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Viewing cable 07WELLINGTON769, NEXT ROUND OF NEW ZEALAND DEPLOYMENTS TO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07WELLINGTON769 2007-10-22 18:49 2011-04-28 00:00 SECRET Embassy Wellington
VZCZCXRO6261
PP RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHWL #0769 2951849
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 221849Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4821
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 5002
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0040
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC CAMP H M SMITH HI PRIORITY
RHMFITT/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
S E C R E T WELLINGTON 000769 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
OSD PASS JESSICA POWERS; PACOM PASS FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2032 
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL NZ AF US
SUBJECT: NEXT ROUND OF NEW ZEALAND DEPLOYMENTS TO 
AFGHANISTAN -- MAYBE SAS, MAYBE TRAINERS 
 
Classified By: Embassy Wellington DCM David J. Keegan, Reasons E.O. 129 
58, 1.4 (a), (b), and (d) 
 
1. (C) DCM recently discussed current mil-mil relations with 
New Zealand Ministry of Defence (MOD) CEO John McKinnon. 
McKinnon reported that MOD was preparing a submission to a 
select Cabinet committee on future deployments to Afghanistan 
after the current deployment cycle concludes in September 
2008. The report would need to be approved and then signed 
off by the full Cabinet no later than early December in order 
for the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) to be ready to 
deploy or redeploy any forces by the September 2008 time 
frame. 
 
2. (C) McKinnon noted that the Government was very conscious 
that the New Zealand public continues to express support for 
NZDF deployments to Afghanistan. However, the Prime Minister 
particularly is quite conscious that there is a mix of 
factors contributing to that support, one of which is the 
relative dearth of casualties. That factor will weigh in, 
though not necessarily determine, the Cabinet's decision. 
 
Victoria Cross & the SAS 
------------------------ 
 
3. (SBU) The Government was also quite conscious that the 
awarding of the Victoria Cross to SAS Corporal Willie Apiata 
had drawn a unique and positive public spotlight on the SAS 
role in Afghanistan. Even given that Apiata received his 
decoration for valor in a very bloody fight, both Apiata's 
action and the role of the SAS in Afghanistan had received 
near universal public support. A documentary by a local TV 
network on the SAS and its training camp has also been viewed 
very positively. 
 
4. (S) Any deployment of SAS forces back to Afghanistan would 
have to take into account the fact that the force is 
under-manned. It is also the most ready of any NZ forces and 
therefore would be the first force to be called into any 
contingency such as Fiji or an evacuation from Fiji. Having 
mentioned Fiji, McKinnon immediately said that he should only 
have been speaking of the Pacific Islands in general, but he 
left no doubt that Fiji was the first and most pressing 
contingency. He suggested that even if SAS forces deployed to 
Afghanistan, it might be necessary to consider how and 
whether they might be extracted to respond to an island 
crisis. 
 
Training the Trainers 
--------------------- 
 
5. (C) In addition, MOD was evaluating a "train the trainer" 
program as one of several other options for a NZDF role in 
Afghanistan. It was still too early to assess how this or 
other options would eventually be handled in a paper for 
Defence Minister Phil Goff to present to Cabinet. One issue 
would be logistical and transport support, but it was 
difficult to assess at this point how large a factor that 
would be. 
 
A-4 Options 
----------- 
 
6. (C) MOD is in the preliminary stages of attempting to 
flesh out and verify another approach to selling its retired 
A-4 attack aircraft. While it is aware that OSD has promised 
to inform GNZ as soon as possible on whether its current 
sales proposal will be approved, NZ has recently become aware 
of another opportunity, which he declined to specify. When 
and if that possibility becomes more defined, MOD will brief 
OSD in Washington to ensure maximum coordination. McKinnon 
made it clear that the factor driving MOD was simple: "the 
money would be nice." 
KEEGAN