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Viewing cable 07STATE146856, 2007:COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07STATE146856 2007-10-19 23:36 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Secretary of State
VZCZCXRO4783
PP RUEHAG RUEHAO RUEHAP RUEHAT RUEHBC RUEHBI RUEHBL RUEHBZ RUEHCD
RUEHCHI RUEHCI RUEHCN RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDF RUEHDT RUEHDU
RUEHED RUEHEL RUEHFK RUEHFL RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHGH RUEHGI RUEHGR RUEHHA
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RUEHROV RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHTRO RUEHVC RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHC #6856/01 2922347
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 192336Z OCT 07
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 6356
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 STATE 146856 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC EFIN KCRM PTER KHLS AEMR
SUBJECT: 2007:COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 
 
REF:  STATE 145633 
 
NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION. 
 
1. This message provides preparation guidance for 
preparing the 2007 Country Reports on Terrorism (CRT). 
 
2. We recommend that "Country Reports on Terrorism 2006" 
be the starting point for this year's exercise. Per 
reftel, the Department requests that posts draft narrative 
submissions, as opposed to the itemized format used 
through 2005, and that you post submissions on 
intellipedia.  Three examples of the kind of reporting we 
seek are in paragraph 12. 
 
3. Per reftel, for the 2007 CRT, we will not/not accept 
Post submissions in the itemized format. Please note the 
proper URL for setting up your passport account is: 
https://passport.csp.sgov.gov/passport/servle t/Passport. 
(In reftel, "gov" was misspelled as "goli". We regret any 
confusion this may have caused.) 
 
4. Posts' submissions must be UNCLASSIFIED.  Although the 
Department is authorized to provide a separate classified 
supplement to its report to Congress, past reports were 
unclassified.  If posts find it necessary or useful to 
 
SIPDIS 
provide classified information or commentary, they should 
classify such material separately by paragraph. 
 
5. Each post is requested to report major political 
developments or changes likely to have an impact on the 
ability of terrorists to attack or operate in the relevant 
country, including using it as a safe haven.  We also ask 
you to report changes or trends that emerge when comparing 
local developments in terrorism/counterterrorism in 2007 
versus 2006. 
 
6. Submissions are due NLT December 21. Since the report 
covers calendar year 2007, any significant developments 
occurring after post submission should be addressed in an 
addendum for submission during the first three weeks of 
2008.  Please note that The Department must transmit the 
2007 report to Congress by April 28, 2008.  Given the 
necessary clearance and coordination processes, the 
inflexible printing schedule, and the short lead time 
between the end of the calendar year and the April 30 
deadline for submission to Congress, we are under strict 
time constraints to incorporate your contributions into a 
product that is the definitive USG public document on 
international terrorism. 
 
7. Please note that 2007 preparation instructions for the 
Country Reports on Terrorism (CRT), with any necessary 
updates, are available on Intellipedia-S on CLASSNet as 
part at the following link: 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Country_Rep orts_on_Terro 
rism_2007_Preparation_Instructions. These instructions are 
also on the unclassified State Department intranet site: 
http://intranet.state.gov, at the Directory tab under the 
heading  "Related Resources".  Instructions include: 
 
(a) legislation and mandated requirements; 
 
(b) a 2007 CRT requirements checklist; 
 
(c) style guidelines (voice, spelling, transitional 
language, etc.)  We urge you to review these guidelines, 
because we can lose hours of time on continuity issues, 
such as the spelling of al-Qaida, Hizballah, 
counterterrorism (one word), and safe haven (two words). 
 
8. The Department will depend on posts' contributions to 
meet our requirements and will also work closely with the 
National Counterterrorism Center to compile all requested 
information.  We ask Posts to consider four distinct (but 
sometimes overlapping) categories of information: 
 
-- General Assessment 
-- Sanctuary (Safe Havens) Assessment 
-- Terrorist Groups 
-- Foreign Government Cooperation 
 
Each post should review the description of each category 
of information below to determine if last year's report 
requires updating. 
 
9. GENERAL ASSESSMENT. The annual Country Reports on 
Terrorism (CRT) is required to include detailed 
 
STATE 00146856  002 OF 006 
 
 
assessments on each foreign country (a) in which acts of 
international terrorism of major significance occurred; 
(b) that is currently designated as a state sponsor of 
terrorism (Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan and Syria); or 
(c) that is otherwise determined by the Secretary to be 
subject to the report. 
 
(SBU/NOFORN) This should include: 
 
--A review of the country's major counterterrorism 
efforts. An analysis of trends in international terrorism 
in each country, including changes in the technology 
terrorists used, methods and targets of attack, 
demographic information on terrorists, and other 
appropriate information. 
 
Only leadership steps taken in international fora need be 
included. We include a matrix of which countries are 
signatories to the thirteen international agreements and 
protocols, so this information need not be included in 
Post submission. 
 
-- The response of the judicial system in each country 
relating to terrorism affecting U.S. citizens or 
facilities that have a significant impact on U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts, including responses to 
extradition requests. 
 
-- Significant support, if any, for international 
terrorism, and particularly to specific terrorist or 
umbrella groups, to include: 
 
a.  political and financial support; 
b.  diplomatic support through diplomatic recognition and 
diplomatic privileges; 
c.  providing safe haven to terrorists or terrorist groups 
(i.e., groups actively engaged in international 
terrorism); 
d.  providing weapons of mass destruction, or assistance 
in obtaining or developing such weapons, to terrorists or 
terrorist groups; 
e. positions (such as voting records) on matters relating 
to terrorism in the UNGA and other international bodies. 
 
10. SAFE HAVEN ASSESSMENTS.  Please include detailed 
assessments with respect to each foreign country being 
used as a safe haven for terrorists or terrorist 
organizations.  These assessments should include: 
 
-- The extent of knowledge by the government of the 
country with respect to terrorist activities on the 
territory of the country. 
 
-- The actions of the country: 
a.  to eliminate any terrorist safe haven in its 
territory, 
b.  to cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism efforts, and 
c.  to prevent the proliferation of and trafficking in WMD 
in and through the territory of the country. 
Note:  If safe haven does not apply to your country, there 
is no need to state that. 
 
11. INFORMATION ON TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. This 
information should be updated in Chapter 6, "Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations."  This information could be 
referenced, but not repeated, in your country narrative. 
 
12. Please include information about activities that 
occurred in 2007 of any terrorist group (i.e.,. any group 
actively practicing, or which has significant subgroups 
which practice, international terrorism) and any umbrella 
group that is: 
 
a.  known to be responsible for the kidnapping or death of 
a U.S. citizen during the preceding five years; 
b.  known to have obtained or developed, or to have 
attempted to obtain or develop, weapons of mass 
destruction; 
c.  known to be financed by a designated state sponsor of 
terrorism; 
d.  a designated foreign terrorist organization; or 
e.  a known terrorist group which the Secretary of State 
believes should be included in the report. 
f. Posts are invited to offer assessments of additional 
groups they may recommend be subject to the report; where 
appropriate we will make recommendations to S. 
 
13. In the case of State Sponsors of Terrorism (Cuba, 
Iran, Syria, Sudan, and North Korea), this information 
should include: 
 
-- Significant financial support provided by foreign 
 
STATE 00146856  003 OF 006 
 
 
governments to those groups directly, or provided in 
support of their activities; 
 
-- Provisions of significant military or paramilitary 
training or transfer of weapons by foreign governments to 
those groups; 
 
-- Provision of diplomatic recognition or privileges by 
foreign governments to those groups; 
 
-- Provision by foreign governments of safe haven from 
prosecution to these groups or their members responsible 
for the commission, attempt, or planning of an act of 
international terrorism; 
 
14. INFORMATION ON FOREIGN GOVERNMENT COOPERATION.  The 
CRT should also include the following information 
concerning each foreign country that the U.S. has sought 
cooperation during the previous five years in the 
investigation or prosecution of an act of international 
terrorism against U.S. citizens or interests: 
 
-- The extent to which the government of the country is 
cooperating in apprehending, convicting, and punishing the 
individual(s) responsible for the act. 
 
--The extent to which the government of the country is 
cooperating to prevent further acts of terrorism against 
U.S. citizens in the country.  (This information should 
also be provided with respect to any foreign country from 
whom the U.S. has sought cooperation in the previous five 
years in the prevention of an act of international 
terrorism against U.S. citizens or interests.) 
 
15. Posts should also include important follow-up 
information to major developments from prior years that 
continued into 2005, including resolution or continuation 
of terrorist prosecutions for acts committed in prior 
reporting years. 
 
16. It is important for all posts to draw a distinction 
between host government actions aimed at suppressing 
terrorist activity and those aimed at suppressing 
legitimate political opposition or dissent.  Posts should 
also comment on the counterterrorism efforts of relevant 
regional organizations and groupings for which they may be 
responsible (e.g. OSCE, ASEAN, GCC, and others). 
 
17. We provide the 2006 reports of Uzbekistan, the United 
Kingdom, and Saudi Arabia as possible templates of the 
kind of reporting we seek: 
 
a.  Uzbekistan 
There remained a clear potential for Islamic extremism and 
acts of international terrorism in Uzbekistan. Supporters 
of terrorist groups such as al-Qaida, the Islamic Movement 
of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), and 
the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), were active in 
the region. Members of these groups expressed anti-U.S. 
sentiments and have attacked U.S. interests in the past, 
including a 2004 suicide bombing at the U.S. embassy in 
Tashkent, which was clamed by the Islamic Jihad Group 
(IJU), now the IJU. U.S. Government personnel and 
facilities continued to operate at a heightened state of 
alert. 
The Government of Uzbekistan did not provide safe haven 
for terrorists or terrorist organizations. However, the 
country's poor economic climate and repressive government 
policies created conditions in which large portions of the 
population were increasingly susceptible to extremist 
ideologies. Uzbekistan's porous borders, particularly in 
the Ferghana Valley, allowed for people and illicit goods 
to move in and out of the country with relative freedom. 
The government responded to these threats with even more 
repressive actions against regime opponents and those it 
deemed to be religious extremists. However, it failed to 
address the conditions terrorists might exploit to gain 
popular support and recruits for their cause. Although 
Uzbekistan was among the first states to support U.S. 
efforts in the War on Terror, the Government of Uzbekistan 
ended virtually all counterterrorism cooperation with the 
United States in mid-2005. In November 2005, the United 
States fully vacated, at Uzbekistan's request, the Karshi- 
Khanabad airbase. Authorization for U.S. aircraft to 
overfly Uzbekistani territory ended in January 2006, 
although an agreement was signed in November allowing 
Department of Defense-contracted civilian aircraft to 
overfly Uzbekistan on a fee-per-flight basis. 
Tashkent hosted the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's 
(SCO) Regional Antiterrorism Center Secretariat (RATS), 
which claimed to have begun to focus on operational 
activities such as developing a coordinated list of 
 
STATE 00146856  004 OF 006 
 
 
terrorist groups and facilitating joint counterterrorism 
exercises among SCO member states. In the past, the 
government participated in UNODC and OSCE programs aimed 
at ensuring that it enacted appropriate terrorism 
legislation. However, Uzbekistani participation in these 
programs has virtually ended, and the government has made 
little progress in this regard. 
b. United Kingdom 
There were no successful terrorist attacks in the United 
Kingdom in 2006. In August, British, Pakistani, and 
American officials worked together to disrupt a terror 
plot involving British citizens intent on detonating 
aircraft traveling between the United Kingdom and the 
United States. The British government arrested over 20 
individuals suspected of being involved in that plot, many 
of whom were subsequently charged with criminal acts and 
intent to carry out acts of terrorism. Their cases 
remained before the courts. Some of those arrested had 
spent time in or had ties to Pakistan. The British and 
American governments instituted new restrictions to 
transatlantic airline travel in response to the revealed 
airline plot. The United States and United Kingdom enjoyed 
a wide-range of bilateral information sharing on threat 
assessments and terror networks, and government responses 
to both. Cooperation in derailing the transatlantic terror 
plot in August was evidence of the ability of the two 
governments to work together, in real-time, to avert loss 
of life from terrorism. 
The British government acknowledged the existence of some 
200 known terror networks in the United Kingdom. In 
November, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, head of the 
domestic security service (known as MI5), made a stark 
announcement that there were some "1,600" individuals, 
"200 networks," and an estimated "30 terror plots" in the 
United Kingdom. The British government viewed 
radicalization of young people in the U.K. and elsewhere, 
regardless of whether those radicalized in the U.K. had 
ties to AQ or are "homegrown," as a growing threat to 
international and British security. 
The government enacted new counterterrorism legislation 
that made the "glorification of terrorism" illegal, and 
expanded the government's ability to detain terror 
suspects before charging them. The government has a 
mechanism for deporting foreign terror suspects to their 
home countries once those countries agreed to provide 
assurances that the suspects' human rights will not be 
violated upon their return. The courts tried and convicted 
several prominent terror suspects involved in terror plots 
prior to 2006. The British government also increased its 
efforts at outreach to Muslim communities within the U.K. 
It sought to support advocates of moderate interpretations 
of Islam and to gain support from within British Muslim 
communities to counter the appeal of extremist ideology 
and radicalization. 
The United States and the U.K. worked closely within the 
UN and the FATF to deny terrorists and their supporters 
access to the international financial system. The United 
Kingdom had strong legal provisions for freezing assets 
related to terrorist financing, including the Terrorism 
(United Nations Measures) Order 2001, the al-Qaida and 
Taliban (United Nations Measures) Order 2001, and the 
Antiterrorism Crime and Security Act 2001. In October, the 
British government took measures to further strengthen its 
terrorist financing legislation when Chancellor Gordon 
Brown announced that Her Majesty's Treasury, on the advice 
of law enforcement agencies, had agreed to use "closed 
source evidence" (classified materials) in asset freezing 
cases where there were strong operational reasons to 
impose a freeze but insufficient unclassified information 
available. He also announced that the government would 
seek to amend its existing domestic legislation to give 
"the Treasury the power to stop funds reaching anyone in 
the U.K. suspected of planning terror or engaging with 
terror." 
c.  Saudi Arabia 
The Government of Saudi Arabia continued to experience a 
mix of successes and setbacks in its efforts to combat 
terrorism. Government security forces conducted successful 
operations against terrorist cells, capturing or killing 
large numbers of wanted terrorist suspects, as well as 
members of their support networks. The government has made 
some progress in other aspects of its counterterrorism 
effort, such as financing and education, but it still has 
significant ground to cover to address these issues. 
Saudi efforts suffered setbacks with prison breaks and an 
attack that led to the discovery of extensive support 
networks in the Kingdom. Prison escapes occurred in March 
at the al-Kharj prison and in July from al-Malaz jail in 
Riyadh. On February 24, a Saudi-based AQ cell conducted a 
suicide attack utilizing vehicle-borne improvised 
explosive devices on Saudi Aramco's Abqaiq oil 
stabilization and processing facility near Dammam, which 
 
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resulted in the death of two security guards and several 
of the bombers. 
Saudi security forces achieved several successes, both in 
response to these attacks and independently of them. Saudi 
security forces killed or captured all of the members of 
the Abqaiq cell and all but three of the Maraz prison 
escapees.  On August 21, five wanted terrorists 
surrendered in response to government assurances in the 
media that they would receive mitigated sentences. In 
December, the government announced the capture during the 
previous three months of 136 suspected terrorists who were 
involved in terrorist support networks in the Kingdom. 
The Saudi government initiated several programs to support 
its counterterrorism efforts and bolster its campaign 
against extremists. King Abdullah created a special 
security court, the Court of the Divergent, to prosecute 
terrorist suspects.  Interior Minister Prince Nayif gave 
public assurances that the Court would not be a military 
tribunal, but would conform to existing judicial practices 
and law. Additionally, the government began planning a 
border security system, including fences and sensors, to 
prevent infiltration of terrorists or terrorist funding 
into the kingdom.  In December, the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) summit reiterated its calls to criminalize 
terrorism, and called for a comprehensive effort against 
terrorism to include intellectual, social, and educational 
efforts. 
The Saudi government moved to monitor and enforce its 
anti-money laundering and terrorist finance laws, 
regulations, and guidelines. However, it still had not 
established a High Commission for Charities. As in many 
countries in the Middle East, there was still an over- 
reliance on suspicious transaction reporting to generate 
money laundering investigations. Saudi Arabia's 
unwillingness to publicly disseminate statistics regarding 
money laundering prosecutions impeded the evaluation and 
design of enhancements to the judicial aspects of its 
anti-money laundering system. The Saudi government did not 
subject Saudi international charities to the same 
government oversight as domestic charities. In August, the 
UN 1267 Sanctions Committee designated the International 
Islamic Relief Organization's (IIRO) branches in Indonesia 
and the Philippines, and the Kingdom's Eastern Province 
Branch Director, Abdulhamid Al-Mujil. 
In late 2005, the government enacted stricter regulations 
on the cross-border movement of money and precious metals. 
Money and gold in excess of $16,000 must be declared upon 
entry and exit from the country. While the regulations 
were effective immediately, Customs has not issued new 
cash declaration forms, and therefore has not yet been 
able to enforce the current regulation. In the cultural 
arena, official visits by a number of U.S. officials, 
including Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious 
Freedom John Hanford, highlighted the government's efforts 
to remove references in textbooks that called for violence 
against non-Muslims and Muslims of different sects. The 
government also initiated the National Campaign to Counter 
Terrorism, which included publications, lectures, and 
workshops intended to educate school-age girls and boys 
about the evils of terrorism. To promote tolerance, the 
government began revising curricula and teaching methods, 
screening and reevaluating existing teachers, improving 
selection of future teachers, and better monitoring of 
teachers. 
The government continued to require religious leaders to 
attend courses designed to eradicate extremist ideology in 
the mosques and monitor mosque sermons to promote 
tolerance and eliminate extremism. Several religious 
leaders were fired or subjected to punitive actions for 
failure to abide by government instructions to avoid 
provocative speeches against non-Muslims and non-Sunni 
Muslims. In previous years in some mosques, a second 
preacher would appear after the main preacher during the 
Friday prayer and speak provocatively against Jews, 
Americans, or non-orthodox Muslims. This practice is less 
prevalent now, due in large part to the government's 
efforts to combat extremism in the mosques. 
The Saudi government remained engaged in its efforts to 
root out terrorists and their support networks in the 
Kingdom, but continued to face difficulties in combating 
the appeal of AQ ideology. Despite significant efforts and 
successes in the counterterrorism realm, Saudi security 
forces continued to discover new terrorist networks in the 
Kingdom. The Saudi government will need to further address 
the social and religious underpinnings that sustain the 
Saudi form of Islamic extremism. 
 
18. Department greatly appreciates the volume of work that 
goes into post contributions to this effort. S/CT is 
prepared to respond to any and all questions posts may 
have to assist in preparing their contributions. Please 
forward all questions to S/CT Rhonda Shore at 
 
STATE 00146856  006 OF 006 
 
 
shorerh@state.sgov.gov.  We are confident that thanks to 
the information to be provided by posts, this year's 
Country Reports on Terrorism will be the best effort yet 
to explain the continuing threat. 
19. Minimize considered. 
RICE