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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 17 TOKYO 004746 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 10/10/07 
 
 
Index: 
 
AMERICAN EMBASSY, TOKYO 
PUBLIC AFFAIRS SECTION 
OFFICE OF TRANSLATION AND MEDIA ANALYSIS 
INQUIRIES:  03-3224-5360 
INTERNET E-MAIL ADDRESS: otmatokyo@state.gov 
DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 
October 10, 2007 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Poll on Fukuda cabinet, political parties, MSDF refueling 
mission (Sankei) 
 
(2) Poll: More than half of Fukuda supporters did not support Abe 
(Tokyo Shimbun) 
 
(3) Defense minister denies allegation of MSDF fuel diversion, 
stating that US warship consumed it in three days (Yomiuri) 
 
(4) Detailed report on Diet debate: Defense Minister Ishiba says he 
will disclose information on alleged diversion of fuel provided by 
MSDF as much as possible (Yomiuri) 
 
(5) DPJ finds itself in dilemma over Ozawa's proposal; Efforts to 
come up with counterproposals to fueling operation run into snags 
(Nikkei) 
 
(6) Japan to continue economic sanctions against DPRK for another 
half year; Many hurdles lie ahead for Japan to clear before dialogue 
possible with DPRK (Nikkei) 
 
(7) Editorial: Continuation of sanctions against DPRK (Mainichi) 
 
(8) Day of nightmare of "nuclear umbrella" disappearing (Sankei) 
 
(9) Japan follows in China's wake in dealing with Burma (Sankei) 
 
(10) How about food safety? BSE (Part 3): Local governments opposed 
to review of blanket testing (Asahi)  14 
(Corrected copy) How about food safety? BSE (Part 1): Antipathy 
deep-seated among Japanese consumers to increasing US beef on 
shelves (Asahi) 
 
(11) Political Cartoons 
 
 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Poll on Fukuda cabinet, political parties, MSDF refueling 
mission 
 
SANKEI (Page 5) (Abridged) 
September 29, 2007 
 
Questions & Answers 
(Figures shown in percentage, rounded off.) 
 
Q: Do you support the Fukuda cabinet? 
 
 
TOKYO 00004746  002 OF 017 
 
 
Yes 55.3 
No 28.7 
Don't know (D/K) + Can't say which (CSW) 16.0 
 
Q: Which political party do you support? 
 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 33.9 (30.5) 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) 28.1 (25.9) 
New Komeito (NK) 4.4 (4.9) 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 3.4 (3.1) 
Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto) 2.0 (1.6) 
People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto) 0.2 (0.5) 
New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon) 0.2 (0.5) 
Other answers (O/A) 0.4 (1.0) 
None 26.1 (30.5) 
D/K + Can't say (C/S) 1.3 (1.5) 
 
Q: What's your impression of the Fukuda cabinet's lineup? 
 
None the better for the change 45.1 
Balanced 17.2 
Featureless 15.9 
Competent 14.8 
Surprised 2.1 
Fresh 0.7 
D/K+C/S 4.2 
 
Q: Who do you think is the most hopeful of all in the Fukuda 
cabinet? 
 
Health, Labor & Welfare Minister Yoichi Masuzoe 56.8 
Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba 4.7 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka Machimura 2.1 
Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura 1.6 
Justice Minister Kunio Hatoyama 1.3 
Internal Affairs & Communications Minister Hiroya Masuda 1.0 
Land, Infrastructure & Transport Minister Tetsuzo Fuyushiba 1.0 
Minister of State for Administrative Reform Yoshimi Watanabe 0.8 
Environment Minister Ichiro Kamoshita 0.5 
Education, Science & Technology Minister Kisaburo Tokai 0.4 
Finance Minister Fukushiro Nukaga 0.3 
Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries Minister Masatoshi Wakabayashi 
0.1 
National Public Safety Commission Chairman Shinya Izumi 0.1 
Minister of State for Declining Birthrate Yoko Kamikawa 0.1 
O/A 1.9 
None 15.3 
D/K+C/S 11.4 
 
Q: Do you have expectations for the Fukuda government over the Abe 
government? 
 
His personal character 
Yes 63.0 
No 25.1 
D/K+CSW 11.9 
 
His leadership 
Yes 56.5 
No 27.4 
D/K+CSW 16.1 
 
 
TOKYO 00004746  003 OF 017 
 
 
Political approach 
Yes 50.1 
No 24.1 
D/K+CSW 25.8 
 
Cabinet lineup 
Yes 43.6 
No 37.6 
D/K+CSW 18.8 
 
Party lineup 
Yes 33.9 
No 41.1 
D/K+CSW 25.0 
 
Foreign policy 
Yes 44.0 
No 36.3 
D/K+CSW 19.7 
 
Economic policy 
Yes 36.2 
No 42.8 
D/K+CSW 21.0 
 
Q: What would you like the Fukuda government to pursue first? 
 
Pensions 31.1 
Economic disparities 21.8 
Political scandals over money 13.1 
Tax reform, such as consumption tax 7.7 
North Korea 6.6 
Education reform 5.9 
Global warming 4.4 
National security 3.0 
Yasukuni Shrine 1.6 
Constitutional reform 1.5 
D/K+C/S 3.3 
 
Q: When would you like the House of Representatives to hold its next 
election? 
 
Within the year 16.6 
During the 1st half of next year 38.5 
During the 2nd half of next year 22.3 
The year after next 20.5 
D/K+C/S 2.1 
 
 
Q: How long do you think the Fukuda government will continue? 
 
Step down within the year 8.0 
Until around the next election for the House of Representatives 
52.9 
Until the fall of the year after next 24.7 
Continue until after the fall of the year after next 10.6 
D/K+C/S 3.8 
 
Q: Do you support a big coalition of the LDP and the DPJ? 
 
Yes 40.3 
No 48.0 
 
TOKYO 00004746  004 OF 017 
 
 
D/K+CSW 11.7 
 
Q: Do you support continuing the Maritime Self-Defense Force's 
refueling activities in the Indian Ocean? 
 
Yes 51.0 
No 39.7 
D/K+CSW 9.3 
 
(Note) Figures in parentheses denote the results of the last survey 
conducted Sept. 15-16. 
 
Polling methodology: The survey was conducted Sept. 26-27 by the 
Sankei Shimbun and Fuji News Network (FNN) over the telephone on a 
computer-aided random digit dialing (RDD) basis. For the survey, a 
total of 1,000 persons were sampled from among males and females, 
aged 20 and over, across the nation. 
 
(2) Poll: More than half of Fukuda supporters did not support Abe 
 
TOKYO (Page 2) (Abridged) 
October 1, 2007 
 
The Tokyo Shimbun yesterday tabulated findings from its recent 
online public opinion survey of political monitors conducted along 
with the inauguration of Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda's cabinet. 
 
Asked whether to support the Fukuda cabinet, the proportion of those 
who answered "yes" and that of those who answered "yes to a certain 
degree" totaled 45.9 PERCENT . The proportions of those who answered 
"no to a certain degree" and "no" added up to 54.1 PERCENT . As seen 
from these figures, the Fukuda cabinet's disapproval rating topped 
its approval rating. However, when the Tokyo Shimbun polled monitors 
shortly after the Abe cabinet's shuffle that took place in late 
August, the new Abe cabinet's support rate was 25.5 PERCENT , with 
its nonsupport rate at 74.5 PERCENT . In the online poll taken this 
time, the Fukuda cabinet's support rate was higher than that for the 
new Abe cabinet. 
 
In the survey this time, a total of 162 persons supported the Fukuda 
cabinet. The Tokyo Shimbun looked into their answers given to the 
survey taken right after the Abe cabinet's shuffle. In that survey, 
a total of 53.7 PERCENT  answered "no" or "no to a certain degree" 
when asked whether to support the new Abe cabinet. This shows that 
those who support the Fukuda cabinet include a considerable number 
of persons who abandoned the Abe cabinet in its last phase. 
 
Respondents were also asked about the advisability of continuing the 
Maritime Self-Defense Force's refueling activities in the Indian 
Ocean. To this question, 47.9 PERCENT  said the government should 
call off the MSDF's refueling mission and review it, and 25.8 
PERCENT  said the MSDF's refueling mission should be ended now, with 
21.2 PERCENT  insisting that the MSDF's refueling mission should be 
continued. As seen from these figures, negative answers outnumbered 
affirmative ones. 
 
The online poll this time was conducted in late September with a 
total of 500 monitors. Answers were obtained from 353 persons (70.6 
PERCENT ). 
 
(3) Defense minister denies allegation of MSDF fuel diversion, 
stating that US warship consumed it in three days 
 
TOKYO 00004746  005 OF 017 
 
 
 
YOMIURI (Page 1) (Full) 
Eve., October 10, 2007 
 
On the issue of fuel supplied by the Maritime Self-Defense Force 
(MSDF) in the Indian Ocean to US supply ships being diverted to the 
Iraq war, which would not be for the intended purpose, Defense 
Minister Ishiba, appearing this morning in the Lower House Budget 
Committee, revealed in detail the contents of a briefing by the 
United States that there had not been any diversion of fuel. Ishiba, 
noting that "the contents of the US' explanation are extremely 
logical," stressed that the Japanese government had concluded there 
had been no diversion of fuel. 
 
The charge of fuel diversion was derived from official US Navy 
documents and other material obtained by the Japanese NGO Peace 
Depot through the US Freedom of Information Act. The NGO charged 
that in 2003, the MSDF supply ship Tokiwa, operating in the Indian 
Ocean based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, supplied a 
US supply ship with 800,000 gallons of fuel, and that this oil was 
likely used in the Iraq war. 
 
According to Ishiba's explanation, the Tokiwa supplied 800,000 
gallons in fuel on Feb. 25, 2003, to the US supply ship Pecos, which 
in turn refueled the US Navy carrier Kitty Hawk and one cruiser. Of 
that amount, the aircraft carrier, which was then engaged in 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the action that began after the 
terrorist attacks on the US, was supplied that day with 675,000 
gallons of fuel. The carrier later carried out operations in the 
Persian Gulf. 
 
According to the US-side's calculation, the average fuel consumption 
of a conventional aircraft carrier while on tactical maneuvers is 
113,000 gallons per day. The fuel it was provided with, amounted to 
one week's supply, using simple arithmetic, but from what the US 
side explained, the aircraft carrier's fuel was consumed in three 
days from the 25th. 
 
Ishiba indicated three premises: 1) The standard (daily) fuel 
consumption, as provided by the US in 2003, was approximately 
200,000 gallons; 2) the aircraft carrier at the time it transited 
the Holmes Strait was traveling at a fairly high speed of 33 knots; 
and 3) it was conceivable that several flight operations were 
carried out while it was navigating at high speed.  He thus 
concluded: "It is logical to assume that the standard daily 
consumption of 200,000 gallons a day was exceeded, so in three days, 
(the fuel) can be considered as having been consumed. The fuel can 
be considered as having been used for OEF." 
 
In addition, he pointed out: "It is extremely reckless to deduce 
that because the vessel entered the Persian Gulf, its fuel was used 
for other purposes than OEF." 
 
He was replying to a question from Democratic Party of Japan Vice 
President Kan. 
 
(4) Detailed report on Diet debate: Defense Minister Ishiba says he 
will disclose information on alleged diversion of fuel provided by 
MSDF as much as possible 
 
YOMIURI (Page 9) (Slightly abridged) 
October 10, 2007 
 
TOKYO 00004746  006 OF 017 
 
 
 
Antiterrorism measures 
 
Gen Nakatani (former defense chief): Japanese tankers are in the 
Persian Gulf. They cannot navigate safely without being guarded by 
the multinational force. What are your measures to protect sea 
lanes? 
 
Prime Minister Fukuda: The sea lanes are Japan's lifelines. If 
terrorists engage in secret maneuvers, supplies of Japan's life and 
blood will come to a halt. (Antiterrorism measures) are aimed at 
cooperating with other countries, but they also mean to protect our 
country. It is important to take a stance of cooperating with other 
countries. 
 
Nakatani: The government should give clear explanations on the 
allegation that the fuel provided by the Maritime Self-Defense Force 
(MSDF) was used for a purpose other than that under the 
antiterrorism special measures law for Afghanistan. 
 
Defense Minister Ishiba: Japan has exchanged official notes with 
other countries in which they pledged that fuel provided by Japan 
would not be used for purposes other than that listed under the 
Antiterrorism Special Measures Law. We inquired of the United States 
and received a confirmation that the US had not used Japan's oil for 
other purposes. We have to scrutinize the evidence to back up the 
US' explanation. The fact that the US has said so is not enough. I 
want to disclose information as much as possible. 
 
Nakatani: Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) President Ichiro Ozawa has 
said that he would like to have the SDF participate in the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Is 
that possible? 
 
Ishiba: The government has taken a position that the Constitution 
does not allow the SDF to take part in the ISAF. Should the SDF 
participate in the ISAF, the Constitution will have to be 
reinterpreted regarding the use of the right of collective 
self-defense. In addition, revising the SDF Law and the law to deal 
with armed attacks will be necessary. 
 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Machimura: The positive view that Japan 
should participate in the ISAF is better than the position of 
opposing everything. However, Japan is not allowed to conduct 
activities corresponding to the use of armed force, which is banned 
by Article 9 of the Constitution, even though such activities are 
backed by UN resolutions. The ISAF has mainly carried out ground 
operations. The number of victims has exceeded 300. To put it 
plainly, operations are carried out in a combat zone. I don't think 
Japan will be able to dispatch the SDF there immediately. 
 
Tetsuo Saito of New Komeito: I believe that it is indispensable to 
create a circumstance under which many Japanese people agree with 
(MSDF refueling mission in the Indian Ocean) in the nature of 
dispatching the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) overseas. What's your 
view? 
 
Fukuda: According to the results of recent polls, I think the number 
of people who understand this operation has increased. I assume that 
there remain many people who do not understand it well. Therefore, 
it is necessary to give the public appropriate explanations through 
Diet debate. I want the opposition parties to cooperate with us. 
 
TOKYO 00004746  007 OF 017 
 
 
 
Right of collective self-defense 
 
Saito: The New Komeito has insisted that the government's 
interpretation that Japan cannot exercise the right of collective 
defense should be maintained. 
 
Fukuda: I want to hold debate on the relationship between the 
Constitution and the special measures law to support Iraq's 
rehabilitation and the antiterrorism law when new duties come up. It 
is necessary to discuss as to whether and how far the Constitution 
allows the SDF to take part in international activities and whether 
discussion will be needed. I think the handling of such matters 
should be done carefully. 
 
(5) DPJ finds itself in dilemma over Ozawa's proposal; Efforts to 
come up with counterproposals to fueling operation run into snags 
 
NIKKEI (Page 3) (Abridged slightly) 
October 10, 2007 
 
Fierce debates began yesterday between the ruling and opposition 
camps at the House of Representatives Budget Committee. Main 
opposition Democratic Party of Japan (Minshuto or DPJ) President 
Ichiro Ozawa is trying to intensify the party's offensive against 
the government and ruling parties with his UN-centered logic 
regarding the controversial question of extending the Maritime 
Self-Defense Force's refueling mission in the Indian Ocean. With 
many DPJ lawmakers unhappy with Ozawa's approach, forming a 
consensus in the party will not be easy. The government's and the 
ruling bloc's plan to introduce a bill on new legislation to the 
Diet is likely to be delayed to next week or later. 
 
In yesterday's Budget Committee session, Liberal Democratic Party 
lawmaker Gen Nakatani criticized Ozawa's statement that a DPJ 
government would allow the country to join the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Nakatani said: 
"According to the Cabinet Legislation Bureau's interpretation of the 
Constitution, Japan is not allowed to take part in an operation 
involving the use of force even if that is endorsed by a UN 
resolution." 
 
Troops from 37 countries, mostly NATO members, are taking part in 
the ISAF, established based on UN Security Council Resolution 1386. 
Involving the use of armed force, the mission has cost those 
countries many lives. 
 
Despite that, Ozawa still argues that Japan should join the ISAF as 
a means of contributing to the international community. This comes 
from his belief that the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) should take part 
even in dangerous UN operations, as necessary. Ozawa is also eager 
to send troops to UN peacekeeping operations (PKO) in strife-ridden 
in Sudan. 
 
What lies behind Ozawa's statement is his judgment that there is 
nothing legally wrong with the SDF joining UN-authorized operations 
even if they involve military action. The logic is that joining UN 
resolution-based operations does not constitute exercising a 
sovereign right of the state and that such is not constrained by 
Article 9 of the Constitution prohibiting the use of force. He also 
says that whether to actually dispatch the SDF must be determined by 
the government at the time. 
 
TOKYO 00004746  008 OF 017 
 
 
 
The government and ruling parties do not subscribe to Ozawa's logic, 
saying it contravenes the Constitution. Ishiba told the Budget 
Committee: "The SDF cannot join (the ISAF) unless the constitutional 
interpretation is altered." 
 
Ozawa also says that SDF missions overseas must be strictly 
restricted when there is no UN resolution. That is why Ozawa opposes 
the MSDF refueling naval vessels of the United States and other 
countries engaged in the war in Afghanistan. His view is that the 
MSDF's logistical support for the war in Afghanistan that began 
without a UN resolution constitutes exercising the right to 
collective self-defense, which is prohibited according to the 
government's constitutional interpretation. 
 
Many DPJ lawmakers do not agree with Ozawa's logic. A senior DPJ 
lawmaker thinks it is difficult to include ISAF participation in a 
counterproposal to new legislation, for discussions on specifics 
might put strain on the leftists in the party and the united front 
with the Japanese Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party. 
 
As an alternative plan, there are moves in the party to recommend 
allowing the SDF to extend logistical support to the ISAF or joining 
the provincial reconstruction team (PRT), a military-civilian effort 
to improve security. 
 
Nevertheless, they are more dangerous than a PKO and require a 
review of the five principles of PKO participation, including the 
conclusion of a cease-fire agreement between warring parties. 
 
To make a clear distinction and keep rejecting talks with the LDP, 
Ozawa seems to be playing up his stock argument, knowing that it 
might cause friction within the party. 
 
Ozawa has been developing his stock argument on how Japan should 
contribute to the international community, contributing his essay to 
the latest issue of the monthly magazine Sekai that went on sale on 
Oct. 9. 
 
His view is that even if they involve the use of force, taking part 
in operations based on a UN Security Council resolution transcends 
the right to self-defense, a sovereign right of the nation, and that 
such is not constrained by Article 9 of the Constitution. Japan is 
allowed to exercise the right to self-defense either when the 
country comes under a direct armed attack or when the country might 
come under an armed attack following a contingency in areas 
surrounding Japan. 
 
Japan is not allowed to join the exercising of the right to 
self-defense by other countries that lacks a UN resolution. 
Therefore, the SDF refueling operation for assisting America's war 
in Afghanistan that started without a direct UN resolution is 
unconstitutional. Japan is allowed to join the dangerous ISAF in 
Afghanistan and PKO in Sudan because they are based on UN 
resolutions. 
 
In contrast, the government's view is that under Article 9, the SDF 
is not allowed to use force overseas irrespective of UN 
resolutions. 
 
(6) Japan to continue economic sanctions against DPRK for another 
half year; Many hurdles lie ahead for Japan to clear before dialogue 
 
TOKYO 00004746  009 OF 017 
 
 
possible with DPRK 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
October 10, 2007 
 
The Fukuda administration decided at a cabinet meeting yesterday to 
extend the duration of the economic sanctions now imposed on North 
Korea for another half a year. Although Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda 
has made clear his intention to attach importance to dialogue with 
North Korea in order to resolve the nuclear and abduction issues, 
Pyongyang is bound to react negatively to this decision. During the 
recent inter-Korea summit meeting, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il 
reportedly said that "there are no more Japanese abductees in North 
Korea." This remark is creating a stir, making the prospects for 
Japan-North Korea bleak. 
 
According to a source familiar with the Japanese and South Korean 
governments, the recent inter-Korea summit meeting devoted a certain 
amount of time to discussing Japan-North Korea relations. President 
Roh Moo Hyun reportedly said that "Japan and North Korea should 
resolve their pending issues and improve their relations." 
Reportedly, Kim indicated discontent, arguing: "I made efforts to 
resolve the abduction issue by jointly working with former Prime 
Minister Junichiro Koizumi to come out with the Pyongyang 
Declaration, but the responses Japan later took only disappointed 
me." 
 
DPRK grabs information that Japan would continue sanction measures 
 
Speaking of the Japanese abductees, Kim reportedly proclaimed that 
"there are no other Japanese abductees than the five (who have 
already returned to Japan)." Roh reportedly urged Kim to mend 
relations with Japan, explaining that Prime Minister Fukuda's 
foreign policy could meet his expectations. In response, Kim 
reportedly said: "Then, I'd like to wait and see how Mr. Fukuda will 
act from now on." 
 
Reportedly, Kim had already grasped the information that the 
Japanese government would soon act to extend the term of economic 
sanctions now imposed on the North. In this regard, Roh reportedly 
gave an account to Kim this way: "You must consider how strong 
public opinion is in Japan." 
 
Prime Minister Fukuda served as chief cabinet secretary in September 
2002, when then Prime Minister Koizumi visited the North and signed 
the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration. Since taking office as 
prime minister, Fukuda has mentioned the need for dialogue (with the 
North), giving consideration to the North, which has called for 
"settling past issues," including Japan's colonial rule of Korea. 
 
Japan's North Korea policy "would dramatically change" under the 
Fukuda administration, a government source noted, while adding, 
"Japan will return to the Koizumi administration's line of placing 
importance on the Pyongyang Declaration, from the Abe administration 
line of aiming at having the North Korean regime collapse by putting 
the screws to it." 
 
However, it will not be an easy task to bridge the gaps between 
Japan and North Korea. In response to the North's firing a barrage 
of ballistic missiles at the Sea of Japan and its nuclear test, both 
of which occurred last year, Japan independently imposed sanctions 
on the North and afterwards took the lead in the UNSC for UN 
 
TOKYO 00004746  010 OF 017 
 
 
sanctions on the North. At one point someone in the Japanese 
government suggested using aid to the flood-hit North Korea as a 
means to improve relations with it, but the Abe administration put 
that idea on hold in line with the Prime Minister's Official 
Residence's judgment. 
 
DPRK likely to take a wait-and-see attitude for a while 
 
Late yesterday Fukuda was asked by reporters about extending the 
term of the sanctions on the North. He said: "Japan decided to 
impose (the sanctions) at a time when (there was no progress on the 
abduction issue). So, I don't think even if Japan decides to 
continue them, it would not affect bilateral negotiations." On the 
other hand, the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan 
(Chongryon) released a statement blasting Japan. The statement said: 
"It is a serious act that betrays our trust of Japan. It has become 
clear who has stood in the way of dialogue between the DPRK and 
Japan." 
 
North Korea regards Japan's economic strength as a necessary element 
for it to maintain its current system. But the North has shown no 
signs of making a move at this time because it cannot read what 
action Japan will take. A source familiar with Japan-ROK relations 
took this view: "North Korea is likely to take time to assess how 
serious the Fukuda administration is about resuming a dialogue with 
it." 
 
(7) Editorial: Continuation of sanctions against DPRK 
 
MAINICHI (Page 5) (Full) 
October 10, 2007 
 
The government at a cabinet meeting yesterday decided to extend by 
six months its economic sanctions against North Korea. Japan's basic 
stance is that there can be no normalization of ties between Japan 
and North Korea without a settlement of the abduction issue. Since 
there has been no concrete progress on the abduction issue, the 
government cannot help but continue its sanctions. 
 
Following the missile launches last July and the nuclear test last 
October by North Korea, the government has independently imposed 
sanctions against that nation. The sanctions include a ban on 
imports of all goods from that nation and a ban on port calls by all 
of its ships. The government has extended the ban once again this 
time, following the first extension in April. 
 
Financial sanctions, including the freeze on bank accounts held by 
missile-related companies and individuals and the ban on exports of 
luxury goods, introduced following the adoption of a resolution by 
the United Nation's Security Council (UNSC), will also be kept in 
place. 
 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Machimura gave two reasons for the 
continuation of those sanctions: (1) no progress on the abduction 
issue; and (2) various other factors, including the nuclear issue. 
Given the fact that Japan's sanctions against North Korea are meant 
to apply pressure on the nation because of its nuclear issue, a 
concern commonly harbored by the international community, and the 
abduction issue involving Japan and that nation, the reasons given 
by Machimura are only natural. 
 
Regarding the nuclear issue, participants in the six-party talks 
 
TOKYO 00004746  011 OF 017 
 
 
reached an agreement in early this month that North Korea disable 
its three nuclear facilities by December 31 this year and declare 
all of its nuclear development programs. Though there are still some 
deficiencies in the agreement, the six-party talks have gotten 
underway in the run-up to the implementation of these second-phase 
steps by North Korea before year's end. 
 
In the meantime, there has been no concrete progress on the 
abduction issue. The government has officially recognized 17 
abduction victims, of whom 12 have not yet returned home.  Aside 
from these people, there are many other missing persons whose 
disappearances are probably related to North Korea. 
 
General Secretary Kim Jong Il pledged to reinvestigate the 
whereabouts of abduction victims, who are said to have died or whose 
whereabouts is reportedly unknown. However, the authenticity of most 
of the material evidence, data and records North Korea produced 
later was dubious. In addition, Kim during the inter-Korean summit 
last week said, "There are no more Japanese abductees." This was 
revealed by a South Korean official who joined President Roh Moo 
Hyun on his visit to North Korea for the summit. 
 
North Korea may oppose Japan continuing its sanctions. However, 
before opposing Japan's decision, it should make a sincere response 
in order to make a breakthrough in the abduction issue. If Kim's 
remark that there are no more Japanese abductees is true, he must 
fulfill his accountability, producing evidence to that effect. 
 
The Japanese side must not impose sanctions for the sake of imposing 
sanctions. North Korea has begun showing a delicate change in its 
stance with eye on holding talks, as can be seen in that it during a 
bilateral working group meeting last month avoided using the 
expression "the abduction issue has been settled." Japan should make 
efforts to promote talks, by valuing this incipient change. 
 
Japan should calmly continue its sanctions until North Korea makes a 
sincere response. However, circumstances in North Korea and the 
effects of the sanctions have changed from the time when the 
sanctions were launched. Cooperation with the US and South Korea is 
increasingly becoming important. 
 
(8) Day of nightmare of "nuclear umbrella" disappearing 
 
SANKEI (Page 1) (Excerpts) 
October 5, 2007 
 
In 2009, North Korea would succeed in test-firing the long-range 
ballistic missile, "Taepodong 2." It then would declare: "We are now 
capable of attacking the United States. It is also possible for us 
now to arm our missiles with nuclear warheads." The US would call on 
the United Nations to slap sanctions against the North, but China 
would insist: "Sanctions are not necessary." Reconnaissance planes 
would be rapidly mobilized from US military bases in Okinawa. 
 
Needless to say, this scenario is fanciful. It was dreamed up as a 
computer simulation by experts on security issues from Japan and the 
US meeting in Tokyo this July to game a possible crisis on the 
Korean Peninsula. 
 
However, North Korea actually fired missiles in July of last year 
and carried out a nuclear test last October. It has also been 
reported that North Korea is developing a new missile dubbed the 
 
TOKYO 00004746  012 OF 017 
 
 
"Musudan." As it stands, the North has continued provocative acts 
toward the international community. The gap between reality and 
virtual reality is certainly narrowing. 
 
National Defense Academy President Professor Fumio Ota, who oversaw 
the simulation, said: "It thought it was necessary to consider how 
the US, China, and South Korea would respond to a nuclear or missile 
crisis from North Korea and what Japan should do in such a case." 
 
Officials responsible for defense affairs are worried most about a 
case in which Pyongyang succeeds in producing a nuclear ballistic 
missile capable of attacking the US. 
 
It has been believed that Japan's safety has been ultimately 
guaranteed by the US' "nuclear umbrella," as well as by the presence 
of US forces in Japan. However, many persons now wonder if the 
Pentagon would respond to seriously protect Japan's security in 
earnest if and when China or North Korea develop a nuclear missile 
that can reach the US. 
 
When Ota asked this question to a former high-ranking US official in 
February of last year, that person replied: "I can neither say 'yes' 
nor 'no'." "It was a shocking answer to me," Ota said. 
 
Japan first came to question the "nuclear umbrella" when China's 
moves to build up its strategic nuclear force were noticed. 
 
After all, security and water are not provided free of charge. Even 
in the Japan-US Security Treaty, the US does not necessarily commit 
itself to unconditionally using armed force (to protect Japan). 
Article 5 of the treaty specifies that the US will move to protect 
Japan only when the US judges the action will be in its interest. 
 
Since the regime under DPRK leader Kim Jong Il, unlike China, is 
developing nuclear weapons for its survival, there is the 
possibility that it might take a self-destructive step by attacking 
Japan. Moreover, the North is a dictatorship that has committed 
illegal acts without mercy, so there is a probability that nuclear 
deterrence will not normally function with that country, as it did 
with Russia in the cold-war era. 
 
Under such conditions, if the North launches a nuclear attack on 
Japan, will the US be able to retaliate against it, sacrificing 
residents of the West Coast, such as California? 
 
The organizer for the July simulation tried to add this scenario: 
The US might abandon its nuclear umbrella. But based on the judgment 
this scenario will inevitably give a great shock to parties 
concerned, the organizer decided to remove it just before the event. 
Japan does not want to think about the day of the nuclear umbrella 
disappearing. 
 
Danger of leaving deterrent function in others' hands 
 
Beijing has fiercely pressed North Korea to return to the six-party 
talks since the North forcibly carried out a nuclear test (last 
October). 
 
China's pressure on the North might be stemming from a desire to 
prevent the US from taking hasty military action against that 
country. Should the US military launch a strike on the North, 
hundreds of thousands of refugees would flow into China. A military 
 
TOKYO 00004746  013 OF 017 
 
 
occupation of North Korea by the US forces is a security nightmare 
for China. 
 
Meanwhile, China is concerned about the possibility of Japan, a huge 
economic power, becoming a nuclear power by developing its own 
weapons. For Beijing, Japan's nuclear capability is far more 
terrible than North Korea going nuclear. 
 
To prevent Japan and the US from making such moves, China needs to 
assume the initiative in the six-party talks. Japan, however, is not 
a normal country. The fact that Japan has not discussed a nuclear 
option openly and widely has alarmed Beijing. 
 
Then Liberal Democratic Party Policy Research Council Chairman 
Shoichi Nakagawa said last October: "It should be acceptable to 
discuss Japan's option for nuclear arms." This remark, however, 
triggered fierce criticism. Even former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, 
who has an understanding about nuclear disputes, had to put the 
issue under seal, saying, "I will not place the issue on the 
agenda." 
 
Reactions to discussing Japan's nuclear option reflect the view that 
although defending the nation is acceptable, deterrence should be 
left in the hands of others. 
 
Kenneth Waltz, an expert on US nuclear power, has written an article 
titled, "Heading toward nuclear peace," in which he denies the 
common idea that Europe's strong defense capability worked to stave 
off an attack from the Soviet Union. According to Waltz, not defense 
capability but the capability to punish an enemy contributes to 
deterring attacks. 
 
Assuming that only nuclear weapons can successfully deal with a 
nuclear threat, what options are left for Japan, besides 
independently developing a nuclear capability, if the "nuclear 
umbrella" becomes dysfunctional for Japan's security? The following 
three options come to the fore through discussion with experts on US 
nuclear strategy: 
 
Japan should: (1) rent a nuclear testing site in the US under the 
Japan-US alliance and possess its own nuclear weapons (British 
type); (2) reinforce the "nuclear umbrella" by bringing in nuclear 
weapons from the US (former Western Germany type); or (3) coexist 
with nuclear weapons of North Korea and China without having its own 
ones (coexistence type). 
 
Ota is alarmed: "Unless Japan prepares response measures assuming 
every situation, the Japan-US alliance might disintegrate." No 
progress has been made on North Korea's denuclearization. On the 
contrary, there is even the feeling that the US might vaguely 
tolerate North Korea's nuclearization. 
 
Japan is a strange country in which discussing a nuclear option is 
not allowed. In this case, there is no other means for now but for 
Japanese politicians to make efforts to make the "joint illusion" of 
the US' nuclear deterrence more solid. In a Japan-US summit, Japan 
should take up the "nuclear umbrella" as an official agenda item and 
declare: "Japan will never give up its nuclear option as long as the 
North continues nuclear development programs." 
 
By doing so, Japan should draw out a stronger "nuclear umbrella" 
from the US, with the aim of strengthening its deterrent capability 
 
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and protecting the safety and prosperity of its people. 
 
(By Akio Takahata, Hiroshi Yuasa) 
 
(9) Japan follows in China's wake in dealing with Burma 
 
SANKEI (Page 6) (Slightly abridged) 
October 10, 2007 
 
Kinya Fujimoto, Bangkok 
 
Japan, like China and India, is expected by the international 
community to use its influence on the military junta in Myanmar 
(Burma). To be sure, Japan has maintained close ties with that 
country since the days when it had been called Burma. But Japan 
lacks special personal ties with Burma at present because of a 
generational change in the military junta. Instead, Japan has 
recently been following in the footsteps of China in its diplomacy. 
Relations between Japan and Burma have been historically portrayed 
as something very special, but it seems time for Japan to depart 
from this illusion. 
 
The international community expects Japan as a major aid-donor to 
put pressure on Burma. Japan has been Burma's top aid donor among 
the industrial nations since the 1990s. 
 
However, Japan in principle halted new projects under its official 
development assistance (ODA) program since 2003, when the 
pro-democratic leader Aung San Suu Kyi was again placed under house 
arrest. Japan's annual ODA disbursements to Burma have dropped 
accordingly to 3 billion yen or so, one-tenth of the amount Japan 
gave at the end of the 1980s. In this regard, a diplomatic source 
commented: "Even if aid from Japan to Burma stopped, there would 
little effect on that country." 
 
Nonetheless, other countries expect Japan to put pressure on Burma, 
given the special relationship between the two countries in 
historical terms. 
 
During Burma's struggle for independence from Britain in 1948, the 
so-called "30 Comrades," including General Aung San, father of Suu 
Kyi, and former President Ne Win, played an important part. In the 
early 1940s, those 30 Comrades received military training from the 
Imperial Japanese Army on Hainan Island and later organized the 
Burma Independence Army (BIA), the predecessor of the current 
Burmese Forces. 
 
These past circumstances contributed greatly to cementing ties 
between Burma and Japan. Close relations continued from the 1960s 
through the 1990s, during which Ne Win was in power. In those days, 
the Japanese side was able to meet with whoever the ranking 
officials of Burma might be. 
 
But with the death of Ne Win in 2002, generational change followed, 
and bilateral ties between Burma and Japan changed completely. 
 
What disappointed the Burmese military junta most is reportedly when 
Japan sided with the United States on the question of whether to put 
the Burmese issue on the agenda of the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) and then voted for the issue being on the agenda. 
Since then Japan's influence on Burma has been on the decline. In 
fact, when the Japanese ambassador to Burma hosted a party at the 
 
TOKYO 00004746  015 OF 017 
 
 
end of last year, joining it from the Burmese military junta was a 
vice foreign minister instead of a foreign minister. 
 
In contrast, when the Chinese ambassador to Burma held a party in 
September of last year, the State Peace and Development Council's 
(SPDC) First Secretary Thein Sein, the number four leader of the 
military junta, attended the party. China is now received most 
warmly by the military junta in Burma. 
 
Recently, Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Mitoji Yabunaka visited 
Burma and asked the junta to allow him to meet with Suu Kyi, but his 
request was brushed aside, giving the impression that Japan no 
longer receives red-carpet treatment, unlike the days when Ne Win 
was in power. 
 
The Japanese government, however, remains unable to clamp down on 
the junta, feeling that if it did so, it would only drive the junta 
closer to China. 
 
Perhaps out of this concern, Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka 
Machimura said onf Sept. 26: "I wonder whether it is a good policy 
to simply join hands with the US and European nations to criticize 
(Burma)." Japan, however, has no strong diplomatic tools to leverage 
the junta. 
 
"The Japanese government appears weak-kneed, despite the death of a 
Japanese cameraman, because of the junta's armed crackdown," a 
member of a support group for Burma in Bangkok said. The 
international audience pays close attention as to how Japan responds 
to Burma. 
 
(10) How about food safety? BSE (Part 3): Local governments opposed 
to review of blanket testing 
 
ASAHI (Page 3) (Full) 
October 10, 2007 
 
All 1.21 million head of cattle being raised in Japan in FY2006 
underwent BSE testing under the blanket inspection requirement. 
 
At the Tokyo Central Wholesale Meat Market (Minato Ward), the 
nation's largest meat-processing plant, biopsies start at 07:30 a.m. 
before animals are killed and disassembled. The severed heads are 
delivered to the Shibaura Meat Sanitary Inspection Station in the 
market to check the extracted medullas, in which abnormal prions 
causing BSE tend to accumulate, using a specific reagent chemical. 
 
This station tested about 94,000 cows in FY2006, but there was none 
that tested positive. Inspection Department Head Kotoe Ando proudly 
said: "We have established a system under which infected cows are 
not overlooked, though it is painstaking work." 
 
There is a move to review this blanket testing system. Based on the 
judgment that testing is unnecessary for cattle 20 months of age or 
younger, the government has decided to discontinue subsidies to 
cover the full amount of testing costs (approximately 200 million 
yen) for local governments. In response, local governments that 
house many livestock breeders have fiercely reacted, one assailing: 
"Consumers will feel uneasy." Miyazaki and Wakayama have decided to 
independently continue the blanket-testing system. 
 
The government's new policy is based on the report with 
 
TOKYO 00004746  016 OF 017 
 
 
recommendations issued in 2005 by the Food Safety Commission under 
the Cabinet Office. The report noted that the results of testing 
more than 4 million cows showed that if the brain and spinal cord 
were removed, the risk of BSE to humans was very small. 
 
Although some local governments show an understanding of the 
contents of the report, they intend to continue blanket testing out 
of consideration to livestock farmers. They also want to reassure 
consumers of the safety of beef. Sanitary Management Division Head 
Yuichi Nagashima of the Miyazaki prefectural government, which 
decided to keep the blanket-testing system, also commented: "I think 
cattle 20 months of age or younger are BSE-free, but many do not 
think so. We do not want consumers to feel ill at ease." 
 
(Corrected copy) How about food safety? BSE (Part 1): Antipathy 
deep-seated among Japanese consumers to increasing US beef on 
shelves 
 
ASAHI (Page 3) (Full) 
October 8, 2007 
 
We see beef that bear tags reading "delicious and safe" and 
"American beef" on retail store shelves recently. 
 
The leading supermarket chain Seiyu began this March placing US beef 
on the store shelves after the government lifted a ban on imports 
levied in reaction to the discovery of the first case of BSE in the 
United States in December 2003. Makoto Ishimi, a buyer of livestock 
products, said that a growing number of consumers want to have 
cheap, juicy US beef. 
 
Other leading supermarkets followed Seiyu, with Ito-Yokado Co. and 
Uny Co. resuming US beef in June and the Daiei Co. in August. The 
total volume of imported US beef jumped from about 2,000 tons until 
May to about 4,000 tons in August. 
 
For US beef, Japan has set the requirements of exporting only beef 
from cattle 20 months of age or younger and removing specified risk 
materials (SRM) such as the brain and spinal cord. At ports and 
airports in Japan, quarantine officers carry out sampling 
inspections. 
 
Nonetheless, vertebral columns were found in a veal shipment from 
the US only one month after the ban on imports was lifted in later 
2005, underscoring the sloppiness of US processing procedures. Japan 
again imposed a ban on US beef imports for six months. Under such a 
situation, Seiyu dispatched its employees to the plants certified to 
export beef to it, and they reportedly confirmed that the plants 
have introduced a double check system for SRM removal. 
 
Again, though, inspectors discovered the internal organs and the 
tongues from cattle of uncertain age in US veal shipments this 
spring in quarantining beef from another dealer. Consumers now have 
strong antipathy to the safety of US beef. 
 
Although US beef imports certainly increased, the volume still 
remains low, since annual domestic demand in Japan is 800,000 tons. 
While Japan was restricting US beef imports, beef from Australia 
sharply increased. Now, seven times more beefs have been imported 
from Australia than those from the US. The US is calling on Japan to 
ease its import requirements, but it is questionable that the US 
will be able to stimulate demand in Japan for its beef when Japanese 
 
TOKYO 00004746  017 OF 017 
 
 
consumers are still harboring a strong distrust in the product. 
 
DONOVAN