, they should be allowed to return to public life. 
A phrase we heard repeatedly was the need to ensure the former 
Ba'athists had no "bloody hands".  The government officials stressed 
that from a humanitarian view, screening and vetting former 
Ba'athists makes sense.  Additionally, they also strongly argued 
that excluding Ba'athists, as is current policy, does nothing to 
 
BAGHDAD 00003728  002 OF 002 
 
 
mitigate Ba'athist influence in society. They said it merely 
relegates former Ba'athists to sponsoring sub-rosa activities, 
frequently from outside the country, in an attempt to return to some 
form of political participation. 
 
Return To Society, Not Return To Power 
-------------------------------------- 
¶7.  (SBU) One executive felt that a return of the best educated, 
most experienced administrators would greatly enhance the ongoing 
reconciliation process, not as individuals coming into the ranks of 
power, but as skilled facilitators of an improved quality of life 
work for the average person.  Diyala executives feel that the 
average citizen longs for a technical level of leadership that can 
take care of business and has less concern for the ideological, 
religious, or other divisive issues that prevent the delivery of 
essential services. 
 
Comment 
------- 
¶8.  (U) In Diyala, it seems clear rehabilitating Ba'athists and 
getting the province back in working order is a prime consideration 
of the leadership.  Despite the fact that none of these executives 
would have risen to their current positions had Ba'athists been 
participating in the government process, it is remarkable that they 
speak with one voice, Sunni and Shia, when they say that they feel 
the time is right to screen, vet, and restore to public life those 
former Ba'athists with no blood on their hands. End Comment. 
 
CROCKER