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Viewing cable 07AITTAIPEI2436, MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07AITTAIPEI2436 2007-11-02 10:42 2011-08-23 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
VZCZCXYZ0004
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #2436 3061042
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 021042Z NOV 07
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7286
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 7411
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 8696
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 002436 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS 
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: U.S.-CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS 
 
Summary:  Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused news 
coverage November 2 on the recent fuel price hikes on the island; on 
former KMT Chairman Lien Chan's outcry Thursday against the KMT's 
elimination of the wording of "cross-Strait consensus of 1992" from 
its party document laying out next year's central platform; and on 
the UN referendum.  In terms of editorials and commentaries, an 
op-ed piece in the pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" 
called on Taiwan to be vigilant of the possibility that China may 
use its arms sales as a tool to threaten the United States' arms 
sales to Taiwan.  A separate op-ed by Richard Halloran, a writer 
based in Hawaii, suggested that the Bush administration fashion a 
cross-Strait policy of strategic clarity and tactical ambiguity and 
"dump the 'one China' policy in favor of asserting that the ultimate 
resolution of the Taiwan question would be governed by the principle 
of self-determination."  End summary. 
 
A) "China's Arms Sales May Press US" 
 
Cheng Ta-chen, an independent defense analyst in Taipei, opined in 
the pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
30,000] (11/2): 
 
"... Figures published by the US Congressional Research Service show 
that China has sold ammunition, especially missiles, to developing 
countries for an average amount of US$1.3 billion per year in the 
past few years.  This is the fifth-largest amount in the world. 
Compared with the arms sales of countries like the US and Russia, it 
is still only a small amount -- less than one-eighth of US arms 
sales to developing countries. But because some of the countries 
that buy arms from China are countries that the US regards as "rogue 
states" -- such as Iran and North Korea -- the US is still worried 
about it. 
 
"Given these circumstances, it is possible that China will use its 
arms sales as a tool to threaten the US' international arms sales. 
In the past, China has always protested the US policy of selling 
weapons to Taiwan, but to its regret it has had no means to 
effectively respond to or counter it.  But now the situation has 
changed. With the improved quality of Chinese arms and the expansion 
of its international arms sales, if the incentive is big enough, the 
US government might decide to abandon the sale of certain kinds of 
arms to Taiwan if that is a condition China sets.  If that happens, 
the difficult situation Taiwan faces with regard to its national 
security and modernization could become even more precarious because 
of this new form of arms sales-related pressure that China may be 
exercising over the US. This could also result in further 
complications in relations between Taiwan and the US.  The Taiwanese 
public must be vigilant." 
 
B) "Trade the Ambiguity for a Clear US Policy" 
 
Richard Halloran, a writer based in Hawaii, opined in the 
pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation: 
30,000] (11/2): 
 
"... Although the debate over the "one China" policy among Chinese, 
Taiwanese and various US factions sometimes takes on theological 
overtones worthy of Jesuit or Talmudic scholars, it is a serious 
issue in which one misstep could lead to war. 
Adding to the confusion has been the US policy of 'strategic 
ambiguity.' It is intended to keep the Chinese and Taiwanese 
guessing as to what the US would do if China attacked Taiwan. 
Unhappily, strategic ambiguity has confused both of them, the US 
people and just about everyone else. 
 
"In sum, the 'one China' policy and 'strategic ambiguity' have made 
an inherently unstable confrontation across the Taiwan Strait all 
the more susceptible to miscalculation, which down through history 
has been the greatest cause of war.  Perhaps it is time for the 
administration of US President George W. Bush to fashion a policy 
of: (a) strategic clarity, in which the US would set out explicitly 
its objectives in the confrontation between China and Taiwan; (b) 
tactical ambiguity, in which the US would declare that it would 
respond to threats to the peace in a political, economic and 
military manner of its own choosing and timing. 
 
"The US would dump the 'one China' policy in favor of asserting that 
the ultimate resolution of the Taiwan question would be governed by 
the honored principle of self-determination.  The new policy would 
insist that the Taiwanese be allowed to decide on the nation's 
status.  They would also be entitled to determine when they would 
decide. The people of Taiwan would be permitted to tell China, the 
US and everyone else to leave them alone. ..." 
 
YOUNG