VZCZCXYZ0015
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDS #3254/01 3101432
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 061432Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8467
INFO RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA 1986
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 8791
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 3216
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 2999
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 4051
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2932
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 6290
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7122
RUEHC/DEPT OF INTERIOR WASHDC
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHDC
RHMFIUU/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ2/CCJ5/CCJS//
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

UNCLAS ADDIS ABABA 003254 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, DAS AF JSWAN, AF/E, AF/PDPA, OES, 
A/S PRM SAUERBREY, AND PRM/AFR 
AFR/AA KALMQUIST, WWARREN, JBORNS, KNELSON 
DCHA/AA MHESS, GGOTTLIEB 
DCHA/OFDA KLUU, ACONVERY, PMORRIS, KCHANNELL 
DCHA/FFP JDWORKEN, PMOHAN, SANTHONY, PBERTOLIN 
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD 
USDA/FAS FOR U/S PENN, RTILSWORTH, AND LPANASUK 
NAIROBI FOR OFDA/ECARO JMYER, GPLATT, RFFPO NCOX, USAID/EA 
ROME FOR AMBASSADOR, OHA, HSPANOS 
BRUSSELS FOR USEU PBROWN 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH, RMA 
USUN FOR TMALY 
NSC FOR PMARCHAN, JMELINE 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PHUM SENV EAGR PGOV ET
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON HUMANITARIAN DYNAMICS IN THE OGADEN 
 
REF:  A) ADDIS ABABA 3046; B) ADDIS ABABA 2566; D) ADDIS ABABA 3200 
AND PREVIOUS 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Recent discussions between Post and UN agency, 
donor, and NGO interlocutors over the past two weeks highlight the 
challenges facing the Ogaden area of Ethiopia's Somali region. 
Ongoing commercial restrictions, limited operational access due to 
internal security operations in response to counterinsurgency, and 
population displacement have exacerbated the plight of the already 
vulnerable.  NGOs report that physical indications of severe 
malnutrition are manifesting themselves.  Collapse of the livestock 
market (backbone of pastoralist livelihood), persistent and 
increased prevalence of Acute Watery Diarrhea (AWD), consumption of 
wild foods, and declining caloric intake in some parts of the 
severely affected zones are aggravating factors for famine.  Despite 
recent good rains, the convergence of multiple shocks have strained 
livestock herds and resulted in increased vulnerability to famine 
and destitution through loss of livelihoods. 
 
¶2. In response to conditions on the ground, Ethiopian Government 
(GoE) ministries and UN agencies have prepared joint response plans 
for Somali Region based on recommendations of the September UN 
mission report.  On October 31, the U.S. Embassy hosted a donor, UN 
and diplomatic corps meeting on the Ogaden.  Key donor and 
implementing partners agreed on an action plan to sustain diplomatic 
pressure on the GoE to take expeditious action to address the 
humanitarian crisis.  The UN has compiled an internal matrix of 
recommendations on response activities, focusing on proposed 
actions, which has been shared with key humanitarian donors.  Key 
humanitarian donors continue to meet regularly to discuss funding 
strategies, priority programs, and funding gaps particularly in the 
non-food arena.  End Summary. 
 
ACCESS TO HUMANITARIAN FOOD AID 
------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Approximately 1.1 million of the Somali region's 4.6 
million people are chronically food insecure (600,000 of 1.2 million 
in the Ogaden are under stress).  The September UN assessment team 
reported a pervasive lack of food in the conflict-affected areas 
(Ref A).  Limited food aid deliveries continue to be significantly 
delayed.  Of the 5000 MT allocated for the Ogaden area in June -- 
the first food aid sent to the Ogaden in calendar year 2007 -- only 
81 percent has actually been dispatched; the percentage that has 
actually reached the beneficiaries remains unclear.  In mid-October, 
the Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Agency (DPPA) allocated 
70,000 MT for a three-month food ration for 642,000 beneficiaries in 
the five conflict affected zones.  As of October 29, only 182 MT 
(0.26 percent) of this allocation had been dispatched.  Delivery and 
distribution of this dispatch are still weeks away and transport 
contracts for the 70,000 MTS are not yet finalized. 
 
¶4. (SBU) DPPA's intended reduction in the number of food 
distribution points (FDPs) in response to counterinsurgency 
operations, lack of resources and ability to control food 
distribution in Somali Region is of additional concern.  Prior to 
the recent crisis, DPPA maintained 500 FDPs in Somali Region, 
including approximately 300 within the five conflict affected zones. 
 The Somali Regional authorities, seeking to prevent diversion of 
food, have proposed a food distribution plan limited to 74 FDPs, of 
which only 28 are in the conflict-affected areas.  By distributing 
food only to woreda headquarters, trucks will drive past 
beneficiaries for FDPs and then require them to walk to the distant 
site and back again.  Donors argue that this plan is not viable as 
it will force already vulnerable populations to walk hundreds of 
kilometers to reach the food, posing a significant protection issue 
in a militarized zone.  WFP has developed a counter-proposal 
advocating for 190 distribution sites in the Ogaden area.  USAID/FFP 
and Post are reluctant to proceed with the most recent contribution 
of $24.6 million (equivalent to 30,000 MTS of food commodities) 
until the GoE agrees to increase the number of distribution sites in 
the Ogaden area and has conveyed this concern to DPPA.  UNOCHA is in 
the affected areas looking at additional sites, which the GoE has 
approved but still far short of what is necessary. 
 
ACCESS TO COMMERCIAL FOOD 
------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) The food security situation has steadily deteriorated over 
the past several months following restrictions on commercial trade 
imposed in June.  Although the GoE opened four major trade routes 
into Somali Region -- including two in the North, one in the East 
and one in the Southeast -- aid agencies report no tangible change 
on the ground.  Trucks are bottlenecked in Kebridebaya, just south 
of Jijiga and outside the Ogaden area.  The few commercial trucks 
that do get through must pay the military 1,500 Ethiopian birr 
(approximately USD 165) for escorts.  These levies, coupled with 
increased insurance rates for trucks operating in these areas, 
further inflate already-high food prices. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The lack of commercial food in the Ogaden is exacerbated by 
restrictions on population movements.  Villagers report that if the 
military catches anyone moving food from towns to rural areas, they 
confiscate the food and, in some cases, shoot the people.  Rural 
populations are similarly forbidden from entering urban areas to 
sell milk or other products.  As a result of commercial trade 
restrictions and limitations on the movement of people, informal 
market surveys now indicate tripling of many of the already high 
food prices.  At the same time, livestock prices are not believed to 
have fallen to half their pre-conflict value.  This deterioration in 
the terms of trade has seriously impacted already-depleted coping 
mechanisms and livelihoods.  According to the UN, the local 
population in some areas is surviving by collecting wild grasses and 
grains and slaughtering livestock in response to the starvation 
tactics used by the military. 
 
MALNUTRITION AND MORBIDITY 
-------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Two recent nutrition surveys within and along the periphery 
of the Ogaden reflect crisis malnutrition levels, and in some 
locations, over twice the normal threshold levels for emergencies. 
Malnutrition rates are projected to be much higher in non-accessible 
locations.  A Save the Children/UK survey from Fik zone indicates 
crisis levels of malnutrition present with 20.8 percent Global Acute 
Malnutrition (GAM) and 1.4 percent Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) 
among children under five.  (Note: The World Health Organization 
classifies GAM rates over 10 percent as warranting immediate 
nutritional support interventions. End Note).  The levels of crude 
and under-5 mortality rates are 0.56 deaths/10,000/day and 1.5 
deaths/10,000/day respectively.  A late September, Adventist 
Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) nutrition survey in Kelafo 
Woreda, Gode Zone, and Somali Region identified a GAM rate of 13.2 
percent and a SAM rate of 3.4 percent.  The ADRA survey identified 
crude mortality rates (CMR) of children under five at 2.93, well 
above the acceptable rate of 1.03 per 10,000 for least developed 
countries.  The continued high SAM rates are worrying, a reflection 
of the acuity of the food security situation in the woreda.  (Note: 
In an emergency context, high levels of malnutrition are considered 
to be a late indicator of a humanitarian crisis.  End note.)  NGOs 
have expressed concern that high mortality rates are a future 
certainty, even if unfettered humanitarian access were to be granted 
immediately. 
 
¶8. (U) Measles vaccination rates for the surveyed area were 
estimated to be 3.2 percent documented by vaccination card and 37.2 
percent by card and mother's recall, well below the 70 percent 
targeted for the region by UNICEF and the Ministry of Health. 
UNICEF has also highlighted endemic health problems such as malaria, 
shigella, and AWD in the area will aggravate an already fragile 
situation.  (Note: GoE is disputing the 20.8 percent malnutrition 
rate urging that over 600 cases is too small a sample.  But the GoE 
still remains an impediment.) 
 
¶9. (SBU) Although the GoE has provided federal approval for UNICEF 
to deploy 15 mobile health and nutrition assessment and response 
teams to the Ogaden, additional modalities and approvals need to be 
worked out at the regional level.  UNICEF has begun providing 
emergency supplies to limited health facilities.  Supplies -- 
including emergency drugs to treat 235,000 patients for six months, 
water purification items, nutrition and therapeutic food to cover 
16,000 children, and non-food supplies -- were delivered in 
mid-October to eight designated health posts including Elkere (Afder 
zone), Gode, Kelafo, Denan (Gode zone), Fik, Aware, Gashamo, and 
Warder.  GoE approvals are still pending for deliveries to Kebri 
Dehar and Degehabur. 
 
EXACERBATING CONDITIONS 
----------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) As detailed in reftels, forced movement of pastoralists 
due to insecurity from fighting and their herds earlier this year 
and underlying pervasive fear reported by the UN assessment team has 
had pastoral populations trapped between military and insurgent 
elements and has greatly restricted traditional pastoral livelihood 
patterns.  During the past week, desert locust swarms from Somalia 
crossed the border into Somali Region, further aggravating the 
situation.  The FAO Desert Locust Information Services reported a 
desert locust infestation in Kebri Dehar, parts of Korahe and 
Degehabur zones, and throughout Warder zone.  To date, control 
operations have not been possible.  The infestation is destroying 
browse and pasture and will likely spread to other areas.  The 
locally-laid hoppers will fledge and could form a small immature 
swarm within a month.  The Somali Region is planning to conduct 
aerial chemical spraying to contain the spread. 
 
SECURITY OPERATIONS 
------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Pockets of violence and human rights violations from both 
sides of the conflict continue according to agencies on the ground. 
Ongoing military operations and GoE regulations have restricted 
humanitarian access in Warder, Korahe, Degehabur, Fik, and parts of 
Gode zone over the last five months.  While most soldiers have 
remained in their barracks since early-October, NGOs, UN agencies, 
and even regional government officials confirm that civil servants 
from various line ministries in Somali Region have now been directed 
to mobilize militias along clan and community lines to take up arms 
against the insurgents.  This trend has pitted inexperienced and 
poorly equipped local populations against the relatively better 
equipped insurgency.  The ONLF has announced two rounds of large 
military victories against "the military," but in reality local 
communities have suffered the casualties due to regional 
government-led mobilization.  It is not clear the mobilization of 
civil servants will affect the regional health bureau or other 
regional bureaus that would normally be involved in humanitarian 
response activities.  What is clear is the increased ONLF attacks 
have raised insecurity in the region affecting food deliveries. 
 
THE US AND DONOR RESPONSE 
------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) On August 16, 2007, a complex emergency was declared for 
Somali Region (Ref B) following growing concerns that a severe 
humanitarian crisis was imminent in the Ogaden.  USAID/FPP has 
provided USD 40 million of emergency food assistance to WFP since 
July 2007 and USAID/OFDA provided USD 3.7 million in August 2007 for 
Somali Region response activities.  The United States remains the 
only donor providing food aid specifically for Somali Region and 
continues to coordinate directly with WFP and the DPPA. 
 
¶13. (SBU) The GoE has agreed to the establishment of two joint UN 
support offices in Kebri Dehar and Degehabur towns to strengthen 
monitoring and humanitarian assistance.  The GoE has requested the 
UN to provide a list of names and addresses of staff that will be 
based in the sub-offices to determine appropriateness.  While a few 
UN agencies remain more cautiously optimistic; most operational 
agencies agree that recent GoE outreach has not translated into 
increased operational access to date.  The UN provided the GoE a 
list of 37 NGOs willing to work in Somali Region.  In a meeting on 
November 2, the GoE informed the UN that only 11 of these NGOs were 
"approved."  Of these 11, only a handful are international NGOs and 
some current key partners active in the region are not among them. 
 
MOVING FORWARD 
-------------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) Following the October 31 donor and NGO roundtable hosted 
by Ambassador Yamamoto, donor Ambassadors, NGOs, and UN agencies 
agreed to coordinate closely on information sharing and to present a 
consistent and persistent message to Ethiopian officials of the need 
for an immediate and sustained GoE response, but to do so in a quiet 
and non-confrontational manner.  Key points would include: 
 
--Informing the GoE of the crisis situation in the Ogaden, 
 
--Acknowledging what the GoE has done in opening corridors for 
humanitarian relief, but noting that more needs to be done and the 
donors, UN and NGOs are ready to help, 
 
--Recognizing the counter-insurgency problem in the Ogaden, 
 
--Expressing a commitment to help meet the GoE's call for food and 
medical supplies, 
 
--Committing to work with the GoE on relief in the Ogaden, 
 
--Seeking the GoE's views on, and suggesting possible proposals for 
resolving, tensions in the Ogaden with the ONLF (i.e. facilitate 
dialogue with ONLF and or broader discussion with Ogaden elders), 
and 
 
--Pressing a strong message of the need to push food aid and open 
commercial trade and livestock trade throughout the Ogaden. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Ambassador and DCM arranged to meet with Minister of State 
for Foreign Affairs Dr. Tekeda Alemu and National Security Advisor 
Abay Tsehaye to raise these concerns (Septel).  EU Ambassadors 
agreed to raise these points with Prime Minister Meles in a 
pre-arranged October 31 meeting.  Ambassador and Political Counselor 
have met Ogaden officials.  While a group of Ambassadors from the 
Ethiopian Partners' Group will seek an appointment with Prime 
Minister Meles and Foreign Minister Seyoum in the coming days, 
Ambassador Yamamoto and Post's principal officers will continue to 
raise these points with GoE officials at every opportunity.  Ref D 
provided specific talking points for Washington-based officials to 
draw on in urging GoE authorities to address this crisis. 
 
YAMAMOTO