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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 001300 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CARC 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O.12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL ASEC PTER SOCI AM
SUBJECT:  ONE AND THE SAME?  THE COMPLEX ETHNIC PICTURE OF YEZIDIS 
AND KURDS IN ARMENIA 
 
REF: A) YEREVAN 1259 B) YEREVAN 723 C) YEREVAN 528 D) YEREVAN 274 E) 
 
06 YEREVAN 1484 F) 06 YEREVAN 1424 
 
YEREVAN 00001300  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (SBU) Self-identification as either Yezidi or Kurd largely 
depends on individual self-perceptions.  While closely related, many 
Yezidis and Kurds in Armenia insist on being either/or.  Almost all 
Yezidis and Kurds here observe the pagan, sun-worshipping Yezidi 
faith, and speak the same Kurdish dialect, but base their affinity 
with the Kurdish nation on different criteria.  The small 
self-identified Kurdish minority views the idea of a future Greater 
Kurdistan as a home for all Kurds - with no reference to a Yezidi 
nation - while the much larger (in Armenia) Yezidi community sees 
Greater Kurdistan as a home base within which could be nested an 
autonomous Yezidi homeland.  Their varying sympathies 
notwithstanding, neither minority appears to be actively involved in 
the armed struggles of their respective brethren in Turkey or Iraq. 
End summary. 
 
¶2.  (U) This is the second of a two-part series on Kurds/Yezidi in 
Armenia.  These cables report findings from  a month of recently 
completed fieldwork by Dr. Mark Yoffe, a George Washington 
University researcher participating in the IREX U.S. Embassy Policy 
Specialist Program.  The first cable (ref A) provided details of the 
communities' socio-economic situation.  This follow-up report 
details the complex question of Kurdish and Yezidi identity and 
affiliation in Armenia. 
 
------------------------------------ 
WHAT MAKES A KURD A YEZIDI (OR NOT)? 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (SBU) In his travel to 13 villages, mainly populated by Yezidis 
and some by Kurds, Yoffe found that self-identification is largely 
rooted in one's internal beliefs about ethnicity, although he often 
found that a given village as a whole tended toward either a Kurdish 
or Yezidi self-identity.  These internal beliefs trump even the 
language both minorities share, which is the Kurdish dialect of 
Kurmanji, although Kurds write it in the Latin alphabet and Yezidis 
in Cyrillic.  (Note:  According to data collected by Yoffe, Yezidis 
currently number around 40,000 in Armenia, non-Muslim Kurds 1,500 
and Muslim Kurds under 100.  See ref A for more information.  End 
note.) 
 
¶4. (SBU) In his interviews with Yezidis of all stripes, from rural 
villagers to urban intellectuals, Yoffe found that animosity toward 
Muslim Kurds appears to be the driving force for those who 
self-identify as Yezidis.  Like ethnic Armenians, Yezidis suffered 
persecution at the hands of Turks and Muslim Kurds during the 
1915-era Anatolian massacres - persecution that is still vividly 
remembered.  Indeed, Yoffe found Yezidi communities which took great 
pride in the several dozen Yezidi who fought alongside Armenians 
against Muslim Azerbaijanis during the Nagorno-Karabakh war.  At 
least one community had a monument to its Yezidi NK-war dead. 
 
¶5. (SBU) While most self-identifying Kurds in Armenia are not 
Muslim, and practice the Yezidi faith, they dismiss the idea of a 
Yezidi nation.  The decreasing few who still identify themselves as 
Kurds largely base their ethnicity on their moral support of a 
Greater Kurdistan that will eventually house all ethnic Kurds. 
Unlike their Yezidi neighbors, the Kurds in Armenia pay no heed to 
the Muslim-Yezidi religious divide, and view Yezidis as ethnic Kurds 
who, like them, will eventually be Kurdish brethren in a hoped-for 
future Kurdistan. 
 
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VARYING VIEWS ON GREATER KURDISTAN 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) In addition to the Yezidi-Muslim religious divide that they 
use to distinguish themselves from Kurds, Yezidis also differ from 
Kurds in their reasons for supporting (in the abstract) 
establishment of a Greater Kurdistan.  Yezidis view the 
establishment of such a land as the natural precursor to creating a 
protected, autonomous homeland that Yezidis from all over can 
finally call home.  This view is more parochial in comparison with 
the cosmopolitan Kurdish view in Armenia, which envisions a Greater 
Kurdistan as home to all ethnic Kurds, irrespective of any religious 
differences. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Although both Yezidis and Kurds are highly conscious of 
their ethnicity, Kurdish intellectuals in Yerevan and Kurds in the 
 
YEREVAN 00001300  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
countryside to exhibit greater ethnic pride than Yezidis, attuned as 
they are to Kurdish history and the sentiment of belonging to a 
larger Kurdish nation.  Proud of their history and the possession of 
oil-rich lands in northern Iraq, Kurds in Armenia appear to be 
frustrated by the marginal peasant-like status that has been their 
lot in the modern era. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
KURDISH AND YEZIDI SYMPATHIES FOR ARMED STRUGGLES 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Both Yezidis and non-Muslim Kurds are increasingly 
concerned about the plight of their "brothers and sisters" in Turkey 
and Iraq.  Both minorities share great animosity against Turks, and 
all are conscious of the fact that Turkey's potential incursion 
route into northern Iraq first crosses largely Yezidi/Kurdish lands. 
 Both minorities also think President Bush will not allow Turkey to 
mount a large-scale operation in northern Iraq.  Yoffe said almost 
all villages he visited possess at least one satellite dish, and 
that most Yezidis/Kurds are up to date about recent developments in 
the region thanks to reception of Kurdish-language programs. 
 
¶9. (SBU) In spite of these sympathies, Yoffe saw  no evidence of 
Yezidis or Kurds actively participating in armed struggles in either 
Turkey or Iraq.  He did hear anecdotal stories about a handful of 
Yezidis going abroad to enlist in the PKK cause in the mid-nineties. 
 Although both minorities acknowledge the legal presence of a PKK 
representation in Yerevan, and repetitive visits by PKK activists to 
some Yezidi and Kurdish villages, the extent of either minority's 
support appears to be more moral than material - not least because 
the overwhelming majority of members of each community are extremely 
poor, subsistence farmers or herders, with no resources to spare. 
There is a common strand of opinion that armed struggle for 
Kurdistan was the job of their Kurdish brethren in Iraq or Turkey. 
Armenian Kurds/Yezidi seem too occupied with their own struggles for 
subsistence to involve themselves in conflicts abroad.   Of the two 
groups, self-identified Kurds were far more likely than Yezidi to 
consider active cooperation - such as offering medical care or safe 
haven - with PKK representatives. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Yoffe said that while the Kurdish tend to be coy about 
their support, it is known that the few Kurdish entities that exist 
in Armenia - a writer's union, a union of Kurdish intelligentsia, 
and a Kurdish national council - have also been approached by 
Kurdish nationalist emissaries in the past.  Some of these 
intelligentsia have also traveled to Kurdish areas in Iraq and 
Turkey, and maintain contact with Kurdish leaders in both places. 
Yoffe suspects the goal of these visits is not so much to recruit 
foot soldiers for the current armed struggles as it is to cultivate 
sympathy and support for the eventual creation of a Greater 
Kurdistan which, if one listens to conspiracy theories, might 
potentially include Yezidi/Kurdish areas in Armenia. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶11. (SBU) Based on Yoffe's research, it appears that the 
Yezidi-Kurdish divide in Armenia is a fluid though largely 
inconsequential one.  Both minorities - whether considered 
individually or as one and the same - share a common history that 
unites them.  Yezidis and Kurds are dispossessed peoples who dream 
of their own homelands in a historically volatile region.  While 
both groups at least morally support the creation of a Greater 
Kurdistan, their varying rationale, poverty, and lack of desire to 
get personally involved cast doubt on the likelihood that this 
support will ever become more consequential. 
 
PENNINGTON