VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAK #2848/01 3321554
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 281554Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4466

UNCLAS ANKARA 002848 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR S/CT KEN MCKUNE, NCTC AND DHS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KVPR PTER PREL PGOV PINR CVIS ASEC KHLS TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON 
INFORMATION COLLECTION, SCREENING AND SHARING 
 
REF: STATE 133921 
 
¶1. (U)  This cable is sensitive but unclassified.  Please 
handle accordingly.  Post responses are keyed to reftel 
questions. 
 
¶2. (U) A. Watchlisting (see para 10, below) 
 
¶3. (U) B. Traveler Information Collection. 
-- Who collects traveler information?  Turkish National 
Police (TNP) Foreigners Police maintains a machine-readable 
computer system in order to collect data on entry and exits 
of travelers with machine-readable passports (MRP) and 
maintains a database on entry and exit of travelers with 
non-MRPs, which includes Turkish citizens. 
 
¶4. (U) C. Border Control and Screening. 
-- Does the host government employ software to screen 
travelers of security interest?  The Turkish National Police 
has a computerized database that is used to screen travelers, 
but we do not know how TNP uses this system or what sources 
they use to feed intelligence into this system. 
-- Are all travelers tracked electronically, or only 
non-host-country nationals?  What is the frequency of 
travelers being "waived through" because they hold up what 
appears to be an appropriate document, but whose information 
is not actually recorded electronically?  What is the 
estimated percentage of non-recorded crossings, entries and 
exits?  All travelers, both inbound and outbound, regardless 
or national origin, to include Turkish citizens, are tracked 
electronically at all points of entry.  We believe "waived 
through" seldom occurs at Turkish border Points of Entry. 
The TNP checks all individuals' identification information 
for validity, including entry visas, and compares traveler 
information against TNP's database. An estimate of 
non-reported border crossings is unknown at this time, but 
the Turkish Security Directorate has informed the UNHCR and 
the IOM that approximately 100,000 persons per year 
enter/exit Turkey illegally by land and sea. 
-- Do host government border control officials have the 
authority to use other criminal data when making decisions on 
who can enter the country? If so, please describe this 
authority (legislation, mandates, etc).  Unknown at this 
time.  The EU is working with Turkey on a "Twinning Project" 
to train and equip border police, which includes enhancing 
infrastructure and automated equipment and is working closely 
with them to upgrade border controls.  The Twinning Project's 
primary aim is to form a constituting basis for the financial 
contribution of the EU for the necessary legal and 
institutional reforms, training activities, infrastructure 
and equipment for integrated border management. 
-- What are the host government's policies on questioning, 
detaining and denying entry to individuals presenting 
themselves at a point of entry into the country?  Which 
agency would question, detain, or deny entry?  The Border 
Police officers make the decision to accept or deny entry to 
any individual based on the validity of their entry documents 
and information contained in the Turkish database.  The TNP, 
Ministry of the Interior and the Department of Foreigners, 
Border, and Asylum work together on acceptance or denial of 
entry, depending on the nature of each case. 
-- How well does information sharing function within the host 
government, e.g., if there is a determination that someone 
with a valid host-government visa is later identified with 
terrorism, how is this communicated and resolved internally? 
Unknown at this time. 
 
¶5. (U) D. Biometric Collection. (see para 11, below) 
 
¶6. (U) E. Passports. 
-- If the host government issues a machine-readable passport 
containing biometric information, does the host government 
share the public key required to read the biometric 
information with any other governments?  If so, which 
governments?   Turkey does not issue machine-readable 
passports.  The TNP, however, does use a computer system that 
can collect data from machine-readable passports.  For the 
past three years, the GOT has announced plans to issue 
machine-readable passports, but they have not begun to issue 
these passports.  Most recently, on 15 November 2007, the 
Turkish MOI announced it will issue in 2008 E-passports that 
operate with an electronic chip and that have pages with 
figures and pictures that can be seen only under UV light, a 
measure to reduce use of fraudulent passports. 
-- Does the host government issue replacement passports for 
full or limited validity (e.g. the time remaining on the 
original passports, fixed validity for a replacement, etc.)? 
The GOT only issues normal passports.  Turkish citizens 
purchase the period of time they want to have a passport, up 
to five years.  This will be increased to ten years for full 
validity when the GOT issues the new machine-readable 
 
passports.  GOT does not issue limited-validity passports, 
but a Turkish citizen may opt to request a one-year passport, 
which is extendable for additional years, up to five years, 
upon request and payment. 
-- Does the host government have special 
regulations/procedures for dealing with "habitual" losers of 
passports or bearers who have reported their passports stolen 
multiple times?  We do not know if Turkey has special 
procedures for dealing with habitual losers of passports. 
-- Are replacement passports of the same or different 
appearance and page length as regular passports (do they have 
something along the lines of our emergency partial duration 
passports)?  There are no emergency partial duration 
passports. 
-- Do emergency replacement passports contain the same or 
fewer biometric fields as regular-issue passports?  No, the 
same amount of fields as the normal blue passport book 
because the GOT does not issue emergency replacement 
passports. 
-- Where applicable, has Post noticed any increase in the 
number of replacement or "clean" (i.e. no evidence of prior 
travel) passports used to apply for U.S. visas?  No. The GOT 
issues red passports to diplomats; official green passports 
to certain GOT employees and other family members with 
certain restrictions.  Since the government pays for these 
passports, they are often lightly used.  In the case of 
regular blue Turkish passports, however, it is up to the 
individual how often he wants to replace it, up to the 
maximum validity.  Since the fees are very high for Turkish 
blue passports, with a fee based on a yearly rate, passports 
are extended only when the individual intends to travel.  In 
the past three years, post has perceived no change in the 
number of "clean" passports.  Also, many visa applicants 
bring their cancelled passports with them to the visa 
interview to show the record of previous travel. 
--  Are replacement passports assigned a characteristic 
number series or otherwise identified?  No. 
 
¶7. (U) F. Fraud Detection. 
-- How robust is fraud detection and how actively are 
instances of fraud involving documents followed up?  Post 
believes that Turkey has robust fraud detection measures in 
place, and the U.S. Consular Section in Embassy Ankara has 
coordinated numerous anti-fraud training exchanges with the 
GOT.  The TNP maintains a Document Forensic Unit which uses 
modern technology to inspect documents.  The GOT has a 
history of detaining not just Turkish nationals that it 
believes are traveling on fraudulent documents, but has 
detained other nationals, including U.S. citizens, believed 
to be traveling on fraudulent documents.  As recently as 
April 2007, the Consular Section coordinated an exchange and 
training visit of DHS officials to meet with their 
counterparts in the TNP.  In addition, in 2006, the U.S. 
Consular staff - American and locally engaged staff - visited 
the headquarters of the TNP Document Forensic Unit to 
exchange views on trends in fraud detection. 
-- How are potentially fraudulently issued documents taken 
out of circulation, or made harder to use? Unknown. 
 
¶8. (U) G. Privacy and Data Security. 
--  What are the country's policies on records related to the 
questioning, detention or removal of individuals encountered 
at points of entry into the country? How are those records 
stored, and for how long?  Records of people questioned and 
detained upon arrival in Turkey are filed in hardcopy for a 
minimum of five years.  Terrorist suspects' files are 
maintained for longer (NFI). 
-- What are the country's restrictions on the collection or 
use of sensitive data?  There is no comprehensive privacy and 
data security regime in Turkey.  The Turkish-US legal 
assistance treaty would govern US access to collected 
information.  Wiretaps require a warrant from the courts; 
however, in addition, wiretaps are frequently done by 
circumventing the courts.  There are legal prohibitions 
against profiting from the exploitation of personal data and 
against revealing confidential information.  The relatively 
new Turkish Republic Identity (T.C. Kimlik) database 
maintains a record on every citizen, including a national 
identity/tax number; it is publicly accessible via the 
internet (see below).  Civil servants are required to submit 
a confidential Financial Disclosure form every five years to 
their agency's personnel department.  The country's top 100 
taxpayers are publicized in the media each year, but it is 
unlikely that such information is accessible on anyone. 
Medical records are confidential. 
-- What are the requirements to provide notice to the public 
on the implementation of new databases of records?   We are 
unaware of formal public notification requirements; however, 
the public is well-informed about some databases relevant and 
in use by the public.  It is unlikely that government 
agencies would disclose information about databases to which 
 
the public does not have access. 
-- Are there any laws relating to security features for 
government computer systems that hold personally identifying 
information?  We are unaware of laws related to computer 
security features.  Every government agency has an IT 
department responsible for safeguarding and updating 
protection tools, with varying levels of success. 
-- What are the rules on an individual's ability to access 
data that homeland security agencies hold about them?  Every 
individual may petition any agency to release information 
under the Law on Access to and Evaluation of Information 
(2003).  Should the agency refuse to disclose the 
information, the individual may appeal to an oversight board 
of 11 (Committee on Access to and Evaluation of Information). 
 Court cases are in principle open to citizens, and 
individuals may obtain information on the records, but the 
lack of centralization and the suspicion on the part of court 
recordkeepers make access cumbersome. 
--  Are there different rules for raw data (name, date of 
birth, etc.) versus case files (for example, records about 
enforcement actions)?  The rules are agency- or 
database-dependent.  Raw data on personal information is 
confirmable on the publicly available website 
tckimlik.nvi.gov.tr; access to information requires name, 
date of birth, father's name, mother's name, province and 
county.  Records on enforcement actions are obtainable by the 
citizen in question who may present his identity card and 
obtain his own legal record (these are routinely included in 
job applications).  The Registry of Deeds is technically 
available to the public, but there are some obstacles, such 
as the fact that access can depend on developing personal 
relationships with the people working there. 
--  Does a non-citizen/resident have the right to sue the 
government to obtain these types of data?  A non-citizen 
would have the same right to petition (and appeal) for 
information under the Law on Access to and Evaluation on 
Information.  Non-citizens may use the courts in the host 
country, but should be aware of bias of the court system in 
favor of the state. 
 
¶9. (U) H. Immigration Data Bases. 
-- What computerized immigration databases are used to track 
entries and exits?  The TNP Passport Control Branch keeps a 
record of all entries and exits of Turkish citizens and 
visitors through all ports of entry, including land, sea and 
airports. 
-- Is the immigration database available at all ports of 
entry (POEs)?  Collection is done at all ports of entry, 
including seaports, land border crossings and airports. 
-- If immigration databases are available at some POEs, but 
not all, how does the host government decide which POEs will 
receive the tool?  All POEs collect data.  Data on visitors 
is also collected by hotel staff when visitors check into 
hotels in Turkey. 
-- What problems, if any, limit the effectiveness of the 
systems?  For example, limited training, power brownouts, 
budgetary restraints, corruption, etc.?  Unknown, but all of 
the problems listed above probably impact the collection 
system.  The entry/exit data record is held for ten years 
only.  When Turkish visa applicants are asked by a Consular 
officer to provide a record of exits and re-entries to 
Turkey, the TNP Passport Control Officer provides that record 
to the applicant in one day. 
-- How often are national immigration databases updated? 
Records are maintained for 10 years.  Please note that each 
refugee or asylum seeker is registered by the Foreigners and 
Border Police.  They keep an open record on refugees and 
asylum seekers until such time as they depart Turkey. 
 
¶10. (U) I. Watchlist and Information Sharing. 
--  Is there a name-based watchlist system used to screen 
travelers at POEs?  Both the TNP and Turkish customs have 
name-based lists used to screen travelers. 
--  What domestic sources of information populate the 
name-based watchlist, i.e. names of deported persons, 
terrorist lookouts, criminal wants/warrants?  Not known at 
this time. 
--  What international watchlists do the host government use 
for screening individuals, e.g. Interpol or TSA No Fly lists, 
UN, etc.?  The only international watchlist currently known 
to be used by the host government is the TSA No Fly list. 
Private security companies at Istanbul's Ataturk Airport also 
have access to this list.  The FBI recently offered the TNP 
an MOU which would allow for the sharing of watchlisting 
databases and give the TNP access to the Terrorist Screening 
Center's (TSC) Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB). 
-- What bilateral/multilateral watchlist agreements exist 
between host government and its neighbors?  No known 
bilateral/multilateral watchlist agreements exist between 
Turkey and its neighbors, although Legatt has been advised by 
TNP contacts that Turkey is attempting to coordinate such 
 
regional cooperation which would include sharing of 
watchlisting databases. 
 
¶11. (SBU) J. Biometrics.  The GOT does not currently collect 
biometrics information from travellers.  The TNP maintains a 
biometric database, which it is trying to expand.  In April, 
2007, the FBI proposed a biometrics sharing agreement with 
the TNP that would allow direct access to the FBI database 
for known or suspected terrorists.  The FBI is waiting for a 
reply. 
 
¶12. (SBU) K. Identifying Appropriate Partners.  Turkey would 
be an appropriate and valuable partner in data sharing; FBI 
is already pursuing data sharing arrangements through the 
Terrorist Screening Center.  As a NATO ally with a 
long-standing indigenous terrorist problem, Turkey is already 
experienced both in dealing cooperatively with us and in 
combating terrorism.  As an international terrorist transit 
country and the site of major al-Qaeda attacks in 2003, 
Turkey is also a rich source of information on the fight 
against terror.  At the same time, differences of definition 
and priorities may complicate a data sharing relationship. 
Internal sharing may also be a problem. 
-- Are there political realities which would preclude a 
country from entering into a formal data-sharing agreement 
with the U.S? No. 
-- Is the host country's legal system sufficiently developed 
to adequately provide safeguards for the protection and 
nondisclosure of information?  Yes. 
-- How much information sharing does the host country do 
internally?  Is there a single consolidated database, for 
example?  If not, do different ministries share information 
amongst themselves?  Information sharing across agencies can 
be a problem.  There is no single consolidated database. 
Institutional rivalries, particularly among the police and 
intelligence service, can complicate information sharing and 
bilateral cooperation. 
-- How does the country define terrorism?  Are there legal 
statutes that do so?  Terrorism is defined in the Anti-Terror 
Law #3713 (TMK, 1991).  "Terrorism" is any kind of criminal 
act done by one or more persons belonging to an organization 
with the aim of changing the characteristics of the Republic 
as specified in the Constitution, its political, legal, 
social, secular and economic system, damaging the individual 
unity of its State with its territory and nation, endangering 
the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, weakening or 
destroying or seizing the authority of the State, eliminating 
fundamental rights and freedoms, or damaging the internal or 
external security of the State, public order or general 
health using force and violence and by means of pressure, 
terror, intimidation, oppression or threat."  Thus, the 
definition of terrorism in Turkey is both too broad and too 
narrow, per US interests.  It is too broad in that it 
characterizes many non-terrorist conducts as terror; it is 
too narrow in that only actions that damage Turkey's own 
national interest are included.  Therefore, it may be 
difficult to bring about action against internationally 
recognized terrorist groups that do not pursue terrorist 
goals within Turkey.  In addition, Turkey's definition 
results in a narrow terrorism finance definition, leaving out 
fundraising by international terrorist groups that do not 
target the state of Turkey (such as Hamas). 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ 
 
WILSON