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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDS #3334/01 3191415
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 151415Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8565
INFO RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA 2008
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 8806
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 3245
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 3004
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 4062
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2937
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 6295
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7127
RUEHC/DEPT OF INTERIOR WASHDC
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHDC
RHMFIUU/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ2/CCJ5/CCJS//
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

UNCLAS ADDIS ABABA 003334 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, DAS AF JSWAN, AF/E, AF/PDPA, OES, 
A/S PRM SAUERBREY, AND PRM/AFR 
AFR/AA KALMQUIST, WWARREN, JBORNS, KNELSON, CTHOMPSON 
DCHA/AA MHESS, GGOTTLIEB 
DCHA/OFDA KLUU, ACONVERY, CCHAN, PMORRIS, KCHANNELL 
DCHA/FFP JDWORKEN, PMOHAN, SANTHONY, PBERTOLIN 
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD 
USDA/FAS FOR U/S PENN, RTILSWORTH, AND LPANASUK 
NAIROBI FOR OFDA/ECARO JMYER, GPLATT, RFFPO NCOX, USAID/EA 
ROME FOR AMBASSADOR, OHA, HSPANOS 
BRUSSELS FOR USEU PBROWN 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH, RMA 
 
USUN FOR TMALY 
NSC FOR PMARCHAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PHUM SENV EAGR PGOV ET
SUBJECT: USAID FIELD ASSESSMENT IN THE OGADEN 
 
REF:  A) ADDIS ABABA 3046; B) ADDIS ABABA 2566; C) ADDIS ABABA 3200; 
 
D) ADDIS ABABA 3254 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: A small USAID team traveled to conflict-affected 
areas of the Ogaden November 4-8, 2007 to try to obtain some ground 
truth on humanitarian, conflict and commercial trade conditions. 
Following the field assessment, USAID confirms the situation to be 
very serious and a continued cause for alarm on the humanitarian and 
human rights front, despite recent movement on trade and access 
following international and media pressure.  The USAID team traveled 
to Jijiga, Hartesheik, Kebribeyah, and Degehabur, interviewing over 
30 people.  Although the flow of commercial goods has begun to 
trickle back into Degehabur town and other urban areas over the last 
week, field investigations uncovered mainly superficial changes as 
residents report limited commercial food in rural areas and urban 
areas south and east of Degehabur town, ongoing intimidation tactics 
by the ENDF, commandeering of commercial goods by the military, 
minimal livestock trade, and restricted movement.  The UN recently 
opened field offices in Degehabur and Kebridehar, but humanitarian 
access on the ground remains highly restrictive and limited to urban 
areas despite increased negotiation between GoE and UN officials 
over operational modalities. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Major findings from the field include: a) widespread 
pervasive fear persists for personal security by the civilian 
population including fear of retribution; b) access to commercial 
food remains limited either due to minimal availability in rural 
areas or increasingly limited economic means to purchase food in 
urban areas; c) pockets of famine already exist with deteriorating 
health and nutrition conditions with excess mortality a certainty 
during the upcoming long dry jilaal season; d) GoE line ministry 
civil servants are increasingly being pressed into military service 
which will also affect humanitarian services; e) alarming human 
rights abuses continue; and f) the nature of the conflict has 
shifted recently with  increased fighting anticipated in the coming 
months. Based on these field observations, the need for intensified 
international pressure is essential to minimize the impact of the 
crisis on civilians.  End summary. 
 
USAID TEAM TRAVELS TO THE OGADEN 
-------------------------------- 
¶3. (SBU) The two-person assessment team represented the first USAID 
road travel within the Ogaden in more than three years due to 
ongoing security concerns.  The USAID team traveled with an 
international partner NGO to Degehabur without military escorts. 
Despite the low profile, most people were terrified to talk with any 
international organization following threats and promised 
retribution by the military.  Through discreet individual interviews 
with a range of people, the team learned of continued repercussions 
stemming from the recent UN assessment.  This included the 
re-arrests and disappearance of some villagers who had spoken openly 
with the UN assessment team. 
 
¶4. (SBU) In nearly all interviews with civilian populations, the 
USAID team encountered a pervasive fear for individual safety and 
security.  Many expressed a frustration at being caught between the 
ENDF and ONLF and increased concerns over the continued presence of 
landmines.  International agencies underscored the constant 
harassment of their local staff by regional government and security 
officials about staff, programs, intent and indicated local NGOs are 
often more harassed. In meetings in Degehabur and Jijiga, government 
officials advised the USAID team that they were not aware of 
challenges faced by the NGOs and that there was no problem for 
travel and access. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Note: Despite receiving verbal approval from senior 
government and security officials for Ogaden travel, local staff of 
the U.S. NGO accompanying the USAID team were told by local 
officials that the team was in Degehabur illegally and admonished 
the NGO staff to take the foreigners back to Jijiga.  Local 
officials later harassed and threatened the NGO as to the intent of 
the mission. The USAID team met with the Head of the Pastoral 
Development Bureau who is also the new humanitarian coordination 
focal point and with the Somali Region President to advise them of 
the nature of the monitoring and humanitarian assessment trip. 
Although the situation seemed to be defused, USAID will closely 
monitor the status of the NGO staff to ensure no further fallout 
will occur following the visit.  End note. 
 
FOOD SECURITY AND ACCESS TO COMMERCIAL FOOD 
------------------------------------------- 
¶6. (SBU) The food security situation will continue to worsen 
progressively if commercial and livestock restrictions are not 
immediately improved in the areas of military operations. While 
there has been some movement on trade and commercial food to major 
urban areas over the last week between Jijiga and Degehabur, 
tangible improvements remain elusive for vulnerable households. 
Livestock trade remains highly disrupted, commercial food does not 
appear to be reaching the large majority outside of urban areas, 
commercial food is often commandeered by the ENDF, food aid is 
diverted primarily by the ENDF, and the overwhelming climate of fear 
prevails.  GoE action continues to be construed as a policy of 
collective punishment against Ogadeni clans and during interviews 
informants indicated to the USAID team that the form of collective 
punishment is starving the population.  In spite of the risks, some 
brave small scale traders or desperate villagers are attempting to 
transport food from towns to rural areas via donkey or on human 
backs.  Locals interviewed by Mission personnel report that if 
people are caught by the military or militia transporting food to 
rural areas, the food and animal are confiscated, and occasionally 
the person shot (ref D). 
 
¶7. (SBU) Over the last week, commercial goods seem to be moving to 
Degehabur town more easily with military escort.  Limited commercial 
deliveries of food are reportedly coming via Togwachale, 
Hartesheikh, and Aware.  However, movement of food to the vast 
majority of the population off the main road and in remote villages 
remains highly restricted.  Commercial traders explained that all 
trucks must pay for military escort.  Initially many trucks were 
bottlenecked in Kebribebaya until traders understood that 
arrangements had to be made with the military, usually requiring 
large cash payments to obtain permits for access between Jijiga and 
Kebribebaya, and onwards. [Note: Ref D describes payments up to 
1,500 birr/USD 165 needed for military escorts.  End note.]  Traders 
indicated that up to 70 percent of all commercial trucks are being 
commandeered by the ENDF for military purposes, and many truck 
owners are attempting to hide themselves from the military.  Truck 
drivers also expressed fear over routes they were being ordered to 
take by the ENDF.  In two separate examples this year, truck drivers 
were ordered to drive on a specific rural road; both incidents 
resulted in landmine explosions.  Where there are no military 
operations, Somaliland traders can reportedly still enter and the 
 
ONLF leaves them alone.  Traders also noted that the highland trucks 
allowed into the Ogaden in September/October due to special 
arrangements were no longer present since people began boycotting 
purchase of goods from the Tigrayan traders. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Commercial access is still fairly restricted south and east 
of Degehabur; however, the recent increase in food availability in 
urban areas is leading to a decrease in the prices of cereals in 
urban locations like Degehabur.  The team verified that prices of 
sugar, rice, sorghum and oil appear to be stabilizing (In August, 
the price of food in local markets doubled compared to pre-conflict 
prices; prices are now approximately 20 percent higher than 
pre-conflict prices).  These reflect market prices only in Degehabur 
town, as traders and agencies operating further south in Kebridehar 
and indicated prices there are double or even triple the 
pre-conflict amounts.  In addition, some traders cited specific 
examples when the ENDF had taken truckloads of commercial food prior 
to Ramadan and warned the traders that they were not to speak of it 
to anyone or face serious consequences.  In some cases, payment was 
promised, however only one businesswoman indicated that the ENDF 
returned three bags of rice from her original truckload as payment 
for goods taken.  Traders also stated that humanitarian food aid is 
now referred to as "operational food" by the military. 
 
¶9. (SBU) During interviews, traders, women, and civil servants 
advised the USAID team that the recent food availability and lower 
prices in Degehabur town will have minimal impact on poor 
populations until households can access cash through livestock 
sales.  Shop owners complained in town that it does no good to have 
foodstuffs since there are so few customers.  Pastoralist 
livelihoods are completely dependent upon selling livestock to 
purchase food grains.  Livestock prices remain at half of their 
pre-conflict value in Degehabur and likely worse in more remote 
areas.  This deterioration in the terms of trade has seriously 
impacted already-depleted coping mechanisms and livelihoods.  In the 
absence of trade, food aid alone will not have a significant impact 
on the affected population due to diversions. 
 
ACCESS TO HUMANITARIAN FOOD AID 
------------------------------- 
¶10. (SBU) The September UN assessment team reported a pervasive lack 
of food in the conflict-affected areas.  Although availability of 
food is improving slightly in urban areas, actual household access 
to food remains highly restricted.  Food aid deliveries have been 
delayed; in mid-October, the DPPA allocated 70,000 MT for 956,000 
beneficiaries in Somali Region, including 53,000 MT specifically for 
642,000 people in the Ogaden reflecting the first allocations of the 
calendar year.  As of November 6, WFP and DPPA reported 2,935 MT in 
108 trucks had been dispatched from Dire Dawa for Fik and East Imi 
(88 trucks) and Kebridehar (20 trucks), reflecting less than 6 
percent of the overall allocation to the Ogaden dispatched to date. 
Delivery and actual distribution of this dispatch are still pending 
confirmation.  In an effort to better monitor DPPA's distribution in 
the Ogaden, particularly as food aid is being taken by the military 
as reported reftels, WFP is deploying international/local teams in 
Degehabur and Kebridehar.  WFP has recruited 24 new staff, including 
12 food aid monitors, who will be located in these areas. 
 
¶11. (SBU) DPPA's intended reduction in the number of food 
distribution points (FDPs) in Somali Region is still a concern. 
Prior to the recent crisis, DPPA maintained 500 FDPs in Somali 
 
Region, including approximately 300 within the five conflict 
affected zones.  The Somali Regional authorities recently proposed a 
food distribution plan limited to 74 FDPs, of which only 28 were in 
the conflict-affected areas.  WFP developed a counter-proposal 
advocating for 186 distribution sites in the five conflict- affected 
zones which was approved on November 7.  [Comment: While the 186 
FDPs are significantly better than the 28 proposed by the GoE, the 
186 FDPs still reflect a 38 percent reduction in previously utilized 
FDPs in the conflict-affected zones.  According to WFP field staff, 
the 186 FDPs are considered manageable.  If security and 
humanitarian access improves, additional FDPs should be considered 
in the future in other rural areas. End comment.] 
 
LIVESTOCK TRADE AND DETERIORATING LIVELIHOODS 
--------------------------------------------- 
¶12. (SBU) The livestock trade still remains significantly hobbled 
due to the commercial restrictions.  In Degehabur, livestock prices 
are still only fifty percent of pre-restriction levels (roughly 
2,500 birr for a male camel now, previous rates were 5,000 birr). 
The quantity of animals brought to market is also very low, likely 
due in part to restricted movement and pastoralists unwilling to 
sell at such low prices.  Low livestock prices are also reported in 
Fik and Kebridehar, despite historically high livestock prices in 
the Ethiopia and Somalia markets.  Prior to the conflict, traders 
estimated that 10 truck loads of goats and sheep were transported 
daily for trade, in addition to the sale of camels.  Traders in 
Degehabur complained that the trucks which formerly came to the 
market to transport livestock to Hargeisa and through the Berbera 
port in Somaliland are no longer able to come. 
 
¶13. (SBU) This localized collapse of livestock trade comes at a time 
when animal exports and domestic sales for pastoralists have just 
begun improving after a decade of low prices.  The restriction of 
live animal trade to Saudi Arabia imposed due to Rift Valley Fever 
in 1998 was only partially lifted at the end of 2006.  After 1998, 
the decrease in livestock prices/sales left many pastoralists highly 
vulnerable, evidenced by the 1999-2000 famine in Somali Region. 
Since 2000, an average of one million Somalis require food 
assistance (ref D) each year, having lost their animals and 
livelihoods during previous droughts.  Restrictions on livestock 
trade in the Ogaden have also undermined recent progress of 
USAID-funded program supporting pastoralists. 
 
¶14. (SBU) The convergence of multiple shocks have strained livestock 
herds and resulted in increased vulnerability to famine and 
destitution through loss of livelihoods. Forced movement of 
pastoralists and their herds earlier this year and underlying 
pervasive fear has had pastoral populations trapped between military 
and insurgent elements and has greatly restricted traditional 
pastoral livelihood patterns.  Some pastoralists confided to the 
USAID team that people were moving deeper into the bush and forced 
to move every week to avoid the military sweeps.  [Comment: the 
Degehabur mayor, who accompanied the USAID team to the livestock 
market, was almost physically assaulted by angry traders complaining 
about the collapse of the market.  Other pastoralists who had been 
threatened by security elements not to talk about the situation, 
stated scornfully "I am an old man, they can shoot me, I only fear 
Allah..." End comment.] 
 
¶15. (SBU) Despite good rains earlier in the year, the short season 
deyr rains have been poor since their onset in mid-October to date. 
The very poor distribution and quantity in most areas have raised 
early concerns about the prospects of the season and discouraging 
crop planting activities in most agro-pastoral areas.  The short 
season rains end in November and are followed by the "jilaal" or 
long dry spell which stretches from the Ogaden into neighboring 
Somalia.  Within the Somali context, malnutrition rates normally 
spike during this period due to the drying up of milk supply and 
lack of other food supply.  Entering the jilaal season with already 
high levels of malnutrition means severe malnutrition and under five 
mortality rates will increase significantly.  NGOs have expressed 
concern that high mortality rates are a future certainty, even if 
unfettered humanitarian access were to be granted immediately.  Food 
security conditions are also complicated by desert locus swarms 
which appeared in Somali Region last month, detailed ref D. 
 
HEALTH AND NUTRITION CONCERNS 
----------------------------- 
¶16. (SBU) Per reftels, two recent nutrition surveys within and along 
the periphery of the Ogaden reflect crisis malnutrition levels, and 
in some locations, over twice the normal threshold levels for 
emergencies.  Malnutrition levels are projected to be much higher in 
non-accessible locations and recent anecdotal reporting seems to 
confirm this.  OCHA reported that villagers who recently walked long 
distances to reach Degehabur town for medical treatment indicated up 
to 14 children died recently from marasmus and kwashiorkor (severe 
malnutrition) in the woreda.  The Degehabur Hospital Administrator 
and other medical staff confirmed a significant increase in 
malnutrition within the area, but stated increased fear and 
restricted movement in the countryside was preventing villagers from 
coming and/or staying at the hospital for treatment.  Amidst fears 
of the deteriorating humanitarian crisis, the GoE has dismissed NGO 
concerns as political statements and has recently labeled some 
nutritional assessments as "fictitious". 
 
¶17. (SBU) Endemic health problems such as malaria, shigella, and AWD 
in the area will aggravate an already fragile situation.  UNICEF 
reported an increase in documented cases of malnutrition, shigella, 
measles and other diseases in the limited areas where information is 
available.  UNICEF has delivered supplies to nine of the ten 
designated health posts in Somali Region, with the exception of 
Kebridehar which is still pending GoE approval.  USAID confirmed the 
recent arrival of medical and water purification supplies in 
Degehabur town, but noted bureaucratic delays from the regional 
government meant that hospital officials were not yet authorized to 
use the medical supplies even though the supplies were physically 
stored on the hospital premises.  [Note:  USAID and UNICEF raised 
this issue with the Jijiga regional government officials and 
authorization was underway.  End note.] 
 
¶18. (SBU) The USAID team believes health and nutrition conditions 
are rapidly deteriorating but serious impediments remain to rapid 
response efforts.  Full humanitarian access and security for NGOs 
and UN agencies to mobilize essential services, provide community 
therapeutic feeding, conduct immunization campaigns, and deliver 
emergency supplies is critical, particularly as the GoE does not 
have the capacity to implement activities, even in normal times. 
Without the easing or lifting of restrictions on food availability, 
health and nutrition activities will have minimal impact and only 
serve as a temporary stopgap measure to the crisis. 
 
CONFLICT AND HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS 
---------------------------------- 
¶19. (SBU) As part of the counter-insurgency efforts during the past 
few weeks, the GoE has focused on major recruitment into local 
militias or "tadaqis" in an effort to shift the balance of fighting 
from the Ethiopian military (ENDF) to local Ogadeni sub clans. 
Civil servants and local contractors who receive funding from the 
GoE are being mobilized to join the militias and increasingly being 
pressured to go to the frontlines. This trend has pitted 
inexperienced and poorly equipped local populations against the 
relatively better equipped insurgency.  In Degehabur, the USAID 
visit coincided with a major security meeting with civil servants to 
join the militia, organized by the Head of Security for Somali 
Region and the Deputy Chair of the Somali wing of the ruling party. 
 
 
¶20. (SBU) In private line ministry agriculture and health officials 
discussed the details of the process of militia recruitments. 
Direct refusal is not an option, otherwise officials are deemed 
aligned with the ONLF and "tortured and killed", but some officials 
have managed to avoid joining to date by avoiding meetings or going 
on trips.  Civil servants are terrified of either refusing or 
joining the militia, particularly after an incident in Gunu Gedu 
(near Degehabur) where 17 civil servant/militias were killed by the 
ONLF and local people a few weeks ago. 
 
¶21. (SBU) The recruitment of health workers and teachers has further 
reduced the inadequate basic services even in major towns.  USAID 
obtained a confidential list of schools and health posts which are 
currently closed and occupied by the military as bases.  Most 
schools seem to be closed with teachers either having fled or joined 
the militia.  Twenty-one schools are currently closed in seven 
woredas (districts) of Degehabur, Fik, Korahe and Warder zones.  The 
recruitment of health workers into the militia is also a major 
concern, compromising the ability of a functional health system in 
rural Ogaden and diminishing the small number of available health 
workers.  UNICEF reports that many regional health bureau workers 
slated for joint training of the mobile health and nutrition teams 
did not appear as expected, even though the incentive of per diems 
was provided.  Eight health posts in the four zones are reported as 
being occupied by the military.  [Note: During discussions with the 
Degehabur Hospital Administrator, military officials were banging on 
the windows to summon health workers to go to the recruitment.  End 
note.] 
 
¶22. (SBU) During interviews, local informants expressed concern that 
the scale of fighting appeared to be increasing, citing specific 
incidents and new trends.  A relatively new development is the 
pursuit of "blood money" for the Ethiopian soldiers and militia 
killed by the ONLF.  In Somali tradition when someone is killed, the 
responsible sub clan is expected to either pay blood money of 100 
camels (roughly 500,000 birr/USD 55,000) or to suffer a retribution 
killing.  Although not always actively pursued in the past, the 
Somali Regional Council declared two months ago that seeking blood 
money for any killings by the ONLF was now mandatory.  The GoE has 
subsequently required the sub clans in Degehabur area to pay for the 
74 people killed in Abule, where Ethiopian and Chinese oil workers 
and Ethiopian troops were killed in April.  Each member of the local 
sub clans, determined by family status, has been allocated an amount 
to pay, which was 300 birr for the individual who described the 
situation.  Similar payments are demanded from subclans in any area 
where ENDF or militia are killed. 
 
¶23. (SBU) Villagers also described the early November fighting in 
Degehabur and Fik zones, and the atmosphere of fear, focusing on the 
recent ENDF visit to Hascoli.  The village in Fik was suspected to 
be an ONLF supported area and there is an allegation that the ENDF 
killed an 11 year-old child, the mother, and another child.  The 
situation escalated with the local community mobilizing and wounding 
three soldiers, with the community now awaiting retribution.  The 
USAID team also heard first hand accounts of the following 
incidents: a) four people garroted three months ago in the military 
compound in Degehabur and their bodies displayed in town; b) eleven 
elders hung in public in Damot in July, with one woman escaping to 
Somaliland; c) pastoralists from Damot town forcibly relocated to 
"protected" villages; among other accounts. 
 
¶24. (SBU) The cumulative affect of the actions around the conflict 
seem to be deepening local animosity against the GoE and likely 
translating into sympathy/support for the insurgents.  Apart from 
government sources the team spoke with, the key issue raised against 
the ONLF was their unequivocal killing of ENDF or militia, even of 
some civil servants forced to join the militia against their will. 
NGOs described being stopped by both the ONLF and GoE, with both 
sides of the conflict indicating the humanitarian agencies should 
not be associated with the other side.  The concept of operational 
neutrality and humanitarian corridors is not well understood; this 
issue will become increasingly critical as aid agencies seek 
humanitarian access without enforced military escorts. 
 
LACK OF HUMANITARIAN SPACE 
-------------------------- 
¶25. (U) Humanitarian access remains challenging.  Aid agencies 
operating on the ground still report a significant disconnect in 
directives pertaining to humanitarian access between GoE officials 
Addis and Jijiga.  In October, the UN provided the GoE a list of 37 
NGOs willing to work in the Ogaden.  On November 2, DPPA advised UN 
agencies only 12 international and local NGOs were "approved" to 
operate in the conflict-affected areas of the Ogaden.  Approved NGOs 
include Save the Children/US, Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF)-Greece, 
Oxfam GB, Pastoralist Concern Association, OWDA, Save the 
Children/UK, Islamic Relief, International Rescue Committee, 
Partnership for Pastoralist Development, Save the Rural Society, 
Wabi Shebelle Development Association, and Fafan Development 
Organization.  On November 13, the DPPA approved an additional seven 
NGOs: Mercy Corps, MSF-Belgium, MSF-Switzerland, International 
Medical Corps, Cooperazione Internationale (COOPI), Mother and Child 
Development and German Agro Action. 
 
¶26. (SBU) The DPPA and Somali Regional officials offer no 
explanation for the selection of the approved agencies. Of 
particular concern is that several key NGOs currently operational in 
Kebridehar did not make the list including Action Contre la Faim 
(ACF) and Medecins du Monde (MDM), yet agencies not operational were 
approved.  In the first humanitarian coordination forum in Jijiga on 
November 7, Somali Region officials were at a loss to explain how 
agencies were selected, but assured agencies that this only 
reflected the first round of approvals.  When non-approved 
international NGOs asked what this meant, they were advised that 
"unless they have specifically been told not to go ahead, NGOs 
should feel free to go ahead or continue with activities."  However, 
when an international NGO subsequently requested permission to 
travel to Degehabur, they were advised they could not go. Agencies 
in Kebridehar relate similar experiences.  Some NGOs have also been 
privately advised that agencies will not be permitted any access to 
certain areas with ongoing military operations in the foreseeable 
future.  In discussion with staff of various agencies in the field, 
the staff advised the USAID team that they expected harassment to 
continue and that free access to rural areas was highly unlikely in 
the near future. 
 
¶27. (SBU) Although the GoE has agreed to the establishment of UN 
offices in Kebridehar and Degehabur towns, they also insisted on a 
list of names and addresses of staff that will be based in the 
sub-offices to determine appropriateness.  It remains uncertain if 
UN agencies and NGOs will be granted unfettered access to rural 
areas for program implementation and monitoring.  Nevertheless, NGOs 
state that the presence of UN agencies will raise visibility and 
could create a more favorable working environment. 
 
¶28. (SBU) COMMENT:  While the GoE is taking important actions to 
respond to the humanitarian situation - dispatching food, approving 
UN offices and FDPs, allowing access to select NGOs - largely in 
response to international pressure, the situation is a "crisis" with 
little end in sight.  The GoE's political and military 
counter-insurgency strategies now include shifting operational 
responsibility to local militias which are being manned through 
forced conscription of civil servants including in the health, 
agriculture and education sectors and taxing blood money payments 
for oil workers and ENDF soldiers killed by the ONLF from the local 
population.  These actions are further fueling popular support for 
the rebellion that they are meant to undermine.  As such, it is 
likely to provoke even harsher measures that will, in the end, be 
even more counter-productive and increase levels of conflict, 
further exacerbating the humanitarian situation.  End comment. 
 
YAMAMOTO