VZCZCXRO5447
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0784/01 2830852
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 100852Z OCT 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5771
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000784 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG AND AF S/E NATSIOS 
PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF CD SU
SUBJECT: SUDAN REBELS IN CHAD REPORT JEM SPLIT 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: JEM representatives informed Emboffs that a 
split has taken place within the movement, pitting Chairman 
Khalil Ibrahim on one side against his former Vice-Chair 
Bahar and field Commander Banda on the other. JEM "Chief 
Negotiator" Ahmed Tugod Lissan accused JEM/Bahar of 
perpetrating the massacre of AMIS forces in Haskanita in 
complicity with the GOS and Mini Minawi. End Summary. 
 
BANDA/BAHAR FACTION SPLITS OFF 
 
2 (SBU) In a meeting with the Charge and PolOff on October 4, 
JEM representative in N'Djamena  Tajaddin Niam said that a 
serious of actions by JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim had resulted 
in the creation of a new JEM wing.  According to Niam, 
Ibrahim had sacked JEM leaders and commanders who did not 
agree with him.  He had tried to extend the Darfur conflict 
into Kordofan. By calling for a separate Darfur region 
(September 18 BBC interview), he refused to abide by the 
principles of the JEM manifesto.  His actions showed that he 
was not serious about the Tripoli talks but intended rather 
to doom the talks before they started. This had produced a 
split between JEM units loyal to Khalil Ibrahim and units 
loyal to former Vice-Chair Bahar Idriss Abugarda (among which 
Niam counted himself). 
 
¶3. (U)  Tajaddin stated that JEM was ready to issue a 
communiqu to international actors formally announcing the 
split and naminQhe new JEM "collective leadership." (Note: 
Post received a note on October 5 documenting the grievances 
against Khalil Ibrahim and announcing that the JEM would be 
under the leadership of Bahar Idriss Abugarda with a 15 
person committee.  General Abdalla Banda Abaker will lead as 
commander in chief of JEM forces.  End Note.) Tajaddin said 
Bahar Idriss Abugarda supported the talks in Tripoli and 
planned to attend as the leader of the JEM. He said that 
there is a role for Khalil Ibrahim in the JEM organization 
provided that "he express a willingness to compromise"; 
Tajaddin added that he would not be surprised if the Tripoli 
talks failed if Khalil decided to attend as leader of the JEM. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Tajaddin also expressed concern over the "capture" 
of three JEM commanders by Khalil, including the intelligence 
chief of the JEM, in Darfur.  (Note: The three commanders are 
Mohammed Saleh Mongo, Abdel-Aziz Suliman Ori and Omer Bakeit 
Abaker. End Note) Tajaddin stated that they are working with 
the international community, including ICRC and UN offices, 
to have them returned. 
 
KHALIL LOYALIST ACCUSES JEM SPLINTER OF SELLING OUT TO SUDAN 
 
¶5. (SBU) JEM Chief negotiator Ahmed Tugod Lissan met with 
Charge on October 8 to present his version of the JEM split. 
He claimed that Bahar -- former Vice-President in charge of 
the Darfur region -- had been in the field too long.  There 
had been complaints from other commanders who asked for the 
dismissal of Bahar and Field Commander Banda.  A committee 
had been formed to examine the charges, which included 
misallocation of finance and unexplained losses of vehicles 
and weapons.  The investigation concluded that Banda and 
Bahar had made serious mistakes.  The entire JEM Executive 
Body (save Tajadine Niam) agreed that Banda should be sacked. 
 Bahar - who had been with Lissan in Tripoli and Arusha -- 
subsequently informed the movement that he was cutting all 
ties with Khalil Ibrahim. It became apparent that Bahar had 
been recruiting in the field with a view to forming a new JEM 
wing. Accordingly Bahar was also sacked. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Lissan claimed that Bahar and SLA/Unity were 
responsible for the attack on Haskanita.  (CDA asked if Bahar 
had photographic evidence.  Lissan said that he did not, but 
that he had informants.) Lissan stated that Bahar was 
desperate for recognition, and the attack was intended to let 
the international community and the mediation team know that 
he had the numbers on the ground and needed to be included in 
the peace talks. (In fact, according to Lissan, Bahar has 
only five cars.) Lissan added that the subsequent razing of 
the town was carried out by Sudanese armed forces. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Queried as to Bahar's motivation for carrying out 
the attack, Lissan claimed Bahar had essentially sold out to 
the Sudanese.  He had promised them that he would sign the 
DPA, unseat Khalil and take his vehicles.  He had linked up 
with Mini Minawi for support.  Mini had provided transport at 
the Chad border for a meeting with the GOS Intelligence Chief 
Saleh Gosh, the Minister of Defense Abdel Rahim Mohammed and 
Darfur Negotiator Nafi Ali Nafi. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Lissan characterizedQad's current relationship 
with the JEM as "very good."  He said that President Deby had 
 
NDJAMENA 00000784  002 OF 002 
 
 
met with JEM a few weeks ago, and had specifically cautioned 
Bahar against any split, saying that he would not support any 
effort to undermine the peace process. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Lissan reiterated that the path to peace lay with 
working with the core Abuja negotiators.  He was concerned 
that Special Envoy Natsios wanted to see all of the movements 
in Tripoli.  To invite all of them (some thirty by his 
calculation) would doom the talks.  Factions that had been 
fighting in the field would refuse to sit down with groups 
that had no credibility.  The core group of Abd al-Wahid, JEM 
(Khalil), SLA Abd al-Shafi, Khamis Abdulla and SLA/Unity were 
the key players.  Lissan said he had also warned the Libyans 
that the negotiation would be a failure if the key groups did 
not have a chance to sit down and come up with one vision and 
one negotiating team. 
TAMLYN