Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07SAOPAULO834, BRAZIL: POLITICAL SCIENTISTS OFFER GLOOMY PROGNOSIS, SEE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07SAOPAULO834.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07SAOPAULO834 2007-10-11 20:02 2011-07-11 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Sao Paulo
VZCZCXRO7366
PP RUEHRG
DE RUEHSO #0834/01 2842002
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 112002Z OCT 07
FM AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7571
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 8681
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 2900
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 3135
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0572
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 2464
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 3515
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 2166
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 8386
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 3835
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 2925
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SAO PAULO 000834 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/BSC, INR/IAA, INR/R/AA 
STATE PASS USTR FOR KATE DUCKWORTH 
NSC FOR TOMASULO 
TREASURY FOR JHOEK 
USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC 
USDOC ALSO FOR 3134/USFCS/OIO 
DOL FOR ILAB 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
USAID FOR LAC/AA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR ECON BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: POLITICAL SCIENTISTS OFFER GLOOMY PROGNOSIS, SEE 
LITTLE HOPE FOR REFORM 
 
REF: (A) BRASILIA 1745; (B) SAO PAULO 749; (C) SAO PAULO 48 
     (D) SAO PAULO 777 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (SBU) At a September 28 lunch with Emboffs, two prominent 
political scientists offered a gloomy outlook on the current 
political situation.  According to them, chances for meaningful 
political reform seem dead, and the ongoing scandals involving 
Senate President Renan Calheiros (ref A) offer all too clear a 
picture of how the incentives and rewards system works for 
politicians.  From the academics' perspective, opposition parties 
are unable to mount a serious challenge to the governing coalition, 
and the likelihood is that, with or without President Lula, the 
forces currently in power will remain there indefinitely.  The two 
experts differed on whether Lula will seek a Constitutional 
amendment to enable him to run for a third term in 2010.  The 
assessment presented by these two analysts reflects a growing 
consensus among the political, media, and business elite in Brazil. 
At this point, however, the growing sense of malaise among the elite 
has not coalesced in any clear call for reform.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (U) Emboffs lunched September 28 with political scientists 
Bolivar Lamounier and Jose Augusto Guilhon de Albuquerque to discuss 
the current political scene.  Both academics have published widely 
on Brazilian political issues; Lamounier taught for many years at 
the University of Sao Paulo (USP) and the Catholic University (PUC) 
and now has his own political consulting firm.  Guilhon de 
Albuquerque, also an USP Professor Emeritus who specialized in 
international affairs, is an advisor to Vaz de Lima, President of 
the Sao Paulo State Legislative Assembly (ALESP).  Both are 
associated with the opposition Social Democracy Party of Brazil 
(PSDB). 
 
---------- 
PSDB BLUES 
---------- 
 
3.  (SBU) Lamounier and Guilhon believe that the current situation, 
in which President Lula's 13-party governing coalition dominates 
Congress and receives little effective opposition from the PSDB and 
its own coalition partner, the Democratic Party (DEM), is bad for 
Brazilian democracy.  The PSDB is in a difficult position for 
various reasons, not the least of which is its inability to oppose 
many of Lula's policies as he has taken many aspects of the PSDB's 
center-left agenda and made it his own.  Opposing Lula would 
therefore be tantamount to renouncing the PSDB's own history and 
record.  The second reason is that the two most prominent PSDB 
leaders, Governors Jose Serra of Sao Paulo and Aecio Neves of Minas 
Gerais, both want to run for President in 2010.  Consummate 
politicians, they both understand the dangers of criticizing a very 
popular sitting president and his administration.  Furthermore, 
political differences aside, both are on friendly terms with Lula 
and don't want to confront or challenge him openly. 
 
4.  (SBU) Lamounier believes that Lula's two main pillars of support 
- his own Workers' Party (PT) and the Brazilian Democratic Movement 
Party (PMDB) - will remain in power for some time to come regardless 
of the outcome of the 2010 presidential election.  These parties 
have entrenched themselves throughout the federal bureaucracy 
through political appointments to various jobs.  There are almost 
 
SAO PAULO 00000834  002 OF 004 
 
 
20,000 non-career "Cargos de Confianca" (positions filled by 
political appointees) in the Executive Branch, including some 4,000 
officials named directly by the President.  In addition, the parties 
are benefiting from a generally strong economy and the popularity of 
social programs like "Bolsa Familia." 
 
5.  (SBU) Compounding the problem is that while most parties don't 
have any viable presidential candidates, the PSDB has two and a half 
- Serra, Neves, and 2006 nominee Geraldo Alckmin - and still no 
democratic system for choosing among them.  (When Serra and Alckmin 
were competing for the party's 2006 presidential nomination, there 
was widespread perception that three PSDB leaders - Neves, former 
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC), and party president Tasso 
Jereissati - were the sole arbiters of the nomination.  While PSDB 
officials insist that the triumvirate consulted extensively with 
many state and local officials and other representatives of the 
party's base before announcing the candidate, the image of the PSDB 
as an undemocratic and elitist party, out of touch with the people, 
has lingered.)  Essentially, the party has too many candidates and 
not enough new ideas, not a recipe for success. 
 
6.  (SBU) Even if the PSDB works through its problems and its 
nominee wins the 2010 presidential election, the PMDB will still 
hold the balance of power, Lamounier said.  The new president will 
have no choice but to seek an alliance with the PMDB, which will 
likely require control over certain Ministries and a large amount of 
pork and patronage.  The PMDB, Lamounier cautioned, is always the 
problem, never the solution, because it has no political identity or 
ideology and exists for the sole purpose of advancing the personal 
interests of its members. 
 
------------------ 
LULA TO RUN AGAIN? 
------------------ 
 
7.  (SBU) Guilhon believes Lula is willing to do whatever is 
necessary to remain in power and may, despite his repeated denials, 
be positioning himself to run for a third term.  He said that in 
light of the paucity of potential candidates of presidential 
stature, the political climate after the 2008 municipal elections 
might permit the PT to introduce the necessary proposal to amend the 
Constitution, and that the PMDB could help garner the votes needed 
for it to pass twice in each house before October 2009.  (Note: Rule 
changes introduced within one year of an election generally do not 
enter into force until the following election.  End Note.) 
Lamounier disagreed, commenting that such a move would make Brazil 
look like Venezuela and would thus be unacceptable to the people, 
the political class, and Lula himself, who prides himself on his 
democratic credentials.  For Lamounier, the question is who will be 
Lula's preferred candidate in 2010. 
 
------------------------ 
...OR DESIGNATE AN HEIR? 
------------------------ 
 
8.  (SBU) Both commentators agreed, without debate, that the PT has 
"nobody" to run as Lula's successor.  They quickly ticked off the 
weaknesses of various "petistas" whose names have been mentioned. 
This led them to consider, as Lula is reportedly doing, possible 
candidates from other parties in the governing coalition.  Guilhon 
mentioned federal deputy Ciro Gomes of the Brazilian Socialist Party 
(PSB), who finished third with about 11% of the vote in 1998 and 
fourth with about 12% in 2002 and went on to serve as Minister of 
National Integration in Lula's first term.  Lula is known to think 
highly of him, and he might be able to win a lot of votes in the 
 
SAO PAULO 00000834  003 OF 004 
 
 
populous northeast.  When the PT in early September issued a 
resolution at its National Congress calling for a PT candidacy (ref 
B), a bloc of left and center-left parties in the governing 
coalition - the Communist Party of Brazil (PC do B), the PSB, the 
Democratic Labor Party (PDT), and several smaller configurations - 
organized themselves into a "Left Bloc" with a view to putting Gomes 
forward as an alternative candidate. 
 
9.  (SBU) Lamounier agreed that Gomes might run but predicted he 
would be "christianized".  This is a term of art named after 
Christiano Machado, nominated for president in 1951 by the Social 
Democratic Party (PSD) but subsequently abandoned when his party 
decided to throw its support to former dictator Getulio Vargas of 
the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB).  Likewise, in 1989 the Liberal 
Front Party (PFL) and the PMDB nominated candidates but then 
"christianized" them and supported Fernando Collor de Mello. 
Lamounier thinks Lula may support a Gomes candidacy but then abandon 
him to support the PSDB's Aecio Neves (who may or may not switch 
parties) or somebody from the PMDB, which despite being Brazil's 
largest party has not run a presidential candidate since 1994. 
 
----------------------- 
REFORM REMAINS UNLIKELY 
----------------------- 
 
10.  (SBU) Neither Lamounier nor Guilhon expected much to come of 
the PT's proposal to create a Constituent Assembly with limited 
authority to design and enact political reform.  They agreed that 
the system needs to be reformed, citing the proportional vote in 
legislative elections as a major weakness that isolates 
office-holders from the voters and renders them unaccountable. 
Lamounier expressed support for a direct representation bill 
creating Congressional districts, such as the one proposed by 
federal deputy Arnaldo Madeira (PSDB-SP) (ref C), but was not 
optimistic about its chances.  While everyone agrees the current 
system encourages and rewards corruption and fecklessness, it is so 
beneficial to the office-holders that they would never approve a 
fundamental reform with teeth. 
 
----------------- 
ECONOMIC CONCERNS 
----------------- 
 
11.  (SBU) The two experts' concern over the health of the political 
system extends to the economic realm as well.  They see government 
expenditures increasing rapidly due to social programs such as 
"Bolsa Familia," of which they were both critical.  When the program 
was introduced by Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC), Guilhon said, 
recipients had to meet conditions to qualify, such as keeping their 
children in schools and vaccinating them.  Under Lula, it has grown 
so large and inclusive (between 45 and 50 million beneficiaries) 
that even if the requirements were still on the books, the 
government would be unable to enforce them.  In effect, he opined, 
the program has become a cash giveaway.  Lamounier believes the 
government's lack of fiscal discipline will lead to a crisis within 
the next ten years and speculates that this is the reason Lula 
doesn't really want a third term. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
12.  (SBU) Though the PT was founded in Sao Paulo and still has 
support among the working class, the business community and large 
portions of the academic community favor the PSDB.  Many of these 
 
SAO PAULO 00000834  004 OF 004 
 
 
"tucanos", as members of the PSDB are called, are frustrated with 
their party's failure to articulate a credible alternative to the 
Lula administration, and the statements from these political 
commentators are in line with this sentiment.  While a third 
consecutive Lula Presidency is unlikely, and the PT appears to have 
few viable candidates, the PSDB is similarly in disarray. 
 
13. (SBU) The gloomy assessment presented by these two analysts 
reflects a growing consensus among the political, media, and 
business elite in Brazil-as evidenced, for example, by the creation 
of the "Cansei" movement (ref D).  Until recently, the general 
sentiment among the elite has largely been one of relief that Lula 
maintained orthodox economic policies and has been willing to work 
within the political system.  Now, many are focusing on the future. 
More aware than most Brazilians of the pace at which the world is 
changing, the elite are beginning to realize that the political and 
economic systems that worked well for them prior to globalization 
may well become a serious impediment to economic growth and 
political modernization.  At this point, however, the growing sense 
of malaise among the elite has not coalesced in any clear call for 
reform.  Nor is it clear that the broader Brazilian population, 
content with economic stability, appeased by government handouts, 
and dismissive of corruption, sees any need for it.  End Comment. 
 
 
14.  (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Brasilia. 
 
WHITE