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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 NAIROBI 004202 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS USTR - BILL JACKSON AND JONATHAN MCHALE 
STATE FOR AF/E, AF/EPS AND EB/CIP 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: ECON ECPS EFIN KE
SUBJECT: KENYA'S BIG PUSH FOR ICT REFORM AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
REF: A. NAIROBI 3262, B. NAIROBI 1770, C. NAIROBI 565 
 
NAIROBI 00004202  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
Sensitive-but-unclassified.  This cable contains business 
proprietary information and is not for release outside USG 
channels. 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: With elections looming in December, Kenya's 
private sector and reform-minded government officials are racing to 
either complete or put in motion a series of intertwined reforms and 
infrastructure projects aimed at generating growth across the entire 
economy through greater competition, lower costs, and greater 
investment in the cross-cutting sector known as information and 
communication technologies (ICT).  If all of the reform and 
infrastructure initiatives now in play converge in the coming 
months, they could set the stage for stronger sustained economic 
growth throughout Kenya and the region for years to come.  Among the 
highlights: 
 
-- The privatization (and revitalization) of Telkom Kenya, the 
country's monopoly fixed line phone company. Likely buyer: A 
consortium led by France Telecom. (Paras 3-4). 
 
-- The sale to the public of 25% of Safaricom, the country's (and 
the region's) largest and most profitable mobile phone company. 
(Paras 5-7). 
 
-- The issuance of Kenya's first 3G mobile license, worth a cool $25 
million.  (Para 8). 
 
-- Greater competition in the mobile market with the licensing of a 
third mobile service provider and a new "fixed wireless" service 
using CDMA technology. (Paras 9-11). 
 
-- Significant progress towards achieving the holy grail of fiber 
optic connectivity with the rest of the world.  One or two submarine 
fiber optic cables, one led by Kenya, and one by a U.S. venture 
capital firm, should be "lit up" and in business by mid-2009. 
(Paras 14-18). 
 
-- Significant progress towards a terrestrial fiber network in Kenya 
that will go to the borders of all its neighbors. This, together 
with the submarine cables, should provide affordable, high-speed 
global connectivity to the entire EAC region.  (Paras 19-20). 
 
End summary. 
 
¶2.  (U) This cable is an update on activities and developments in 
Kenya's critical ICT sector.  It is based on a wide range of sources 
and information gathered in recent weeks, including from meetings on 
October 18 between Emboffs, a visiting U.S. International Trade 
Commission analyst, and several key players in Kenya's ICT sector. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
The End Game: Privatizing Telkom Kenya 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) After years of struggle and self-imposed setbacks, Kenya 
is finally on the verge of privatizing its lumbering, loss-making 
monopoly fixed line phone company, Telkom Kenya.  With advice from 
the World Bank Group's International Finance Corporation (IFC) and 
$80 million from the World Bank itself, Telkom has peacefully shed 
over 10,000 jobs in the past 12 months, and is scheduled for a final 
tranche of job cuts in November that will bring its payroll to just 
over 3,000.  The estimated savings from these job cuts will total 
over KSh 4 billion (over $60 million) per year, freeing up capital 
badly needed to upgrade both Telkom's fixed network, and expand its 
more recently established "fixed" mobile network (see para 11 
below). 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
French, Indians, Brits, Libyans in Hunt to Buy Telkom 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Telkom is restructuring its balance sheet to reduce the 
KSh 50 billion ($760 million) in debt and tax liabilities it now 
carries on its books using the proceeds of the upcoming sale of 
Safaricom, the mobile company in which it holds a 60% share (para 
5).  The company's privatization plan calls for the sale of 51% of 
the company to a strategic investor, with the winner to be announced 
on November 26.  Details at this stage are sketchy, but according to 
Telkom CEO Sammy Kirui on October 18, there are six consortia 
 
NAIROBI 00004202  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
currently bidding for the purchase.  These include three Indian-led 
groups: Reliance, MTNL, and Bharti.  Another group brings together 
British Telecom and a Libyan entity we believe is called LAP - the 
Libya Africa project.  France Telecom and Agility of Kuwait may form 
a fifth group, and Telkom South Africa leads a sixth.  Bitange 
Ndemo, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Information and 
Communication, told Econ/C October 23 that the France 
Telecom/Agility consortia is the most aggressive thus far in bidding 
for Telkom. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
To Privatize Telkom, You Have to Spin Off Safaricom 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Job cuts aside, the most challenging aspect of the Telkom 
Kenya privatization has stemmed from the company's ownership, on 
behalf of the GOK, of 60% of Safaricom, Kenya's first and largest 
mobile phone service provider (see below).  In an anomaly that is 
galling to Safaricom's management and foreign owners, Telkom is 
already offering its own mobile services in direct competition with 
Safaricom and with the country's second mobile provider, Celtel 
(more on this below in paras 11-13). 
 
---------------------------------- 
Why the Safaricom IPO is Important 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) To resolve this glaring conflict of interest, the GOK is 
moving to unbundle the two companies through what will be the 
largest (by far) initial public offering (IPO) in the history of the 
Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE).  The GOK plan calls for Telkom's 60% 
ownership in Safaricom to be transferred to the Ministry of Finance 
in the coming days so that the privatization can proceed.  Then, 
either late this year or early next, 25% of Safaricom's shares will 
be sold to the public on the NSE.  The GOK will retain the balance 
of shares, but will place a portion of these in a special purpose 
vehicle designed to allow Safaricom's 40% owner, Vodaphone Kenya 
(which is a subsidiary of Vodaphone UK), to buy additional shares in 
the future and ultimately achieve 51% or more ownership of Safaricom 
-- should it so choose.  Recent press reports, however, indicate 
Vodaphone may forgo a majority stake in Safaricom if the GOK cedes 
its right as the current majority shareholder to appoint the 
company's CEO. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Meanwhile, the IPO, if successful, will represent a triple 
play for Kenya.  Ministry PermSec Ndemo believes the IPO will raise 
around $2 billion. This will provide direct one-time support of $530 
million to plug the GOK's budget deficit.  It will also allow the 
GOK to pay down Telkom Kenya's debt and tax liabilities and pay for 
a new mobile license (see para 13), all in preparation for its 
privatization.  In addition to unlocking the Telkom privatization in 
this way, the Safaricom IPO is also important because it is likely 
to play a major role in the ongoing cultural shift in Kenya away 
from traditional assets like land and cattle to more modern 
financial instruments like stocks and bonds. 
 
-------------------------- 
Mobile Market Also on Fire 
-------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) As in many other African markets, the growth of mobile 
telephony in Kenya continues to astound.  In 2000, industry pundits 
estimated that the country would have 400,000 users within five 
years, but Kenya now has 8.1 million after seven.  Safaricom CEO 
Michael Joseph, whose company's pre-tax profits in 2006 equaled 1.6% 
of Kenyan GDP, said on October 18 that Safaricom is enjoying 50% 
revenue growth per year.  The Safaricom and Celtel networks 
currently cover 30% of Kenya's land area and 75-80% of the 
population.  With a penetration rate of only 25%, however, the 
market looks set to continue its rapid growth over the next 5-10 
years.  A telling example: Safaricom on October 18 paid $25 million 
to the industry regulator, the Communications Commission of Kenya 
(CCK), for a Third Generation, or 3G, mobile license.  CEO Michael 
Joseph said the company needs 3G spectrum to keep up with demand for 
high-speed data services from corporates, and because Kenya is 
running out of room on the 2G radio spectrum. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Econet Finally Gets 3rd Mobile License 
-------------------------------------- 
 
 
NAIROBI 00004202  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
¶9.  (SBU) But the current mobile market, dominated by Safaricom and 
Celtel, has come to resemble just that - a duopoly, resulting in a 
less-than-fully competitive market. It was thus good news in August 
when Econet Wireless, a South Africa-based mobile phone operator, 
was finally allowed to exercise its rights under a much-coveted 
third mobile license, which it had won in a tender three years 
earlier in September 2004.  It had been blocked from rolling out its 
network by then-Minister of Information and Communications (and 
current Foreign Minister) Raphael Tuju.  Tuju attempted to revoke 
the license, citing unexplained irregularities in the tender 
process.  Econet fought Tuju and the Communications Commission of 
Kenya (CCK) in court, and won, but was still prevented by the CCK 
from rolling out its network because it had not paid fully for the 
license fee after a falling out with its local partner. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) In July, Econet, the Ministry, and CCK reached two 
interlocking agreements in which Econet agreed to drop several 
pending lawsuits against Tuju and the GOK in exchange for the 
Ministry declaring Econet's license to be "in good standing."  CCK 
in turn agreed to provide Econet with the network codes and 
frequencies required for roll-out as soon as Econet satisfied the 
requirement for 30% local Kenyan ownership, and paid the $12 million 
it still owed on the license fee.  CCK Director-General John Waweru 
confirmed on October 18 that Econet has met these requirements.  As 
such, Econet expects to begin service roll-out by March 2008 after 
an initial investment in infrastructure totaling $100 million. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
More Competition: Telkom Kenya Enters Mobile Fray... 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) As noted above, Telkom Kenya, although ostensibly a fixed 
line service provider, is also in practice the other new player in 
Kenya's mobile market.  In September, it officially rolled out a 
"fixed wireless" service following a year-long trial period.  The 
service, which is based on Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) 
technology, came to Telkom as a gift from the Chinese government in 
the form of a KSh20 million ($300,000) concessional credit to Kenya 
in 2006, ostensibly to fund a CDMA network that would reach 
under-served rural areas with nominally fixed services.  In 
September 2006, Telkom and Chinese firm Huawei signed a contract to 
construct a CDMA 2000 access network and microwave backbone, and to 
provide thousands of free CDMA handsets (which Kenyan middlemen 
promptly bought up, marked up, and sold).  Since last year when the 
trial began, Telkom has aggressively rolled out the service in urban 
areas, competing head-to-head with Safaricom and Celtel.  It already 
claims 150,000 subscribers, and predicts it will have a million 
customers by the end of the year.  Indeed, having failed through the 
years to expand its legacy fixed line network, Telkom is banking on 
"Telkom Wireless" to make it commercially relevant after its 
privatization. 
 
------------------ 
...But Is It Fair? 
------------------ 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Safaricom and Celtel point out that Telkom Wireless 
amounts to a gift from the GOK to Telkom to make the latter more 
attractive to a prospective buyer - and at their expense in terms of 
competitive fairness.  They argue that the CDMA network was 
originally cast as a GOK development project to provide fixed 
services to remote rural communities, but has now morphed into a 
full-scale commercial mobile service.  Further, they rightly point 
out that Telkom Kenya is not properly licensed for mobile services, 
did not pay for a mobile license, and gets an additional edge over 
Safaricom and Celtel by not having to pay the 10% excise duty on 
mobile airtime that they do. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Telkom to Get Mobile License for $55 Million 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) In response to these criticisms, the CCK on September 28 
published a notice of its intention to issue a mobile license to 
Telkom Kenya.  In separate meetings on October 18, CCK Director 
General John Waweru and Telkom Kenya CEO Sammy Kirui both insisted 
that Telkom Kenya would pay for the license at a price of $55 
million, equivalent to the price paid by Safaricom in 2000.  Despite 
this pledge, industry players remain suspicious of GOK and CCK 
intentions, believing the latter will continue to tilt the 
competitive playing field in favor of Telkom Kenya.  These fears are 
 
NAIROBI 00004202  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
fueled by persistent rumors that two major GOK-initiated 
infrastructure projects, an undersea fiber optic cable and a new 
terrestrial fiber network (paras 14-18 below), will be handed over 
to Telkom Kenya for management once they are completed.  This would 
give Telkom effective control over vital infrastructure that all 
companies, including its rivals, will need to survive and grow. 
 
------------------------------- 
The Desperate Need for Fiber... 
------------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU) As noted reftels, Africa's East Coast is the last 
remaining major landmass in the world without fiber optic 
connectivity to the rest of the world.  As such, all data and voice 
traffic in and out of the region must utilize satellite technology, 
which is both expensive and inappropriate for certain types of ICT 
applications.  The growth of the ICT sector in Kenya, and with it 
the entire economy, has lagged as a result.  Kenya's fledgling call 
center industry, for example, is currently paying $3,000 per 
megabyte per month vs. the global norm of $300-600 in competing 
markets such as India's.  Moreover, satellite bandwidth is 
increasingly scarce at any price.  According to Safaricom CEO 
Michael Joseph on October 18, Kenya will run out of satellite 
capacity in July 2008, forcing companies to pay higher costs for 
increasingly lower quality satellite bandwidth.  Safaricom - indeed 
the entire region - is desperate for affordable fiber connectivity. 
 
------------------- 
...Under the Sea... 
------------------- 
 
¶15.  (SBU) A number of projects are underway to deal with this 
critical infrastructure bottleneck.  Reftels report extensively on 
three different competing initiatives to construct a submarine fiber 
optic cable for the East Coast of Africa.  Of the three, the two 
front runners continue to be the Kenya-UAE TEAMS project, which will 
connect Mombasa with Fujaira in the UAE, and the larger SEACOM 
project, which will run along the entire coastline from South Africa 
to the Red Sea.  It is led by a subsidiary of American venture 
equity giant, the Blackstone Group. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) On October 11, TEAMS took a step closer to fruition when 
the GOK announced that French firm Alcatel had won the $82 million 
contract for system construction.  In winning the tender, Alcatel 
edged out U.S. firm Tyco, which was unable to match its rival on 
either price or completion date, despite aggressive advocacy by the 
U.S. Mission in Kenya with both the company and the Ministry f 
Information and Communications.  Alcatel has promised to complete 
the TEAMS cable by June 2009, but many suspect this date will slip. 
The CEOs of both Safaricom and Telkom Kenya complained on October 18 
that the financing for the project has not yet been secured.  They 
and other operators in Kenya and the region are being invited to 
make $5 million equity commitments to TEAMS by the end of November, 
but have yet to see a business plan for the project. 
 
¶17.  (SBU) SEACOM, meanwhile, also appears on track for completion 
by mid-2009, despite a great deal of uncertainty generated in 
September when South African Communications Minister Ivy 
Matsepe-Casaburri and other telecom officials stated publicly that 
the country would not allow non-South African-owned cables to land 
there.  While these threats appear to have died down, the South 
African Government is the driving force behind a grandiose, almost 
utopian plan under the New Partnership for Africa's Development 
(NEPAD) to develop a continental terrestrial broadband network 
linked to several new submarine cables, all of which would be 
licensed by NEPAD (vs. national governments) and supervised by a new 
supranational regulator.  The plan is outlined in the "Policy and 
Regulatory Framework Protocol for NEPAD ICT Broadband Infrastructure 
Network," completed in Kigali in August 2006.  But only a handful of 
African countries have signed it.  Kenya has not, and CCK 
Director-General Waweru said on October 18 that Kenya fundamentally 
disagrees with the approach being taken by the NEPAD protocol. 
 
¶18.  (SBU) In any event, in the teeth of these developments, SEACOM 
is proceeding with system construction, having already secured 
financing for the $300 million project and locked in a construction 
contract with U.S. fiber maker Tyco.  In South Africa, it is 
partnered with Neotel, through whose license it will land near 
Durban.  In Kenya, SEACOM is on the verge of having its landing 
rights in Mombasa approved by CCK. 
 
 
NAIROBI 00004202  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
-------------- 
...and on Land 
-------------- 
 
¶19.  (SBU) On land, at least two privately operated fiber networks 
already link a handful of major cities in Kenya. Electricity 
distributor Kenya Power and Lighting is also laying fiber optic 
cable on its poles and plans to offer bandwidth services. 
Additionally, Telkom Kenya completed a 310 mile fiber cable linking 
Mombasa to Nairobi in July 2006, and the company is just now 
completing the project's second phase - a cable linking Nairobi to 
the Ugandan border at Malaba.  To complement this, the GOK in 
February announced an ambitious plan to build a $50 million national 
fiber network linking all of the country's major towns and cities. 
To manage the network, it formed a special purpose vehicle, the 
Fiber Optic National Network (FONN), owned by the Kenyan Ministry of 
Finance.  In June, the GOK awarded the tender to construct FONN to 
three different companies, Sagem of France and Huawai and ZTE of 
China.  Three companies were chosen instead of one in order to 
finish the project more quickly, perhaps in as few as 6-7 months. 
 
------------------------- 
The Regional Implications 
------------------------- 
 
¶20.  (SBU) Telkom Kenya's and private sector fiber already connects 
Nairobi to the Ugandan border.  On top of this, the terrestrial FONN 
project will extend to Busia, also on the Ugandan border; Moyale on 
the Ethiopian border; Lokichogio near the border with Southern 
Sudan; and Namanga and Mabayani on the Tanzanian border.  To further 
regionalize the effort, Kenya has offered equity ownership in TEAMS 
to telecom operators in the four other EAC countries, as noted in 
para 16 above.  However, PermSec Ndemo told Econ/C October 23 that 
operators and governments in the four other EAC countries are 
"dragging their feet," and have been unwilling to commit to TEAMS 
for fear of irritating the South African government, which continues 
to push the grandiose NEPAD network initiative.  Ndemo, a former 
U.S.-based business executive, sees the NEPAD plan as hopelessly 
unrealistic and many years away from realization.  He said EAC 
country operators have until the end of November to commit to TEAMS. 
 If they don't, they'll have to buy capacity from TEAMS at higher 
rates than they'd enjoy as owners.  His view: NEPAD is a pipedream, 
TEAMS is coming soon, and EAC operators should get on board now 
before the train leaves the station. 
 
-------------------------- 
Comment: Kenya in the Lead 
-------------------------- 
 
¶21.  (SBU) In any event, once both FONN is complete and either TEAMS 
and/or SEACOM land in Mombasa, a regional fiber network will be in 
place.  Thereafter, and assuming a reasonable regulatory 
environment, the entire EAC region should benefit from affordable 
high-speed connectivity with itself, and with the rest of the world. 
 As such, the importance of current ICT activities, policies, and 
trends in Kenya cannot be overstated.  Whether its neighbors agree 
or not, Kenya in our view rightly sees itself as a leader in this 
regard.  While its own regulatory environment still needs 
improvement, its policymakers have taken a great deal of political 
and economic risk over the past two years to get Kenya and the rest 
of region connected as quickly as possible to the rest of an 
increasingly "flat" and competitive global economy. 
Slutz