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DE RUEHC #5598 2902223
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O 172213Z OCT 07
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TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0000

UNCLAS STATE 145598 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL KPKO UN MARR
SUBJECT: USG COMMENTS ON UNDPKO "CAPSTONE DOCTRINE" 
 
REF: MCCURRY/ODELL E-MAILS 
 
¶1. (U) As part of its "peace operations 2010" reforms, 
the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), 
with the help of more than 250 international experts 
meeting in workshops around the world, has developed a 
document that sets out for practitioners the guiding 
principles and core tasks of UN peacekeeping operations. 
Once finalized, this document (the "Capstone Doctrine") 
will be issued as a DPKO publication, and will replace the 
1995 General Guidelines on United Nations Peacekeeping. 
 
 
¶2. (U) Australia, Canada and Japan have all shared their 
views with USUN and/or the Department of State (copies of 
position papers/comments provided to country desks), and 
we understand that the five largest troop-contributing 
countries met this summer to seek a common position. DPKO 
staff working on this paper hope to present a final draft 
to DPKO management on October 22. USUN may give the text 
in paragraph 3 to DPKO and to other delegations as needed, 
for use in discussions, on the understanding that it be 
treated with discretion. 
 
3.(U) U.S. Comments on the Draft UN Peacekeeping Capstone 
Doctrine: 
 
Overview 
 
The U.S. commends the work that has gone into this 
generally excellent document. This will provide an 
invaluable tool for peacekeepers and policy makers. It 
reflects the substantial growth in the size, number and 
mandated tasks of UN peacekeeping operations in the 21st 
century. Missions are now being asked to lay the 
groundwork for sustainable peace, rather than simply to 
monitor and support the early stages of a cease-fire and 
peace agreement. 
 
That said, we believe the document would benefit from more 
precision in its definition of terms and of how it 
addresses the range of activities required to move from 
conflict to stability and even prosperity. Most notably, 
it blurs the Security Council's primacy in determining when 
peacekeeping missions are needed and what their mandates 
should be. 
 
The charts and illustrative figures as we received them 
are confusing and not well-executed. 
 
We would like the opportunity to review Annex 2 (list of 
current mandated tasks) and Annex 3 (Legal Framework for 
UN Peacekeeping Operations) before the document is 
finalized. 
 
 
Introduction and Chapter 1: These segments are a useful, 
concise overview of the changing international 
environment. 
 
Chapter The Spectrum of Peace Operations: The 
definitions provided here are increasingly artificial, 
with considerable overlap and not much added value. 
Although the distinction between "peacekeeping" and "peace 
enforcement" is sometimes used as a form of shorthand, it 
is not particularly useful or meaningful in the UN 
context, and the Security Council does not make such 
distinctions when establishing the mandates of 
peacekeeping operations. A more useful distinction that 
could use discussion or clarification in the text is the 
difference between UN political missions and peacekeeping 
operations. We are not clear what is meant 
by "positive" peace (paragraph 28). We recommend 
mentioning the contribution of bilateral donors and the 
growing body of expertise among donors, governments and 
beneficiary countries on peacebuilding. The document very 
usefully notes the increasing degree to which the various 
elements of peace operations overlap in practice. 
 
Chapter 3: The Role of UN Peacekeeping Operations: This 
is generally clear and helpful. However, it should make 
clear (paragraph 36) that, while the Secretary-General 
recommends modifications to mandate, size and other 
factors 'affecting an operation, it is the Members of the 
Security Council that negotiate and authorize them. 
Further, the Security Council can and does take steps 
without any recommendations from the Secretary-General, and 
is free to reject or accept his proposals. In para 36, we 
note that mandate renewal discussions are another 
Opportunity to make modifications to mandate, personnel 
strength, structure or other aspects of a UN peacekeeping 
operation. We recommend (paragraph 38) that the report 
refer to the restructuring of the "security" forces, not 
the "armed" forces (to include such elements as the 
police), and that it specify "management" as well as 
"distribution" of natural resources. In paragraph 40, we 
recommend that the report include a specific reference to 
the particular vulnerability of women and children. It 
should be noted that the complicating effects of human 
rights abuses on efforts to achieve national 
reconciliation include both psychological and legal 
problems, as well as social disruption. Paragraph 42 
should be amended to read "..better match of capabilities 
to mission requirements and better division of 
responsibilities between and coordination among7 
the various actors involved in responding to post-conflict 
situations. 
 
We have some concerns about how the draft document 
describes the core business of UN peacekeeping 
operations. Specifically, we do not necessarily agree 
that UN peacekeeping operations should remain "..until the 
State is able to assume full responsibility for the 
security of its populations." Each scenario and country 
situation may be different. In general UN peacekeepers 
should maintain a secure and stable environment while 
resources are mustered, plans are developed, and the 
groundwork is laid for the State to resume full 
administration of state functions, including the provision 
of security. 
 
Paragraph 49 is overly broad in its characterization of 
the legal responsibilities of UN entities. We of course 
agree that UN entities (personnel, agencies, and so on) 
should respect and promote human rights. We are 
uncertain, however, of the source of the asserted 
"individual responsibility" of peacekeeping personnel "to 
protect, promote and advocate for human rights", and of 
the basis on which individual peacekeeping personnel (as 
opposed to States) are "bound" by international human 
rights law. We would urge that this paragraph be revised 
to indicate that applicable standards for peacekeepers' 
conduct in relation to human rights arise from UN policies 
rather than from specific requirements under international 
law. Similarly, we note that the assertion that all 
peacekeeping personnel "are bound by international human 
rights law" may be overly broad, in particular because it 
fails to take account of the potential applicability of 
other bodies of law, including international humanitarian 
law, that may serve as the lex specialis in particular 
circumstances and may affect the applicability of 
provisions of human rights law. We expect that these 
issues may be addressed in greater detail in Annex 3 to 
the Capstone Document, addressing the legal framework for 
United Nations peacekeeping operations, and we would 
welcome the opportunity to review and comment on this 
Annex. 
 
Peacekeeping is not a substitute for development 
assistance. We welcome the statement in paragraph 54 
underlining that UN peacekeeping operations are neither 
mandated nor have the resources to engage in long-term 
peacebuilding. Similarly, the discussion in paragraphs 55 
and 56 of UN peacekeeping operations serving a "catalytic" 
role and "laying the foundations" for subsequent 
peacebuilding are to the point. The U.S. also agrees, 
strongly, that resources should be adequate to the 
mandated tasks (paragraph 56); in our view, there has been 
an increasing tendency in recent years to add tasks for 
which the resources (human, technical/logistic or 
financial) may not be available. This point cannot be 
overly stressed. While the draft document 
is very.clear about the distinction between peacekeeping 
and development, as it progresses there are a number of 
instances where that distinction becomes blurred. For' 
 
instance, it should be made clear (paragraph 58 and 
paragraph 59) that support by the peacekeeping operation 
for economic reforms or humanitarian assistance will be 
provided if the Security Council has mandated such 
support. 
 
In a similar vein, peacekeeping resources are not to be 
used to provide material forms of assistance (e.g. goods, 
consumables, money) to the host country. We do not fully 
understand the scope of the "Quick Impact Projects" 
discussed in the box following paragraph 59 and are 
concerned by the suggestion that UN peacekeeping * 
operations may have some general authority to provide " 
financial support" to hOst country institutions funded 
from assessed peacekeeping contributions. We would urge 
that this discussion be revised to reflect the principle 
that funding for material assistance to host country 
institutions must come from traditional aid sources and 
not from the budgets of peacekeeping operations. 
Traditional aid sources must then become more flexible and 
rapid in responding to the myriad tasks and requirements of 
early stages of an operation. To that end, we continue to 
support the concept of the use of 
"Quick Impact Projects" in the earlier stages of an 
operation to facilitate good relations between units and 
the communities in which they are working, and to support 
overall mission objectives. 
 
Chapter 4: Guiding Principles of UN Peacekeeping 
Operations: The distinction made in the proposed 
amplified and longer list of "guiding principles" between 
"credibility" and "legitimacy" is obscure and provides no 
added value. We recommend that the discussion of 
"legitimacy" be removed; if the Security Council has 
mandated the mission, it is by definition "legitimate." 
Its effectiveness and impartiality will determine its 
credibility. We continue to have concerns about the lack 
of clarity and possibility for confusion posed by the word 
"consent." The discussion in the Australian paper is very 
useful on this issue. "Consent" is a complex concept, it 
may be coerced under certain circumstances, and may be 
present at the political level but not fully present in a 
given situation in the field. We support the Australian 
recommendation that the document avoid too much 
specificity about who is giving consent, since any given 
conflict or political situation will contain variables 
that do not meet the model, and those variables are likely 
to change. It is also important to underscore that the 
Security Council, consistent with its authority under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, retains the option of 
authorizing a UN mission even in the absence of the 
consent of the host country. "Restraint in the use of 
force" is a useful formulation, and allows for a gradation 
of responses in accordance with the mandate, rules of 
engagement, and operational realities. We welcome the 
statement that "the use of force always has political 
implications." We note that, as drafted, the discussion 
of use of force issues may suggest limits on the authority 
of peacekeepers to use force in situations of armed 
conflict that are not required by international 
humanitarian law. To the extent that it is UN policy to 
impose such limits on peacekeepers' actions for policy, 
rather than legal, reasons, we suggest that the discussion 
be revised to make this clear. 
 
Chapter 5: Deciding to Deploy a UN Peacekeeping 
Operation: We underline (paragraph 84.) that the Security 
Council determines not only when and where a UN 
peacekeeping operation should be deployed, but also what 
its mandate should be. Overall, the discussion of the 
conditions needed for success is'excellent. 
 
Chapter 6: Planning a UN Peacekeeping Operation: This 
section quite properly focuses on the critical role played 
by good planning and long-term thinking about subsequent 
priorities during stabilization. However, trying to draw 
sharp distinctions between phases of an operation is 
perhaps less useful than speaking of-priorities and how 
they may change as a situation becomes more stable. 
Focusing on priorities also allows identification of other 
means to achieve political or security stability, such as 
through a UN political mission. 
 
Chapter 7; Directing and Supporting UN Peacekeeping 
Operations: We found the direct acknowledgment (paragraph 
118) that levels of authority in UN peacekeeping 
operations are not as clear as they are in military 
organizations to be to the point and helpful. It should 
be made clear in-paragraph 120, as it is later in the 
document, that the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General has authority in country to direct the 
 
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other UN agencies. Also useful is the discussion in 
section 7.2, on UN Logistics and Administrative Support, 
of the possible need to shift focus and resources among 
changing priorities as circumstances changes, and of how 
the budget cycle may not be able to respond rapidly to 
short-term needs. We welcome the particular attention 
called (section 7.4) to the security needs of UN 
international and national staff. 
 
Chapter 8: Management and Integration of UN Peacekeeping 
Operations: This is an excellent exposition. The 
description in this section of the need to work in and 
across a variety of national and organizational cultures 
is succinct, clear and helpful, and underlines how 
problems in this area can undermine the success of a 
 
 
mission. 
 
Chapter 9: Maintaining the Support of the Host 
Population: Another practical, clear section, with 
useful, concrete examples. We would welcome further 
discussion with the Secretariat of the issues related to 
welfare of uniformed personnel and civilian staff raised 
in, paragraph 161. 
RICE